Delhi High Court Backs CCPD Concerns on SBI Promotion Policy, Orders Fresh Consideration of Barriers Faced by Blind Officers

Published by: Disability Rights India (DRI)

Category: Employment Rights | Banking Sector | Reasonable Accommodation

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia
Case No.: W.P.(C) 6027/2025
Case Title: Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association v. State Bank of India & Others
Date of Judgment: 29 May 2026

Background

More than three years after the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) found SBI's promotion policy discriminatory towards blind employees, the Delhi High Court has directed the State Bank of India to formally revisit the issue and examine solutions to prevent career stagnation of officers with visual disabilities.

The litigation was initiated by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA), challenging SBI's promotion policy that requires officers aspiring for promotion to Senior Management Grades (Scale IV and V) to first serve as Branch Managers or in Credit, Trade Finance or Forex assignments.

The Association argued that these assignments involve functions that are presently inaccessible to blind officers because of the absence of assistive technology, inaccessible documentation systems, physical inspection requirements and unresolved questions of legal liability.

A Battle That Started Before the CCPD

This litigation did not emerge overnight.

The controversy traces its origins to proceedings initiated before the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) in 2022 by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA). The complaint challenged SBI's promotion policy on the ground that mandatory Branch Manager and Credit-related assignments effectively excluded blind officers from promotional opportunities because the duties associated with those roles were not accessible under existing systems and technologies.

After examining the issue, the CCPD accepted the core concerns raised by VIBEWA and held that the promotion criteria had the effect of disadvantaging visually impaired employees. The CCPD recommended that SBI modify its promotion policy, provide reasonable accommodation, recognise alternative assignments performed by blind officers and review exclusionary provisions that impeded career progression.

SBI, however, declined to implement the recommendations, resulting in the dispute eventually reaching the Delhi High Court.

Significantly, while the High Court stopped short of striking down the promotion policy, it accepted the legitimacy of the concerns underlying the CCPD proceedings. The Court noted that seemingly neutral promotion criteria can operate in a discriminatory manner against persons with disabilities and directed SBI's Board of Directors to reconsider the issue after examining detailed proposals to be submitted by VIBEWA.

Thus, nearly three-and-a-half years after the CCPD's intervention, the concerns first raised before the disability rights watchdog have now received judicial recognition from the Delhi High Court.

The Real Issue: Equal Criteria or Equal Opportunity?

The case raises a recurring question in disability rights jurisprudence: Does treating everyone identically always amount to equality?

SBI argued that the same promotion criteria apply to all officers and that several visually impaired officers are already performing the mandatory assignments.

VIBEWA, however, contended that equality cannot mean forcing blind officers to satisfy requirements that are designed around visual functions.

The Association pointed out that Branch Managers and Credit Officers are required to:

• Verify original title deeds and signatures;
• Conduct physical inspections of business premises and collateral properties;
• Monitor CCTV footage and strong rooms;
• Verify stocks and securities;
• Certify regulatory compliance carrying personal liability.

In the absence of accessible systems and clear accountability mechanisms, blind officers face barriers that their sighted counterparts do not. The result is not merely inconvenience—it is exclusion from promotion itself.

High Court Recognises the Principle of Indirect Discrimination

While the Court did not strike down SBI's policy, it accepted an important legal principle.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Leesamma Joseph and In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court recognised that a seemingly neutral rule can still operate in a discriminatory manner if it disproportionately disadvantages persons with disabilities.

The Court observed:

"Any provision that creates an impediment to the promotion of visually impaired officers would run contrary to the provisions of the RPwD Act."

This observation is significant because it shifts the focus from formal equality to substantive equality—the cornerstone of modern disability rights law.

Why the Court Did Not Strike Down the Policy

The Court ultimately refrained from invalidating the promotion criteria because it found that the Association had not placed before it sufficient details regarding specific officers adversely affected by the policy or concrete proposals capable of addressing SBI's operational concerns.

However, instead of rejecting the claim, the Court adopted a solution-oriented approach.

It directed VIBEWA to submit a comprehensive representation identifying affected officers, detailing the barriers they face, and proposing alternative pathways, accommodations and best practices adopted by other public sector banks. SBI's Board of Directors has been directed to examine these proposals and consider implementing feasible measures consistent with the RPwD Act.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment is important for reasons extending far beyond SBI.

First, it represents judicial recognition that career stagnation can itself amount to disability discrimination.

Second, it reinforces the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence that indirect discrimination is as harmful as explicit exclusion.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, it breathes fresh life into the CCPD's 2022 findings, which SBI had effectively ignored for over three years.

