Showing posts with label Karnataka High Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Karnataka High Court. Show all posts

Monday, June 1, 2026

Universal Accessibility Gets Judicial Backing: Karnataka High Court Issues Comprehensive SOP, Declares Accessibility a Fundamental Right

Court: High Court of Karnataka
Bench: Justice Suraj Govindaraj
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 11351 of 2020
Case Title: PSBB Learning Leadership Academy v. Mrs. Barnali Rout & Others
Date of Judgment: 1 June 2026

Introduction

In a judgment that may significantly influence the future of accessibility jurisprudence in India, the Karnataka High Court has issued a comprehensive Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Universal Accessibility covering government institutions, private establishments, educational institutions, transport infrastructure, public spaces, housing developments, and digital platforms.

The judgment arose from a dispute involving a teacher who acquired a severe locomotor disability while attempting to save a student from a potentially fatal incident. However, the Court transformed what began as an individual grievance into an opportunity to address the systemic barriers faced by persons with disabilities across Karnataka.

The resulting 465-page judgment stands out as one of the most comprehensive judicial interventions on accessibility ever delivered by an Indian court. Our sector colleague Dr. Jayna Kothari, Senior Advocate represented the Respondents in the case.

The Background

Mrs. Barnali Rout, a teacher employed by PSBB Learning Leadership Academy, Bengaluru, suffered a serious spinal injury in August 2013 while attempting to prevent a student from jumping from a school building. The incident left her with approximately 90% permanent locomotor disability.

The State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities directed the school to pay compensation and provide relief. The school challenged the Commissioner's order before the Karnataka High Court, raising multiple legal questions, including:

  • Whether the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 applies to private educational institutions.
  • Whether private employers are obligated to provide reasonable accommodation.
  • Whether the State Commissioner possesses authority to issue corrective directions.
  • What obligations educational institutions owe to employees who acquire disabilities during service.

The Court answered each of these questions in favour of a robust and purposive interpretation of disability rights.

Accessibility Is a Fundamental Right

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the judgment is its unequivocal recognition that accessibility is not a welfare measure.

The Court held that accessibility flows directly from the guarantees of equality, dignity, freedom, and life under the Constitution. Drawing from Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 38, 41, and 46, the Court declared that accessibility is a fundamental right and not an act of charity.

The judgment adopts the principles of:

  • Universal Design;
  • Inclusion by Design;
  • Reasonable Accommodation;
  • Barrier-Free Environment; and
  • Substantive Equality.

Importantly, the Court also recognised the concept of intersectionality, acknowledging that disability often overlaps with gender, age, caste, poverty, geography, and other forms of disadvantage.

A Landmark SOP on Universal Accessibility

The most enduring feature of the judgment is the Court's issuance of a detailed Standard Operating Procedure on Universal Accessibility.

The SOP has been directed to operate throughout Karnataka as binding directions until the State Government frames comprehensive accessibility rules under Sections 40 and 45 of the RPwD Act, 2016.

Who Is Covered?

The SOP extends to an extraordinary range of establishments, including:

Government Institutions

  • Secretariat buildings
  • Government departments
  • Courts and tribunals
  • Police stations
  • Panchayat offices
  • Municipal offices
  • Prisons and correctional facilities

Public Commercial Establishments

  • Shopping malls
  • Commercial complexes
  • Multiplexes and cinemas
  • Hotels and restaurants
  • Banks and ATMs
  • Fuel stations

Educational Institutions

  • Schools
  • Colleges
  • Universities
  • Coaching centres
  • Libraries
  • Examination centres

Healthcare Facilities

  • Hospitals
  • Clinics
  • Rehabilitation centres
  • Mental health institutions

Transport Infrastructure

  • Railway stations
  • Metro stations
  • Bus terminals
  • Airports
  • Taxi stands
  • Parking facilities
  • Footpaths and pedestrian crossings

Religious and Cultural Institutions

  • Temples
  • Mosques
  • Churches
  • Gurudwaras
  • Museums
  • Heritage sites
  • Sports complexes

Residential Developments

  • Apartment complexes
  • Housing societies
  • Student hostels
  • Senior living facilities

Digital Platforms

The SOP is particularly notable for its detailed treatment of digital accessibility. It applies to:

  • Government websites;
  • Mobile applications;
  • E-governance portals;
  • Court filing systems;
  • Online grievance portals;
  • Smart-city platforms; and
  • Public-facing private digital services.

The Court has mandated compliance with recognised digital accessibility standards and emphasised WCAG 2.1 Level AA compliance, keyboard accessibility, screen-reader compatibility, captioning, and support for Indian Sign Language.

Accessibility Obligations for New and Existing Buildings

The Court has adopted a phased compliance model.

New Constructions

  • Every new public or private building must be designed as accessible from inception.
  • No building approval or completion certificate should be granted unless accessibility requirements are incorporated into the design.

Existing Buildings

The SOP requires accessibility retrofitting through defined timelines. High-footfall facilities have been prioritised for early compliance, such as:

  • Airports,
  • Railway stations,
  • Metro stations,
  • Bus terminals,
  • Shopping malls, and
  • Commercial complexes

The Court has also mandated accessibility audits, annual reviews, renewal audits, and surprise inspections. Significantly, the Court directed that occupancy certificates and trade licence renewals should be linked to accessibility compliance. This is potentially one of the strongest enforcement mechanisms seen in Indian accessibility jurisprudence.

Detailed Accessibility Standards

Unlike many previous judicial directions that merely refer to accessibility in general terms, the Karnataka High Court has prescribed specific measurable standards.

The SOP includes requirements relating to:

  • Ramp gradients;
  • Accessible toilets;
  • Lift dimensions;
  • Corridor widths;
  • Service counters;
  • Signage;
  • Wayfinding systems;
  • Emergency evacuation measures;
  • Areas of Rescue Assistance;
  • Accessible parking;
  • Public seating; and
  • Communication accessibility.

The judgment therefore moves beyond principles and enters the domain of practical implementation.

Special Directions for Educational Institutions

The Court devoted particular attention to schools and educational institutions. Every educational institution is required to:

  • Establish Disability Anti-Discrimination Committees;
  • Adopt Inclusive Education Policies;
  • Ensure that admissions are not denied solely on the ground of disability;
  • Install safety features in buildings;
  • Maintain accessible facilities; and
  • Develop emergency response protocols.

These directions have significance far beyond the facts of the present case and may serve as a model for educational institutions nationwide.

Private Sector Obligations Clarified

One of the most important legal findings concerns the applicability of the RPwD Act to private establishments.

The Court carefully distinguished the position under the 1995 disability law and held that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 expressly covers private establishments.

The judgment notes that the statutory definitions of "establishment" and "private establishment" leave little room for doubt.

Consequently, schools, companies, trusts, societies, hospitals, commercial entities, and other private organisations are bound by many obligations under the RPwD Act, including non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation.

This clarification is likely to have significant implications across India.

State Accessibility Authority

Recognising that rights without implementation mechanisms often remain ineffective, the Court directed the State Government to establish:

State Accessibility Authority

The Authority is expected to:

  • Monitor compliance;
  • Empanel accessibility auditors;
  • Issue certifications;
  • Maintain monitoring systems;
  • Update standards; and
  • Publish annual accessibility reports.

District Accessibility Committees

The Court also directed constitution of District Accessibility Committees across Karnataka to ensure local-level implementation and monitoring.

Relief to the Teacher

The Court upheld the compensation awarded to the teacher and directed the school to offer meaningful reinstatement through reasonable accommodation measures, including:

  • Ground-floor wheelchair-accessible classrooms;
  • Accessible washroom facilities;
  • Transport allowance;
  • Additional rest breaks;
  • Online teaching options when required; and
  • Necessary support arrangements.

The Court firmly rejected the argument that the teacher's conduct in attempting to save a student could diminish the school's obligations under disability rights law.

