Inclusive Medical Education Requires Accommodation: Delhi High Court on Rights of Disabled Students

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Prathiba M. Singh
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1712/2025
Case Title: Sahil Arsh v. National Medical Commission & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 4 February 2026

 

Background

 

The petition before the Delhi High Court was filed by a medical student with a disability who challenged certain regulatory restrictions imposed by the National Medical Commission (NMC) that limited the ability of persons with disabilities to pursue medical education. The petitioner contended that the eligibility criteria and institutional practices adopted by medical authorities did not adequately account for the needs of students with disabilities.

 

According to the petitioner, despite the statutory protections provided under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several medical institutions continued to apply rigid eligibility requirements that effectively excluded candidates with disabilities from pursuing medical education or completing their training on equal terms. The petitioner argued that such practices were inconsistent with the principle of reasonable accommodation mandated by the RPwD Act.

 

The matter therefore raised an important question regarding the obligations of regulatory bodies governing professional education. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether professional standards could be interpreted in a manner that excluded persons with disabilities or whether institutions must adapt their systems to ensure inclusive participation.

 

Key Observations

 

The Delhi High Court emphasised that professional education, including medical education, must be governed by the principles of equality, accessibility and reasonable accommodation recognised under the RPwD Act. The Court observed that regulatory bodies cannot frame or enforce rules that have the effect of systematically excluding persons with disabilities from professional courses.

 

Justice Prathiba M. Singh noted that the purpose of disability legislation is to ensure that educational institutions adopt inclusive practices that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively. This includes not only physical accessibility but also modifications in academic procedures, evaluation systems and institutional support mechanisms.

 

The Court further observed that professional competence should not be assessed through rigid assumptions about disability. Instead, institutions must examine whether reasonable accommodations and assistive technologies can enable students with disabilities to perform the essential functions required in the profession.

 

Importantly, the Court emphasised that regulatory frameworks governing medical education must be interpreted in a manner that advances the objective of inclusion rather than reinforcing outdated perceptions about the capabilities of persons with disabilities.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Court directed the National Medical Commission to reconsider the petitioner’s case in light of the principles of reasonable accommodation under the RPwD Act.

• Authorities were instructed to ensure that regulatory guidelines governing medical education are consistent with the statutory rights of persons with disabilities.

• The Court emphasised that institutions must adopt inclusive policies that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively in professional education.

 

Commentary

 

The judgment represents an important development in the evolving discourse on disability rights in professional education. Historically, certain professions—including medicine—have been governed by rigid eligibility criteria that often excluded persons with disabilities based on assumptions about their abilities.

 

However, contemporary disability rights law recognises that such exclusion frequently reflects institutional barriers rather than inherent limitations. Advances in assistive technologies, adaptive learning systems and inclusive teaching methods have significantly expanded the possibilities for persons with disabilities to participate in professional fields.

 

By emphasising the obligation of regulatory bodies to incorporate reasonable accommodation into professional education frameworks, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed the transformative vision underlying the RPwD Act. The statute seeks not merely to remove formal barriers but to reshape institutional practices so that diversity becomes a normal and expected feature of educational environments.

 

The decision also signals a broader shift in judicial thinking. Rather than treating disability as a ground for exclusion from demanding professions, courts increasingly recognise that institutions must adapt their structures to accommodate diverse forms of participation. In doing so, the judgment contributes to the development of a more inclusive model of professional education in India.

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Substantive Equality over Technicalities- SC Grants Relief to Woman with Benchmark Disability saying Reasonable Accommodation is a Fundamental Right [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026

Case Title: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors.  [PDF 289 KB]

Date of Judgment: 13 January 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 53

Cases Referred: Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India (2024 INSC 775); Anmol v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 387); Om Rathod v. DGHS (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130); Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592); Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC; Avni Prakash v. NTA; Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625; Jane Kaushik v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257)

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Brief 

In a significant judgment reinforcing the centrality of reasonable accommodation and substantive equality in public employment, the Supreme Court in Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited held that technicalities such as expiry of a recruitment panel cannot defeat the fundamental and statutory rights of persons with disabilities (PwDs). The Court directed Coal India Limited (CIL) to appoint the appellant, a woman with benchmark disability, by creating a supernumerary post and ensuring a suitable, accessible desk job with assistive infrastructure. 