The Court has not given SBI a clean chit. Instead, it has required the country's largest public sector bank to engage with the concerns raised by blind employees, revisit the CCPD's recommendations, and seriously examine whether alternative pathways and reasonable accommodations can be devised.

For thousands of employees with disabilities working in the banking sector, the judgment sends a clear message: promotion policies cannot be insulated from scrutiny merely because they are framed in neutral language. If a rule creates barriers that prevent persons with disabilities from progressing in their careers, institutions must justify those barriers and actively seek solutions.

The next chapter of this battle will now unfold before SBI's Board of Directors.

Editor's Disclosure: The author of this blog post, Advocate Subhash Chandra Vashishth, represented the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA) in the proceedings before the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities that culminated in the CCPD's recommendations discussed in this article. The CCPD recommendations were covered in our blog post titled "Court of CCPD holds the SBI's Promotion Policy to grades of SMGS IV and SMGS V (2022-23) as discriminatory to employees with visual disabilities, recommends review" dated 01 Dec 2022.

Read the High Court Judgement  in VIBEWA Vs. SBI & Others

Supreme Court Clarifies RPwD Act: Persons Forcibly Made to Ingest Acid Also Entitled to Recognition as Acid Attack Victims [Judgement included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1112 of 2025

Case Title: Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

Date of Order: 04 May 2026

In an important and expansive interpretation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”), the Supreme Court has ruled that persons who are forcibly made to ingest acid must also be treated as “acid attack victims” under the law, even if they do not suffer visible external disfigurement.

The order significantly broadens the protection available to survivors of acid violence by recognizing that acid attacks are not confined to incidents involving acid being thrown on a victim’s body. The Court also clarified that persons suffering internal injuries caused by acid ingestion are equally entitled to the protections and statutory benefits available under the RPwD Act.

Background

The matter arose in ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the rights, rehabilitation, and protection of acid attack survivors. During the hearing, senior advocate and Amicus Curiae Mukul Rohatgi pointed out a significant gap in the statutory framework.

Under the Schedule to the RPwD Act, “acid attack victims” are recognized as persons with specified disabilities. However, the definition referred to persons disfigured due to violent assaults involving the “throwing of acid or similar corrosive substances.” This wording unintentionally excluded victims who were forced to ingest acid or suffered internal injuries without visible external disfigurement.

The Court noted that both Section 326B of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code and Section 124(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 expressly recognize not only the throwing of acid but also the administration of acid by other means as a criminal offence.

Supreme Court’s Observations

The Bench observed that the present wording of the RPwD Act created an artificial distinction between categories of acid attack survivors. The Court specifically noted:

“A plain reading of the above indicates that victims to whom acid has been administered are not encompassed within the expression ‘acid attack victims’.”

The Court further acknowledged that the law’s current emphasis on “disfigurement” improperly restricted the scope of protection:

“Further, the use of the term ‘disfigured’ appears to confine the scope to external disfigurement of the body, thereby excluding cases involving internal injuries or scarring caused by the administration of acid.”

Recognizing the serious implications of such exclusion, the Court adopted a purposive and rights-oriented interpretation of the RPwD Act.

Key Directions Issued by the Court

Pending a formal amendment to the Schedule of the RPwD Act, the Supreme Court directed that:

“for all intents and purposes, and in order to give full effect to the legislative scheme underlying the 2016 Act, the expression ‘acid attack victims’ shall be construed to include victims to whom acid has been administered.”

The Court went further and clarified that the protection would also extend to survivors suffering internal injuries:

“It shall further include those who have suffered internal injuries, irrespective of whether there is any external disfigurement of the body.”

Importantly, the Bench declared that this interpretation would operate retrospectively from the inception of the RPwD Act:

“This clarificatory interpretation shall be deemed to have been incorporated at Serial No. 1A(e) of the Schedule from the inception of the 2016 Act.”

The Court also recorded the submission of the Solicitor General that the concerned Ministry had already initiated steps to formally amend the Schedule to the Act.

Significance of the Judgment

This order is a major step toward a more inclusive and realistic understanding of acid violence under Indian disability law. By recognizing survivors of forced acid ingestion and those with internal injuries, the Supreme Court has ensured that the RPwD Act is interpreted in line with its social welfare and human rights objectives.

The judgment also reinforces an important principle in disability jurisprudence: disability rights protections cannot be denied merely because an injury is not externally visible. Internal injuries, chronic pain, organ damage, and long-term medical consequences can be equally disabling and deserving of legal recognition and support.

