Supreme Court Advances Rehabilitation Framework for Cadets Disabled During Military Training

ECHS benefits extended for life; Court recognises Section 34 reservation and asks States to consider out-boarded cadets under Ex-MP quota

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon’ble Mrs. Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manmohan
Case: In Re: Cadets Disabled in Military Training Struggle
Case No.: Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 6 of 2025
Order Date: 4 August 2026
Status: Proceedings continuing, to be listed on 08 Sep 2026

Background

The Supreme Court is continuing its suo motu proceedings concerning the rights and rehabilitation of military cadets who suffer disabling injuries during military training and are consequently discharged before completion of training or commissioning.

The issue assumes significance because such cadets occupy a peculiar position in law and policy. They have been selected for and have entered military training, but disability acquired during the course of training prevents them from completing the training and pursuing a military career. At the same time, they may not fall within the conventional definition of an “ex-serviceman” for purposes of reservation in civilian employment.

As reported earlier on Disability Rights India in October 2025, the Court had taken cognizance of the peculiar position of such “out-boarded” cadets, who, despite sustaining disability during official military training, could fall outside several welfare and rehabilitation measures available to personnel injured after entering regular service.

The earlier proceedings had focused on the absence of an adequate institutional framework addressing their medical care, financial security, rehabilitation, resettlement and other long-term needs. The Court had appointed Senior Advocate Rekha Palli as Amicus Curiae and directed the concerned authorities to examine the recommendations placed before it.

The present order dated 4 August 2026 records important developments since then. The Court has noted that the Ministry of Defence has extended Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) benefits to invalidated cadets, with their medical expenses being taken care of throughout their lives. The Court described this as a “laudable measure.”

The Court has also begun examining the financial assistance available to out-boarded cadets and, importantly, has addressed their access to employment reservation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

ECHS Benefits Extended for Life

One of the most significant developments recorded in the latest order concerns healthcare.

The Ministry of Defence has informed the Court that, pursuant to its earlier directions, ECHS benefits have been extended to invalidated cadets, with their medical expenses being taken care of throughout their lifetime.

The Court expressly appreciated this measure as a “laudable” one. This represents an important movement from the earlier position identified in the proceedings, where out-boarded cadets could face uncertainty regarding long-term medical support after their discharge.

For a cadet whose disability is acquired during military training and may require lifelong treatment, rehabilitation or assistive support, continuity of healthcare is a fundamental component of any meaningful rehabilitation framework.

The latest order therefore records a concrete measure that has emerged from the Court's continuing intervention.

Disparity in Monthly Disability Benefits

The Court was also apprised of a disparity in the monthly disability benefits available to different categories of trainees.

The Amicus Curiae pointed out that the monthly disability benefit being paid to an officer trainee (Army Cadet), plus DA, is ₹12,240, whereas a Jawan trainee/recruitee before attestation (Army) receives ₹18,000 per month.

The Amicus also brought to the Court's notice disparity in the payment of ex gratia amounts to out-boarded cadets.

In response, the Additional Solicitor General informed the Court that the Eighth Pay Commission has been constituted and would consider enhancement of the rates of ex gratia payment payable to out-boarded cadets.

The Court accordingly reserved liberty to the concerned persons to make representations before the Eighth Pay Commission and expressed the expectation that the Commission would consider the matter from all aspects and may suitably enhance the monthly ex gratia payment.

Thus, while the Court has not itself determined a revised amount, the issue has now been placed before the Eighth Pay Commission for consideration.

Section 34 of the RPwD Act Applies to Out-Boarded Cadets with Benchmark Disabilities

A major development in the latest proceedings concerns the application of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 to out-boarded cadets.

The Court noted that questions had arisen regarding the applicability of the Act, particularly in relation to cadets whose benchmark disability is below 40%.

In relation to cadets with 40% or more disability, however, the Court expressly recognised the operation of the statutory reservation framework.

The Court referred to Section 34 of the RPwD Act, under which the appropriate Government is required to reserve not less than 4% of the total number of vacancies in the cadre strength in each group of posts for persons with benchmark disabilities.

The Court held:

“We find that the out boarded cadets ought to be entitled to the benefit of the said provision and make their applications for employment accordingly in the reserved category in terms of the aforesaid Act.”

This is a significant development in the proceedings.

The Court has thus recognised that an out-boarded cadet who satisfies the statutory benchmark-disability requirement can seek employment under the horizontal reservation framework under Section 34.

States Asked to Consider Out-Boarded Cadets Under Ex-MP Quota

The Court also considered the position of States which had already taken steps to include out-boarded cadets within the category of “ex-servicemen” for purposes of employment.

The Court placed on record its appreciation of those States which had considered out-boarded cadets in the ex-servicemen category for employment through the reserved category.

The Court then issued an important direction to the States:

“The States are directed to consider granting reservation to out boarded cadets in the quota of ‘Ex-Military Personnel (Ex-MP)’...”

