Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Case: Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 4665–4666 of 2025
Date of Judgment: 19 June 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 647
In a landmark judgment with far-reaching implications for urban planning, disability rights, and inclusive mobility, the Supreme Court of India has declared that the right to walk on safe and demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
The Court held that this right flows from Article 19(1)(d), which guarantees freedom of movement (All citizens shall have the right…to move freely throughout the territory of India), read together with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), and Article 21.
Significantly, the Court declared that the rights of pedestrians have primacy over motorised transport, marking a decisive shift away from the long-standing vehicle-centric approach to urban development.
Tragic Facts, Transformative Jurisprudence
The case arose from the death of a five-year-old child who was walking to school with his father when a tanker struck him from behind. The Court noted that there was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing on the road where the accident occurred.
While adjudicating the compensation claim, the Court moved beyond the immediate facts to examine a larger constitutional question: whether citizens possess an enforceable right to safe walking infrastructure.
Answering in the affirmative, the Court observed:
"The right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. The fundamental right to walk will take within its sweep the right to demarcated footpaths. These rights are primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles."
Walking Is Not a Privilege—It Is a Constitutional Right
In a powerful articulation of the constitutional value of walking, the Court observed that the right to move under Article 19(1)(d) cannot be reduced to movement on wheels.
The judgment recognises that walking is deeply connected to human dignity, expression, association, participation in public life, and access to opportunities. It noted that Indian cities and towns have systematically prioritised motor vehicles at the cost of pedestrians, resulting in the exclusion of millions of citizens from public spaces.
The Court lamented that pedestrians are often treated as "a nuisance" on roads that should belong to everyone.
Accessibility: A Major Win for Persons with Disabilities
Although the case did not arise directly under the disability rights framework, the judgment has profound implications for persons with disabilities, older persons, children, and all vulnerable road users.
For persons with disabilities, the right to walk on demarcated footpaths cannot be interpreted merely as the existence of a physical pathway. The constitutional guarantee necessarily requires accessible, continuous, unobstructed, and universally designed pedestrian infrastructure.
This includes:
- Step-free and barrier-free footpaths;
- Accessible kerb ramps at crossings;
- Tactile guiding and warning indicators;
- Adequate width for wheelchair users and persons using mobility aids;
- Audible pedestrian signals;
- Non-slip surfaces;
- Removal of encroachments and street-level obstacles;
- Accessible wayfinding and signage.
The judgment reinforces the obligations already imposed under the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities' notified accessibility standards, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Rules framed thereunder, and the Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India.
A footpath that cannot be used safely and independently by persons with disabilities cannot be regarded as a constitutionally compliant footpath.
Duty Bearers Identified
The Court clearly identified the authorities responsible for ensuring the right to walk:
- Urban Development Authorities;
- Municipal Corporations;
- Municipalities; and
- Panchayats.
The Court held that where a road exists, there is a corresponding obligation to ensure the existence and maintenance of safe and demarcated footpaths.
This is not a matter of policy discretion but a constitutional duty.
Constitutional Remedies Beyond Motor Accident Claims
In an important clarification, the Court held that remedies under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, are not sufficient to protect pedestrian rights.
Citizens whose right to walk is violated can seek constitutional remedies, including restitution and compensation, directly against the authorities responsible for creating and maintaining pedestrian infrastructure.
The Court observed that these remedies are independent of claims available under the Motor Vehicles Act.
This finding significantly expands accountability for inaccessible and unsafe public infrastructure.
Continuing the Trajectory of Pedestrian Rights
The present judgment builds upon the Supreme Court's earlier interventions in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India concerning road safety and pedestrian infrastructure.
Notably, in 2025, the Supreme Court recognised that footpaths must remain unobstructed and accessible to all users, including persons with disabilities. The Court directed authorities across the country to ensure the removal of encroachments and the creation of disability-friendly pedestrian infrastructure.
Disability Rights India had previously covered that important development in its article, "Supreme Court of India Upholds Right to Accessible and Obstruction-Free Footpaths for Persons with Disabilities."
Today's judgment elevates that principle to a higher constitutional plane by expressly declaring the right to walk on demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right.
Call for a Dedicated Legislative Framework
Recognising the absence of a comprehensive legal framework governing pedestrian rights, the Court directed that copies of the judgment be forwarded to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways, as well as the Law Commission of India.
The Court emphasised the need for legislation that:
- Formally recognises the right to walk;
- Clearly identifies duty bearers;
- Establishes enforcement mechanisms;
- Provides effective remedies; and
- Creates an independent regulatory framework for pedestrian infrastructure.
Why This Judgment Matters
For decades, persons with disabilities have argued that inaccessible footpaths deny them the ability to access education, employment, healthcare, recreation, justice, and participation in community life. The Supreme Court has now unequivocally recognised that walking infrastructure is not merely a matter of urban design—it is a matter of constitutional rights.
This judgment also speaks to the everyday reality faced by millions of families across India. In the absence of safe, continuous and dedicated pedestrian footpaths, parents are often compelled to use private vehicles or hire school transport services merely to drop and pick up their children from schools located less than a kilometre away. This dependence on motorised transport is not a matter of choice but a consequence of unsafe public spaces. It discourages walking, increases traffic congestion, worsens air pollution, and deprives children and families of the well-documented physical and mental health benefits associated with regular walking.
As the Court reminds us, walking is far more than a mode of transport—it is a social, cultural and democratic act deeply embedded in India's collective consciousness, from Mahatma Gandhi's historic Dandi March to countless everyday journeys that connect people to their communities.
The true measure of this judgment will lie in whether governments and local bodies transform this constitutional promise into universally accessible, safe and walkable streets for everyone. The right to walk must now mean the right of every person—including persons with disabilities, children, older persons and other vulnerable road users—to move safely, independently and with dignity.
Read the Judgment:
Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., 2026 INSC 647 (19 June 2026).