The ruling is likely to have a substantial impact on access to disability certificates, reservations, rehabilitation schemes, healthcare benefits, compensation, and social protection measures available to acid attack survivors under the RPwD Act and allied welfare schemes.

At a broader level, the decision reflects the Supreme Court’s continuing move toward purposive interpretation of disability legislation so that statutory benefits are not defeated by narrow or technical readings of definitions. However, we still see that the definition "Acid Attack Victim" It doesn't yet cover the Thermal Burn victims due to throwing of kerosene or petrol or a similar material.

Read the Order/Judgement in Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

Madras HC Reinforces Voting Rights and Electoral Accessibility for Disabled Persons in Vaishnavi Jayakumar's petition against ECI

Court: Madras High Court
Bench: Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan
Case No.: W.P. No. 34815 of 2025
Case Title: Vaishnavi Jayakumar v. The Election Commission of India & Ors.
Date of Order: 30 April 2026

Background

In an important case concerning disability rights and democratic participation, the Madras High Court considered issues relating to accessibility of polling stations, election-related information, and digital electoral systems for persons with disabilities.

The petition was filed by our friend and sector colleague Ms. Vaishnavi Jayakumar seeking systemic reforms to ensure that elections are conducted in a manner consistent with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”), the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, and the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021.

The petitioner sought directions to the Election Commission of India and other authorities to:

• designate only fully accessible polling stations with all “Assured Minimum Facilities”;
• ensure permanent compliance of polling infrastructure with universal accessibility standards;
• publish complete polling booth data, including geo-coordinates and available accessibility facilities;
• make electoral documents available in accessible formats such as HTML and ePUB; and
• introduce accessible and multi-modal CAPTCHA systems on government websites.

The petition highlighted continuing barriers faced by persons with disabilities during elections despite repeated statutory mandates, judicial pronouncements, and Election Commission guidelines.

A major grievance raised before the Court was the continuing reliance upon temporary arrangements such as makeshift ramps during elections instead of permanent barrier-free infrastructure at polling stations.

The petitioner also pointed out that election-related websites and digital information systems frequently remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities, thereby preventing equal and independent participation in the electoral process.

The matter therefore raised broader constitutional questions concerning accessible democracy and equal political participation for persons with disabilities.

Key Observations of the Court

The Bench recognised accessibility in the electoral process as an essential constitutional and democratic requirement rather than a mere administrative formality.

The Court acknowledged that the RPwD Act imposes a positive obligation upon the Election Commission and State authorities to ensure that polling stations, electoral processes, and election-related information are fully accessible to persons with disabilities.

Importantly, the Court recognised that meaningful exercise of voting rights cannot exist where physical, informational, and digital barriers continue to prevent persons with disabilities from independently exercising their franchise.

The Bench took note of submissions highlighting that many polling stations continue to lack permanent accessibility infrastructure despite repeated judicial and statutory directions.

The Court observed that temporary arrangements introduced only during elections do not satisfy the standards of universal accessibility, dignity, and equal participation recognised under disability rights jurisprudence.

A particularly significant aspect of the proceedings lies in the Court’s recognition that accessibility extends beyond physical infrastructure and includes digital accessibility and accessible dissemination of information.

The Bench acknowledged the importance of ensuring that election-related information published on official websites is made available in formats accessible to persons with visual and other disabilities, including accessible HTML and ePUB formats.

The Court also recognised that inaccessible CAPTCHA systems and inaccessible government websites effectively function as digital barriers excluding persons with disabilities from accessing crucial electoral information and services.

Importantly, the proceedings highlighted the constitutional obligation of public authorities to move beyond symbolic inclusion toward genuine accessibility grounded in universal design principles.

During the hearing, the Election Commission of India informed the Court that directions had already been issued to State authorities to ensure accessibility measures, including permanent ramps and other facilities at polling booths. It was further assured that deficiencies noticed during recent elections would be examined and appropriately addressed.

Accessibility and Democratic Participation

One of the most important aspects emerging from the proceedings is the Court’s recognition that voting rights of persons with disabilities cannot be meaningfully exercised in the absence of accessible infrastructure and accessible information systems.

The case foregrounds the principle that democracy itself becomes exclusionary when public institutions fail to accommodate disabled citizens.

The proceedings therefore reinforce that:

• accessibility is integral to electoral justice;
• political participation forms part of substantive equality; and
• the right to vote necessarily includes the right to independently and dignifiedly access the electoral process.

The matter also reflects the evolving judicial understanding that digital accessibility forms an inseparable component of constitutional accessibility obligations in contemporary governance systems.

