Supreme Court Sets Four-Week Deadline for Appointment of Independent Disability Commissioners in the States and Centre in Rajive Raturi Vs Union of India

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case: Rajive Raturi v. Union of India & Others, W.P. (C) No. 243 of 2005 (along with connected matters)
Order Date: 29 July 2026

Next Date of Hearing: 20 January 2027

Statutory Provisions Involved

Provision	Subject	Relevance in this Order
Section 74, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities and Additional Commissioners	The Supreme Court directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with this provision.
Section 79, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities	The Court directed ten States/UTs to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks and clarified that the appointments must be made with independent charge, not as an additional charge.
Section 89, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Punishment for contravention of the Act, Rules or Regulations	The Court noted the absence of an effective mechanism for recovery of penalties under this provision and urged the Union Government to address this while finalising the Rules.
Rule 30, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017	Qualifications and eligibility for appointment of the Chief Commissioner	The Court specifically referred to Rule 30 and reminded the Union Government that a serving Government officer must retire from service before appointment as Chief Commissioner, thereby reinforcing the independence of the office.

Background

More than three years after the Supreme Court directed all States and Union Territories to appoint independent Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities by 31 August 2023, the issue has once again come before the Court owing to continued non-compliance by several Governments. In its order dated 17 July 2023 in Seema Girija Lal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had recognised that Commissioners perform crucial statutory functions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and directed all defaulting States and Union Territories to make appointments within a fixed timeline. Despite those directions, vacancies have continued in several jurisdictions, while the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also remained without a regular incumbent since 2019.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, while monitoring implementation of its landmark accessibility judgment in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, has once again intervened to strengthen the institutional framework under the RPwD Act. By its order dated 29 July 2026, the Court directed ten States and Union Territories to appoint independent State Commissioners within four weeks, directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within the same period, and issued further directions concerning the finalisation of accessibility rules and enforcement of the Act.

The matter has remained under continuous monitoring to ensure effective implementation of the judgment. Earlier, by an order dated 11 February 2026, the Court had sought detailed status reports from the Union Government regarding progress made in framing the new accessibility framework.

When the matter was taken up on 29 July 2026, the Court considered the latest status report filed by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD) and issued several important directions concerning the implementation of the RPwD Act. The order addresses three significant issues: the appointment of statutory disability commissioners, progress in framing accessibility rules, and strengthening enforcement mechanisms under the Act.

Accessibility Rules Under the RPwD Act

The Union Government informed the Court that substantial progress had been made in framing the new accessibility rules pursuant to the Supreme Court's judgment.

According to the status report placed before the Court:

• the draft notification relating to the built environment is ready for final notification;
• draft rules relating to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have already been published; and
• a draft report relating to assistive technologies, services and products has also been prepared.

Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that before the draft rules are finalised and notified, the suggestions already submitted by disability organisations and domain experts should be meaningfully considered so that no deficiencies remain in the final framework.

Accepting this submission, the Court observed that there should be no difficulty in ensuring that the Rules effectively fulfil the objectives of the RPwD Act. Noting that several stakeholders had already submitted detailed suggestions before the committees constituted by the Ministry, the Court urged the Union Government to carefully examine those recommendations before finalising the Rules.

The Bench observed that once the Rules are notified, shortcomings should not subsequently emerge that could have been addressed during the drafting stage itself.

The Court further requested the learned Additional Solicitors General to provide copies of the latest status report along with the draft Rules to all stakeholders so that they may examine the proposals and submit their responses at the earliest.

Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Independent State Commissioners

One of the most important aspects of the order concerns the continued absence of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities in several States and Union Territories.

During the hearing, Advocate Rahul Bajaj pointed out that despite the statutory requirement contained in Section 79 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several States had still not appointed State Commissioners. It was submitted that these authorities perform a crucial role in ensuring effective implementation of the Act and in providing an institutional mechanism for grievance redressal and monitoring compliance.

The Court recorded that the following States and Union Territories had not appointed State Commissioners:

• Delhi
• Haryana
• Rajasthan
• Himachal Pradesh
• Karnataka
• Tamil Nadu
• Sikkim
• Nagaland
• Puducherry
• Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed all these Governments to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with Section 79 of the RPwD Act. The Court made it clear that the direction must be strictly complied with, observing that any laxity would be viewed "very strictly".