Background

Coal India Limited had issued a recruitment notification in 2019 for Management Trainees. Sujata Bora applied under the visually disabled category, qualified for interview, and was later called for document verification and an Initial Medical Examination (IME) in 2021. She was declared medically unfit on the ground of visual disability coupled with residual partial hemiparesis.

Challenging this, she approached the Calcutta High Court. The Single Judge quashed the IME result and held that CIL could not deny appointment in the multiple disabilities category, but limited relief by directing consideration in the subsequent recruitment cycle since the earlier process had concluded. The Division Bench, however, set aside even this relief, primarily on the ground that the panel had expired.

Before the Supreme Court, detailed medical assessment was ordered through an AIIMS medical board. The final report assessed her disability at 57%, above the 40% benchmark threshold, making her eligible under the RPwD Act. The Court also interacted with the appellant and noted her determination and capability. 

Key Directions

The Supreme Court:

• Set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court.

• Held that the appellant had been wrongly denied employment through no fault of her own.

• Directed creation of a supernumerary post for her appointment.

• Requested that she be given a suitable desk job, with a separate computer and keyboard consistent with universal design under the RPwD Act.

• Requested posting at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam.

• Exercised powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. 

Reasonable Accommodation as a “Gateway Right”

One of the most important contributions of this judgment is its strong articulation of reasonable accommodation. The Court reaffirmed that:

• Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right.

• It is a gateway right enabling PwDs to enjoy all other rights.

• Denial of reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination and undermines substantive equality.

The Court rejected a narrow view of accommodation limited to devices or physical aids, instead endorsing a broad, purposive interpretation aligned with dignity, autonomy, and participation.

Intersectionality: Gender and Disability

The Court expressly recognised intersectional discrimination, noting that the appellant was a single woman with disability striving to overcome compounded barriers. It held that equality analysis cannot be unidimensional where multiple axes of disadvantage operate together. This acknowledgment strengthens the evolving Indian jurisprudence on intersectionality in disability rights.

Directive Principles and the Right to Work

Linking disability rights with constitutional philosophy, the Court invoked Articles 14, 21, 39(a), and 41, reiterating that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are “two wheels of a chariot.” The right to livelihood and work was treated as integral to a meaningful life.

Corporate Responsibility and Disability

Notably, the judgment situates disability inclusion within Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and ESG frameworks, referencing UN Guiding Principles and ILO materials. It emphasises that disability rights are human rights and must be addressed from a non-discrimination perspective, not merely as diversity optics. 

Significance

This ruling is a landmark for several reasons:

1. Panel expiry cannot defeat disability rights where injustice is evident.

2. Reasonable accommodation is firmly embedded as a fundamental right.

3. Supernumerary posts are validated as a remedy in appropriate cases.

4. Intersectionality receives explicit judicial recognition.

5. Public sector employers are reminded that exclusion at the threshold, without exploring accommodations, is unlawful.

The Court’s opening line—“Lack of physical sight does not equate to a lack of vision”—aptly captures the spirit of the decision. The judgment sends a clear message: disability rights are not charity, nor mere policy preferences; they are enforceable legal and constitutional guarantees.

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Supreme Court directs Reasonable Accommodation and Protections under Section 20 RPDA for Employees acquiring disability in service

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026
Case Title: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd. & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 13 January 2026

 

Background

 

The case arose from a dispute concerning the employment rights of a worker who had acquired a disability during the course of her service with Coal India Limited, a public sector undertaking. The petitioner contended that after acquiring a disability, she was denied meaningful reasonable accommodation in the workplace and faced administrative actions that effectively undermined her continued employment.

 

She argued that the actions of the employer violated the statutory protections provided under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, particularly the obligation of employers to provide reasonable accommodation and to ensure that employees who acquire disabilities are not discriminated against.

 

The matter eventually reached the Supreme Court, where the central question was whether public sector employers could evade their obligations under the RPwD Act by relying on rigid service rules that failed to account for the needs of employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Key Observations

 

The Supreme Court emphasised that the RPwD Act represents a shift from a welfare-based understanding of disability to a rights-based legal framework grounded in dignity and equality. Public authorities and government-controlled entities are therefore under a positive obligation to ensure that persons with disabilities are able to participate in employment on equal terms.

 

The Court observed that employees who acquire disabilities during service are particularly vulnerable, as they may suddenly find themselves excluded from the very institutions they have served for years. In such circumstances, the law requires employers to explore reasonable accommodation measures rather than resorting to administrative actions that result in exclusion.

 

The Bench reiterated that the RPwD Act explicitly prohibits discrimination against employees with disabilities and mandates the creation of inclusive workplaces. Employers must therefore interpret service rules in a manner that promotes participation rather than exclusion.

 

The Court also noted that public sector undertakings, as instrumentalities of the State, are bound by constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity. Administrative decisions affecting employees with disabilities must therefore be consistent with both statutory protections and constitutional principles.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Supreme Court held that the employer was required to comply with the obligations imposed under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

• The authorities were directed to reconsider the petitioner’s employment status in light of the statutory requirement to provide reasonable accommodation.

• The Court emphasised that public sector employers must adopt measures that enable continued employment of persons who acquire disabilities during service.

• Relevant authorities were directed to ensure that future administrative decisions are consistent with the principles laid down in the RPwD Act.

Commentary

 

The judgment highlights the growing recognition within Indian constitutional jurisprudence that employment rights form a critical component of disability inclusion. For many individuals, employment is not merely a source of income but also a foundation for dignity, independence and social participation.

 

Employees who acquire disabilities during service often face a sudden erosion of these rights. Without strong legal protections, they may find themselves marginalised within the workplace or pushed out of employment altogether. The RPwD Act seeks to address this problem by imposing clear obligations on employers to provide reasonable accommodation and to prevent discrimination.

 

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case reinforces the transformative nature of the statute. By insisting that employers interpret service rules in a manner consistent with disability rights, the Court underscored that inclusion requires institutional adaptation rather than mere formal compliance with existing regulations.

The broader significance of the decision lies in its recognition that disability rights cannot remain confined to theoretical guarantees. For persons with disabilities to participate fully in public life, workplaces must be designed and administered in ways that anticipate diversity and remove barriers to participation. The ruling therefore strengthens the evolving framework of disability rights law in India by reaffirming that equality in employment requires proactive institutional reform.

Read the judgement: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd. & Ors. [PDF 289KB]

Supreme Court: Citing Reasonable Accommodation provisions, bench directs a person with defective colour vision to be appointed as Assistant Engineer Electrical

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aravind Kumar

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12671 of 2022]

Case Title: Mohamed Ibrahim Vs. The Chairman & Managing Director & Ors.

Date of Judgement: 16 October 2023

Brief:

The Supreme Court granted relief to the appellant - a person with colour blindness - who was denied appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer applying the principle of "reasonable accommodation" as defined in the RPwD Act. Incidently, colour blindness is not an identified or defined disability in the schedule to the Act.

The Court highlighted that the provisions of the RPwD Act are specifically designed to foster the participation and empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (PwDs). However, it expressed its concern that the benefits arising from affirmative action are confined to a specific category of PwDs, including those with orthopedic, visual, hearing, and mental disabilities, among others covered in the schedule to the Act. These benefits are intricately linked to the concept of "benchmark" disabilities, which grants affirmative action and similar benefits to PwDs who meet a defined threshold of disability, typically 40 percent or more. This distinction based on specified categories and threshold conditions, as per the topc court, creates substantial barriers.

It bench observed, “The actual benefits in the form of affirmative action are defined by a specific category of PwDs (orthopaedical, visual, hearing, mental, etc.) and tied to the context of “benchmark” disabilities, which entitles those PwDs who qualify with a certain threshold of disability (40 percent or more) to the affirmative action and other similar benefits. The nature of inclusion of specified categories only to the exclusion of other categories of disabilities, on the one hand, and the eligibility of a threshold, in the opinion of this court, constitute barriers.”

"The twin conditions of falling within defined categories, and also a threshold condition of a minimum percentage, of such disabilities, in fact are a barrier," opined the court. The Court emphasized the necessity of a more rational and inclusive approach to accommodate individuals who may not it into the established categories of PwDs in the schedule to the Act.

“The facts of this case demonstrate that the appellant is fit, in all senses of the term, to discharge the duties attached to the post he applied and was selected for. Yet, he is denied the position, for being “disabled” as he is color blind. At the same time, he does not fit the category of PwD under the lexicon of the universe contained within the Act. These challenge traditional understandings of what constitutes “disabilities”. The court has to, therefore, travel beyond the provisions of the Act and discern a principle that can be rationally applied.”

The bench was hearing an appeal against the Madras HC judgment which had ruled in favour of the respondent(TANGEDCO) asserting its right to reject the appellant's candidature on the grounds of colour blindness. The case revolved around a job application for the position of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) by the appellant. The appellant, who was initially considered qualified for the role, was subsequently found to be color blind during a medical examination. This raised concerns about his ability to fulfill the responsibilities of an engineer, which frequently involve working with color-coded power cables and wires.

As a result of these concerns, TANGEDCO rejected the appellant's candidature. The appellant challenged this decision under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the Madras High Court initially ruled in his favor, directing TANGEDCO to offer him the position. However, in appeal before the division bench, the decision highlighted the evolving doctrine of proportionality, indicating that TANGEDCO's decision had a reasonable basis, even by this modern standard. Consequently, the division bench's judgment reversed the previous order, leading the appellant to seek redress from the Supreme Court. 

The SC bench noted that respondent TANGEDCO had not explicitly indicated that colour vision deficiency, in any form or degree, serves as a disqualifying factor for the role of an Assistant Engineer. It emphasized that the appellant, being a graduate in electrical engineering, possessed knowledge and experience related to the role's functions. Additionally, practical experience during the course exposed the candidate to equipment defects and solutions for breakdowns. Thus, the SC bench established the need for some form of accommodation.

The Court relied on Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 4 SCR 638 to highlight that when public facilities and services are designed with standards inaccessible to persons with disabilities, it results in their exclusion and a denial of rights. The concept of equality goes beyond merely preventing discrimination; it involves addressing systematic discrimination through positive rights, affirmative action, and reasonable accommodation.

The Court also cited the case of Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India  2021 (13) SCR 823, which distinguishes between formal equality and substantive equality. Substantive equality aims to achieve equal outcomes, and the principle of reasonable accommodation plays a critical role in this.

The Court observed that reasonable accommodation entails accommodating disabled individuals based on their capacities. It also relied on Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission  2021 (12) SCR 311, which held “The principle of reasonable accommodation acknowledges that if disability” should be remedied and opportunities are “to be affirmatively created for facilitating the development of the disabled. Reasonable accommodation is founded in the norm of inclusion. Exclusion results in the negation of individual dignity and worth or they can choose the route of reasonable accommodation, where each individual's dignity and worth is respected.”

The court also cited Ashutosh Kumar v. Film and Television Institute of India (2022),  where the Supreme Court directed the FTII to accommodate students with colour blindness saying, "The respondent institute is a premier institute and one would expect it to encourage liberate thought process and not put courses connected with films in any conformist box".

While  acknowledging the resondent's concerns about colour vision impairment, the Court reminded the TANGEDCO of its obligation to operate within the framework of "reasonable accommodation" as defined by Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act. Resultantly, the court set aside the impugned judgement of the Division bench of Madras High Court saying, “The impugned judgment cannot stand; it is set aside. TANGEDCO, the respondent corporation, is directed to appoint and continue the appellant in its service, as AE (Electrical) at the appropriate stage of the grade of pay,”.

During the hearing, the Court learnt that a member of the bar, Mr. Mehmoud Yumar Faruqi had life experiences of colour blindness -as someone living with a condition of colour blindness and had collected considerable case law and literature. The court had, therefore, requested his assistance for the proceedings. The court expressed its gratitude for his assistance.  

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Delhi High Court holds EPFO's action discriminatory in denying typing speed exemption to a candidate with upper limb disability.

Court: Delhi High Court 

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameshwar Rao & Honb'le Mr. Justice Anoop Kumar Mendiratta

Case No.: W.P.(C) 9255/2019

Case title: Raju Ranjan Vs. Union of India & Anr.

Date of Decision: 11 July 2023

Brief:

A division bench of the Delhi High Court ruled in favor of an disabled individual's on the issue of exemption from the computer typing test for individuals with upper limb disabilities in a case involving the Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO). 

The Court acknowledged that when a clerical position is designated as suitable for individuals with upper limb impairments, it becomes impermissible to subject such individuals to a pre-employment computer typing test. This is because persons with disabilities in their arm or hand may face significant challenges in maintaining the required typing speed. Consequently, such a typing test would be deemed arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible.

As a result of this judgment, the Delhi High Court directed the Employees Provident Fund Organization to grant an exemption to a candidate with a disability in one arm from the computer skill test for the position of Social Security Assistant. The candidate's employment eligibility would be determined solely based on their performance in the written examination.

The petitioner, who has a 40% Locomotor Disability affecting one arm, argued that the EPFO failed to appreciate the nature of their disability, despite presenting an Exemption Certificate issued by the Competent Authority.

It was observed that the EPFO had identified the Social Security Assistant position as suitable for individuals with one arm disabilities, thereby fulfilling their legal obligation under the 1995 Act. However, the recruitment rules for this position required a typing speed of at least 5000 Key Depressions Per Hour (KDPH) for data entry work. This requirement was deemed arbitrary and discriminatory toward individuals with physical handicaps, particularly those with one arm affected, as it would be virtually impossible for them to achieve this typing speed.

The only logical application of the job advertisement would have been to grant an exemption to physically handicapped individuals with one arm affected. Regrettably, this was not done, and the EPFO did not prescribe relaxed standards for candidates with such disabilities. The petitioner, for instance, was able to achieve a typing speed of only 1935 KDPH.

The petitioner argued that the EPFO's conduct revealed that they had identified the position as a mere formality to show compliance with legal provisions, rather than a genuine intention to extend the benefits of the Act to potential beneficiaries.

Furthermore, the EPFO's actions were found to be arbitrary and discriminatory. Internally, the EPFO had granted an exemption from the computer skill test to all physically challenged Lower Division Clerks (LDCs) for their promotion or absorption into the Social Security Assistant position, even if the disability affected both hands or had an impact on computer operations. 

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CCPD directs IBPS to allow examinee with vision disabilities to use digital magnifier during examination as a reasonable accommodation

Court: Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities

Date of Judgement: 03 July 2023

In a significant ruling, the Court of Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) addressed the case of a complainant with substantial hearing and visual disabilities seeking accommodation during the Institute of Banking and Personnel Services (IBPS) examination. The complainant, facing 93% hearing impairment and 75% visual impairment, requested the use of a digital magnifier to participate in the examination, crucial for reading questions displayed on a computer screen and subsequently recording answers on paper with the aid of a scribe.

IBPS, however, denied the use of the digital magnifier citing concerns over potential unfair advantages due to its photo capture and storage capabilities.

Legal Framework and Decision:

Under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the CCPD emphasized the obligation of the government to provide "reasonable accommodation" to persons with disabilities. The Commissioner underscored that such accommodation is not discretionary but a mandated protection against discrimination. The refusal to accommodate the complainant’s request was deemed discriminatory under this provision.

Commissioner’s Recommendation:

In response to the case, the CCPD directed IBPS to either vet the complainant's digital magnifier prior to the examination or alternatively provide an appropriate device themselves. This decision underscores the importance of accommodating technological aids that enable persons with disabilities to participate fully and fairly in competitive examinations.

This ruling sets a precedent for ensuring equitable access and opportunity for persons with disabilities in public examinations, reinforcing the principles of inclusivity and non-discrimination as enshrined in Indian disability rights law particularly teh concept of 'reasonable accommodation'.

Triputa HC: Employer's Failure To Meet Needs Of Disabled Persons Breaches Norms of "Reasonable Accommodation" [Judgement included]

Court: Tripura High Court, Agartala, India

Bench/Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arindam Lodh

Case Title:   WP(C) 694 of 2020 | Sri Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl v. Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited (TSECL) and Ors.

Date of Judgement:  01 Aug 2022

Cases Referred/quoted : Vikash Kumar Vrs. Union Pulbic Service Commission & Ors., (2021) 5 SCC 370. 

The case in brief

The petitioner was an employee of Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited. During the course of performing his duties, he met with an accident which rendered him disabled. He was not paid salary by the Corporation because he could not perform the duties he owed to the Corporation as their employee, though he was willing to join and perform duties which would be commensurate with his disability.

The Tripura High Court observed that employers must "reasonably accommodate" persons with disabiliteis into service and that failure to do so violates their rights under  The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The Court also refered to Secction 47 of the Persons with Disabilties  Act 1995 (now repealed) and a DoPT Memorandum dated 25 Feb 2015 on subject "Amendment to Central Civil Service (Leave) Rules, 1972 - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (PWD Act, 1995)- regarding" and  expressed that the aforesaid memorandum dated 25th February, 2015 was further reviewed in the year 2016 where the rights of persons with disabilities were not in any way diluted rather expanded the rights of such persons. It mandates that the State-employer must create conditions in which the barriers posed by disability can be overcome.

It is pertinent to note that the protections available under Secction 47 of the PWD Act 1995 have been contined in Section 20(4) of the RPWD Act 2016 as below:

"20. Non-discrimination in employment. - (1) No Government establishment shall discriminate against any person with disability in any matter relating to employment:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.

(2) Every Government establishment shall provide reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free and conducive environment to employees with disability.

(3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability.

(4) No Government establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his or her service:

Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

(5) The appropriate Government may frame policies for posting and transfer of employees with disabilities."

The single bench presided by Mr. Justice Arindam Lodh in his order remarked,  "The conduct of the concerned officer is not in consonance with the object the legislatures wanted to achieve. Keeping in mind the objectives of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the respondents should realize the challenge the petitioner has been facing and accommodate him with humane approach. Any failure to meet the needs of disabled person will definitely breach the norms of reasonable accommodation."

It is the case of the petitioner that while the petitioner was discharging his duties he suffered an accident and out of that accident, he became disabled. Due to such disability, he could not attend his duties. It is the contention of the respondents that the salary of the petitioner was duly paid upto 16.03.2020. Thereafter, no salary was paid to the petitioner though he was all along willing to join to perform his duties commensurate to his disability. From the report of the Standing Medical Board, it is clear that the petitioner was not in a position to perform his official and field level activities which may work out throughout the State. In spite of that report, the petitioner was not paid his due salary and other allowances treating his absence from duty as unauthorized.

Court noted that a plea has been taken that the respondents did not accept his joining report or leave application as he did not report to the joining authority in person. He expressed his willingness to join his duties by submitting an application to the authority concerned. But it was refused on the pretext that the petitioner was not physically appeared before the concerned authority which is not at all expected. The conduct of the concerned officer is not in consonance with the object the legislatures wanted to achieve.

Keeping in view the above objective, the court directed the respondents to "reasonably accommodate" the petitioner and passed the folloiwng order:

"(i) the respondents are to pay all the cumulative dues such as salary, allowances, etc. which were payable to the petitioner under his service conditions within a period of three month from today;

(ii) the salary and allowances payable to the petitioner shall be released from this month and regularize his service conditions by way of recalling all the earlier orders passed by TSECL treating his absence from duty as unauthorized absence. Those unauthorized absence period, according to the TSECL, shall be regularized and that would not have any bearing to the service of the petitioner;

 

(iii) if it is found that the petitioner is eligible to perform his duty, then, he may be permitted to undertake such duties. Further, if the petitioner is found to be unfit to perform the nature of duties, which he was performing before being disabled, then, he should be assigned/adjusted with such suitable duties which he would be able to discharge;

(iv) if the petitioner is found incapable of performing any kind of duties, then, the respondents are under obligation and shall pay all service benefits including the promotion to the petitioner by creating a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation;

(v) the respondents shall utilize capacity of the petitioner by providing and environment around him and ensure reasonable accommodation by way of making appropriate modifications and adjustments in the spirit of the discussions and observations made here-inabove;

(vi) the petitioner shall appear before the constituted Medical Board of the State Government within 7 (seven) days from today. The Medical Board shall examine and issue necessary certificate mentioning the extent of his disability in consonance with the RPwD Act; and

(vii) it is not advisable to send the petitioner to the Medical Board time and again."

What is missed in this judgement.

The judgement though extends relief to the petitioner, it  adopts some very poor legal reasoning for the relief provided.

Firstly, the judgement fails to appropriately explain the “reasonable accommodation” & its relation to the employment rules. In fact there was no reference needed to be made with reasonable accommodation since the law is clear on the protections available under the Act to a person acquirng disability while in service. It ensures that such a person will not be discriminated against merely because of the disabilty acquired and his job, post and related benefits would be protected even when the person is unable to perform any functions. 

Secondly, it presents that the barriers faced by disabled persons arise from their medical condition of disability, rather than the disabling environment around them which mmay be inform of inaccessible built environment, discriminatory employment policies and practices.

Thus the thought processs and the reasoning given in the judgemement doesn't gel with the overal scheme of the RPWD Act and jurisprudence developed through various case laws since 1996.

 

Read the judgement embedded below:

Supreme Court of India- Degree of disability no ground to deny reasonable accommodation [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud; Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice Sanjiv Khanna

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1882 of 2021 

Case Title: Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission & Others.

Date of Judgement: 11 February 2021  

Cited as:  2021 SCC OnLine SC 84

Cases refered/quoted: 

• Jeeja Ghosh vs. Union of India (2016)  7 SCC 761; 
• V Surendra Mohan vs. State of Tamil Nadu;  
• Rajive Raturi v. Union of India and Ors., 2017 ; 
• Disabled Rights Group and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 397.

Case Brief:

On February 11, 2021, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission (Vikash Kumar) held that that an individual with Writer’s Cramp or dysgraphia which is neither an identified disability in the Act nor has been certified as benchmark disability, is entitled to a scribe in India’s Civil Services’ Examination (CSE). 

The judgement is a significant step towards ensuring inclusivity for persons with disabilities as it emphatically affirms their position as rights bearers. It represents a move from a medical model of disability wherein disability is viewed as an affliction to a human rights model in consonance with the mandate of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCPRD).

This judgement proposes reasonable accommodation and non-discrimination as the fulcrum of contemporary disability jurisprudence. The judgement goes on to valorise the social model of disability and rejects the medical model of disability.

Case details:

In a landmark 62-page judgment, the Supreme Court of India has said that the principle of reasonable accommodation, spelt out in the 2016 Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, captures the positive obligation of the State and private parties to provide additional support to persons with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective participation in society. 

The Court further said that “…Cases such as the present offer us an opportunity to make a meaningful contribution in the project of creating the RPwD generation in India… A generation of disabled people in India which regards as its birthright access to the full panoply of constitutional entitlements, robust statutory rights geared to meet their unique needs and conducive societal conditions needed for them to flourish and to truly become co-equal participants in all facets of life.”

The case concerned a person with a chronic neurological condition resulting in Writer’s Cramp, or extreme difficulty in writing. He was denied a scribe for the Civil Services Exam by the UPSC, on the ground that he did not come within the definition of person with benchmark disability (40% or more of a specified disability).  The Court, in rejecting this stand, held that the petitioner was a person with disability and that provision of scribe to him came within the scope of reasonable accommodation.  The Court said ” … the accommodation which the law mandates is ‘reasonable’ because it has to be tailored to the requirements of each condition of disability. The expectations which every disabled person has are unique to the nature of the disability and the character of the impediments which are encountered as its consequence…”

In a detailed analysis of Indian and International disability law, the Court said that disability is a long-term condition which due to barriers in the environment hinders full and effective participation in society. Reasonable accommodation implies looking at the specific disabling condition and providing amenities in accordance. Examples: Blind persons need screen reading software to work on the computer, hearing impaired need sign language interpreters. Reasonable accommodation extends to all persons with disabilities, not just those with benchmark disabilities.

The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) argued that as per the CSE Rules 2018 a scribe could only be provided to blind candidates and candidates with locomotor disability and cerebral palsy which resulted in an impairment of function by at least 40%. The Supreme Court observed that the UPSC’s response was contrary to the reply filed by the nodal ministry in India for implementing the provisions of the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). The law had been enacted after India became a party to the UNCRPD in 2007.

The reply of the ministry recognised that there may be certain medical conditions not identified as disability per se but which have a detrimental impact on the writing capability of a person. Therefore, the onus was on the examining body, in consultation with India’s health ministry, to consider such cases for grant of scribe, extra time or other facilities, on production of a medical certificate. 

In this context, the Supreme Court noted that a ‘person with disability’ under the RPwD Act includes individuals with a ‘long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with various barriers, hinders full and effective participation in society equally with others’. The RPwD separately defines persons with ‘benchmark disability’ as those who are certified to have not less than 40% of the disabilities specified in the Schedule of the RPwD Act.

The Supreme Court opined that the higher threshold of benchmark disability could not be imposed to deny equal access to persons with disabilities contrary to the ethos of non-discrimination enshrined in the fundamental rights chapter of the Indian Constitution. 

The judgement clarified that the scheme of the RPwD Act imposed a benchmark disability as a precondition only for access to specific entitlements such as affirmative action as under Sections 32 and 34 of Chapter VI. In other words, the absence of benchmark disability could not be used to deny other forms of reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities. 

The bench relied upon the landmark precedent of Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India wherein it was held that equality is not only limited to preventing discrimination but also embraces a wide ambit of positive rights including reasonable accommodation. The principle of reasonable accommodation, the Court observed in Vikash Kumar, is a facet of substantive equality set out in General Comment 6 of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The Court also held that the denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes disability-based discrimination under Section 3 of the RPwD Act. The object of the provision is to ensure that persons with disabilities can overcome insidious barriers of exclusion without the imposition of a disproportionate burden. In this context, the state has an obligation to develop an appropriate environment guaranteeing equality of opportunity to persons with disabilities. Reasonable accommodation, such as the facility of a scribe, is therefore an enabling instrument for securing substantive equality.

Further, the state had raised a concern that the provision of a scribe could offer an undue advantage to persons with disabilities. In response, the Court pointed to  the absence of empirical data to hold that this argument of misuse was unsubstantiated. The unfounded suspicion, the Court also remarked, in fact perpetuated the stereotype that persons with disabilities have to resort to state largesse due to their inability to compete on a level-playing field.

Finally, the Court emphasised that it expected the government to consult persons with disabilities in a bid to democratise policy making. It remains to be seen whether such an endeavour results in lasting impact.

Read the judgement embedded below in Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1882 of 2021 titled as Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission & Others. 

Download the judgement  [418 KB]