Commentary

The proceedings in Vaishnavi Jayakumar v. Election Commission of India & Ors. represent an important development in India’s evolving disability rights jurisprudence relating to political participation and accessible democracy.

Historically, persons with disabilities have faced multiple barriers in exercising their voting rights, including inaccessible polling booths, lack of assistive infrastructure, inaccessible transportation, inaccessible election materials, and digital exclusion.

One of the most transformative aspects of the case lies in its insistence upon permanent accessibility infrastructure instead of temporary election-time arrangements. This distinction is significant because temporary measures often perpetuate dependency, uncertainty, and indignity for disabled voters.

The proceedings also broaden the understanding of accessibility by recognising the central importance of digital accessibility within modern democratic participation.

In contemporary electoral systems, citizens increasingly depend upon online platforms for voter information, polling station details, candidate information, and election procedures. Inaccessible websites and inaccessible CAPTCHA systems therefore operate as structural barriers to democratic participation.

Another important aspect of the case is its emphasis on universal accessibility standards under the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021. By invoking these standards, the petition reinforces that accessibility is a measurable and enforceable legal obligation rather than a discretionary administrative choice.

The matter further contributes to the growing recognition that disability rights are inseparable from democratic rights and citizenship rights.

Importantly, the proceedings reaffirm that inclusion cannot be reduced to token compliance. Accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act require proactive institutional transformation grounded in dignity, autonomy, and equal participation.

At a broader constitutional level, the case reinforces that electoral participation for persons with disabilities must not depend upon charity, assistance, or temporary accommodations, but upon enforceable rights ensuring independent and equal participation within the democratic process.

The proceedings therefore represent a significant step toward strengthening the constitutional vision of an inclusive democracy where accessibility is treated not as an exception, but as an essential prerequisite for equal citizenship and meaningful participation in public life.

Read the Judgement

Disabled Employee Shifted to New Cadre cannot Claim Past Seniority: Bombay High Court Clarifies Scope of Section 47

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench
Bench: Justice M. W. Chandwani
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 6535 of 2024
Case Title: Rameshwar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 26 March 2026

In a significant ruling on the scope of service protections available to employees acquiring disability during service, the Bombay High Court has held that a disabled employee shifted to another post or cadre cannot claim seniority in the new cadre based on past service in the previous post. The bench ruled that while the law mandates the protection of pay and service benefits for those who acquire a disability during service, it does not grant them a "carried-forward" seniority that disrupts the existing hierarchy of their new cadre.

The Court clarified that while Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 safeguards continuity of employment, pay, and service benefits, it does not extend to disturbing the existing seniority structure of the cadre into which such an employee is absorbed.

Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Lab Technician in 2002. After acquiring low vision in 2010, he sought reassignment to a suitable post. Pursuant to earlier court directions, he was absorbed in 2016 as an Extension Officer (Panchayat) with the same pay scale and service benefits.

At the time of absorption, he was placed at the bottom of the seniority list in the new cadre. Several years later, when a seniority list for promotion was published excluding his name, the petitioner challenged this placement, arguing that his past service since 2002 should be counted for determining seniority and eligibility for promotion.

Key Legal Issue

Whether a government employee who acquires disability during service and is shifted to another cadre under Section 47 can claim seniority in the new cadre based on past service in the previous post.

Court’s Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 47 of the 1995 Act and emphasized that the provision operates in two distinct spheres:

1. Protection against discharge or reduction in rank:
   An employee acquiring disability cannot be removed or demoted and must be accommodated in a suitable post with the same pay scale and service benefits.

2. Protection against denial of promotion solely on the ground of disability:
   Promotion cannot be denied merely due to disability, but this does not override other eligibility conditions.

The Court made a crucial distinction between:

• Reduction in rank (which is prohibited), and
• Reduction in seniority (which pertains to inter se placement within a cadre and affects promotional prospects).

It held that maintaining pay and service benefits does not automatically entail carry-forward of seniority into a different cadre.

Seniority vs. Protection Under Disability Law

The Court observed that allowing a transferred employee to retain seniority from a previous cadre would:

• Disrupt the settled seniority of existing employees in the new cadre,
• Lead to inequity and potential discrimination against those already serving in that cadre, and
• Go beyond the legislative intent of Section 47.

It emphasized that the law aims to protect the disabled employee without prejudicing the rights of others.

“…in the process of shifting a disabled employee… seniority of the employees who are already in that cadre… cannot be disturbed.”