The purpose identified by the Court is to enhance the employment prospects of out-boarded cadets within the State and Union Territory cadres.

The Court further directed its Registry to send a copy of the order to the Chief Secretaries of the States for consideration and implementation in terms of Section 34 of the RPwD Act.

Consideration to be Independent of DoPT Definition of Ex-Servicemen

An important qualification accompanies this direction.

The Supreme Court clarified that the consideration by States for extending the Ex-MP reservation to out-boarded cadets shall be “de hors” the definition of “Ex-Servicemen” adopted by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) of the Central Government.

This is significant because the difficulty faced by out-boarded cadets arises partly from their unusual status. They have undergone military training and acquired disability in the course of that training but may not satisfy the conventional administrative definition of an ex-serviceman having completed certain number of years of military service as a combatant member.

The Court has therefore separated the State-level consideration of their employment reservation from the technical definition adopted by DoPT at the Central level.

Cadets Below 40% Disability: A Separate Scheme Under Consideration

The Court has also kept open the question of rehabilitation of cadets whose disability is below 40%.

The Court noted that the RPwD Act benefits of reservation in jobs etc. may not apply to cadets whose benchmark disability is below the statutory threshold. It therefore observed that a suitable scheme may be prepared and extended to such cadets.

The learned Additional Solicitor General informed the Court that instructions would be sought on this aspect.

This distinction is important. While Section 34 reservation is linked to the statutory concept of benchmark disability, the Court has recognised the need for a separate welfare response for cadets who have been out-boarded because of disability but do not meet the 40% threshold.

The question of their rehabilitation therefore remains part of the continuing proceedings.

Sabharwal Committee Recommendations to be Reconsidered

The Court has also directed the respondent Departments to reconsider the recommendations made by the Sabharwal Committee in light of the fact that the matter is now before the Supreme Court with the objective of ameliorating the conditions of out-boarded cadets.

The Court expressed the expectation that favourable recommendations would emerge from the respondent Departments.

This direction is significant because it indicates that the Court's intervention is not confined to individual monetary or employment benefits but continues to examine the broader institutional framework governing the rehabilitation of out-boarded cadets.

Individual Writ Remedies Remain Open

The Supreme Court also clarified that the pendency of the suo motu proceedings will not prevent individual cadets from pursuing their own writ petitions before the High Courts.

The Court directed that individual writ petitions should be considered on their own merits notwithstanding the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings.

Where an individual petition had earlier been disposed of because of the pendency of the present suo motu proceedings, liberty has been granted to the concerned petitioner to seek revival of the petition before the respective High Court.

This ensures that the continuing systemic proceedings before the Supreme Court do not operate to the prejudice of individual cadets seeking case-specific relief.

A Rights-Based Approach to Rehabilitation

The order reflects a broader understanding of rehabilitation under disability law. Rehabilitation cannot be limited to medical treatment or financial assistance. It must also encompass employment, economic independence, dignity and meaningful participation in society.

For military cadets, employment rehabilitation assumes particular importance because acquiring a disability during training may permanently close the career pathway for which they were selected and trained.

The Supreme Court's intervention seeks to ensure that such cadets are not left in a legal vacuum merely because their disability occurred before completion of formal military service.

The order also demonstrates the importance of substantive equality. A rigid application of conventional classifications may leave out persons whose circumstances do not fit neatly within existing administrative categories. The Court has instead sought to ensure that the underlying purpose of disability and rehabilitation law is not defeated by such classifications.

What Has Changed Since the October 2025 Proceedings?

The latest order shows that the proceedings have moved beyond the initial stage of identifying the problem and seeking a rehabilitation framework.

Some concrete developments have now been placed before the Court:

Healthcare: ECHS benefits have been extended to invalidated cadets, with lifetime medical expenses being taken care of.

Financial assistance: The disparity in monthly disability benefits and ex gratia payments has been placed before the Eighth Pay Commission for consideration.

Employment: The Court has expressly recognised the entitlement of out-boarded cadets with 40% or more benchmark disability to seek the benefit of Section 34 reservation.

State-level reservation: States have been directed to consider reservation for out-boarded cadets under the Ex-MP quota.

Below 40% disability: The Union Government has been asked to consider a suitable scheme for cadets who fall outside the benchmark-disability threshold.

Existing recommendations: The respondent Departments have been directed to reconsider the Sabharwal Committee recommendations.

The proceedings therefore appear to be moving towards a more comprehensive framework addressing medical care, financial support, employment and rehabilitation.

DRI Perspective

The latest order is an important development in the continuing proceedings concerning out-boarded military cadets.

When the Supreme Court first took up the issue in 2025, the principal concern was the existence of a gap in the institutional framework for persons who acquire serious disabilities during military training but are discharged before commissioning. The October 2025 proceedings highlighted the absence of adequate recognition and a comprehensive rehabilitation framework for this category.