Why This Judgment Matters

This decision is remarkable for at least five reasons.

  1. First, it treats accessibility as a constitutional right rather than a welfare measure.
  2. Second, it recognises that disability rights obligations extend beyond government establishments to the private sector.
  3. Third, it bridges the longstanding implementation gap by prescribing concrete standards and timelines.
  4. Fourth, it places digital accessibility on an equal footing with physical accessibility.
  5. Fifth, it creates an institutional framework for monitoring compliance rather than leaving implementation to goodwill alone.

DRI's Perspective

For years, disability rights advocates have highlighted that India's challenge is no longer the absence of law but the absence of implementation.

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 contains an extensive framework on accessibility. Yet progress across many sectors has remained uneven because accessibility standards have often lacked enforceable implementation mechanisms.

The Karnataka High Court's judgment seeks to address precisely this gap.

While many aspects of the SOP may require further scrutiny and some directions may ultimately be tested before appellate courts, the judgment unquestionably represents one of the boldest judicial attempts to operationalise accessibility rights in India.

Its influence is likely to extend far beyond Karnataka.

If implemented effectively, the judgment may become a model for other States and contribute significantly to transforming accessibility from a legal promise into a lived reality.

Accessibility is not charity. Accessibility is not welfare. Accessibility is a right. The Karnataka High Court has now said so in unmistakable terms.

Read the Judgement dated 01 June 2026 in PSBB Learning Leadership Academy v. Mrs. Barnali Rout & Others 

Monday, November 11, 2024

Ktk HC- Candidates with “absolute blindness” deserve preferential consideration over those with “low vision” for employment

Court: Karnataka High Court

Bench: Mr. Justice Krishna Dixit and Mr. Justice CM Joshi 

Caste Title:  State of Karnataka & Ors Vs. Ms. Latha H N. 

Case No.: Writ Petition No. 19994 of 2024 (S-KSAT)

Date of Judgement: 11 Nov 2024

Synopsis:

Karnataka High Court has once again reinforced the principle of equity in disability rights, particularly in the realm of employment. Addressing a petition concerning the rights of blind candidates, the division bench comprising Justice Krishna S. Dixit and Justice C.M. Joshi ruled that candidates with “absolute blindness” deserve preferential consideration over those with “low vision” for employment, provided their disability does not impede their ability to perform the duties required by the job.

This decision arose in the case of H.N. Latha, a blind Scheduled Caste candidate from Periyapatna taluk in Mysuru district, who had applied for the post of Kannada and social studies teacher in government primary schools. Despite being listed in the selection list published on March 8, 2023, her candidature was rejected on July 4, 2023. Latha challenged this rejection before the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT), which not only directed the appointment authority to reconsider her case but also awarded her ₹10,000 in costs.

The education department, dissatisfied with the tribunal’s decision, argued that reservations for candidates with “low vision” and those with “blindness” form separate categories. They contended that the tribunal had failed to recognize this distinction. However, the High Court dismissed their appeal, upholding the tribunal’s directive to reconsider Latha’s case within three months.

Recognizing the Strengths of Blind Candidates

The court’s judgment went beyond merely resolving a legal dispute. It underscored the inherent strengths and unique abilities of blind individuals, challenging the stereotype that blindness is an insurmountable barrier to professional competence. The division bench highlighted several positive qualities often found in blind individuals, including:

  • Exceptional adaptability and resilience.
  • Strong coping mechanisms to navigate daily challenges.
  • Outstanding listening skills and memory recall.
  • Unwavering commitment and focus on achieving goals.
  • Heightened senses such as hearing, touch, and smell.

In a remarkable observation, the court drew inspiration from history, citing examples of blind individuals who have achieved extraordinary success. From Homer, the legendary poet of The Iliad and The Odyssey, to John Milton, author of Paradise Lost, to modern-day figures like Srikanth Bolla, the CEO of Bollant Industries, the judgment reminded us of the limitless potential of individuals with blindness when given the right opportunities.

A Call for Inclusive Policies

The court criticized the education department for its failure to adopt inclusive policies. It noted that either specific posts should have been earmarked for blind candidates or that they should have been allowed to compete alongside candidates with low vision for the advertised positions. By upholding the tribunal’s order, the High Court not only reinstated Latha’s right to be reconsidered for the teaching post but also sent a strong message about the importance of equal opportunities for individuals with disabilities.

This judgment is significant not just for Latha but for the broader movement for disability rights in India. It serves as a reminder that true inclusion requires going beyond formal compliance with laws to actively recognizing and leveraging the unique strengths of persons with disabilities.

The Way Forward

The ruling has opened up new avenues for advocacy. It highlights the urgent need for policymakers and employers to adopt inclusive hiring practices that ensure fairness while tapping into the diverse abilities of all individuals, including those with disabilities. It is a wake-up call to challenge societal and institutional biases and move toward a more equitable and inclusive workforce.

As India strives to fulfill its commitments under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), judgments like these lay the foundation for a society that values and empowers its most marginalized members.

H.N. Latha’s fight for her rightful place in the workforce is a story of resilience and justice, one that inspires hope for a future where disability is not seen as a limitation but as a source of strength and diversity.

Read the judgement 

Friday, April 5, 2024

Karnataka HC: Husband with 75% disability can not be directed to pay maintenance to estranged wife [Judgement included]

Court: Karnataka High Court, India

Bench: Justice M. Nagaprasanna

Case No.WP No. 48615 of 2013 (GM - FC)

Case Title: Priyanka Singh v Pankaj Singh Sengar 

Date of Judgement: 05 April 2024

Brief:

In a recent judgment by the Karnataka High Court, presided by Justice M. Nagaprasanna, a significant ruling was made regarding the obligation of a husband to pay maintenance to his estranged wife. The case, titled Priyanka Singh v Pankaj Singh Sengar, addressed the dispute between a husband and wife, where the husband, suffering from a 75% disability, was contested by the wife for maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Background:

Mr. Pankaj Singh Sengar and Mrs. Priyanka Singh were married in 2011 and had a daughter together. However, marital discord ensued, leading to the husband filing for annulment of the marriage, alleging the wife's voluntary departure from their matrimonial home. Amidst legal proceedings, the wife filed for interim maintenance, initially granted at Rs. 15,000 monthly, which became a subject of dispute over unpaid arrears. The husband, acquiring a 75% disability due to a stroke, resigned from work, leading to the wife's pursuit of maintenance through execution petitions, resulting in arrest warrants against him.

Court's Decision:

The court, after careful consideration, ruled in favor of the husband, stating that his 75% disability rendered him incapable of securing employment and thus exempted him from paying maintenance. Citing legal precedents and emphasizing the husband's inability to function as an able-bodied individual, the court held that maintenance cannot be expected from someone incapacitated to such a degree.

Key Points of the Judgment:

  • The husband's 75% disability incapacitated him from earning and maintaining the wife and child.
  • The court recalled the maintenance order, restricting it to the date of the husband's disability, to avoid exacerbating his dire situation.
  • Maintenance cannot be granted without considering the spouse's ability to provide it.
  • The responsibility for the grandchild's necessities was placed on the husband's father.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Karnataka High Court's judgment in Priyanka Singh v Pankaj Singh Sengar sets a significant precedent regarding the obligation of spouses, particularly those with disabilities, to provide maintenance. The ruling reflects a nuanced understanding of familial responsibilities amidst challenging circumstances, ensuring fairness and equity in matrimonial disputes.

Implications:

This judgment underscores the importance of considering spouses' abilities and circumstances in maintenance disputes, particularly in cases involving disabilities. It highlights the need for empathy and pragmatism in legal proceedings concerning family matters, ensuring just outcomes for all parties involved.