Findings on Facts

On the facts of the case, the Court noted:

• The petitioner himself sought transfer to the new post.
• He accepted the condition of being placed at the bottom of the seniority list at the time of appointment.
• He raised the issue of seniority only after several years, when promotion opportunities arose.
• He did not meet the minimum qualifying service requirement (7 years) in the new cadre at the relevant time.
• His non-promotion was not on account of disability, but due to lack of eligibility and seniority.

Distinguishing Precedents

The petitioner had cited following two cases to support his case to argue that Section 47 is mandatory.:

1. Kunal Singh vs. Union of India (2003) 

The Difference: In Kunal Singh, the employer actually discharged (fired) the employee after he acquired a disability.

The Court's View: The Bombay High Court noted that the issue in Kunal Singh was the termination of service without applying Section 47 protections. In Rameshwar’s case, the Zilla Parishad did not try to fire him or reduce his rank; they actually absorbed him into a new post as requested.

2. The Sahib Singh Case (Punjab and Haryana High Court)

The petitioner also relied on Sahib Singh Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd., where a court allowed an employee shifted to a new post to keep his original seniority.

The Bombay HC's Critique: Justice Chandwani observed that the Sahib Singh ruling relied on Kunal Singh, but in his view, it misconstrued that Supreme Court decision.

Binding Precedent: Most importantly, the Bombay High Court pointed to its own Division Bench decision in Shyamkumar Vs. Union of India (2023). This ruling states that denial of promotion doesn't violate the Act if the employee doesn't meet the recruitment rules of the new cadre. As a "Nagpur Bench" decision, Shyamkumar is legally binding on this court, whereas the Punjab and Haryana ruling is not.

Conclusion

Dismissing the writ petition, the Court held that:

• Past service in a previous post cannot be counted for determining seniority in a new cadre after transfer or absorption under Section 47.
• The statutory protection ensures continuity of employment and benefits, but does not confer a right to retrospective seniority in a different cadre.
• Promotion claims must be assessed based on applicable service rules and eligibility criteria, not merely on disability status.

Significance

This judgment provides important clarity on the limits of protection under disability law in public employment. While reinforcing that employees acquiring disability must be protected from loss of employment and pay, the Court has balanced this with the rights of other employees by preserving the integrity of cadre-based seniority systems.

For disability rights advocates, this judgment underscores the importance of the "same pay scale and service benefits" mandate while acknowledging the administrative realities of cadre-based seniority. It confirms that while the law provides a safety net to prevent a disabled worker from losing their livelihood or status, it does not allow for a "leapfrog" over colleagues who have spent years building seniority in a specific department. Thus it underscores that disability rights in employment are protective, not preferential, and must operate within the broader framework of service jurisprudence. 

However, the Punjab and Haryana High  court Judgement in Sahib Singh vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., still stands which highlighted a critical legal stance that employees cannot be penalized with loss of seniority or benefits merely due to a change in, or adaptation of, their job roles because of acquired disability.  We believe, this analysis can be used against employees acquiring disabilities 

Read the Judgement here (PDF 115 KB)

Bipolar Disorder Without Benchmark Disability Not Enough to Invoke Transfer Protection: says Delhi High Court

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Amit Mahajan
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3022/2026
Case Title: Ms. Shalu Pruthi v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr.
Date of Judgment: 25.03.2026

In a decision that sits at the intersection of service law and disability rights, the Delhi High Court has declined to interfere with the transfer of a Kendriya Vidyalaya teacher who invoked Bipolar Affective Disorder as a ground for retention at a preferred station.

The Court upheld the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, finding no infirmity in the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan’s (KVS) decision to transfer the petitioner from Delhi to Babugarh Cantt. in the Agra region.

Background and Facts

The petitioner, a Primary Teacher appointed in 2009, had been serving in Delhi for over a decade. Her transfer traces back to the 2022 rationalisation exercise within KVS, which later became the subject matter of litigation culminating in proceedings before the Supreme Court.

Pursuant to directions issued therein, teachers were invited to indicate preferred stations. The petitioner opted for Faridabad, Ghaziabad, and Noida. However, owing to non-availability of vacancies, she was posted to Babugarh Cantt., approximately 90 km from her first preference.

Challenging this, she relied primarily on her long-standing diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder, contending that:

• she required continuous psychiatric care,
• family support was essential for stability, and
• the authorities failed to extend reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Tribunal’s View

The Tribunal had rejected her plea, holding that her case did not fall within the “Medical Disability Ground” (MDG) category under the KVS Transfer Policy dated 30.06.2023.

This policy recognises limited categories, including specified illnesses and “any other disease with more than 50% mental disability.”