The order of 4 August 2026 indicates that the intervention is beginning to produce tangible outcomes.

The extension of lifetime ECHS coverage addresses one of the most immediate concerns—continuity of healthcare after discharge. The consideration of enhanced ex gratia assistance addresses the economic consequences of disability. Most significantly, the Court has now connected the rehabilitation of out-boarded cadets with the statutory framework of the RPwD Act by recognising their access to Section 34 reservation where they have benchmark disability.

The direction concerning the Ex-MP quota is also noteworthy. Rather than allowing the technical definition of “Ex-Servicemen” to become an obstacle, the Court has asked States to consider an employment reservation framework specifically capable of accommodating the peculiar position of out-boarded cadets.

At the same time, the Court has not treated the 40% benchmark as the end of the rehabilitation inquiry. Its direction for consideration of a separate scheme for cadets below 40% disability is important in this regard. A statutory threshold for a particular benefit should not be confused with the absence of disability or the absence of rehabilitation needs.

The proceedings therefore continue to move towards a broader conception of rehabilitation—one that includes healthcare, financial security, employment and long-term support, rather than merely a one-time compensation payment.

The Supreme Court has not yet finally disposed of the matter. The directions contained in the 4 August 2026 order are part of continuing proceedings, and the precise contours of the final rehabilitation framework remain to be determined.

The matter is next listed for 8 September 2026.

Read the Earlier DRI Coverage

Supreme Court Examines Rights of Officer Cadets Disabled During Military Training; Seeks Rehabilitation Framework — Disability Rights India, 7 October 2025.

For Child Victims, Consider Impact on Future: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation to ₹83.38 Lakh for Infant Left Paralysed for Life

90% Physical Disability Can Mean 100% Functional Disability: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation for Child with Catastrophic Disability;  SC says compensation for disabled children must account for lifelong loss, dependence, future care and loss of quality of life

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Anjaria
Case: Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr.
Civil Appeal No.: 7067 of 2026
Date: 3 August 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 785

Background

The Supreme Court has substantially enhanced compensation payable to a child who suffered catastrophic and permanent disability in a motor accident when she was only six months old.

The case concerned Shreejita Pattnaik, who suffered severe spinal cord and neurological injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 16 June 2015. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia and was assessed as having 90% permanent locomotor disability. The medical evidence established that she would require lifelong medication, care, supervision and assistance.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Cuttack, had awarded compensation of ₹30,12,960. The Orissa High Court subsequently enhanced the amount to ₹45,40,800. The claimant, through her mother, approached the Supreme Court seeking further enhancement.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and enhanced the compensation to ₹83,38,360, with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization.

90% Physical Disability, But 100% Functional Disability

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is the Court's distinction between physical disability and functional disability.

The Court noted that the percentage of physical disability certified by a medical board and the actual impact of that disability on a person's earning capacity need not always be identical.

In Shreejita's case, although her permanent physical disability was assessed at 90%, the Court examined the actual consequences of the disability. She had been only six months old when the accident occurred, was permanently dependent upon others and would be unable to independently perform normal day-to-day activities.

The Court concluded that her future earning capacity had been completely destroyed and held that her functional disability was 100%.

This distinction is important in disability jurisprudence. A medical percentage does not necessarily capture the real-world consequences of disability. The relevant inquiry, particularly while determining loss of earning capacity, is the impact of the disability on the person's ability to pursue livelihood and live independently.

The Court observed that physical disability and functional disability operate in different fields: physical disability concerns medically assessed bodily impairment, whereas functional disability concerns the effect of that impairment upon the person's ability to live a normal life and pursue gainful employment.

A Child with Catastrophic Disability Cannot Be Treated Merely as a Non-Earning Person

The Court emphasised that children who suffer permanent or near-total disability constitute a distinct category in motor accident compensation cases.

A catastrophic injury during childhood does not merely cause an immediate physical impairment. It can alter the entire course of the child's life, affecting education, employment, social participation, independence, relationships and ordinary experiences of childhood and adulthood.

The Court noted that a child suffering catastrophic injury may lose much more than physical capacity. Ordinary activities such as playing, attending school, interacting with friends and participating in social life may become inaccessible.

Importantly, the Court connected these consequences with human dignity, observing that when a catastrophic injury deprives a child of the ability to perform ordinary functions independently, the resulting loss goes beyond physical disability and amounts to a continuing deprivation of dignity.

Minimum Wages of a Skilled Worker to Be Considered

The Court rejected the approach of treating the injured child as an unskilled labourer for calculating future loss of earnings.

Relying upon its earlier decisions, the Court held that in cases involving children who suffer permanent disability, minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the concerned State at the relevant time should be considered rather than simply assigning a notional income.