Wednesday, December 20, 2023

Responding to a PIL in Karnataka HC, Govt Mandates Voice-Based Public Address Systems in Buses: A Victory for Inclusive Transportation

Court: Karnataka High Court

Bench: Chief Justice Prasanna B. Varale and Justice Krishna S. Dixit

Date of Hearing: 20 Dec 2023

Brief:

In a significant stride towards inclusive transportation, the Karnataka State government has taken a decisive step by mandating the installation of voice-based public address systems and disabled-friendly mechanisms in all existing buses. This development, revealed during a hearing at the High Court of Karnataka, marks a crucial milestone in response to a PIL petition filed by N. Shreyas Reddy, a visually impaired lawyer, advocating for improved accessibility for commuters with disabilities.

The government's commitment to enhancing public transportation accessibility was demonstrated through the issuance of a circular on December 19, 2023 which stipulates the mandatory installation of voice-based public address systems. This initiative, aimed at benefiting visually challenged commuters, underscores the State's proactive approach in addressing the needs of vulnerable segments of society.

During earlier proceedings, the government assured the court of its intention to introduce a voice-based alert system, signaling a promising commitment to inclusive transportation policies. Subsequently, during the hearing on 20 Dec 2023, the government counsel confirmed the issuance of the circular and assured that both public and private stage carriage vehicles would be equipped with these systems by June 30, 2024.

The circular outlines clear directives for both new and existing vehicles. For new vehicles, the installation of these systems will be verified at the time of registration, while for existing vehicles, it will be assessed during the renewal of fitness certificates. Additionally, the government counsel informed the court of forthcoming clarity through another circular regarding the installation process, further demonstrating a proactive approach towards implementation.

In response to these developments, the Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Prasanna B. Varale and Justice Krishna S. Dixit adjourned further proceedings while requesting the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation to provide a compliance report on the assurance given to the court regarding the installation of these systems in new buses procured from January 2024 onwards.

This proactive stance by the Karnataka government reflects a commendable commitment to fostering inclusive transportation infrastructure. By prioritizing the needs of visually challenged commuters, the government sets a precedent for other states to emulate, furthering the cause of accessibility and inclusivity in public transportation networks.

As these initiatives progress, there is renewed optimism for a future where transportation systems are not only efficient but also equitable, ensuring that every citizen, regardless of ability, can access essential services and opportunities.


Saturday, August 5, 2023

Karnataka HC issues notice to Centre on a PIL challenging exclusion of disabilities as a variable from National Family Health Survey

Court: Karnataka High Court, Bangaluru

Bench: Hon'ble Chief Justice Mr. Prasanna B. Varale and Hon'ble Justice M.G.S. Kamal 

Case No.:  WP (C) 14180 of 2023

Case Title: Javed Abidi Foundation Vs. Union of India (Min. of Health & Family Welfare)

Date of Order: 04.08.2023

Brief of the case 

The petitioner Javed Abidi Foundation has sought a direction to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to include the 21 disabilities mentioned in the schedule to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (RPwD), 2016 as a variable in the household survey questionnaire of the NFHS-6 while pointing out that disabilities was a variable in the NFHS-5.

Quoting various media reports, the petition claimed that the disabilities were excluded from NFHS-6 on the advise of a Technical Advisory Committee citing two reasons - enumerators were not trained nor qualified to ask about and evaluate disability; and enumerating disability as a variable was a time-consuming and laborious process.

The petitioner has argued that the reasons cited to exclude disabilities are unjustifiable in the light of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which states that it the right of persons with disabilities to be part of any data collection exercise and all data about disability should be disaggregated so that persons with disabilities can get the maximum advantage of any schemes and other programmes meant for their welfare. The exclusion also violative of the provisions of the RPwD Act, the petition has complained.

The PIL also disputes the claim of the Union Health Ministry that the disabilities has been already enumerated during the 76th round of the National Sample Survey of 2018 and there would be no change in those figures. The Ministry’s response to petitioner stating that the NFHS-5 contained questions in  the questionnaire on disabilities on the advise of Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, and the primary focus of NFHS is maternal and child health and other questions with a very shorter version of the question will not be advisable.

The court passed the following order:

"The learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to Annexure-P1 and submits that though it is stated by respondent No.5 that it will not be able to collect accurate data on disability in its concurrent form and the primary focus of NFHS is maternal and child health, there are no grounds or reasons forthcoming as to why respondent No.5 is not in a position to collect the data on disability when such an exercise was undertaken by the very respondent in the year 2019.

Issue notice returnable within four weeks.

Sri Madhukar M. Deshpande, the learned counsel accepts notice for respondent No.1."

The PIL has made following prayers in the writ and interim relief:

Writ prayers

a) issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the memorandum dated 14/06/2023 bearing reference number no.y.12011/3/2020-stats at Annexure-M is issued by the 2nd respondent stating unsustainable grounds for exclusion of disability from NFHS 6.

b) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to include the 21 disabilities mentioned in the schedule to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 as a variable in the household questionnaire for the national family health survey 6 as per the petitioners and several other representations to the respondents.

c) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to consider the representations of the petitioner at annexures-d, e, f, k and l and to expeditiously consider his appeal at annexure-q.

d) pass such orders (s) or issue such other writ (s). 

Interim prayer

issue orders to the respondents in the nature of directions to introduce a questionnaire on disabilities by way of addendum that is similar the questionnaire on disabilities introduced in NFHS 5 so as to include all the 21 disabilities mentioned in the schedule to the rights of persons with disabilities act, 2016 as a variable in the household questionnaire for the national family health survey 6.



Monday, July 10, 2023

Karnataka HC- During the exam, facility of Scribe and Option of objective type questions can be availed by other disabilities too, not just by candidates with hearing impairment.

Court: Karnataka High Court, India

Bench: The Hon'ble Mr. Prasanna B. Varale, Chief Justice and The Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.G.S. Kamal

Case No: Writ Appeal No. 722 OF 2023 

Case Title: Karnataka State Law University Vs.  Krishna

Date of Judgement: 10-07-2023

Brief:

The Karnataka High Court dismissed an appeal filed by the Karnataka State Law University challenging a single bench order directing it to conduct III Semester exam for a differently abled Law student, by providing objective type of questions instead of descriptive type of questions.

It said that the overall object of the MSJE Exam Guidelines for persons with disabilities  needs to be appreciated which is providing opportunity for all to participate in the mainstream education system and that there is no stringent distinction based on the nature of disability in Exam Guidelines for alternative objective exam for students with disabilities.

Krishna, having 46% overall impairment affecting both brain and eyes, is pursuing his five years integrated law degree at Vaikunta Baliga Law College. Since he was unable to write by hand as such for the I Semester exam he utilized the facility of scribe. He was, however, informed by the college that unless permission was granted by the University, it cannot permit him to take the help of a scribe for examinations in future.

Accordingly, he made a representation to the appellant-University requesting for objective questions instead of descriptive questions and to utilize the help of a scribe in view of his disability. However, no action was taken on the representation constraining him to file a writ petition before the High Court.

The Court disposed of his petition while directing the University to consider the grievance and pass appropriate orders. Following which the University partly allowed the representation and rejected the request to provide objective questions instead of descriptive questions.

Thus the student again approached the Court which took note of the relevant guidelines issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (Divyangjan) making provision for providing objective questions instead of descriptive questions to the disabled students. Court declined to accept the contention of the appellant-University that the provision is applicable only to the students having hearing impairment.

It held, “Section 2(r) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 `persons with bench mark disability’ means person with not less than 40% of specified disability, where specified disability has not been defined in measurable terms and includes a person with disability where specified disability has been defined in measurable terms as certified by the certifying authority."

Further, it directed the University to subject the student to medical examination by Chief Medical Officer/Civil Surgeon/Medical Superintendent of the Government Health Care Institution and if it is certified that the respondent is suffering from low vision to the extent of 40% or more, provide objective questions instead of descriptive questions.

The University in appeal argued that as per the guidelines, alternative objective questions can be provided only for those students who are are person with hearing impairment and not to persons  from any other disabilities. In the instant case since the student is not a person with hearing impairment but with a visual impairment and mental retardation, it contended that the benefit of the aforesaid provision cannot be extended. It was also submitted that since the student is suffering from mental retardation, objective questions which requires reasoning and intellectual skill cannot be provided.

A division bench said, “The overall object of the guidelines needs to be appreciated which is providing opportunity for all to participate in the mainstream education system. There cannot be any strict and stringent distinction on the basis of the nature of ailment. The purpose is to facilitate the specially abled persons to participate in the examination within the limits provided under the guidelines subject to required compliance in the nature of obtaining certificates from the competent authorities"

It added “Viewed from the said object, learned Single Judge taking note of the provisions describing persons with disability as provided under Section 2(r) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 has directed the appellant-University to subject the respondent for medical examination by Chief Medical Officer/Civil Surgeon/Medical Superintendent of the Government Health Care Institution and only if it is certified that the respondent is suffering from low vision to the extent of 40% or more, to provide objective questions instead of descriptive questions to the respondent in the ensuing examination.”

Accordingly the bench dismissed the appeal filed by the Karnataka State Law University. Read the Judgement below:


Thursday, September 1, 2016

Supreme Court while upholding the Karnataka HC decision directs Karnataka Govt not to deny Primary School Teacher jobs to Visually Impaired Candidatesto

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble the Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon'ble Dr. Justice DY Chandrachud

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 3910 of 2009 (Against the final order and judgment of the Karnataka High Court in PIL Writ Petition No. 16396 of 2005 dt. 29.09.2007)

Case Title: Selection Authority and Deputy Director  Vs. Akhila Karnataka S.K. Andha Sangha

Date of Judgement: 01 Sep 2016

Supreme Court directs Karnataka Govt. to not keep visually impaired persons out of primary school teacher jobs while dismissing the appeal filed by the Karnataka Govt.

Supreme Court of India upheld the ruling of the Karnataka High Court in PIL Writ petition No. 16396 of 2005, directing the Karnataka State Government to ensure reservation for visually impaired persons in the role of primary school teachers and to execute this through a dedicated recruitment drive. This decision marked the culmination of a legal battle that saw the state government arguing that individuals with blindness or low vision were unsuitable for the role of primary school teachers and should not be entitled to reservation in these positions.

The repercussions of this Supreme Court ruling are significant, as it will necessitate the recruitment of hundreds of blind and low vision individuals to address the shortfall in reserved vacancies that had persisted since 2005.

This legal victory was achieved through the efforts of a non-governmental organization (NGO) representing blind individuals, known as the "Akhila Karnataka Andha S.K. Sangha", with the able representation of Advocate Jayna Kothari. The organization had previously succeeded in petitioning the Karnataka High Court, where the state had argued that primary school teacher positions were ill-suited for visually impaired persons. In an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court in July 2016, the state contended that students in primary schools could not be effectively taught by teachers with blindness or low vision. They further claimed that many government primary schools, out of a total of 44,000, had only one or two teachers without additional support staff, making it difficult for such schools to function if reservations were granted to visually impaired persons.

However, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected these arguments put forth by the Karnataka State Government. The bench, led by the Chief Justice of India, pointed out that the Persons with Disabilities Act of 1995 mandates that a minimum of 3% of all government job vacancies should be reserved for disabled individuals. Of this quota, at least 1% should be allocated for persons with impaired vision. Moreover, both the Central and Karnataka State Governments had recognized primary school teaching positions as suitable for blind and low vision individuals in accordance with the said Act. The court maintained that placing visually impaired individuals in schools equipped with other teachers and support staff would not disrupt the schools' functioning, particularly given the availability of modern technology-based aids and appliances for blind and low vision individuals. Thus, the Supreme Court held the state government responsible for fulfilling its obligation to employ visually impaired persons in these positions and dismissed their appeal.

Below the Supreme Court's order dated 01.09.2016 dismissing the appeal of the State Govt. of Karnataka:

"We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length who have taken us through the orders impugned in these appeals. We are of the considered view that the impugned orders do not suffer from any error much less any perversity to compel our interference in exercise of our powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. These civil appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed."

Access the Karnataka HC Judgement:

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Frame rules for appointing Disability Commissioner- Ktk HC

Frame rules to appoint commissioner for disabled, HC tells govt
Bengaluru, Aug 04, 2015, DHNS:

The High Court on Monday directed the State government to frame rules and guidelines for appointing the Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities in four months and to appoint a new commissioner by following the new rules.

Hearing a petition by the All India Physically Handicapped Welfare Association, challenging the appointment of K S Rajanna as the Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, a division bench comprising acting Chief Justice S K Mukherjee and Justice B V Nagarathna disposed of the petition. The bench passed an order stating that Rajanna can remain the commissioner till the new rules are framed and a new commissioner is appointed. The petitioners had contended that Rajanna - who himself is a disabled person - is not eligible enough to hold the position of Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities. The petitioner had challenged his appointment as the commissioner.

Source: Deccan Herald 

Monday, October 27, 2014

Multiple Disabilities Must Be Considered Collectively for Reservation: Karnataka High Court Upholds IAS Selection of Candidate with Combined Disabilities

Court: High Court of Karnataka
Bench: Justice K. L. Manjunath and Justice A. V. Chandrashekara
Case Title: Union of India v. Shri Yaswanth G.V.
Case No.: W.P. No. 44696 of 2014 (S-CAT)
Decided on: 27 October 2014

Background

In a progressive judgment advancing the rights of persons with disabilities, the Karnataka High Court held that multiple disabilities should be assessed cumulatively for determining eligibility for reservation in public employment, even though the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 did not expressly define "multiple disability."

Yaswanth G.V. appeared for the Civil Services Examination, 2009 under the visually impaired category and secured an impressive 107th All India Rank. Medical Boards assessed his visual disability at 30% and locomotor disability at 15%. While neither disability individually met the statutory threshold of 40%, their combined disability exceeded the benchmark. However, the Union of India denied him reservation, contending that disabilities under different categories could not be combined. The Central Administrative Tribunal ruled in his favour, and the Union challenged that decision before the Karnataka High Court.

Issues Before the Court

The principal question before the Court was whether, under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, disabilities falling under different categories could be combined to determine eligibility for reservation in public employment.

Findings of the Court

The High Court dismissed the Union's challenge and upheld the Tribunal's order.

The Court observed that although the 1995 Act did not define "multiple disability", the subsequent National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999 expressly recognised multiple disabilities as a combination of two or more disabilities under the 1995 Act. The Court held that this later enactment could legitimately be read harmoniously with the earlier welfare legislation.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Union of India v. National Federation of the Blind, Pradip Kumar Maity v. Chinmoy Kumar Bhunia, Royal Talkies v. ESI Corporation and Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India, the Bench reiterated that beneficial legislation must receive a liberal interpretation that advances the rights of persons with disabilities rather than defeats them through technicalities.

Rejecting the Government's argument that reservation was available only where a single disability exceeded 40%, the Court held that adopting such a narrow interpretation would unjustly exclude persons suffering from multiple disabilities whose cumulative functional disadvantage was greater than the prescribed benchmark.

Invoking the celebrated observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, the Court observed that judges must "iron out the creases" in legislation where necessary to give effect to Parliament's intent, particularly in welfare statutes enacted for vulnerable sections of society.

“State is enjoined to create conditions and opportunities for the betterment of citizens with disabilities and those differently abled under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act which safeguards their rightful means of livelihood in respect of public employment”. observed the court.

Decision

The Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Union of India and upheld the CAT's direction recognising Yaswanth G.V. as eligible for reservation under the physically handicapped category by taking into account his combined disabilities.

While ordering the appointment of Mr. Mohan, the High Court noted that Mr. Mohan had secured 5th rank in his own category and was also positioned at All India Rank No. 1,173.

“In such circumstances, depriving the Petitioner (Mr. Mohan) of public employment, that too, at the level of Indian Administrative Services on such inconclusive medical...is not only unfair, unjust but also whimsical and arbitrary,” the court said.

The court directed the Centre to appoint Mr. Mohan to the IAS (2015 batch) with all consequential benefits in respect of seniority and promotion on a notional basis.

Why This Judgment Matters

The decision was among the earliest judicial recognitions of the concept of multiple disabilities in the context of public employment under the 1995 Act. It reaffirmed that disability laws are remedial and welfare-oriented legislation requiring purposive interpretation.

Although the subsequent Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 now expressly recognises multiple disabilities as a specified disability, this judgment remains significant because it anticipated that legislative evolution through constitutional principles of equality, inclusion and non-discrimination.

DRI Commentary

This judgment represents an important milestone in India's disability rights jurisprudence. At a time when the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 contained no express provision for multiple disabilities, the Karnataka High Court refused to allow legislative silence to become a ground for exclusion.

Instead, the Court adopted a rights-based and purposive interpretation, recognising that disability cannot always be compartmentalised into isolated medical categories. The cumulative impact of multiple impairments often creates greater barriers to participation than a single disability considered in isolation.

The judgment also foreshadowed the approach subsequently adopted in the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which expressly recognises multiple disabilities as a distinct category deserving equal legal protection. It remains an important reminder that welfare legislation must be interpreted to expand opportunities for persons with disabilities rather than restrict them through rigid technical constructions.

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Union Of India vs Shri Yaswanth G V on 27 October, 2014

Author: K.L.Manjunath And A.V.Chandrashekara                              

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

   DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2014
                       PRESENT
    THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.L.MANJUNATH
                           AND
 THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.V.CHANDRASHEKARA
     

WRIT PETITION NO. 44696 OF 2014 (S-CAT)
 
BETWEEN

 UNION OF INDIA
 MINISTRY OF PERSONAL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES &
 PENSIONS
 NORTH BLOCK
 NEW DELHI-110001
 REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY                   ... PETITIONER
 (BY SRI ARUN M I, ADV.)
 
AND

 1.SHRI YASWANTH G V
 S/O R VINAY KUMAR
 AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
 C/O CHENDRASHEKAR
 NO.54/4, GURUVAPPA STREET
 FIRST FLOOR, SKV GAYATHRI FLAT
 AYANAVARAM, CHENNAI-600023

 2.THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE & EMPOWERMENT
 DEPARTMENT OF DISABILITY AFFAIRS
 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
 SHASTRI BHAWAN, NEW DELHI-110001
 REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY

3.THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF HEALTH SERVICES
NIRMAN BHAVAN, NEW DELHI-110011
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR GENERAL

4.CHIEF COMMISSIONER FOR PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES
SAROJINI HOUSE, 6 BHAGAWAN DASS ROAD
NEW DELHI-110001
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF COMMISSIONER

5.THE UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
DHOLPUR HOUSE, SHAHAJAHAN ROAD
NEW DELHI-110069
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY                        ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M N PRASANNA, ADV. FOR C/R1)

     THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DT.12.12.2013 PASSED IN T.A.NO.470/2013   BY     THE     HON'BLE   CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE BENCH VIDE ANNX-E.

      THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR    ORDERS    ON   23.09.2014  COMING    ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT        OF      ORDERS    THIS    DAY,

A.V.CHANDRASHEKARA, J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

                        ORDER

Present writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India requesting this Court to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of  certiorari quashing the impugned order passed on 12.12.2013 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, in case bearing T.A.No.470/2013 and consequently, to dismiss the said case T.A.No.470/2013.

2. Respondent was applicant before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench. Respondent No.1-Yaswanth G.V. appeared for the Civil Service Examination (CSE) 2009, under the category "Physically Handicapped" (Visually impaired) and secured 107th rank. Hence, his name was recommended as a successful candidate by the Union Public Service Commission in VI sub-category of Physically handicapped category for services allocation on the basis of CSE-2009. As per Rules 21 and 27 of Civil Service Examination, Yaswanth G.V., was asked to undergo a medical examination to testify his claim. The Central Standing Medical Board (CSMB) at New Delhi,  conducted the examination and gave a finding certifying that he had 30% visual disability.

3. According to the statutory notification issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment Notification vide No.16-18/97 NI.I dated 01.06.2001, a person having vision between 40% and 75% would be categorized as person with low vision and those persons with vision impairment exceeding 76% would fall in the category of "persons with blindness". The same is clarified in the letter of Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities bearing No.Identification/Emp./CCD 2008 dated 05.08.2008. Therefore, it is contended that respondent No.1 Yashwanth cannot be considered as a person with low vision.

4. However, the respondent No.1 was given an opportunity to appeal against the findings of the Central Standing Medical Board (CSMB) Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi. Accordingly, medical examination was  conducted by a Special Medical Board at Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi. Even as per the findings of the Medical Board at RML Hospital, the respondent No.1 has 30% visual disability and hence, according to the petitioner herein, respondent No.1 is not visually handicapped person in terms of the letter dated 05.08.2008 at Annexure 'A'.

5. Later on respondent No.1 gave a representation on 08.04.2011 stating that he has 30% visual disability and 15% locomotor disability and on the basis of the same, he put forth a claim being a person with multiple disabilities (Visual and Locomotor) so as to treat him as a person belonging to physically handicapped category. This fact of first respondent having 15% locomotor disability had been confirmed by the Medical Disability Board attached to Lady Curzon Hospital, Bangalore. This was done on an appeal made by the first respondent to the Director General of Health Services.

6. What is contended before this Court is that respondent No.1 has visual disability and the same is less than 40% and he cannot make any claim including 15% locomotor disability. According to him, the said 15% locomotor disability cannot be clubbed with the 30% visual disability. He cannot claim reservation on the basis of multiple disabilities, as per Section 33 of PWD Act, 1995, i.e., Act 1 of 1996.

7. Respondent No.2 the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has opined that the first respondent cannot claim any benefit on the basis of multiple disabilities since visual disability is only 30%. On the basis of the opinion of the second respondent, it was held that respondent No.1 was not entitled to claim reservation on the ground that he is a physically handicapped person. According to the petitioner herein, there is no provision for reservation in employment for person with multiple disabilities with 40% and above where the percentage of disability in view of category mentioned above is less than 40% for availing of benefits including that of reservation in public employment. Hence, it is contended that the claim so made by the first respondent is contrary to the mandate of Section 33 of The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.

8. Challenging the decision of the petitioner, respondent No.1 chose to file an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore, in O.A.No.965/2012 subsequently renumbered as O.A.No.470/2013. Petitioner herein had filed detailed objections and had sought for dismissal of the application. The matter was taken up the by the CAT, Bangalore, and there was divergent opinion between the two learned members. As a result of the same, it was referred to a third Judge, and on the basis of the  opinion of the third Judge dated 12.12.2013, it is held that first respondent is entitled to claim reservation under the category "physically handicapped".

9. Several grounds have been urged in the appeal memo challenging the order dated 12.12.2013. A reference was made to the third Judge and the point of reference so made by CAT to the third Judge are as follows:

"1. Whether degree of disability of the applicant has to be taken as assessed at the time of filing of the application for the Civil Services examination or as assessed subsequently after the interview.

2. Whether multiple disability or any individual disability in each of the three categories of disabilities viz. (i) blindness or low vision, (ii) hearing impaired, and (iii) locomotor disability/cerebral palsy, has to be taken into account for selection/appointment to the Civil Services and whether the concept of  multiple disability as defined in the National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999, can be taken note for selection/appointment to the Civil Services by adding the different disabilities and arriving at a score by using combining formula evolved by the Director General of Health Services.

3. Whether the communication/OM dated 16.02.2012 of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment advising the DoPT, that "cancellation of the candidature of applicant for appointment on the basis of CSE 2009 does not appear to be justified as various services including IAS have been identified suitable for persons with visual impairment as well as for those with locomotor disability", and the underlying policy would be binding on the DoPT/UPSC in regard to selection/appointment of the Applicant, a physically disabled candidate, to the IAS and that whether the subsequent communications dated 5.3.2012 and  16.11.2012 of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment will have only prospective application.

4. Whether this forum can examine the validity of the policy followed by the DoPT, that is, taking only the individual disability in each of the three categories.

5. Whether this Tribunal could allow the transferred application without the likely affected/parties being impleaded in the case"

10. The learned third Judge of the CAT, Bangalore, has answered the points referred to him for his opinion. The answer is found in the order dated 12.12.2013 as per Annexure 'E' and the same is reproduced below:

"1. This is a matter in which my Brothers have expressed differing opinions. But Annexure A-22 which is issued by the most competent authority to deal with the issue had clarified the issue. They have already made clear that for a person with disability the appropriate method to consider the applicants' claim. They have also explained the reasons for the extra time allowed to the disabled persons for writing examination which is only to ensure a level playing field. The communication of DGHS Annexure A-23 which stated that applicant suffered a multiple disability of 40.67% is also pertinent as he is the concerned authority. It is also relevant that with all these disabilities the applicant had secured a rank of 107 and stood 2nd amongst the physically disabled candidates.

2. But, my Brother Hon'ble Shri Naresh Gupta had taken a view that even though there is a change in policy provided for taking into consideration multiple disabilities, it can have only a prospective application and cannot be relied upon to reopen or undo the selections already made in the past. But then, apparently the claim of the applicant was not based on any policy change, but in fact the policy change might have been the result of a cumulative thought process generated in the Ministry of Empowerment, after they have examined the issue in full. But then, Annexure A-22 & 23 have been issued and therefore, it has to be held that it will govern the field.

3. Now coming to the matters of reference as assessed by my Brother Hon'ble Shri Naresh Gupta, the degree of disability on the applicant has not changed either at the time of writing the examination or thereafter. It had remained the same, only the methodology of the assessment of it had changed after the concerned annexures were issued by the concerned Ministry. That is to say that a new light has been thrown into an already existing fact. Therefore, at least at that point, the applicant should be considered.

4. Coming to the 2nd issue raised by my learned Brother Hon'ble Naresh Gupta, there is no law  which prevents clubbing together of disabilities as the idea behind the disability is that only to provide for mercy and pity to be taken into account. It does not behold a civilized society to say that one particular brand of disability alone need to be considered. There is nothing against disability being considered cumulatively as it is the effect of the disability i.e., which is the prime issue.

5. Coming to the 3rd issue, there is no question of prospective application as it is only an explanation of an already existing issue.

6. Coming to the 4th issue it is a duty of adjudicator to adjudicate every issue that pertinently and even arise as corollary issue therein.

7. Coming to the 5th issue, there is no question of any likely affected party or parties. When a principle is being set forth, the effect of the principle as held as correct law will encompass the whole of the populace. But, that does not mean that every person who may have an interest in it will have to be  heard. If that has to be adopted as a yardstick in every case the whole hundred crore of Indian populace will have to be heard. Anyway, this matter had been set at rest by Hon'ble Apex Court for many times and therefore, there may not be any need to examine this matter any further other than academically.

8. But, after examining both it cannot be said by the Tribunal that the applicant should be brought into one particular State Cadre. That of course, must be left to the cadre controlling authority to provide under Rules. It may also be noted in this connection that in all probability all the seats might be filled. Therefore, one adjustment will have to be made for him. Naturally it will be made in terms of availability and suitability. But then, when cadre selection is made by the cadre controlling authority, they shall take into account the facilities for continued treatment for him so as to encompass his special needs with special prerequisites of the region to which he has to be posted.

9. OA is to be allowed with the modified results as stated above. No order as to costs."

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the learned third Judge, CAT has virtually interpreted Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as PWD Act, 1995, for short) by ignoring the golden rule of interpretation. It is argued that unless Section 33 is amended to include persons with multiple disabilities of 40% and above to claim reservation, there cannot be any order. It is argued that the learned third Judge has virtually made a new law which was outside the scope of the CAT. It is argued that reservation for appointment as per Section 33 of PWD Act, 1995, is allowed for only those persons with disabilities who have not less than 40% in a particular category of disability and there is no  provision for reservation in employment for persons with multiple disabilities with 40% and above where the percentage of disability in any particular category mentioned above is less than 40%. It is also contended that respondent No.1 cannot be allocated service against non-PH category vacancies since he had availed extra time in CSE 2009, both in preliminary as well as the main examination.

12. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent has supported the impugned opinion of the third Judge and has argued that one cannot lose sight of the subsequent Act, dealing with Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1994 i.e., Act 44 of 1999. It is argued that the provisions of Section 33 of PWD Act, will have to be read harmoniously in the light of the latest Act i.e., Act 49 of 1999 which is also the Central Act.

13. He has argued that the intention of both the legislations will have to be kept in mind, more particularly, when India is a signatory to international covenant dealing with the protection of physically handicapped persons. He has relied upon several decisions of the Apex Court.

14. It is relevant to deal with the definition of disability as found in Section 2 (i) of the PWD Act, 1995. The same is as follows:

(i) "disability" means-
(i) blindness;
(ii) low vision;
(iii) leprosy-cured;
(iv) hearing impairment;
(v) locomotor disability;
(vi) mental retardation;
(vii) mental illness;

15. Section 2(o) of the said Act defines 'locomotor disability'.

2(o) "locomotor disability" means disability of the bones, joints or muscles leading to substantial restriction of the movement of the limbs or any form of cerebral palsy;"


16. Section 33 of PWD Act, provides for reservation of posts for persons or class persons with disability of which one per cent each shall be reserved for persons suffering from

(i) blindness or low vision;
(ii) hearing impairment;
(iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy; in the posts identified for each disability.

Section 33 is as follows:

33. "Reservation of posts.-Every appropriate Government shall appoint in every establishment such percentage of vacancies not less than three percent for persons or class of persons with disability of which one percent each shall be reserved for persons suffering from-

        i)       blindness or low vision;
        ii)      hearing impairment;
        iii)     locomotor disability or cerebral palsy,
in the posts identified for each disability:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any department or establishment, by notification subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section."

17. The National Trust For Welfare Of Persons With Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation And Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999 is a Central Act which has come into force with effect from 30.12.1999.

18. The object of PWD Act, 1995 is to provide full participation and equality of people with disabilities in the Asian and Pacific region. India is a signatory to the meeting convened at Beijing in December 1992. Since  India being a signatory to the said meeting convened in 1992 at Beijing, it was obligatory on the part of our country to enact suitable legislation for persons suffering with disabilities. A proclamation was adopted in the said meeting held on 05.12.1992 at Beijing about the full participation and equality of people with disabilities in Asian and Pacific regions. The Act aims to provide for the following:

i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities;

ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities;
iii) to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of d evelopment benefits, vis- à-vis non-disabled persons;
iv) to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities;
v)  to lay  down a strategy for comprehensive development  of programmes and services  and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and
vi) to make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream.

19. It is true that on a plain reading of Section 33 of PWD Act, 1995, there should be a reservation not less than 3% for persons or class of persons with disability. Admittedly, the words "multiple disability" have not been defined in PWD Act, 1995. On the other hand, the words "multiple disabilities" have been defined in subsequent Act i.e., Act 44 of 1999 in Section 2(h).

20. Section 2(h) of the said Act defines "multiple disabilities" and the same is as follows:

(h) "multiple disabilities" means a combination of two or more disabilities as defined in clause
(i) of section 2 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (1 of 1996);

21. The intention of the subsequent Act i.e., Act 44 of 1999, is to strengthen families and to protect the interest of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disability after the death of their parents.

22. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, there is no provision dealing with multiple disability in PWD Act, 1995. Here is a case in which the first respondent has blindness to an extent of 30% and 15% locomotor disability, which is definitely more than 40% prescribed in the statutory notification  issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, as per the relevant provisions of PWD Act, 1995. Just because there is no provision for 'multiple disability' in PWD Act, 1995, is it right to deny the opportunity to the first respondent, is the question?

23. What exactly should be the approach of the constitutional courts while interpreting two statutes of welfare legislation has been well dealt with at length way back in 1978 by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Royal Talkies, Hyderabad And Others Vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation reported in (1978) 4 SCC 204. If two interpretations are possible in a welfare legislation, it is specifically held that duty of the Court to choose the one which advances welfare of the weaker sections of society. As per the facts of the said case, the persons employed in the canteen and the cycle stands of cinema theatres are also be considered as employees of the owners of cinema theatres for the  purpose of contribution of amount by the cinema theatre owners under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. Interpreting Section 2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Royal talkies has specifically held that though there is no statutory duty on the owner to run such canteens or cycle stands in the premises of the cinema theatres, the persons engaged in such canteens and cycle stands would be employees for all practical purposes and the cinema owner would be considered as a true employer and therefore, it would be liable for contributing money to the welfare of such employees under Section 2(9) of Employees State Insurance Act, 1948.

24. A bench consisting of Hon'ble three Judges of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Another Vs. National Federation of the Blind and Others reported in (2013) 10 SCC 772, had an  opportunity to deal with Sections 32 and 33 of PWD Act, 1995. The provisions of these two Sections have been interpreted in the light of human and civil rights. It is held that reservation of posts for persons who have disabilities is not dependant upon identification of posts as stipulated by Section 32 and that Section 32 is not a precondition for computation of reservation of 3% vacancies for persons with disabilities out of which 1% each is reserved for persons suffering from blindness/low vision, persons suffering from hearing impairment and persons suffering from locomotor disability or cerebral palsy. It is further held that scope of identification comes into picture only at the time of appointment in post identified for disabled person and is not necessarily relevant at the time of computing 3% under Section 33.

25. The decision rendered in the case of Government of India Through Secretary Vs. Ravi  Prakash Gupta And Another reported in (2010) 7 SCC 626, has been relied upon in the case of Union of India and Another Vs. National Federation of the Blind And Others reported in (2013) 10 SCC 772. In Ravi Prakash's case, the issue was as to whether the reservation of vacancies for persons with disabilities under Section 32 could be calculated on the basis of the backlog vacancies for persons with disabilities. Whether reservation under Section 33 of PWD, 1995, depends upon identification of posts under Section 32 was the question?

26. Section 32 is as follows:

"32. Identification of posts which can be reserved for persons disabilities.- Appropriate Government shall-
a. identify posts, in the establishments, which can be reserved for the persons with disability;
b.  at periodical intervals not exceeding three years, review the list of posts identified and up-date the list taking into consideration the developments in technology."

27. After analyzing the provisions of PWD Act, 1995 in the background of human and civil rights, it is held that identification of posts under Section 32 is for the purpose of making appointments and not for the purpose of reservation under Section 33. It is further held that persons with disability cannot be appointed unless posts are identified under Section 32 but provision for reservation under Section 32 became effective immediately when Act came into force in 1996. It is further held that identification of posts under Section 32 was intended to be carried out simultaneously with coming into force of the Act and therefore, delay in identification under Section 32 cannot be used as a tool to deny the benefit of  reservation under Section 33. Therefore, it is held that Government is obliged to fill up reserved posts which had accumulated from 1996 though the posts were identified by Central Government in 2006. Therefore, Ravi Prakash's case was ordered to be considered. From this decision, which is subsequently followed in the decision of a Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges in National Federation's case, it is evident that the intention of the legislature is to give full protection and promotion to the handicapped persons.

28. Dealing with the interpretation of subordinate/ delegated legislation and the use of internal aids, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kirpal Singh reported in (2014) 5 SCC 189, has made clear that liberal interpretation is to be given to the word "retirement" occurring in para-14 of Pension Scheme, 1995. Kirpal Singh the respondent therein had opted for voluntary retirement in terms of SVRS of 2004 and claimed pension as one of the benefits admissible under para-6 of the above. His claim was rejected by the Insurance Company and hence, he approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which allowed his petition on 25.01.2008 holding that he and similarly placed employees were entitled to claim pension. Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana has taken a view in para- 6 of SVRS of 2004 read with paragraph-14 of the Central Insurance (Employees' Pension Scheme 1995) entitle the employees to claim pension so long as they had rendered minimum of ten years of service in the Corporation/Company from whose service they were seeking retirement under voluntary retirement scheme.

29. Paragraph-14 of the pension scheme speaks as follows:

14. Qualifying service- Subject to the other condition contained in this Scheme, an employee  who has rendered a minimum ten years of service in the Corporation or a Company, on the date of retirement shall qualify for pension.

30. On a conjoint reading of para-6 of SVRS 2004 and para-14 of the Pension Scheme, 1995, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it would leave no manner of doubt that any employee retiring from the service of the Company/Corporation would qualify for payment of pension if he/she has rendered a minimum of ten years of service on the date of retirement. The word "retirement" as found in the definition clause is held to be an inclusive definition so as to include voluntary retirement and not only retirement on attaining superannuation.

31. Relying upon the decision reported in RBI Vs. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that not only the text but also the context in which  a provision has been made will have to be looked into. Paragraph-33 of the decision in RBI Vs. Peerless General Finance's case is very much relevant and the same is extracted below:

33. Interpretation must depend on the test and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text in the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statue is looked at, in the context of its context, its scheme, the sections, clause, phrases and words may take glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in  isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.

32. One more decision of a Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pradip Kumar Maity Vs. Chinmoy Kumar Bhunia and Others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 122, has dealt with the definition "person with disability". It is held that a person with disability would mean a person from suffering not less than 40% of any disability as certified by medical authority and the same would have primacy notwithstanding any State legislation or rules irreconcilable or repugnant thereto. The statutory notification relied upon by the petitioner is a Subordinate/Delegated legislation. Explaining the definition of 'person with disability', it is specifically held that any notification/statutory notification contrary to the explanation of the definition as done by the Hon'ble Apex Court, would stand impliedly repealed.

33. What is further held in the said decision is that statutes, whether Central or State must mandatorily comply with the Constitution and statutes must also conform with discipline of three lists contained in Schedule VII to Constitution.

34. Dealing with the laudable object behind the enactment of persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, in paragraph-4 of Pradip Kumar's case mentioned above, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that laudable intention of the Act is to provide full participation and equality to persons with disabilities in the matter of protection of their rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation.

35. It is further held in paragraph-5 that the Act specifically stipulates that in any recruitment year, any vacancy cannot be filled up due to non-availability of persons with disabilities, the same will have to be  carried forward to the succeeding year and if once again it cannot, yet again be filled up by any eligible candidate. The vacancy must first enure to the benefit of any of the other two categories and only in the event that there are no candidates even therefrom, the employer can fill up such segregated or reserved vacancy by a general appointment.

36. Paragraphs-4 and 5 of the said decision are relevant and are extracted below:

4. The Disabilities Act was passed by Parliament in the wake of the Proclamation that came to be adopted by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Region (ESCAP), the endeavour and expectation of which was the attainment of full participation and equality to persons with disabilities in the matter of protection of their rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation. Keeping in perspective that India was a signatory to the said Proclamation, necessitating its wholesome and holistic implementation, the Disabilities Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 26.8.1995 and came into force on 7.2.1996.

5. The Disabilities Act, inter alia, ordains in Chapter VI, provisions relating to the employment of disabled persons through the device of reservation of posts, establishment of special employment exchanges, the formulation of schemes for ensuring employment of persons with disabilities and the reservation and setting apart of not less than three per cent (3%) seats in government educations institutions and other educational institutions receiving aid from the Government, etc. etc. The Disabilities Act also specifically stipulates that if in any recruitment year any vacancy cannot be filled up due to non-availability of persons with disabilities i.e. (i) blindness or low vision; (ii) hearing impairment; and (iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy, such vacancy shall be carried forward. If in the succeeding year the vacancies in the three categories  cannot yet again be filled up by an eligible candidate, the vacancy must first ensure to the benefit of any of the therefrom, can the employer fill up such segregated or reserved vacancy by a general appointment. It is also note worthy that the reservation of three per cent (3%) is a minimum requirement.

37. What is vehemently argued before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no definition about 'multiple disability' in PWD Act, 1995, and therefore, it cannot be liberally interpreted by ignoring the golden rule of interpretation.

38. We are unable to accept the said contention in the light of a detailed discussion made by us, more particularly, in the light of the two decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. National Federation of the Blind and Others reported (2013) 10 SCC 772 and in the case of Pradip  Kumar Maity Vs. Chinmoy Kumar Bhunia And Others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 122.

39. Apart from this, we have to follow the principles enunciated in Royal Talkies, Hyderabad And Others reported in (1978) 4 SCC 204, in which it is held that if two interpretations are possible in a welfare legislation, the duty of the Court is to choose one which advances the welfare of the weaker sections of the Society. Admittedly, persons with disabilities belong to weaker sections of the society and the Hon'ble Apex Court has liberally construed certain provisions of PWD Act, more particularly, Sections 32, 33 and 41.

40. This has to be viewed in the light of yet another similar legislation i.e., Act 44 of 1999 The National Trust for Welfare Of Persons With Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999, which has come into effect from 30.12.1995. In the said Act, there is a specific definition about 'multiple disability'. The said definition could be imported to the earlier decision i.e., PWD Act,1995 and read down to include even persons suffering from multiple disabilities provided such multiple disability of a person exceeds 40% and above irrespective of the category of disability.

41. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that normally, the Courts should not add or subtract to a provision found in a statute by ignoring the golden rule of interpretation. It is argued that when the legislators themselves have not provided for multiple disability in PWD, 1995, the Court cannot substitute the same by its judgment in the form of a legislation.

42. To this, we have a novel judgment of the King's Bench, England reported in 1 (1948) AC page 291 in  the case of Seaford Court Estates Ld Vs. Asher. It is a decision rendered by two Hon'ble Judges of which Lord Denning was also a Judge.

43. What is held in the said decision is that when a statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold set of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms of free from all ambiguity. The English language according to the said King's bench decision, is not an instrument of mathematical precision and English literature would be much poorer if it were. It is specifically observed that a Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It is further held that it would certainly save the Judges trouble if  Acts of Parliament were drafted with definite prescience and perfect clarity.

44. What should be done in such a case has been very eloquently held and the relevant portion found in page 499 of Seaford Court's case is extracted below:

In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature. That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon's case (I), and it is the safest guide to-day. Good practical advice on the subject was given about the same time by Plowden in his second volume Eyston V Studd. (2) Put into homely metaphor it is this: A Judge should ask himself the question; If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should but he can and should iron out the creases.

45. Section 33 provides for reservation of posts of not less than three per cent for persons or class of persons with disability of which one per cent each shall be reserved for persons suffering from

i) blindness or low vision
ii) hearing impairment
iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy in the posts identified for each disability.

46. As already discussed Section 32 provides for reservation for persons with disability in the  establishments of the appropriate Government. On the basis of the same, a statutory notification is made.

47. Let us assume that only one person having hearing impairment of 40% and above and one person having locomotor disability or cerebral palsy of 40% and above are found to be eligible. Then those two persons would be appointed. Let us assume that there is no person having blindness or low vision of 40% and above. If there is a person who has a blindness of 25% and hearing impairment of 15%, such a person would be a person with multiple disability as per Section 2(h) of Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999 i.e., Act, 44 of 1999 which has come into existence from 30.12.1999. The subsequent Act i.e., Act 4 of 1999 is in addition to the existing benevolent welfare legislation i.e, PWD Act, 1995 and not in derogation of the same.

48. If a strict interpretation were to be adopted, a person having multiple disability with 25% low vision and 15% locomotor disability would not be considered for appointment under the reservation as per Section 33 and the same would go to a general category and not the definition of either of these two Acts under the hypothetical circumstance given above. This hard reality will also have to be kept in mind in order to give a liberal interpretation to the words 'multiple disability'.

49. We are also supported by another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Madan Singh Shekhawat Vs. Union of India and Others reported in (1999) 6 SCC 459. Dealing with the basic rules of interpretation and the beneficial construction. It is held that it is the duty of the Court to interpret a provision especially a beneficial provision, liberally in order to give it a wider meaning. It is made clear that restrictive construction should not be made so as to negate from the object of the provision.

50. As could be seen from the facts of Madan Singh Shekhawat's case, the appellant, while on casual leave was travelling at his own expense to his home station and during journey, met with an accident which resulted in amputation of his hand. Disability pension was denied to him on the ground that he was not on duty since he was on leave on his own "but not yet at public expense". Analysing Rule 6 (c) of Defence Service Regulations in the light of Rule 10 and 48, it is held that words "at public expense" is to be construed literally, since the object of the rule is to provide relief to a victim of an accident during travel. It is further held that the nature of expenditure incurred for the purpose of such travel is wholly alien to the object of the rule and therefore, the said provision will have to be interpreted as it is beneficial provision.

51. Keeping in mind the intention behind formulation of those rules, that the rule-makers did not intend to deprive the army personnel of benefit of the disability pension solely on the ground that the cost of the journey was not borne by the public exchequer. If journey was authorized by the army, it can make no difference whether fare for the same came from public exchequer or army personnel or himself. Therefore, it is held that it would be undertaken by a defence personnel would be authorized travel to being it within the purview of "at public expense". It is further made clear that if an army personnel were to leave the Headquarters or the place of posting he cannot do it without permission and therefore, if he has undertaken travel to his home town or native place at his own cost cannot be considered as an unauthorized so as to deny him the benefit under Rule 6(c).

52.   In   the      case   of   Central   Inland   Water Transport Corporation Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571, Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that the laws exist to serve the needs of the society which is governed by it. If the law is to play its allotted role of serving the needs of the society, it must reflect the ideas and ideologies of that society and must keep time with the heartbeats of the society and with the needs and aspirations of the people. It is made clear that as the society changes, the law cannot remain immutable and it must, therefore, in a changing society, march in tune with the changed ideas and ideologies, Legislatures are, however, not best fitted for the role of adapting the law to the necessities of the time, for the legislative process is too slow and the legislatures often divided by polities are slowed down by periodic elections and overburdened with myriad other legislative activities.

53. This also holds good in the present case to keep in tune with the subsequent Act i.e., Act 44 of 1999 while importing definition of 'multiple disability' in the subsequent Act to the earlier PWD Act, 1995.

54. In the light of the above discussion made by us, we are of the considered opinion that the opinion of the third Judge, Central Administrative Bench, Bangalore, is quite consistent with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above. It is not the question of prospectivity or retrospectivity of the relevant provisions of the PWD Act, 1995. The learned Third Judge has explained the exact position of law in regard to the provisions of Sections 32 and 33 of PWD Act, 1995, which Act, is a welfare legislation enacted to protect the interests of physically handicapped persons who are from weaker sections of the society.

55. Thus we do not find any infirmity or illegality committed by the learned 3rd Judge, in answering points of reference. We do not find any grounds to interfere with the impugned order and as such, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

ORDER Writ petition is dismissed.

Sd/-

JUDGE Sd/-

JUDGE JT/-