High Court’s Findings

The High Court’s reasoning proceeds along three distinct lines:

1. Transfer is an Incident of Service

Reiterating settled service jurisprudence, the Court emphasised that:

• an employee cannot claim posting at a particular place as a matter of right,
• judicial review in transfer matters is narrow, confined to mala fides or statutory violation.

The Court relied on established precedents such as S.L. Abbas, S.C. Saxena, and Shilpi Bose, which consistently hold that administrative discretion in transfers must be respected unless clearly arbitrary.

2. Absence of Benchmark Disability Was Decisive

The core issue turned on whether the petitioner could bring herself within the protective framework of either:

• the KVS transfer policy, or
• the disability law regime.

The Court noted that while medical documents showed ongoing treatment, there was no certification indicating benchmark disability (i.e., the statutory threshold of 40% or more under the RPwD Act, and 50% mental disability under the policy).

This evidentiary gap proved fatal. The Court accepted the employer’s view that without such certification, the case could not be treated under the MDG category.

3. Reasonable Accommodation Cannot Be Claimed in the Abstract

The petitioner relied on Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India and Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan, both of which strongly affirm the principle of reasonable accommodation. 

However, the Court distinguished these precedents on facts.

Case Analysis: The “Benchmark” Barrier—Why the Delhi HC’s Ruling on Bipolar Disorder Fails the Mental Health Test

In a decision that highlights the cold friction between administrative policy and the fluid reality of mental health, the Delhi High Court upheld the transfer of a teacher struggling with Bipolar Affective Disorder. While this judgment aligns with rigid service law, it leaves a glaring void in the progressive interpretation of disability rights.

For the disability rights community, this isn't just about a transfer—it’s about the "quantification of suffering" and the invisible walls built by bureaucratic benchmarks. 

The Outcome: A "Mechanical" Dismissal

The Petitioner, Shalu Pruthi, has served as a Primary Teacher with the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) since February 2009. Having served in Delhi for over 12 years, she was caught in a rationalization exercise and transferred from Delhi to Babugarh Cantt., roughly 90 km from her preferred stations.

She challenged the move, citing a decade-long battle with Bipolar Affective Disorder that requires consistent psychiatric care and essential family support for stability. She argued that the authorities failed to provide reasonable accommodation as mandated by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

The High Court dismissed the petition, leaning on two primary pillars:

• Transfer as an Incident of Service: An employee cannot claim a specific posting as a right, especially in a cadre with All India transfer liability.

• The Certification Gap: The KVS Transfer Policy (2023) recognizes medical grounds only for "specified illnesses" or "any other disease with more than 50% mental disability".

Deep Dive: Diverging from the Supreme Court

The Petitioner relied on two landmark Supreme Court rulings to argue for a sensitive, humane approach:

• Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India (2023): This case established that the Doctrine of Reasonable Accommodation is a fundamental component of equality. It mandates that the State adopt a sensitive approach to ensure administrative actions do not unfairly penalize employees for conditions beyond their control.
• Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan (2022): This ruling emphasized that disability rights must be interpreted in a purposive and rights-based manner, moving away from rigid or formalistic approaches.

Despite these powerful precedents, the High Court held that their application presupposes a "demonstrated legal entitlement". Because Pruthi’s medical records did not explicitly quantify her condition as 50% or more, the Court found no "benchmark disability" and refused to interfere.

Critique: Ignoring the Invisible Reality

This judgment exposes a harsh reality for those with mental health conditions: the quantification of suffering. By sticking strictly to the policy's percentages, the Court has signaled that "reasonable accommodation" has a high entry barrier—one that is fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation.

1. The Stigma of Certification

The Court noted an "evidentiary gap" because the petitioner lacked a formal certificate. However, this ignores the severe stigma attached to mental illness. Many users are reluctant to seek "Benchmark Disability" certificates due to the social "labeling" that follows. Furthermore, there is a chronic shortage of professionals to assess mental illness, and the process often requires repeated, exhausting hospital visits.

2. The 40% vs. 50% Inconsistency

The RPwD Act recognizes "benchmark disability" at 40%. Yet, the KVS policy demands a 50% threshold for mental disability. The Court did not question this discrepancy or consider how a more restrictive internal policy might dilute the spirit of national disability law.

3. A Missed Opportunity for Writ Jurisdiction

Under its writ jurisdiction (Article 226), the Court had the power to order an independent medical assessment to determine the degree of disability. Instead of bridging this evidentiary gap, the Court chose a mechanical approach, rejecting the petition on technical grounds alone.