For the accident in the present case, the applicable skilled-worker wage was calculated at ₹192.50 per day, resulting in an annual income of ₹69,300. After adding 40% towards future prospects and applying a multiplier of 18, the Court calculated the loss of future earning capacity at ₹17,46,360, taking functional disability at 100%.

The Court also restored the multiplier of 18, holding that the recent trend in cases involving severely injured children supports its application.

Lifelong Attendant Charges Must Be Realistically Assessed

The judgment is also significant in its treatment of attendant charges.

The evidence established that Shreejita would remain dependent on others throughout her life and require constant care, supervision and assistance.

The Supreme Court held that attendant charges should not be confined to a nominal amount merely because actual bills or receipts may not have been produced. The Court applied the multiplier method to determine the cost of lifelong attendant care.

Taking the cost of one attendant at ₹6,000 per month and considering the requirement of two attendants, the Court calculated the annual expenditure at ₹1,44,000 and, applying the multiplier of 18, awarded ₹25,92,000 towards attendant charges.

This is particularly important in cases involving persons with severe disabilities who require lifelong personal assistance.

Compensation Must Account for Loss of Quality of Life

The Court further enhanced the amount awarded towards pain, suffering, loss of amenities and loss of marriage prospects.

The Court recognised that pain and suffering include physical discomfort as well as mental and emotional trauma. In the case of a child with catastrophic disability, conventional calculations may fail to adequately capture the lifelong deprivation suffered by the victim.

The amount under the combined heads was therefore enhanced to ₹25 lakh.

The Court emphasised that compensation for such injuries cannot be merely symbolic. The assessment must take into account the unusual deprivation and its consequences throughout the person's life.

Future Medical Needs Cannot Be Underestimated

The Court also found the amount awarded for future medical treatment inadequate.

Given the permanent and debilitating nature of Shreejita's injuries and her requirement for lifelong medical care, the Court enhanced compensation for future medical treatment from ₹5 lakh to ₹10 lakh.

The amount for conveyance and special diet was also enhanced from ₹50,000 to ₹2 lakh, considering the extensive treatment already undergone and the continuing requirement for medical care.

Compensation Enhanced to ₹83.38 Lakh

The Supreme Court ultimately recalculated the compensation as follows:

Head	Compensation
Loss of future earning capacity	₹17,46,360
Attendant charges	₹25,92,000
Pain, suffering, loss of amenities & marriage prospects	₹25,00,000
Medical expenses	₹3,00,000
Future medical treatment	₹10,00,000
Conveyance and special diet	₹2,00,000
Total	₹83,38,360

The compensation was accordingly enhanced from ₹45,40,800 to ₹83,38,360, along with 9% annual interest from the date of filing of the claim until realization. The insurer was directed to deposit the amount within six weeks.

Significance

The judgment is important beyond the quantum of compensation awarded in the individual case.

First, it reinforces that the percentage of medically assessed disability cannot automatically determine the extent of loss of earning capacity. The functional impact of disability must be examined.

Second, children with catastrophic disabilities cannot be treated simply as persons who had no income because they had not yet entered employment. Their future earning capacity and the future that has been irreversibly altered by the injury must be taken into account.

Third, compensation must realistically account for lifelong attendant care, medical treatment, loss of amenities, pain and suffering and other consequences of disability.

Most importantly, the Court's observations recognise that catastrophic disability in childhood affects the person's entire life trajectory. The loss is not limited to physical impairment or immediate medical expenditure. It can affect independence, education, employment, relationships, social participation and dignity.

The judgment therefore strengthens the principle that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act must be “just, fair and reasonable”, and must not become either a token amount or an inadequate approximation of lifelong loss. The Court reiterated that the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial legislation and requires a liberal and purposive interpretation.

DRI Perspective

The judgment is a significant reminder that disability is experienced in the context of a person's entire life, and compensation law must account for that reality.

For a child who acquires catastrophic disability before even beginning school, the consequences cannot be assessed by looking only at present medical expenses or the income the child happens to earn at the time of the accident—which, in the case of an infant, is obviously zero.

The Supreme Court's approach correctly looks forward: What earning capacity has been lost? What care will be required throughout life? What medical expenses are likely to continue? What ordinary experiences and opportunities have been taken away?

The Court's recognition of 100% functional disability despite 90% physical disability is particularly significant. It reinforces that disability assessment for compensation purposes must not become a purely medical exercise divorced from the person's actual life and livelihood.

Equally important is the Court's recognition of human dignity and lifelong deprivation. Compensation is necessarily incapable of restoring the life that was lost or altered by catastrophic injury. But the law must nevertheless make a genuine attempt to provide financial security commensurate with the deprivation suffered.

The judgment consequently moves the assessment of compensation closer to a rights-based and life-course approach to disability, where the objective is not merely to reimburse past expenditure but to provide meaningful financial security for the lifelong consequences of catastrophic disability.