Commissioner Must Hold Independent Charge

The Court also clarified an important aspect that has frequently arisen in disability governance.

Many States have, in the past, assigned the office of State Commissioner to serving officers as an additional charge, rather than appointing an independent statutory authority.

The Supreme Court expressly disapproved this practice and clarified:

"The State concerned shall appoint the Commissioner with an independent charge. The State should not appoint anyone as a Commissioner holding additional charge."

This clarification reinforces the independent character of the statutory office created under the RPwD Act.

Appointment of Chief Commissioner and Additional Commissioners

The Court also considered submissions regarding the prolonged vacancy in the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD). It was pointed out that since 2019 there has been no full-time Chief Commissioner, with the Secretary, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, functioning only as an officer holding additional charge.

Reference was made to Section 74 of the RPwD Act and Rule 30 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, which contemplate appointment of an independent Chief Commissioner and provide that a serving Government officer must retire from Government service before assuming the office.

Accepting these submissions, the Court directed the Union Government to complete the appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities; and two Additional Commissioners, within four weeks, in accordance with Section 74 of the RPwD Act. The Court also specifically invited the attention of the Union Government to Rule 30 while making these appointments.

Effective Recovery of Penalties Under Section 89

Another issue raised before the Court related to Section 89 of the RPwD Act, which prescribes penalties for contravention of the Act and the Rules.

Counsel submitted that although the Act provides for monetary penalties, it does not prescribe any effective mechanism for recovery of those fines, thereby limiting practical enforcement.

The Supreme Court requested the Union Government to consider incorporating an appropriate recovery mechanism while finalising the new Rules so that penalties under Section 89 can be effectively enforced.

Existing Accessibility Standards Continue to Apply

The Court also reiterated an important clarification contained in paragraph 83 of its judgment dated 8 November 2024.

The Bench noted the submission that while new accessibility standards are being framed, compliance with existing accessibility obligations must continue.

The Court reiterated that:

"progressive compliance with the standards listed in the existing Rule 15(1) and the progress towards the targets of the Accessible India Campaign must continue unabated."

This clarification is significant because it prevents authorities from postponing compliance on the ground that revised accessibility standards are under preparation.

Non-Negotiable Accessibility Norms to be Finalised Within Six Months

The Court directed that the issuance of the non-negotiable accessibility norms envisaged in the main judgment must be completed within six months. The matter has been directed to be listed on 20 January 2027 for reporting compliance with all directions issued by the Court.

Significance

The order strengthens the institutional framework established under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. For nearly seven years, the office of the Chief Commissioner has remained without a full-time incumbent, while several States have either failed to appoint State Commissioners altogether or have entrusted the office to officials holding additional charge. By directing appointments within a fixed time frame and expressly requiring independent charge, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that these statutory authorities are intended to function as independent oversight institutions rather than as additional responsibilities assigned to serving bureaucrats.

The order also ensures that the ongoing process of framing accessibility rules remains consultative and participatory by directing meaningful consideration of stakeholder inputs before final notification. At the same time, the Court has reiterated that existing accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act and the Accessible India Campaign remain fully enforceable until the new framework comes into force.

The proceedings will now continue on 20 January 2027, when the Supreme Court will examine compliance with these directions.

Read the Order dated 27 July 2026

Supreme Court Questions TET Requirement for Special Educators in Bihar: Where Is It Prescribed in the Recruitment Rules?

Court:               Supreme Court of India

Bench:               Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu

Case Title:        Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

Case No.:          W.P.(C) No. 132/2016

Order Dated:    28 July 2026

Issue:                 Whether TET can be insisted upon as an additional

                           qualification for appointment of Special Educators in Bihar

Introduction

Please refer to our earlier post dated 28 October 2021 titled Supreme Court Calls for Systemic Reform in Recruitment of Special Teachers for Children with Disabilities in the above matter.

The Supreme Court, while hearing the continuing proceedings in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., has questioned the legal basis for requiring Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) qualification for appointment as Special Educators in Bihar. The Court is examining whether TET was actually prescribed in the applicable recruitment rules before it was introduced as an eligibility condition.

The Issue Before the Supreme Court

Can a State require a Special Educator to possess a Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) qualification when the applicable recruitment rules do not clearly prescribe TET for the post?

This question has acquired considerable importance in the continuing proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the availability and appointment of Special Educators for children with disabilities.

The proceedings arise against the backdrop of a larger concern: children with disabilities cannot receive meaningful inclusive education unless schools have an adequate number of appropriately qualified Special Educators.

The Court's order dated 28 July 2026 does not finally decide whether TET is mandatory for Special Educators. Instead, it raises an important preliminary question—what is the legal source of the TET requirement in Bihar?

Background

The Supreme Court has been monitoring issues concerning the appointment and availability of Special Educators in different States.

In the Bihar recruitment process, the question arose whether candidates possessing the requisite qualification recognised by the Rehabilitation Council of India (RCI) could nevertheless be excluded because they did not possess TET qualification.

The figures placed before the Court demonstrate the practical consequences.

Out of 7,279 sanctioned posts, 816 posts were stated to be reserved for contractual teachers. Following verification of documents relating to 788 candidates, only 139 candidates were found to possess both RCI and TET qualifications.

The remaining 649 candidates did not possess TET qualification and, consequently, were not recommended for appointment.

This led to a fundamental question: if these candidates possessed the professional qualification prescribed for Special Educators under the RCI framework, could the State nevertheless exclude them on the basis of TET?

The petitioners also relied upon the position taken by the RCI that TET is not an RCI-mandated qualification for Special Educators.

The controversy, therefore, is not merely about one additional examination. It concerns the relationship between:

• professional qualification and registration under the RCI framework;
• general teacher eligibility requirements;
• State-specific recruitment rules; and
• the urgent need for Special Educators in schools serving children with disabilities.

What Did the Supreme Court Ask?

During the hearing, the Bench closely examined the language of the Bihar recruitment rules. Justice Dipankar Datta questioned the basis for treating the relevant TET provision as applicable to Special Educators.

The Court's questioning essentially went to the heart of the matter:

Where, in the applicable recruitment rules, is TET prescribed as a mandatory qualification for Special Educators?

The Bench also examined whether the rule relied upon by the State was actually a provision concerning general school teachers and, if so, whether it could automatically be extended to Special Educators.

This distinction is important. A Special Educator is not simply a general teacher with an additional disability-related role. Special Educators undergo specialised professional education and are regulated within the RCI framework.

Consequently, if the State wishes to impose an additional qualification upon this specialised professional category, there must be a clear legal and regulatory basis for doing so.

RCI Qualification and TET: Two Different Questions

The proceedings also bring into focus an important distinction between professional qualification and eligibility for a particular government recruitment process.

RCI recognition and registration are concerned with professional competence and regulation in rehabilitation and special education.

TET, on the other hand, is a teacher-eligibility mechanism generally associated with school-teaching appointments.

The existence of one qualification does not necessarily answer the question whether another qualification may be prescribed.

At the same time, the fact that TET is not an RCI qualification does not, by itself, mean that a State can never prescribe TET as an additional recruitment requirement.

The crucial question is therefore:

Was TET validly prescribed for the particular post under the applicable recruitment rules?

That is the question the Supreme Court has asked the State of Bihar to address.

Why the Recruitment Rules Matter

Eligibility conditions in public employment cannot ordinarily rest merely upon administrative practice or an assumption that a qualification applicable to one category of employees automatically applies to another.

The recruitment rules governing the post are therefore critical.

The Supreme Court has directed the Bihar Government to clarify whether the relevant rules were amended before the recruitment advertisement was issued so as to make TET mandatory.

This temporal question is also significant.

If a qualification was not prescribed in the governing rules when the recruitment process was initiated, the State would have to explain the legal basis for subsequently treating it as an eligibility condition.

The Court has, therefore, adopted a cautious approach: rather than immediately deciding the validity of the TET requirement, it has asked the State to establish the precise statutory and regulatory foundation of its position.

649 Candidates & Human Consequence of an Eligibility Rule

The numbers placed before the Court illustrate why this is more than a technical recruitment dispute.

Of the 788 candidates whose documents were verified:

• 139 reportedly possessed both RCI and TET qualifications.
• 649 reportedly possessed the relevant RCI qualification but lacked TET and were therefore not recommended.

In other words, a large majority of the candidates considered in this exercise were potentially excluded because of the additional TET requirement.

The consequence extends beyond the candidates themselves. Every unfilled Special Educator position has a potential impact on children with disabilities who depend upon specialised educational support.

A recruitment rule that excludes otherwise professionally qualified Special Educators may therefore have implications for the implementation of the right to education and the right to inclusive education.

Does the Supreme Court Say TET Is Not Required?

No—not yet.

This is an important qualification while reporting the order.

The Supreme Court's 28 July 2026 order is interlocutory. It does not finally hold that TET is not required for Special Educators.

Nor does the order establish a universal rule that every RCI-qualified Special Educator must necessarily be appointed without TET.

Rather, the Court is examining whether Bihar had a lawful basis for imposing TET as an additional qualification in the particular recruitment process.

The Court has accordingly sought an affidavit from the State addressing whether the relevant recruitment rules had been amended before the advertisement was issued.

The distinction is important because the larger proceedings have also considered the possibility of States prescribing TET as an additional qualification. The legal question is therefore not simply whether TET is “good” or “bad” for Special Educators, but whether and how it can lawfully be prescribed.

A Larger Question: Should Special Educators Have a Specialised TET?

The proceedings nevertheless raise a legitimate policy question.

If TET is considered necessary for Special Educators, should the test itself be designed around the competencies required of Special Educators?

A general TET is intended to assess competencies associated with teaching.

Special Education requires additional and distinct professional competencies, including understanding of:

• disability-specific educational needs;
• individualised education and support planning;
• assistive technology;
• alternative and augmentative communication;
• reasonable accommodation;
• universal design for learning;
• accessible teaching-learning materials;
• behavioural and psychosocial support;
• communication with families and caregivers; and
• inclusive classroom practices.

The question, therefore, is not whether quality standards should be maintained. They unquestionably should.

The question is whether a general teacher-eligibility test is the appropriate instrument for assessing the professional competence of a Special Educator.

If an additional national eligibility examination is considered necessary, there is a strong case for ensuring that it is appropriately designed around the actual professional competencies required in special and inclusive education.

Implications Under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

The issue also needs to be viewed against the statutory framework of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

Section 16 of the Act requires educational institutions to provide inclusive education to children with disabilities and take specified measures to ensure their participation and access to education.

Section 17 further requires governments and local authorities to take measures for facilitating inclusive education.

These statutory obligations cannot be implemented merely by declaring that education is inclusive.

There must be trained human resources to make inclusion work.

Special Educators play a critical role in this ecosystem. Their availability is particularly important for children who require specialised educational interventions, accommodations, communication support, assistive technologies or individualised educational strategies.

Consequently, recruitment policies affecting the availability of Special Educators must also be examined in the context of the State's obligation to ensure meaningful access to inclusive education.

The Supreme Court's Approach: Qualification Must Have a Legal Foundation

One of the most important aspects of the present proceedings is the Court's insistence on identifying the legal source of an eligibility requirement.

It is entirely legitimate for the State to prescribe appropriate qualifications for public employment.

But an eligibility condition must have a legal foundation.

A qualification prescribed for general teachers cannot necessarily be presumed to apply to every specialised category of teaching professionals.

This is particularly relevant where the specialised category is separately regulated through a statutory professional framework.

The Supreme Court's questioning therefore reinforces a basic principle of public recruitment:

Eligibility conditions must flow from the applicable rules and cannot simply be assumed.

What Happens Next?

The Supreme Court has directed the Government of Bihar to file an affidavit clarifying the position concerning RCI registration and TET qualification, including whether the applicable recruitment rules were amended before the recruitment advertisement.

The matter was listed for further consideration on 4 August 2026, along with matters concerning Special Educator appointments in Delhi, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh.

The Court also did not impose a rigid four-week deadline for appointment letters, noting the practical consideration of the frequency of meetings of the State Cabinet.

The ultimate determination could therefore have implications extending beyond Bihar.

Why This Matters

The case sits at the intersection of professional regulation, public employment and the right to inclusive education.

For Special Educators, the outcome may determine whether RCI qualifications are sufficient for particular government appointments or whether States may additionally insist upon TET.

For governments, the case highlights the importance of ensuring that recruitment advertisements faithfully reflect the governing statutory and regulatory framework.

For children with disabilities, however, there is an even more fundamental concern.

A right to inclusive education is meaningful only when the education system has the human resources necessary to deliver it.

If recruitment requirements unnecessarily narrow the pool of professionally qualified Special Educators, vacancies may remain unfilled. Conversely, if additional qualifications are genuinely necessary to ensure quality teaching, they must be appropriately designed and legally prescribed.

The objective should be neither dilution of professional standards nor unnecessary exclusion of qualified professionals.

It should be quality, specialised and accessible education for every child with disability.

What the Supreme Court May Ultimately Clarify

The continuing proceedings have the potential to provide important clarity on several questions:

1. Is TET universally applicable to Special Educators, or does its applicability depend upon the recruitment rules governing a particular post?
2. Can a State impose TET as an additional qualification where the applicable recruitment rules prescribe RCI qualifications but do not expressly prescribe TET?
3. What is the relationship between RCI professional qualifications and State teacher-recruitment qualifications?
4. Can a qualification introduced through an advertisement be sustained if it was not prescribed in the governing rules at the relevant time?
5. If TET is considered necessary for Special Educators, should there be a specialised test reflecting the competencies of special and inclusive education?

The answers could influence Special Educator recruitment policies across several States.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's order dated 28 July 2026 should therefore be understood as an important judicial inquiry, rather than a final ruling on the necessity of TET for Special Educators.

Its significance lies in the Court's insistence that the State identify the legal basis for an eligibility condition that has resulted in hundreds of RCI-qualified candidates being excluded from consideration.

At the same time, the proceedings raise a broader question about how India regulates and recruits the professionals who make inclusive education possible.

The objective should be to ensure that every child with disability has access to adequately trained, professionally competent and sufficient numbers of Special Educators.

The Supreme Court's eventual decision may help strike that balance—between maintaining professional standards, respecting specialised qualifications and ensuring that recruitment rules do not themselves become a barrier to fulfilling the promise of inclusive education.

For now, the key takeaway is simple: TET cannot be treated as mandatory for Special Educators merely by assumption. Its applicability must be traceable to the governing legal and recruitment framework.

Read the Order

Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 132/2016, order dated 28 July 2026, 

Disclaimer: This article discusses an interlocutory order and should not be read as a final determination by the Supreme Court that TET is either universally mandatory or universally unnecessary for Special Educators. The question remains under consideration in the continuing proceedings.

Probationer Also an 'Employee' Under RPwD Act, Can't be Terminated on Acquiring Disability During Service - says Rajasthan HC

Rajasthan High Court Protects Probationer from Termination on Acquiring Disability; Says  Section 20 of RPwD Act protects government employee who acquires disability during service, irrespective of probationary status

Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur
Bench: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Rekha Borana
Case: Sanjay Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Case No.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3504/2026
Date of Judgment: 22 July 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JP:28292

Background

The Rajasthan High Court has held that a government employee cannot be terminated merely because the employee acquires a disability during service, even where the employee is still on probation.

The petitioner, Sanjay Choudhary, was appointed as a Constable on 3 June 2013. During his probation, he met with an accident on 29 June 2014 and subsequently suffered 100% disability, certified by the competent Medical Board.

Despite the disability having been acquired during service, his services were terminated by order dated 19 June 2018 with effect from 29 June 2014 on the ground that he was no longer capable of performing the duties of a Constable.

The petitioner challenged the termination before the High Court, relying upon Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

The State contended that the petitioner was only a probationer-trainee and had not been confirmed in service and, therefore, could not claim the protection available to an employee under Section 20. The High Court rejected this contention.

Protection Under Section 20 Extends to Probationers

Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act prohibits a Government establishment from dispensing with or reducing in rank an employee who acquires a disability during service.

Where the employee becomes unsuitable for the post held, the establishment is required to shift the employee to another post carrying the same pay scale and service benefits. If this is not possible, the employee is to be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post becomes available or until superannuation, whichever is earlier.

Justice Rekha Borana held that the provision uses the expression “employee” and does not exclude a person merely because the appointment is still under probation.

The Court rejected the argument that an employee ceases to receive statutory protection simply because confirmation in service has not yet taken place.

The Court relied, among other precedents, upon decisions concerning the corresponding protection under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, including Union of India v. Pramod Sadashiv Thakre and Pawan Kumar v. Delhi Transport Corporation.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab concerning the legal protection available to probationers.

Recent Supreme Court Judgment in Bali Ram Reinforces the Principle

The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court's recent judgment in Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, 2026 INSC 689, decided on 13 July 2026.