The Bottom Line: Need-Based, Not Score-Based

Reasonable Accommodation is defined as the necessary and appropriate modifications to ensure persons with disabilities can exercise their rights equally with others. By its very nature, it is need-specific, not just percentage-specific.

Bipolar Disorder can be debilitating and requires environmental stability long before it hits a "50% disability" score on a bureaucratic chart. This ruling highlights the urgent need for more nuanced policy frameworks—so that the promise of reasonable accommodation does not remain narrowly confined to those with the "right" paperwork.

Read the judgement (PDF 578 KB)

Reliance on Outdated Disability Classification Cannot Defeat Right to Employment: Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Candidates with SLD and Mental Illness

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No(s). of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 43728/2025
Case Title: Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 12 March 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 232

In a significant ruling reinforcing the evolving framework of disability rights in public employment, the Supreme Court of India has held that candidates with benchmark disabilities such as Specific Learning Disability (SLD) and mental illness cannot be denied appointment on the basis of outdated identification lists of posts.

The judgment arose from a challenge to the denial of appointment to candidates who had successfully cleared the Combined Graduate Level Examination, 2018 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission for the post of Auditor in the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

Background

The dispute traces back to the recruitment process initiated in 2018. Candidates, including the appellant Sudhanshu Kardam and another candidate, Shri Amit Yadav, had qualified through all stages of the examination and were recommended for appointment under the Persons with Disabilities category.

However, their candidature was rejected by the CAG on the ground that the post of Auditor had not been identified as suitable for persons with mental illness or Specific Learning Disability, relying on the 2013 identification list.

Aggrieved, the candidates relied upon the Gazette Notification dated 4 January 2021 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which updated and expanded the list of identified posts to include these categories of disabilities.

Key Findings of the Court

The Supreme Court took note of the 2021 notification, which superseded the earlier 2013 list and expressly identified Group ‘C’ posts such as Assistant (Audit) and Auditor-II as suitable for persons with benchmark disabilities including mental illness and SLD.

Relying on the affidavit filed by the CAG, the Court recorded that there was no longer any legal or administrative barrier to accommodating the candidates in suitable posts.

Importantly, the Court rejected the continued reliance on outdated classification systems, implicitly affirming that administrative inertia cannot override statutory rights under the RPwD Act.

Directions Issued

The Court issued the following operative directions:

• The Staff Selection Commission was directed to forward the dossiers of the candidates to the CAG within two weeks.

• Upon receipt, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India must consider them for appointment to suitable Group ‘C’ posts.

• If the originally advertised vacancies from 2018 had already been filled, the authorities were directed to create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates.

• The appointments would take effect from the date of joining.

Significance

This ruling is important for several reasons:

1. Dynamic Interpretation of Disability Rights:
   The judgment underscores that identification of posts must reflect current statutory frameworks, particularly the expanded categories introduced under the RPwD Act, 2016.

2. Primacy of Updated Notifications:
   Authorities cannot rely on obsolete identification lists when a subsequent statutory notification has redefined suitability criteria.

3. Substantive Equality in Employment:
   By directing the creation of supernumerary posts, the Court ensured that procedural delays or administrative decisions do not deprive persons with disabilities of their rightful employment opportunities.

4. Recognition of Invisible Disabilities:
   The decision affirms the inclusion of less visible disabilities such as mental illness and Specific Learning Disability within mainstream public employment.

Commentary

The judgment is a clear message that the promise of reservation and inclusion under the RPwD Act cannot be diluted by outdated bureaucratic practices. It aligns with a rights-based approach where identification of posts is not a static exercise but one that must evolve with law and policy.

For disability rights jurisprudence, this decision strengthens the principle that eligibility once recognized by law must translate into actual access to employment, and that the State carries a positive obligation to remove institutional barriers—even if that requires creation of additional posts.

Read the Judgement (PDF 204 KB)

SC Strikes Down Arbitrary Disability Percentage Ceiling for Public Employment: Reaffirms Reasonable Accommodation under RPwD Act in Prabhu Kumar [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 868 of 2024
Case Title: Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others
Date of Judgment: 11 March 2026

In a judgment with far-reaching implications for disability-inclusive public employment in India, the Supreme Court of India has held that the State cannot impose arbitrary upper limits on disability percentages for reservation in public employment unless such restrictions are backed by objective functional assessment and the principles of reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

The judgment is a major reaffirmation of substantive equality and the doctrine of reasonable accommodation, and decisively rejects the long-standing administrative practice of mechanically excluding persons with higher disability percentages from employment opportunities.