Read the judgement

Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr. Civil Appeal No. : 7067 of 2026 [PDF 377KB]

Supreme Court Sets Four-Week Deadline for Appointment of Independent Disability Commissioners in the States and Centre in Rajive Raturi Vs Union of India

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case: Rajive Raturi v. Union of India & Others, W.P. (C) No. 243 of 2005 (along with connected matters)
Order Date: 29 July 2026

Next Date of Hearing: 20 January 2027

Statutory Provisions Involved

Provision	Subject	Relevance in this Order
Section 74, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities and Additional Commissioners	The Supreme Court directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with this provision.
Section 79, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities	The Court directed ten States/UTs to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks and clarified that the appointments must be made with independent charge, not as an additional charge.
Section 89, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Punishment for contravention of the Act, Rules or Regulations	The Court noted the absence of an effective mechanism for recovery of penalties under this provision and urged the Union Government to address this while finalising the Rules.
Rule 30, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017	Qualifications and eligibility for appointment of the Chief Commissioner	The Court specifically referred to Rule 30 and reminded the Union Government that a serving Government officer must retire from service before appointment as Chief Commissioner, thereby reinforcing the independence of the office.

Background

More than three years after the Supreme Court directed all States and Union Territories to appoint independent Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities by 31 August 2023, the issue has once again come before the Court owing to continued non-compliance by several Governments. In its order dated 17 July 2023 in Seema Girija Lal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had recognised that Commissioners perform crucial statutory functions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and directed all defaulting States and Union Territories to make appointments within a fixed timeline. Despite those directions, vacancies have continued in several jurisdictions, while the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also remained without a regular incumbent since 2019.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, while monitoring implementation of its landmark accessibility judgment in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, has once again intervened to strengthen the institutional framework under the RPwD Act. By its order dated 29 July 2026, the Court directed ten States and Union Territories to appoint independent State Commissioners within four weeks, directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within the same period, and issued further directions concerning the finalisation of accessibility rules and enforcement of the Act.

The matter has remained under continuous monitoring to ensure effective implementation of the judgment. Earlier, by an order dated 11 February 2026, the Court had sought detailed status reports from the Union Government regarding progress made in framing the new accessibility framework.

When the matter was taken up on 29 July 2026, the Court considered the latest status report filed by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD) and issued several important directions concerning the implementation of the RPwD Act. The order addresses three significant issues: the appointment of statutory disability commissioners, progress in framing accessibility rules, and strengthening enforcement mechanisms under the Act.

Accessibility Rules Under the RPwD Act

The Union Government informed the Court that substantial progress had been made in framing the new accessibility rules pursuant to the Supreme Court's judgment.

According to the status report placed before the Court:

• the draft notification relating to the built environment is ready for final notification;
• draft rules relating to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have already been published; and
• a draft report relating to assistive technologies, services and products has also been prepared.

Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that before the draft rules are finalised and notified, the suggestions already submitted by disability organisations and domain experts should be meaningfully considered so that no deficiencies remain in the final framework.

Accepting this submission, the Court observed that there should be no difficulty in ensuring that the Rules effectively fulfil the objectives of the RPwD Act. Noting that several stakeholders had already submitted detailed suggestions before the committees constituted by the Ministry, the Court urged the Union Government to carefully examine those recommendations before finalising the Rules.

The Bench observed that once the Rules are notified, shortcomings should not subsequently emerge that could have been addressed during the drafting stage itself.

The Court further requested the learned Additional Solicitors General to provide copies of the latest status report along with the draft Rules to all stakeholders so that they may examine the proposals and submit their responses at the earliest.

Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Independent State Commissioners

One of the most important aspects of the order concerns the continued absence of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities in several States and Union Territories.

During the hearing, Advocate Rahul Bajaj pointed out that despite the statutory requirement contained in Section 79 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several States had still not appointed State Commissioners. It was submitted that these authorities perform a crucial role in ensuring effective implementation of the Act and in providing an institutional mechanism for grievance redressal and monitoring compliance.

The Court recorded that the following States and Union Territories had not appointed State Commissioners:

• Delhi
• Haryana
• Rajasthan
• Himachal Pradesh
• Karnataka
• Tamil Nadu
• Sikkim
• Nagaland
• Puducherry
• Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed all these Governments to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with Section 79 of the RPwD Act. The Court made it clear that the direction must be strictly complied with, observing that any laxity would be viewed "very strictly".

Commissioner Must Hold Independent Charge

The Court also clarified an important aspect that has frequently arisen in disability governance.

Many States have, in the past, assigned the office of State Commissioner to serving officers as an additional charge, rather than appointing an independent statutory authority.

The Supreme Court expressly disapproved this practice and clarified:

"The State concerned shall appoint the Commissioner with an independent charge. The State should not appoint anyone as a Commissioner holding additional charge."

This clarification reinforces the independent character of the statutory office created under the RPwD Act.

Appointment of Chief Commissioner and Additional Commissioners

The Court also considered submissions regarding the prolonged vacancy in the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD). It was pointed out that since 2019 there has been no full-time Chief Commissioner, with the Secretary, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, functioning only as an officer holding additional charge.

Reference was made to Section 74 of the RPwD Act and Rule 30 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, which contemplate appointment of an independent Chief Commissioner and provide that a serving Government officer must retire from Government service before assuming the office.

Accepting these submissions, the Court directed the Union Government to complete the appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities; and two Additional Commissioners, within four weeks, in accordance with Section 74 of the RPwD Act. The Court also specifically invited the attention of the Union Government to Rule 30 while making these appointments.

Effective Recovery of Penalties Under Section 89

Another issue raised before the Court related to Section 89 of the RPwD Act, which prescribes penalties for contravention of the Act and the Rules.

Counsel submitted that although the Act provides for monetary penalties, it does not prescribe any effective mechanism for recovery of those fines, thereby limiting practical enforcement.

The Supreme Court requested the Union Government to consider incorporating an appropriate recovery mechanism while finalising the new Rules so that penalties under Section 89 can be effectively enforced.

Existing Accessibility Standards Continue to Apply

The Court also reiterated an important clarification contained in paragraph 83 of its judgment dated 8 November 2024.

The Bench noted the submission that while new accessibility standards are being framed, compliance with existing accessibility obligations must continue.

The Court reiterated that:

"progressive compliance with the standards listed in the existing Rule 15(1) and the progress towards the targets of the Accessible India Campaign must continue unabated."

This clarification is significant because it prevents authorities from postponing compliance on the ground that revised accessibility standards are under preparation.

Non-Negotiable Accessibility Norms to be Finalised Within Six Months

The Court directed that the issuance of the non-negotiable accessibility norms envisaged in the main judgment must be completed within six months. The matter has been directed to be listed on 20 January 2027 for reporting compliance with all directions issued by the Court.

Significance

The order strengthens the institutional framework established under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. For nearly seven years, the office of the Chief Commissioner has remained without a full-time incumbent, while several States have either failed to appoint State Commissioners altogether or have entrusted the office to officials holding additional charge. By directing appointments within a fixed time frame and expressly requiring independent charge, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that these statutory authorities are intended to function as independent oversight institutions rather than as additional responsibilities assigned to serving bureaucrats.

The order also ensures that the ongoing process of framing accessibility rules remains consultative and participatory by directing meaningful consideration of stakeholder inputs before final notification. At the same time, the Court has reiterated that existing accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act and the Accessible India Campaign remain fully enforceable until the new framework comes into force.

The proceedings will now continue on 20 January 2027, when the Supreme Court will examine compliance with these directions.

Read the Order dated 27 July 2026

Supreme Court Questions TET Requirement for Special Educators in Bihar: Where Is It Prescribed in the Recruitment Rules?

Court:               Supreme Court of India

Bench:               Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu

Case Title:        Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

Case No.:          W.P.(C) No. 132/2016

Order Dated:    28 July 2026

Issue:                 Whether TET can be insisted upon as an additional

                           qualification for appointment of Special Educators in Bihar

Introduction

Please refer to our earlier post dated 28 October 2021 titled Supreme Court Calls for Systemic Reform in Recruitment of Special Teachers for Children with Disabilities in the above matter.

The Supreme Court, while hearing the continuing proceedings in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., has questioned the legal basis for requiring Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) qualification for appointment as Special Educators in Bihar. The Court is examining whether TET was actually prescribed in the applicable recruitment rules before it was introduced as an eligibility condition.

The Issue Before the Supreme Court

Can a State require a Special Educator to possess a Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) qualification when the applicable recruitment rules do not clearly prescribe TET for the post?

This question has acquired considerable importance in the continuing proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the availability and appointment of Special Educators for children with disabilities.

The proceedings arise against the backdrop of a larger concern: children with disabilities cannot receive meaningful inclusive education unless schools have an adequate number of appropriately qualified Special Educators.

The Court's order dated 28 July 2026 does not finally decide whether TET is mandatory for Special Educators. Instead, it raises an important preliminary question—what is the legal source of the TET requirement in Bihar?

Background

The Supreme Court has been monitoring issues concerning the appointment and availability of Special Educators in different States.

In the Bihar recruitment process, the question arose whether candidates possessing the requisite qualification recognised by the Rehabilitation Council of India (RCI) could nevertheless be excluded because they did not possess TET qualification.

The figures placed before the Court demonstrate the practical consequences.

Out of 7,279 sanctioned posts, 816 posts were stated to be reserved for contractual teachers. Following verification of documents relating to 788 candidates, only 139 candidates were found to possess both RCI and TET qualifications.

The remaining 649 candidates did not possess TET qualification and, consequently, were not recommended for appointment.

This led to a fundamental question: if these candidates possessed the professional qualification prescribed for Special Educators under the RCI framework, could the State nevertheless exclude them on the basis of TET?

The petitioners also relied upon the position taken by the RCI that TET is not an RCI-mandated qualification for Special Educators.

The controversy, therefore, is not merely about one additional examination. It concerns the relationship between:

• professional qualification and registration under the RCI framework;
• general teacher eligibility requirements;
• State-specific recruitment rules; and
• the urgent need for Special Educators in schools serving children with disabilities.

What Did the Supreme Court Ask?

During the hearing, the Bench closely examined the language of the Bihar recruitment rules. Justice Dipankar Datta questioned the basis for treating the relevant TET provision as applicable to Special Educators.

The Court's questioning essentially went to the heart of the matter:

Where, in the applicable recruitment rules, is TET prescribed as a mandatory qualification for Special Educators?

The Bench also examined whether the rule relied upon by the State was actually a provision concerning general school teachers and, if so, whether it could automatically be extended to Special Educators.

This distinction is important. A Special Educator is not simply a general teacher with an additional disability-related role. Special Educators undergo specialised professional education and are regulated within the RCI framework.

Consequently, if the State wishes to impose an additional qualification upon this specialised professional category, there must be a clear legal and regulatory basis for doing so.

RCI Qualification and TET: Two Different Questions

The proceedings also bring into focus an important distinction between professional qualification and eligibility for a particular government recruitment process.

RCI recognition and registration are concerned with professional competence and regulation in rehabilitation and special education.

TET, on the other hand, is a teacher-eligibility mechanism generally associated with school-teaching appointments.

The existence of one qualification does not necessarily answer the question whether another qualification may be prescribed.

At the same time, the fact that TET is not an RCI qualification does not, by itself, mean that a State can never prescribe TET as an additional recruitment requirement.

The crucial question is therefore:

Was TET validly prescribed for the particular post under the applicable recruitment rules?

That is the question the Supreme Court has asked the State of Bihar to address.

Why the Recruitment Rules Matter

Eligibility conditions in public employment cannot ordinarily rest merely upon administrative practice or an assumption that a qualification applicable to one category of employees automatically applies to another.

The recruitment rules governing the post are therefore critical.

The Supreme Court has directed the Bihar Government to clarify whether the relevant rules were amended before the recruitment advertisement was issued so as to make TET mandatory.

This temporal question is also significant.

If a qualification was not prescribed in the governing rules when the recruitment process was initiated, the State would have to explain the legal basis for subsequently treating it as an eligibility condition.

The Court has, therefore, adopted a cautious approach: rather than immediately deciding the validity of the TET requirement, it has asked the State to establish the precise statutory and regulatory foundation of its position.

649 Candidates & Human Consequence of an Eligibility Rule

The numbers placed before the Court illustrate why this is more than a technical recruitment dispute.

Of the 788 candidates whose documents were verified:

• 139 reportedly possessed both RCI and TET qualifications.
• 649 reportedly possessed the relevant RCI qualification but lacked TET and were therefore not recommended.

In other words, a large majority of the candidates considered in this exercise were potentially excluded because of the additional TET requirement.

The consequence extends beyond the candidates themselves. Every unfilled Special Educator position has a potential impact on children with disabilities who depend upon specialised educational support.

A recruitment rule that excludes otherwise professionally qualified Special Educators may therefore have implications for the implementation of the right to education and the right to inclusive education.

Does the Supreme Court Say TET Is Not Required?

No—not yet.

This is an important qualification while reporting the order.

The Supreme Court's 28 July 2026 order is interlocutory. It does not finally hold that TET is not required for Special Educators.

Nor does the order establish a universal rule that every RCI-qualified Special Educator must necessarily be appointed without TET.

Rather, the Court is examining whether Bihar had a lawful basis for imposing TET as an additional qualification in the particular recruitment process.

The Court has accordingly sought an affidavit from the State addressing whether the relevant recruitment rules had been amended before the advertisement was issued.

The distinction is important because the larger proceedings have also considered the possibility of States prescribing TET as an additional qualification. The legal question is therefore not simply whether TET is “good” or “bad” for Special Educators, but whether and how it can lawfully be prescribed.

A Larger Question: Should Special Educators Have a Specialised TET?

The proceedings nevertheless raise a legitimate policy question.

If TET is considered necessary for Special Educators, should the test itself be designed around the competencies required of Special Educators?

A general TET is intended to assess competencies associated with teaching.

Special Education requires additional and distinct professional competencies, including understanding of:

• disability-specific educational needs;
• individualised education and support planning;
• assistive technology;
• alternative and augmentative communication;
• reasonable accommodation;
• universal design for learning;
• accessible teaching-learning materials;
• behavioural and psychosocial support;
• communication with families and caregivers; and
• inclusive classroom practices.

The question, therefore, is not whether quality standards should be maintained. They unquestionably should.

The question is whether a general teacher-eligibility test is the appropriate instrument for assessing the professional competence of a Special Educator.

If an additional national eligibility examination is considered necessary, there is a strong case for ensuring that it is appropriately designed around the actual professional competencies required in special and inclusive education.

Implications Under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

The issue also needs to be viewed against the statutory framework of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

Section 16 of the Act requires educational institutions to provide inclusive education to children with disabilities and take specified measures to ensure their participation and access to education.

Section 17 further requires governments and local authorities to take measures for facilitating inclusive education.

These statutory obligations cannot be implemented merely by declaring that education is inclusive.

There must be trained human resources to make inclusion work.

Special Educators play a critical role in this ecosystem. Their availability is particularly important for children who require specialised educational interventions, accommodations, communication support, assistive technologies or individualised educational strategies.

Consequently, recruitment policies affecting the availability of Special Educators must also be examined in the context of the State's obligation to ensure meaningful access to inclusive education.

The Supreme Court's Approach: Qualification Must Have a Legal Foundation

One of the most important aspects of the present proceedings is the Court's insistence on identifying the legal source of an eligibility requirement.

It is entirely legitimate for the State to prescribe appropriate qualifications for public employment.

But an eligibility condition must have a legal foundation.

A qualification prescribed for general teachers cannot necessarily be presumed to apply to every specialised category of teaching professionals.

This is particularly relevant where the specialised category is separately regulated through a statutory professional framework.

The Supreme Court's questioning therefore reinforces a basic principle of public recruitment:

Eligibility conditions must flow from the applicable rules and cannot simply be assumed.

What Happens Next?

The Supreme Court has directed the Government of Bihar to file an affidavit clarifying the position concerning RCI registration and TET qualification, including whether the applicable recruitment rules were amended before the recruitment advertisement.

The matter was listed for further consideration on 4 August 2026, along with matters concerning Special Educator appointments in Delhi, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh.

The Court also did not impose a rigid four-week deadline for appointment letters, noting the practical consideration of the frequency of meetings of the State Cabinet.

The ultimate determination could therefore have implications extending beyond Bihar.

Why This Matters

The case sits at the intersection of professional regulation, public employment and the right to inclusive education.

For Special Educators, the outcome may determine whether RCI qualifications are sufficient for particular government appointments or whether States may additionally insist upon TET.

For governments, the case highlights the importance of ensuring that recruitment advertisements faithfully reflect the governing statutory and regulatory framework.

For children with disabilities, however, there is an even more fundamental concern.

A right to inclusive education is meaningful only when the education system has the human resources necessary to deliver it.

If recruitment requirements unnecessarily narrow the pool of professionally qualified Special Educators, vacancies may remain unfilled. Conversely, if additional qualifications are genuinely necessary to ensure quality teaching, they must be appropriately designed and legally prescribed.

The objective should be neither dilution of professional standards nor unnecessary exclusion of qualified professionals.

It should be quality, specialised and accessible education for every child with disability.

What the Supreme Court May Ultimately Clarify

The continuing proceedings have the potential to provide important clarity on several questions:

1. Is TET universally applicable to Special Educators, or does its applicability depend upon the recruitment rules governing a particular post?
2. Can a State impose TET as an additional qualification where the applicable recruitment rules prescribe RCI qualifications but do not expressly prescribe TET?
3. What is the relationship between RCI professional qualifications and State teacher-recruitment qualifications?
4. Can a qualification introduced through an advertisement be sustained if it was not prescribed in the governing rules at the relevant time?
5. If TET is considered necessary for Special Educators, should there be a specialised test reflecting the competencies of special and inclusive education?

The answers could influence Special Educator recruitment policies across several States.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's order dated 28 July 2026 should therefore be understood as an important judicial inquiry, rather than a final ruling on the necessity of TET for Special Educators.

Its significance lies in the Court's insistence that the State identify the legal basis for an eligibility condition that has resulted in hundreds of RCI-qualified candidates being excluded from consideration.

At the same time, the proceedings raise a broader question about how India regulates and recruits the professionals who make inclusive education possible.

The objective should be to ensure that every child with disability has access to adequately trained, professionally competent and sufficient numbers of Special Educators.

The Supreme Court's eventual decision may help strike that balance—between maintaining professional standards, respecting specialised qualifications and ensuring that recruitment rules do not themselves become a barrier to fulfilling the promise of inclusive education.

For now, the key takeaway is simple: TET cannot be treated as mandatory for Special Educators merely by assumption. Its applicability must be traceable to the governing legal and recruitment framework.

Read the Order

Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 132/2016, order dated 28 July 2026, 

Disclaimer: This article discusses an interlocutory order and should not be read as a final determination by the Supreme Court that TET is either universally mandatory or universally unnecessary for Special Educators. The question remains under consideration in the continuing proceedings.