Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 868 of 2024
Case Title: Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others
Date of Judgment: 11 March 2026
In a landmark judgment with far-reaching implications for disability-inclusive public employment in India, the Supreme Court of India has held that the State cannot impose arbitrary upper limits on disability percentages for reservation in public employment unless such restrictions are backed by objective functional assessment and the principles of reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).
The judgment is a major reaffirmation of substantive equality and the doctrine of reasonable accommodation, and decisively rejects the long-standing administrative practice of mechanically excluding persons with higher disability percentages from employment opportunities.
Background of the Case
The appellant, Prabhu Kumar, a practising advocate with 90% permanent locomotor disability due to left shoulder disarticulation, had applied for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) in Himachal Pradesh pursuant to a 2018 recruitment advertisement.
The recruitment notification reserved two posts for persons with disabilities but imposed a condition that eligible candidates must have disability between 40% and 60% in one arm or one leg.
Despite successfully clearing the written examination and interview, and even topping among candidates selected under the disability category, the appellant was denied appointment solely because his disability exceeded the prescribed 60% ceiling.
The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed his challenge, following the earlier decision in V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.
RPwD Act Creates a “Floor”, Not a “Ceiling”
The Supreme Court examined Sections 2(r) and 33 of the RPwD Act, 2016 and held that the law only prescribes a minimum threshold of 40% disability for benchmark disability status and does not permit the State to impose arbitrary upper limits.
In one of the most significant observations of the judgment, the Court held:
“The RPwD Act, 2016 defines the ‘floor’ for reservation eligibility but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary ‘ceiling’ that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they are otherwise capable of performing the functional requirements of the role through reasonable accommodation.”
The Court further observed that by fixing a 60% cap, the State had effectively rewritten the statutory definition of benchmark disability in a manner contrary to the object of the RPwD Act.
Reasonable Accommodation Is Central to Disability Rights
The Bench relied heavily upon the transformative ruling in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, which had questioned and weakened the earlier precedent in V. Surendra Mohan.
Reproducing extensive portions from Vikash Kumar, the Court reiterated that disability jurisprudence in India must be rooted in reasonable accommodation and not in stereotypical assumptions about capability.
The judgment quoted with approval the observation that:
“Reasonable accommodation is not a matter of charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of our Constitution.”
The Court emphasised that the relevant question is not whether accommodating a person with disability may create “avoidable complications”, but whether providing accommodation imposes a disproportionate or undue burden.
Disability Percentage Cannot Determine Capability
Rejecting the assumption that a higher disability percentage automatically implies inability to perform professional duties, the Court made a strong statement on functional competence:
“The percentage of disability, by itself, cannot be treated as determinative of a candidate’s capability or suitability for public employment.”
The Bench noted that the appellant had already demonstrated his competence by practising law successfully for nearly a decade and by securing the highest rank among disability category candidates.
Importantly, the Court held that suitability must be assessed through actual functional evaluation rather than abstract medical percentages.
Supreme Court Questions the Rationality of the 60% Ceiling
The Court expressed strong disapproval of the State’s inability to justify the 60% disability cap.
The Bench observed:
“We are at a loss to comprehend as to what could have been the rationale behind fixing this upper limit of disability…”
It further noted that the duties of an Assistant District Attorney primarily involve legal reasoning, advocacy, teaching, and advisory functions where locomotor disability in the arm could not reasonably be treated as an impediment.
The Supreme Court also highlighted that even the High Court had recorded serious doubts regarding the basis on which the State had fixed the disability ceiling and had found no evidence of consultation with experts or objective assessment.
Constitutional Equality and Substantive Inclusion
The Court held that the State’s action violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as well as the mandate of the RPwD Act.
The judgment is significant because it shifts the focus from medicalised exclusion to substantive equality and individualised assessment.
It reiterates that persons with disabilities cannot be denied opportunities merely because administrative authorities rely upon preconceived assumptions or arbitrary numerical restrictions unsupported by scientific or functional analysis.
Relief Granted
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed the State of Himachal Pradesh to appoint the appellant as Assistant District Attorney within two weeks.
The Court further directed that:
- the appointment would relate back to 19 September 2019 with all notional benefits;
- if the vacancy was unavailable, a supernumerary post must be created;
- the State must pay costs of ₹5 lakh to the appellant for the prolonged injustice suffered by him.
Commentary
This ruling is likely to become a foundational precedent in disability employment jurisprudence in India.
Across India, recruitment advertisements and institutional policies frequently prescribe rigid medical or disability-percentage restrictions without undertaking any evidence-based assessment of actual job requirements or possibilities of reasonable accommodation. This judgment makes it clear that such exclusions cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
The decision also strengthens the evolving judicial trend seen in cases such as Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, Anmol v. Union of India, and Kabir Pahariya v. National Medical Commission, where the Supreme Court has consistently moved away from stereotype-based exclusion and towards individualised, evidence-based assessment of capabilities.
Most importantly, the judgment recognises that accessibility and reasonable accommodation are not concessions but enforceable constitutional entitlements essential to achieving genuine equality for persons with disabilities in public life.