In Bali Ram, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the statutory protection applicable to an employee acquiring disability during service requires the employer to consider alternative employment carrying the same pay and service benefits and, where necessary, a supernumerary post. (See our DRI Post in Bali Ram) 

The Rajasthan High Court applied this principle to the petitioner's case and found that his termination on account of disability was contrary to Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

Termination Contrary to Section 20

The High Court held that the petitioner's termination was in “total contravention” of Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

The Court also rejected reliance upon Clause 10 of the Memorandum dated 9 May 2013, observing that the provision concerned government servants who died during probation and could not be applied to an employee who had acquired a disability during service.

The statutory obligation was to explore suitable alternative employment rather than terminate the petitioner on account of his disability.

Relief Granted

The High Court quashed the termination order dated 19 June 2018 and directed that the petitioner be deemed to be in service and reinstated.

The Court further directed:

• payment of 50% of salary arrears for the period from 29 June 2014 to 11 February 2026;
• grant of consequential service benefits, including increments and promotion, up to the date of superannuation;
• payment of all consequential retiral benefits upon superannuation;
• adjustment of amounts already paid towards gratuity, NPS or other heads against the salary arrears; and
• payment of the arrears within six weeks.
• In case of default beyond the stipulated period, the outstanding amount would carry 6% interest per annum.

Significance

The judgment is significant because it makes clear that probationary status cannot be used to defeat the statutory protection against termination on account of acquired disability.

Section 20 does not distinguish between a confirmed employee and a probationer. Once an employee acquires a disability during service, the Government establishment must examine reasonable accommodation and alternative employment before considering separation.

The judgment also reinforces the principle that the law requires retention rather than ouster. An employee who becomes unsuitable for the existing post because of disability is not to be treated as having lost the right to employment. The statutory scheme requires the employer to explore another suitable post carrying the same pay and service benefits and, where necessary, to retain the employee against a supernumerary post.

The decision is particularly relevant for government establishments, where probationary appointments should not become a means of circumventing the protection guaranteed by Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

It also fits within the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation in Bali Ram (above) that disability acquired during service attracts a positive obligation on the employer to protect continuity of employment rather than simply terminate the employee.

The judgment thus reinforces an important principle of disability rights law: acquiring a disability during service does not terminate the employment relationship; it triggers the employer's obligation to accommodate and retain the employee.

Read the judgement below 

Sanjay Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3504/2026 [PDF 275KB]

Supreme Court Reaffirms Duty to Accommodate Employees Acquiring Disabilities: CRPF Constable Awarded ₹1.25 Crore Compensation

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih
Case: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 689
Date of Judgment: 13 July 2026

In a landmark judgment reaffirming the right of employees who acquire disabilities during service to continue in employment with dignity, the Supreme Court has dismissed the Union Government's appeal against a visually impaired CRPF constable and upheld the statutory protection contained in Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“PwD Act”). The Court awarded the respondent, Bali Ram, a consolidated compensation of ₹1.25 crore towards back wages, interest and litigation costs.

The judgment is significant not merely for the relief granted to an individual constable who was unlawfully invalidated from service nearly three decades ago, but for its emphatic reiteration that government employers are under a positive obligation to accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Facts of the Case

Bali Ram joined the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as a Constable (Driver) in 1985 after being found medically fit. In 1996, while in service, he developed an ophthalmic condition diagnosed as Disseminated Choroiditis with retinal atrophic patches and macular involvement, resulting in complete blindness in his left eye and partial impairment in his right eye.

Following medical examinations, the Departmental Rehabilitation Board declared him unfit for driving and combatant duties. Subsequently, the Medical Board at the CRPF Base Hospital in Hyderabad concluded that he was permanently incapacitated and unfit for further service in any capacity within the force.

On 11 March 1998, Bali Ram was medically invalidated from service. His subsequent representations seeking redress were rejected, with the authorities taking the position that his disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by service and that he was entitled only to a lump-sum payment of ₹15,000 under the applicable rules.

Aggrieved, Bali Ram approached the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

High Court's Intervention

The Single Judge of the High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, held that the CRPF had acted in violation of Section 47 of the PwD Act. The Court quashed the order of invalidation and directed that Bali Ram be deemed to have remained in service with all consequential benefits.

The Division Bench affirmed the decision in 2014, rejecting the CRPF's appeal.

The Union of India then carried the matter to the Supreme Court.

Section 47: A Mandatory Obligation, Not a Matter of Choice

At the heart of the case lay Section 47 of the PwD Act, which prohibits an establishment from dispensing with the services of an employee who acquires a disability during service. If the employee becomes unsuitable for the post he occupies, the employer must shift him to another post carrying the same pay and service benefits or retain him on a supernumerary post until retirement.

Reiterating the principles laid down in Kunal Singh, the Supreme Court observed:

“The duty imposed by the PwD Act being mandatory and not discretionary, the law did not leave the appellants with an option to discharge their duty at their convenience. Appellants were required to find a chair for the respondent, and not wait for the respondent to beg for one.”

The Court held that Section 47 imposes a positive duty upon the employer to identify suitable alternative employment and that the obligation cannot be shifted onto the employee.

Relief Beyond Pleadings: A Significant Pronouncement

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the Court's discussion on whether constitutional courts can grant relief that has not been specifically sought.

The Supreme Court noted that Bali Ram had originally sought invalid pension and related benefits and had not expressly invoked Section 47. Nevertheless, the High Court had granted him broader relief. The Supreme Court upheld this approach and laid down an important principle:

“Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.”

The Court held that where the record clearly demonstrates that a litigant is entitled to wider relief, and denial of such relief would perpetuate injustice merely because of defective pleadings or inadequate legal assistance, constitutional courts may mould relief appropriately.

This part of the judgment will have implications extending far beyond disability jurisprudence.

Waiver of Disability Rights Rejected

The Union Government argued that Bali Ram had waived his right under Section 47 because he had accepted pensionary benefits and had never specifically sought reinstatement.

Rejecting the argument, the Court held that waiver requires conscious and informed relinquishment of a known right. Since there was no evidence that Bali Ram was ever informed of his statutory rights under the PwD Act, the plea of waiver was untenable.

The Court also observed that waiver of statutory rights under welfare legislation is generally disfavoured.

Exemption Notification Could Not Operate Retrospectively

The Union further relied upon a notification dated 10 September 2002 exempting combatant personnel of the Central Para Military Forces from the operation of Section 47.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument outright. It held that the notification was prospective and could not validate an action that had already become illegal in 1998.

The Court observed:

“The right of the respondent crystallised on the date of ouster; and a later exemption from the statutory mandate cannot efface the breach already committed.”

Importantly, the Court noted that the very issuance of the exemption notification in 2002 demonstrated that the Central Government itself recognised that Section 47 fully applied to the CRPF between 1995 and 2002.

A Sharp Rebuke to the CRPF

The judgment contains unusually strong observations regarding the conduct of the CRPF.

The Bench remarked:

“By not offering alternate posting, the appellants failed in their role as a model employer and converted a welfare provision into a dead letter.”

It further expressed surprise that an instrumentality of the State functioning under the Ministry of Home Affairs could ignore statutory protections available to persons with disabilities.

The Court categorically rejected the argument that disability protection applies only where disability is attributable to service:

“Parliament did not limit Section 47 to disabilities attributable to service; the protection is unqualified and unconditional.”

The focus, the Court held, must be on accommodation rather than exclusion.

Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement

The Court noted that Bali Ram had already crossed the age of superannuation and that reinstatement was therefore no longer possible. By the Court's own calculation, he would have received over ₹82 lakh in salary and allowances had he remained in service.

Recognising that Bali Ram had spent nearly three decades outside employment and had suffered economic hardship despite obtaining a favourable High Court judgment in 2008, the Court held:

“The situation of non-employment of the respondent is entirely the appellants’ creation.”

The Supreme Court consequently modified the High Court's order and awarded him ₹1.25 crore, inclusive of back wages, interest and costs, payable within eight weeks.

The Court also directed the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority or the District Legal Services Authority, Kangra, to assist the visually impaired respondent in safely investing the compensation and attending to his future medical needs.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment strengthens disability rights jurisprudence in at least four important ways.

First, it reiterates that Section 47 of the 1995 Act—and its successor provision, Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—creates a mandatory duty to retain and accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Second, it recognises reasonable accommodation as a constitutional imperative flowing from substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21. The Court expressly relied on Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India to underline that disability is socially constructed and that exclusion results from the failure to create enabling conditions.

Third, it rejects procedural technicalities and the doctrine of waiver as tools to defeat welfare legislation.

Finally, the judgment sends a clear message that public employers cannot evade their responsibilities by citing administrative inconvenience or belated exemption notifications.

For persons with disabilities and their advocates, Union of India v. Bali Ram is a powerful reminder that the law requires the State not merely to refrain from discrimination, but to actively create space for inclusion. The Supreme Court's observation that employers must “find a chair” for an employee who acquires a disability may well become one of the defining statements in India's disability rights jurisprudence.

Download the judgement in: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015, decided on 13 July 2026.

Punjab & Haryana High Court Expands the Meaning of "Medical Emergency" for Persons with Progressive Disabilities

Court: Punjab and Haryana High Court
Bench: Mr. Justice Harpreet Singh Brar
Case Title: Sunil Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors., 
Case No. CWP-2098-2026
Decision Date: 07 July 2026

Background

In a significant judgment strengthening the employment and healthcare rights of persons with disabilities, the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that a government employee who acquired 100% locomotor disability due to Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) cannot be denied statutory protections merely because his treatment was taken in a non-empanelled hospital or because the authorities adopted a narrow understanding of the term "emergency."

The petitioner, an Assistant with the Haryana Board of School Education, developed ALS—a progressive and incurable neurological disorder—during service. After undergoing specialised stem cell therapy in Bengaluru, his claim for medical reimbursement was rejected on the ground that the treatment was not certified as an "emergency." He also sought protection of his employment under Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, including accommodation on a suitable post or creation of a supernumerary post.

The Court's Findings

The court articulated its decision through several core legal and humanitarian principles:

1. The Right to Life and Self-Preservation (Article 21)

The court emphasized that the preservation of human life is instinctive, sacred, precious, and inviolable. Under Article 21, the State bears a fundamental obligation to ensure timely medical care to those in need. The court ruled that the State cannot reasonably expect citizens to refrain from seeking life-saving or specialized care simply because a hospital is non-empanelled. Denying reimbursement under these circumstances fails the test of fairness and reasonableness, thereby violating fundamental constitutional rights.

2. A Disability-Inclusive Redefinition of "Emergency"

The state had originally denied the petitioner's claim based on an opinion from the Civil Surgeon stating the treatment was not an "Medical Emergency". The court sharply rejected this narrow interpretation, noting that the conventional understanding of an "emergency"—which looks only for immediate crises or imminent death—is inherently  "able-bodied centric".

For individuals suffering from progressive, degenerative chronic diseases like Motor Neuron Disease / Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), the court ruled that the definition of an emergency must be wider. It must encompass situations where a delay in medical intervention would result in a rapid, irreversible loss of bodily functions and permanent damage. Seeking immediate, specialized stem cell therapy to halt rapid degeneration meets this inclusive standard of an emergency.

3. Protection for Chronic Diseases

Relying on established judicial precedent (State of Haryana vs. Manoj Jain), the court noted that medical reimbursement claims for recognized chronic diseases cannot be denied solely on technical or bureaucratic grounds. Because the petitioner's condition was categorized as a Chronic Disease by the State Government, the test of essentiality was satisfied. The court affirmed that the petitioner could not be faulted for prioritizing immediate, specialized treatment to safeguard their quality of life over waiting for administrative approvals.

On the employment issue, the Court reaffirmed the mandate of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016, holding that an employee who acquires a disability during service is entitled to be shifted to a suitable post with the same pay and service benefits. If no suitable post is immediately available, the employer must consider the statutory mechanism of a supernumerary post rather than depriving the employee of livelihood or forcing prolonged leave without pay. The Court emphasised that reasonable accommodation must be meaningful and not merely symbolic.

Why This Judgment Matters

This decision is important because it moves disability jurisprudence beyond formal equality and recognises that legal concepts such as "medical emergency" must be interpreted through the lived realities of persons with disabilities. The judgment reinforces that administrative rules governing medical reimbursement and employment cannot be applied mechanically where doing so defeats the objectives of the RPwD Act, 2016 and the constitutional promise of dignity under Article 21.

For government employers across India, the judgment serves as a reminder that the duty to provide reasonable accommodation extends beyond physical accessibility and includes fair decisions relating to medical treatment, continuation of service, and protection of livelihood for employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Read the judgement

Sunil Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors. CWP-2098-2026 dated 07 July 2026 [PDF 271 KB]