Background of the Case

The appellant, Prabhu Kumar, a practising advocate with 90% permanent locomotor disability due to left shoulder disarticulation, had applied for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) in Himachal Pradesh pursuant to a 2018 recruitment advertisement.

The recruitment notification reserved two posts for persons with disabilities but imposed a condition that eligible candidates must have disability between 40% and 60% in one arm or one leg.

Despite successfully clearing the written examination and interview, and even topping among candidates selected under the disability category, the appellant was denied appointment solely because his disability exceeded the prescribed 60% ceiling.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed his challenge, following the earlier decision in V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

RPwD Act Creates a “Floor”, Not a “Ceiling”

The Supreme Court examined Sections 2(r) and 33 of the RPwD Act, 2016 and held that the law only prescribes a minimum threshold of 40% disability for benchmark disability status and does not permit the State to impose arbitrary upper limits.

In one of the most significant observations of the judgment, the Court held:

“The RPwD Act, 2016 defines the ‘floor’ for reservation eligibility but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary ‘ceiling’ that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they are otherwise capable of performing the functional requirements of the role through reasonable accommodation.”

The Court further observed that by fixing a 60% cap, the State had effectively rewritten the statutory definition of benchmark disability in a manner contrary to the object of the RPwD Act.

Reasonable Accommodation Is Central to Disability Rights

The Bench relied heavily upon the transformative ruling in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, which had questioned and weakened the earlier precedent in V. Surendra Mohan.

Reproducing extensive portions from Vikash Kumar, the Court reiterated that disability jurisprudence in India must be rooted in reasonable accommodation and not in stereotypical assumptions about capability.

The judgment quoted with approval the observation that:

“Reasonable accommodation is not a matter of charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of our Constitution.”

The Court emphasised that the relevant question is not whether accommodating a person with disability may create “avoidable complications”, but whether providing accommodation imposes a disproportionate or undue burden.

Disability Percentage Cannot Determine Capability

Rejecting the assumption that a higher disability percentage automatically implies inability to perform professional duties, the Court made a strong statement on functional competence:

“The percentage of disability, by itself, cannot be treated as determinative of a candidate’s capability or suitability for public employment.”

The Bench noted that the appellant had already demonstrated his competence by practising law successfully for nearly a decade and by securing the highest rank among disability category candidates.

Importantly, the Court held that suitability must be assessed through actual functional evaluation rather than abstract medical percentages.

Supreme Court Questions the Rationality of the 60% Ceiling

The Court expressed strong disapproval of the State’s inability to justify the 60% disability cap.

The Bench observed:

“We are at a loss to comprehend as to what could have been the rationale behind fixing this upper limit of disability…”

It further noted that the duties of an Assistant District Attorney primarily involve legal reasoning, advocacy, teaching, and advisory functions where locomotor disability in the arm could not reasonably be treated as an impediment.

The Supreme Court also highlighted that even the High Court had recorded serious doubts regarding the basis on which the State had fixed the disability ceiling and had found no evidence of consultation with experts or objective assessment.

Constitutional Equality and Substantive Inclusion

The Court held that the State’s action violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as well as the mandate of the RPwD Act.

The judgment is significant because it shifts the focus from medicalised exclusion to substantive equality and individualised assessment.

It reiterates that persons with disabilities cannot be denied opportunities merely because administrative authorities rely upon preconceived assumptions or arbitrary numerical restrictions unsupported by scientific or functional analysis.

Relief Granted

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed the State of Himachal Pradesh to appoint the appellant as Assistant District Attorney within two weeks.

The Court further directed that:

• the appointment would relate back to 19 September 2019 with all notional benefits;
• if the vacancy was unavailable, a supernumerary post must be created;
• the State must pay costs of ₹5 lakh to the appellant for the prolonged injustice suffered by him.

Commentary

This ruling is likely to become a foundational precedent in disability employment jurisprudence in India.

Across India, recruitment advertisements and institutional policies frequently prescribe rigid medical or disability-percentage restrictions without undertaking any evidence-based assessment of actual job requirements or possibilities of reasonable accommodation. This judgment makes it clear that such exclusions cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.

The decision also strengthens the evolving judicial trend seen in cases such as Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, Anmol v. Union of India, and Kabir Pahariya v. National Medical Commission, where the Supreme Court has consistently moved away from stereotype-based exclusion and towards individualised, evidence-based assessment of capabilities.

Most importantly, the judgment recognises that accessibility and reasonable accommodation are not concessions but enforceable constitutional entitlements essential to achieving genuine equality for persons with disabilities in public life.

Read the judgement in Prabhu Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh