Supreme Court Declares Right to Walk on Safe, Demarcated Footpaths a Fundamental Right: Accessibility and Inclusion Take Centre Stage

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Case: Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 4665–4666 of 2025
Date of Judgment: 19 June 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 647

In a landmark judgment with far-reaching implications for urban planning, disability rights, and inclusive mobility, the Supreme Court of India has declared that the right to walk on safe and demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.

The Court held that this right flows from Article 19(1)(d), which guarantees freedom of movement (All citizens shall have the right…to move freely throughout the territory of India), read together with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), and Article 21.

Significantly, the Court declared that the rights of pedestrians have primacy over motorised transport, marking a decisive shift away from the long-standing vehicle-centric approach to urban development.

Tragic Facts, Transformative Jurisprudence

The case arose from the death of a five-year-old child who was walking to school with his father when a tanker struck him from behind. The Court noted that there was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing on the road where the accident occurred.

While adjudicating the compensation claim, the Court moved beyond the immediate facts to examine a larger constitutional question: whether citizens possess an enforceable right to safe walking infrastructure.

Answering in the affirmative, the Court observed:

"The right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. The fundamental right to walk will take within its sweep the right to demarcated footpaths. These rights are primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles."

Walking Is Not a Privilege—It Is a Constitutional Right

In a powerful articulation of the constitutional value of walking, the Court observed that the right to move under Article 19(1)(d) cannot be reduced to movement on wheels.

The judgment recognises that walking is deeply connected to human dignity, expression, association, participation in public life, and access to opportunities. It noted that Indian cities and towns have systematically prioritised motor vehicles at the cost of pedestrians, resulting in the exclusion of millions of citizens from public spaces.

The Court lamented that pedestrians are often treated as "a nuisance" on roads that should belong to everyone.

Accessibility: A Major Win for Persons with Disabilities

Although the case did not arise directly under the disability rights framework, the judgment has profound implications for persons with disabilities, older persons, children, and all vulnerable road users.

For persons with disabilities, the right to walk on demarcated footpaths cannot be interpreted merely as the existence of a physical pathway. The constitutional guarantee necessarily requires accessible, continuous, unobstructed, and universally designed pedestrian infrastructure.

This includes:

• Step-free and barrier-free footpaths;
• Accessible kerb ramps at crossings;
• Tactile guiding and warning indicators;
• Adequate width for wheelchair users and persons using mobility aids;
• Audible pedestrian signals;
• Non-slip surfaces;
• Removal of encroachments and street-level obstacles;
• Accessible wayfinding and signage.

The judgment reinforces the obligations already imposed under the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities' notified accessibility standards, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Rules framed thereunder, and the Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India.

A footpath that cannot be used safely and independently by persons with disabilities cannot be regarded as a constitutionally compliant footpath.

Duty Bearers Identified

The Court clearly identified the authorities responsible for ensuring the right to walk:

• Urban Development Authorities;
• Municipal Corporations;
• Municipalities; and
• Panchayats.

The Court held that where a road exists, there is a corresponding obligation to ensure the existence and maintenance of safe and demarcated footpaths.

This is not a matter of policy discretion but a constitutional duty.

Constitutional Remedies Beyond Motor Accident Claims

In an important clarification, the Court held that remedies under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, are not sufficient to protect pedestrian rights.

Citizens whose right to walk is violated can seek constitutional remedies, including restitution and compensation, directly against the authorities responsible for creating and maintaining pedestrian infrastructure.

The Court observed that these remedies are independent of claims available under the Motor Vehicles Act.

This finding significantly expands accountability for inaccessible and unsafe public infrastructure.

Continuing the Trajectory of Pedestrian Rights

The present judgment builds upon the Supreme Court's earlier interventions in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India concerning road safety and pedestrian infrastructure.

Notably, in 2025, the Supreme Court recognised that footpaths must remain unobstructed and accessible to all users, including persons with disabilities. The Court directed authorities across the country to ensure the removal of encroachments and the creation of disability-friendly pedestrian infrastructure.

Disability Rights India had previously covered that important development in its article, "Supreme Court of India Upholds Right to Accessible and Obstruction-Free Footpaths for Persons with Disabilities."

Today's judgment elevates that principle to a higher constitutional plane by expressly declaring the right to walk on demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right.

Call for a Dedicated Legislative Framework

Recognising the absence of a comprehensive legal framework governing pedestrian rights, the Court directed that copies of the judgment be forwarded to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways, as well as the Law Commission of India.

The Court emphasised the need for legislation that:

• Formally recognises the right to walk;
• Clearly identifies duty bearers;
• Establishes enforcement mechanisms;
• Provides effective remedies; and
• Creates an independent regulatory framework for pedestrian infrastructure.

Why This Judgment Matters

For decades, persons with disabilities have argued that inaccessible footpaths deny them the ability to access education, employment, healthcare, recreation, justice, and participation in community life. The Supreme Court has now unequivocally recognised that walking infrastructure is not merely a matter of urban design—it is a matter of constitutional rights.

This judgment also speaks to the everyday reality faced by millions of families across India. In the absence of safe, continuous and dedicated pedestrian footpaths, parents are often compelled to use private vehicles or hire school transport services merely to drop and pick up their children from schools located less than a kilometre away. This dependence on motorised transport is not a matter of choice but a consequence of unsafe public spaces. It discourages walking, increases traffic congestion, worsens air pollution, and deprives children and families of the well-documented physical and mental health benefits associated with regular walking. 

As the Court reminds us, walking is far more than a mode of transport—it is a social, cultural and democratic act deeply embedded in India's collective consciousness, from Mahatma Gandhi's historic Dandi March to countless everyday journeys that connect people to their communities. 

The true measure of this judgment will lie in whether governments and local bodies transform this constitutional promise into universally accessible, safe and walkable streets for everyone. The right to walk must now mean the right of every person—including persons with disabilities, children, older persons and other vulnerable road users—to move safely, independently and with dignity.

Read the Judgment: 

Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., 2026 INSC 647 (19 June 2026).

Supreme Court Moves Beyond Welfare: Ensures Social Security, Dignity and Rehabilitation for Visually Impaired Man Living in Extreme Poverty

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench:  Hon’ble Chief Justice Surya Kant and Hon’ble Justice V. Mohana
Case Title: In Re: Ensuring Basic Human Dignity and Social Security for Differently Abled Citizens Living in Extreme Poverty and Other Ancillary Issues
Case No.: Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 18 of 2026
Neutral Citation: Not Available
Decided on: 16 June 2026

Background

In an important suo motu intervention, the Supreme Court took cognisance of media reports concerning the plight of Japa Bhue, a man who has been blind since birth, and his 80-year-old mother Radhika Bhue, who were living in extreme poverty in Odisha despite being eligible for multiple government welfare schemes.

Treating the issue as one involving constitutional rights rather than an isolated grievance, the Court registered suo motu proceedings to examine whether the State had discharged its obligation to ensure social security, dignity, and basic human necessities for persons with disabilities living in conditions of extreme vulnerability.

The proceedings underscore that constitutional guarantees cannot remain merely theoretical where persons with disabilities are unable to access welfare schemes because of poverty, disability, age, or administrative barriers.

Issues Before the Court

The Supreme Court examined whether:

• State authorities had failed to provide social security and welfare benefits to the visually impaired petitioner and his elderly mother.
• The constitutional guarantee of dignity under Articles 14 and 21 requires proactive State intervention for persons with disabilities living in poverty.
• Disability pensions, old-age pensions, housing assistance, healthcare and other welfare entitlements had actually reached the beneficiaries.
• Immediate and long-term measures were necessary to restore dignity and ensure rehabilitation.

Court's Observations

1. Right to Life Includes the Right to Live with Dignity: The Court reiterated that Article 21 is not confined to mere survival. Persons with disabilities are entitled to live with dignity, security and basic necessities. The Bench recognised that individuals living with both disability and extreme poverty often cannot independently navigate complex governmental procedures to claim benefits.

2. Welfare Schemes Must Reach Beneficiaries:- The Court observed that creating welfare schemes is only the first step. Constitutional obligations are fulfilled only when eligible beneficiaries actually receive the intended assistance. Accordingly, the State was directed to verify whether every available benefit had been extended to the family.

3. Disability Rights Demand a Rights-Based Approach:- The proceedings reflect the continuing shift from a charity or welfare model towards a rights-based understanding of disability. The Court recognised that persons with disabilities are entitled to dignity, autonomy, participation and equal protection under the Constitution and disability law.

4. State Has a Positive Constitutional Duty:- The judgment recognises that where disability intersects with poverty and old age, governments must proactively identify beneficiaries and facilitate access to social security instead of expecting vulnerable citizens to approach public authorities on their own.

Directions Issued

The Supreme Court directed the State of Odisha to:

• File a detailed affidavit through an officer not below the rank of Additional Chief Secretary regarding disability pension, old-age pension, arrears, housing assistance and all other welfare benefits.
• Ensure that all immediate basic amenities are provided to the mother and son pending further proceedings.
• Enable the Odisha State Legal Services Authority to personally interact with the family and submit a report.
• Coordinate with health authorities to provide any necessary medical assistance.
• Consider engaging Japa Bhue as a Para-Legal Volunteer to create awareness among persons with disabilities regarding their legal rights and available welfare schemes, with payment of an appropriate honorarium consistent with minimum wage standards.

Why this Judgment Matters

Although passed in an individual case, the order carries wider significance for disability rights jurisprudence.

First, it recognises that disability and poverty are often intersecting forms of disadvantage requiring affirmative State action.

Secondly, it reinforces that Article 21 encompasses not only physical survival but also access to social security, housing, healthcare and conditions necessary for living with dignity.

Thirdly, the Court shifts the focus from the mere existence of welfare schemes to their effective implementation. Governments cannot claim compliance simply because schemes exist on paper; constitutional accountability requires ensuring that eligible persons actually receive the benefits.

Finally, the direction to engage the visually impaired petitioner as a Para-Legal Volunteer is particularly noteworthy. Rather than treating him merely as a recipient of welfare, the Court recognised his capacity to contribute meaningfully to disability rights awareness within the community. This reflects the modern understanding of persons with disabilities as rights holders and active participants in society.

Disability Rights India View

The order is a welcome reminder that constitutional equality is meaningful only when it reaches those living at the margins. Across India, many persons with disabilities remain excluded from pensions, housing schemes, healthcare and other statutory entitlements because of administrative inaccessibility, poverty and lack of institutional support.

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that governments have a positive obligation not merely to frame welfare schemes but to identify vulnerable persons, remove barriers to access, and ensure that constitutional promises translate into lived realities. The emphasis on rehabilitation, dignity and empowerment—rather than charity alone—marks another important step in the evolution of India's disability rights jurisprudence.

Read the Judgement in this Suo Motu case

Administrative Lapses Cannot Defeat Disability Pension: Rajasthan High Court Grants Relief to Ex-Sepoy After 31 Years

Court: Rajasthan High Court
Bench: Hon'ble Justice Sudesh Bansal and Hon'ble Justice Ravi Chirania
Case Title: Ex Sepoy Om Prakash v. Union of India & Another
Case No.: D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5477/2024
Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JP:20716-DB
Decided on: 8 June 2026

Background

In a significant judgment protecting the rights of disabled veterans, the Rajasthan High Court held that an ex-serviceman could not be denied disability pension because of procedural failures committed by the Army itself.

The petitioner had served in the Indian Army as a Sepoy for over ten years before being discharged in 1995. During service, he developed Radial Nerve Palsy (RNP), a neurological condition for which he underwent repeated treatment and hospitalisation at military hospitals. Despite his documented medical condition, the Army discharged him without convening the mandatory Release Medical Board (RMB) and omitted his medical history from the discharge certificate.

Alleging that these omissions were intended to deprive him of disability pension under the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, the petitioner approached the High Court after remaining without disability benefits for over three decades.

The Union of India opposed the petition, contending that the petitioner had several disciplinary punishments ("red ink entries"), was discharged on account of indiscipline, and that the writ petition was barred by delay.

Issues Before the Court

The High Court considered:

• Whether the petitioner's disability was attributable to or aggravated by military service.
• Whether failure to convene a Release Medical Board violated the mandatory Pension Regulations.
• Whether omission of the petitioner's medical history from the discharge certificate unjustly deprived him of disability pension.
• Whether disciplinary punishments could automatically disentitle an ex-serviceman from disability or invalid pension.
• Whether a pension claim could be rejected solely on the ground of delay.

Court's Observations

1. Failure to Conduct Release Medical Board Was a Serious Procedural Violation: The Court found it undisputed that the petitioner had undergone repeated treatment for his neurological condition while in service. Despite this, no Release Medical Board was constituted before his discharge. The Bench described this omission as a serious lapse and held that the respondents had failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for disregarding the mandatory procedure.

2. Medical History Was Deliberately Omitted: The Court noted that the medical history column in the discharge certificate had been left blank despite clear evidence of prolonged medical treatment immediately before discharge. The circumstances, according to the Bench, indicated that the omission could not be treated as a mere clerical error and had the effect of denying the petitioner his lawful pensionary benefits.

3. Disability Pension Provisions Must Receive a Liberal Interpretation: Recognising disability pension as a beneficial social welfare measure, the Court reiterated that pension regulations should be interpreted purposively so as to advance, rather than frustrate, the rights of disabled servicemen. Technical or procedural lapses attributable to the authorities cannot defeat legitimate pension claims.

4. Disciplinary Record Does Not Automatically Defeat Disability Pension: Rejecting the respondents' reliance on the petitioner's red ink entries, the Court observed that many disciplinary incidents occurred during the period when he was suffering from the neurological disorder. The Bench held that behavioural or performance issues cannot be viewed in isolation where they may have been influenced by a documented service-related medical condition. Red ink entries, by themselves, do not disentitle a serviceman from disability or invalid pension.

5. Pension Is a Continuing Cause of Action: The High Court rejected the objection of delay, reaffirming the settled principle that pension is a recurring entitlement. Each month's non-payment gives rise to a fresh cause of action, and therefore a genuine disability pension claim cannot be dismissed merely because considerable time has elapsed since discharge.

Directions Issued

The Rajasthan High Court:

• Held that the petitioner was entitled to disability/invalid pension under the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.
• Declared that his discharge was intrinsically linked to the disability suffered during military service.
• Directed the Union of India to grant disability/invalid pension.
• Restricted arrears to three years preceding the filing of the writ petition while directing payment of regular pension prospectively.

Why this Judgment Matters

The judgment carries significance beyond the individual case.

First, it reinforces that public authorities cannot benefit from their own procedural failures. Where mandatory safeguards such as a Release Medical Board are ignored, the resulting prejudice cannot be used to defeat a serviceman's statutory rights.

Secondly, the Court adopts a welfare-oriented interpretation of disability pension provisions, recognising that such schemes exist to protect personnel who suffer disabilities while serving the nation.

Thirdly, the decision acknowledges that disciplinary issues may sometimes be connected to an underlying medical condition. This introduces a more humane and contextual approach to assessing entitlement to disability benefits.

Finally, the judgment strengthens the principle that pension claims constitute a continuing cause of action, ensuring that veterans are not denied justice merely because administrative lapses remained unchallenged for many years.

Disability Rights India View

This judgment is an important affirmation that disability rights cannot be defeated by administrative omissions. The failure to convene a Release Medical Board and the omission of the petitioner's medical history were not treated as mere procedural irregularities but as serious lapses with direct consequences for his entitlement to social security.

The ruling also reflects an important disability rights principle: decision-makers must consider the impact of a medical condition when assessing a person's conduct or service record. Mechanical reliance on disciplinary entries, without examining the underlying disability, risks perpetuating injustice.

Although arising in the context of military pension, the judgment has broader relevance for disability jurisprudence. It reinforces that beneficial legislation should be interpreted liberally, procedural safeguards must be faithfully implemented, and the State cannot evade its legal obligations through its own administrative failures. The decision therefore strengthens the constitutional commitment to dignity, social security and substantive justice for persons who acquire disabilities while serving the nation.

Read the Judgement of Rajasthan HC 

Kerala High Court Holds Persons with Down Syndrome Covered Under National Trust Act; Quashes Rejection of Guardianship Application

Court: Kerala High Court
Bench: Hon'ble Justice C.S. Dias
Case: XXX v. The District Collector and Others
Case No.: W.P.(C) No. 12482 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:37272
Date of Decision: 03 June 2026

Introduction 

Kerala High Court Recognises Down Syndrome Within the Protective Framework of the National Trust Act.  

In an important judgment strengthening the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities, the Kerala High Court has held that persons with Down Syndrome are entitled to the protection and benefits available under the National Trust for the Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999 ("National Trust Act").

The Court ruled that a guardianship application cannot be rejected merely because Down Syndrome is not expressly named in the statute, observing that such a narrow interpretation defeats the object of disability welfare legislation. The judgment also reiterates that authorities exercising powers under the National Trust Act must adopt a rights-based, purposive and welfare-oriented approach while deciding applications relating to persons with disabilities.

Background

The writ petition was filed by the father of a 19-year-old woman diagnosed with Down Syndrome and certified as having 55% intellectual disability.

He had approached the competent authority seeking appointment as his daughter's legal guardian under the National Trust Act. The District Collector rejected the application solely on the ground that Down Syndrome is not one of the disabilities specifically mentioned under the Act.

The petitioner's wife opposed the guardianship application, contending that their daughter had attained majority and was free to decide where she wished to reside. Consequently, apart from determining the scope of the National Trust Act, the Court was also required to examine whether the statutory safeguards governing guardianship proceedings had been followed.

Issues Before the Court

The Court considered the following questions:

• Whether persons with Down Syndrome are covered under the National Trust Act.
• Whether the District Collector was justified in rejecting the guardianship application solely because Down Syndrome is not expressly mentioned in the Act.
• Whether the mandatory statutory procedure governing guardianship applications had been followed.
• Whether the impugned order suffered from non-application of mind and arbitrariness.

Key Findings of the Court

1. Down Syndrome is Covered Under the National Trust Act

The Court undertook an extensive examination of the National Trust Act, the National Trust Rules, 2000, the Board of the Trust Regulations, 2001, and the disability certification framework under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

It noted that Down Syndrome is one of the most common genetic causes of intellectual disability and is recognised under Government disability certification guidelines.

Accordingly, the Court held that persons with Down Syndrome squarely fall within the category of persons with intellectual disabilities and are therefore entitled to the statutory protections available under the National Trust Act.

The Court concluded that the Collector's interpretation excluding Down Syndrome from the Act was legally erroneous.

2. Guardianship Applications Require a Meaningful Statutory Inquiry

The Court emphasised that applications seeking appointment of guardians cannot be disposed of mechanically.

Before arriving at a decision, the competent authority is required to:

• scrutinise the application,
• collect all relevant materials,
• assess the person with disability,
• determine whether guardianship is actually necessary,
• hear all concerned parties, and
• record a reasoned decision.

Rejecting an application without following these mandatory steps amounts to a violation of the statutory framework.

3. Welfare of the Person with Disability is Paramount

The Court reiterated that the National Trust Act is a welfare legislation enacted for the protection of persons requiring support in exercising legal and personal autonomy.

Accordingly, every guardianship decision must primarily consider:

• the welfare of the person with disability,
• care and support requirements,
• protection of rights,
• personal circumstances, and
• overall best interests.

The Court cautioned against adopting narrow technical interpretations that undermine the object of disability legislation.

4. Authorities Must Adopt a Rights-Based Interpretation

The Court observed that the District Collector had misunderstood the statutory scheme and failed to apply the law correctly.

Administrative authorities implementing disability legislation must interpret welfare statutes in light of:

• constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity,
• contemporary medical understanding, and
• the rights-based philosophy underpinning disability law.

Directions Issued

The Kerala High Court:

• quashed the District Collector's order rejecting the guardianship application;
• held that the conclusion that Down Syndrome is outside the National Trust Act is legally unsustainable;
• directed the competent authority to reconsider the application afresh;
• ordered that the petitioner, the mother, and the daughter be given an opportunity of hearing; and
• directed completion of the entire exercise within three months.

Why This Judgment Matters

a. Recognition of Down Syndrome Under the National Trust Act

The judgment removes a significant administrative misconception by clarifying that persons with Down Syndrome are entitled to the protections of the National Trust Act despite the condition not being expressly named in the legislation.

This interpretation aligns disability law with contemporary medical science and the broader framework of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

b. Reinforcing Due Process in Guardianship Proceedings

The Court has reaffirmed that guardianship proceedings cannot be treated as routine administrative exercises. Authorities must undertake a meaningful assessment, follow statutory safeguards, and hear all affected persons before taking a decision.

c. Promoting Rights-Based Disability Jurisprudence

The judgment is another example of Indian courts preferring purposive interpretation over rigid textual interpretation in disability law. Rather than restricting statutory benefits through technical readings, the Court has chosen an interpretation that advances inclusion, dignity and equal protection.

d. Guidance for Local Level Committees and District Authorities

The ruling provides valuable guidance to District Collectors, Local Level Committees and other authorities exercising powers under the National Trust Act, making it clear that decisions must be informed by statutory objectives, medical evidence and the welfare of the person with disability.

DRI Commentary

This decision marks an important development in Indian disability jurisprudence by recognising that statutory protection cannot depend upon whether a particular medical condition is expressly named in legislation. The Kerala High Court has correctly adopted a purposive interpretation that gives effect to the object of the National Trust Act rather than defeating it through a narrow reading of its text.

Equally significant is the Court's insistence that guardianship proceedings must be conducted with procedural fairness. Although the judgment does not revisit the evolving jurisprudence on supported decision-making under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), it reinforces that any decision affecting the legal autonomy of a person with disability must be taken only after a careful inquiry, participation of all stakeholders, and adherence to statutory safeguards.

The ruling is likely to benefit numerous families of persons with Down Syndrome who may have previously faced rejection of guardianship applications based on an unduly restrictive interpretation of the National Trust Act. It also serves as a timely reminder that disability legislation is remedial and beneficial in nature, and must therefore be interpreted in a manner that expands—not restricts—the rights and protections available to persons with disabilities

Read the Judgement

Universal Accessibility Gets Judicial Backing: Karnataka High Court Issues Comprehensive SOP, Declares Accessibility a Fundamental Right

Court: High Court of Karnataka
Bench: Justice Suraj Govindaraj
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 11351 of 2020
Case Title: PSBB Learning Leadership Academy v. Mrs. Barnali Rout & Others
Date of Judgment: 1 June 2026

Introduction

In a judgment that may significantly influence the future of accessibility jurisprudence in India, the Karnataka High Court has issued a comprehensive Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Universal Accessibility covering government institutions, private establishments, educational institutions, transport infrastructure, public spaces, housing developments, and digital platforms.

The judgment arose from a dispute involving a teacher who acquired a severe locomotor disability while attempting to save a student from a potentially fatal incident. However, the Court transformed what began as an individual grievance into an opportunity to address the systemic barriers faced by persons with disabilities across Karnataka.

The resulting 465-page judgment stands out as one of the most comprehensive judicial interventions on accessibility ever delivered by an Indian court. Our sector colleague Dr. Jayna Kothari, Senior Advocate represented the Respondents in the case.

The Background

Mrs. Barnali Rout, a teacher employed by PSBB Learning Leadership Academy, Bengaluru, suffered a serious spinal injury in August 2013 while attempting to prevent a student from jumping from a school building. The incident left her with approximately 90% permanent locomotor disability.

The State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities directed the school to pay compensation and provide relief. The school challenged the Commissioner's order before the Karnataka High Court, raising multiple legal questions, including:

• Whether the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 applies to private educational institutions.
• Whether private employers are obligated to provide reasonable accommodation.
• Whether the State Commissioner possesses authority to issue corrective directions.
• What obligations educational institutions owe to employees who acquire disabilities during service.

The Court answered each of these questions in favour of a robust and purposive interpretation of disability rights.

Accessibility Is a Fundamental Right

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the judgment is its unequivocal recognition that accessibility is not a welfare measure.

The Court held that accessibility flows directly from the guarantees of equality, dignity, freedom, and life under the Constitution. Drawing from Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 38, 41, and 46, the Court declared that accessibility is a fundamental right and not an act of charity.

The judgment adopts the principles of:

• Universal Design;
• Inclusion by Design;
• Reasonable Accommodation;
• Barrier-Free Environment; and
• Substantive Equality.

Importantly, the Court also recognised the concept of intersectionality, acknowledging that disability often overlaps with gender, age, caste, poverty, geography, and other forms of disadvantage.

A Landmark SOP on Universal Accessibility

The most enduring feature of the judgment is the Court's issuance of a detailed Standard Operating Procedure on Universal Accessibility.

The SOP has been directed to operate throughout Karnataka as binding directions until the State Government frames comprehensive accessibility rules under Sections 40 and 45 of the RPwD Act, 2016.

Who Is Covered?

The SOP extends to an extraordinary range of establishments, including:

Government Institutions

• Secretariat buildings
• Government departments
• Courts and tribunals
• Police stations
• Panchayat offices
• Municipal offices
• Prisons and correctional facilities

Public Commercial Establishments

• Shopping malls
• Commercial complexes
• Multiplexes and cinemas
• Hotels and restaurants
• Banks and ATMs
• Fuel stations

Educational Institutions

• Schools
• Colleges
• Universities
• Coaching centres
• Libraries
• Examination centres

Healthcare Facilities

• Hospitals
• Clinics
• Rehabilitation centres
• Mental health institutions

Transport Infrastructure

• Railway stations
• Metro stations
• Bus terminals
• Airports
• Taxi stands
• Parking facilities
• Footpaths and pedestrian crossings

Religious and Cultural Institutions

• Temples
• Mosques
• Churches
• Gurudwaras
• Museums
• Heritage sites
• Sports complexes

Residential Developments

• Apartment complexes
• Housing societies
• Student hostels
• Senior living facilities

Digital Platforms

The SOP is particularly notable for its detailed treatment of digital accessibility. It applies to:

• Government websites;
• Mobile applications;
• E-governance portals;
• Court filing systems;
• Online grievance portals;
• Smart-city platforms; and
• Public-facing private digital services.

The Court has mandated compliance with recognised digital accessibility standards and emphasised WCAG 2.1 Level AA compliance, keyboard accessibility, screen-reader compatibility, captioning, and support for Indian Sign Language.

Accessibility Obligations for New and Existing Buildings

The Court has adopted a phased compliance model.

New Constructions

• Every new public or private building must be designed as accessible from inception.
• No building approval or completion certificate should be granted unless accessibility requirements are incorporated into the design.

Existing Buildings

The SOP requires accessibility retrofitting through defined timelines. High-footfall facilities have been prioritised for early compliance, such as:

• Airports,
• Railway stations,
• Metro stations,
• Bus terminals,
• Shopping malls, and
• Commercial complexes

The Court has also mandated accessibility audits, annual reviews, renewal audits, and surprise inspections. Significantly, the Court directed that occupancy certificates and trade licence renewals should be linked to accessibility compliance. This is potentially one of the strongest enforcement mechanisms seen in Indian accessibility jurisprudence.

Detailed Accessibility Standards

Unlike many previous judicial directions that merely refer to accessibility in general terms, the Karnataka High Court has prescribed specific measurable standards.

The SOP includes requirements relating to:

• Ramp gradients;
• Accessible toilets;
• Lift dimensions;
• Corridor widths;
• Service counters;
• Signage;
• Wayfinding systems;
• Emergency evacuation measures;
• Areas of Rescue Assistance;
• Accessible parking;
• Public seating; and
• Communication accessibility.

The judgment therefore moves beyond principles and enters the domain of practical implementation.

Special Directions for Educational Institutions

The Court devoted particular attention to schools and educational institutions. Every educational institution is required to:

• Establish Disability Anti-Discrimination Committees;
• Adopt Inclusive Education Policies;
• Ensure that admissions are not denied solely on the ground of disability;
• Install safety features in buildings;
• Maintain accessible facilities; and
• Develop emergency response protocols.

These directions have significance far beyond the facts of the present case and may serve as a model for educational institutions nationwide.

Private Sector Obligations Clarified

One of the most important legal findings concerns the applicability of the RPwD Act to private establishments.

The Court carefully distinguished the position under the 1995 disability law and held that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 expressly covers private establishments.

The judgment notes that the statutory definitions of "establishment" and "private establishment" leave little room for doubt.

Consequently, schools, companies, trusts, societies, hospitals, commercial entities, and other private organisations are bound by many obligations under the RPwD Act, including non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation.

This clarification is likely to have significant implications across India.

State Accessibility Authority

Recognising that rights without implementation mechanisms often remain ineffective, the Court directed the State Government to establish:

State Accessibility Authority

The Authority is expected to:

• Monitor compliance;
• Empanel accessibility auditors;
• Issue certifications;
• Maintain monitoring systems;
• Update standards; and
• Publish annual accessibility reports.

District Accessibility Committees

The Court also directed constitution of District Accessibility Committees across Karnataka to ensure local-level implementation and monitoring.

Relief to the Teacher

The Court upheld the compensation awarded to the teacher and directed the school to offer meaningful reinstatement through reasonable accommodation measures, including:

• Ground-floor wheelchair-accessible classrooms;
• Accessible washroom facilities;
• Transport allowance;
• Additional rest breaks;
• Online teaching options when required; and
• Necessary support arrangements.

The Court firmly rejected the argument that the teacher's conduct in attempting to save a student could diminish the school's obligations under disability rights law.

Why This Judgment Matters

This decision is remarkable for at least five reasons.

1. First, it treats accessibility as a constitutional right rather than a welfare measure.
2. Second, it recognises that disability rights obligations extend beyond government establishments to the private sector.
3. Third, it bridges the longstanding implementation gap by prescribing concrete standards and timelines.
4. Fourth, it places digital accessibility on an equal footing with physical accessibility.
5. Fifth, it creates an institutional framework for monitoring compliance rather than leaving implementation to goodwill alone.

DRI's Perspective

For years, disability rights advocates have highlighted that India's challenge is no longer the absence of law but the absence of implementation.

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 contains an extensive framework on accessibility. Yet progress across many sectors has remained uneven because accessibility standards have often lacked enforceable implementation mechanisms.

The Karnataka High Court's judgment seeks to address precisely this gap.

While many aspects of the SOP may require further scrutiny and some directions may ultimately be tested before appellate courts, the judgment unquestionably represents one of the boldest judicial attempts to operationalise accessibility rights in India.

Its influence is likely to extend far beyond Karnataka.

If implemented effectively, the judgment may become a model for other States and contribute significantly to transforming accessibility from a legal promise into a lived reality.

Accessibility is not charity. Accessibility is not welfare. Accessibility is a right. The Karnataka High Court has now said so in unmistakable terms.

Read the Judgement dated 01 June 2026 in PSBB Learning Leadership Academy v. Mrs. Barnali Rout & Others 

Supreme Court Issues Notice on PIL Seeking Stronger Enforcement of Disability Commission Orders

Court: Supreme Court of India
Case: Shashank Pandey v. Union of India
Case No.: W.P. (C) No. 715 of 2026
Date of Notice: 01 June 2026
Next Date of Hearing: 21 July 2026

On 1 June 2026, the Supreme Court of India has issued notice in a significant public interest litigation filed by disability rights advocate Shashank Pandey, raising concerns about the ineffective implementation of the grievance redressal mechanism under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). The matter is now listed for hearing on 21 July 2026.

The petition highlights a systemic problem familiar to many persons with disabilities across India: even after securing favourable recommendations from the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) or State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities (SCPDs), implementation often remains elusive because authorities simply ignore the recommendations without consequences.

The Enforcement Gap

The RPwD Act establishes the offices of the CCPD and SCPDs as specialised statutory bodies entrusted with protecting and enforcing disability rights. Sections 76 and 81 of the Act require authorities to act on recommendations made by these commissions within three months. If an authority chooses not to comply, it must communicate reasons for such non-acceptance both to the concerned commission and to the aggrieved person.

According to data relied upon in the petition, however, this statutory framework is routinely disregarded.

The petition cites information furnished by the Union Government before the Supreme Court in an earlier case concerning compliance with CCPD recommendations. The data allegedly reveals that in a majority of cases authorities neither comply with recommendations nor furnish reasons for refusing to do so. For instance, in 2022, action taken reports were received in only 81 out of 250 cases, while reasons for non-acceptance were furnished in only 22 of the remaining cases. Similar trends were reported for 2023 and 2024.

The petitioner argues that only about 10–15% of cases involving non-compliance are accompanied by the statutorily mandated explanation, rendering the legislative safeguard largely ineffective.

Penalty Powers Rarely Used

One of the central concerns raised in the PIL is the near-total absence of enforcement through the penalty provisions contained in the RPwD Act.

Section 93 empowers disability commissions to impose fines on authorities that fail to furnish information, reports, or documents that they are legally required to provide. The petition contends that despite widespread failures to submit action taken reports or reasons for non-acceptance, there is no known instance where the CCPD has actually imposed penalties under this provision.

Similarly, Section 89 provides for penalties for contravention of provisions of the Act, yet the petition alleges that these powers remain largely unutilised.

According to the petitioner, this has resulted in a situation where successful complainants must approach High Courts or the Supreme Court merely to secure implementation of recommendations already issued by specialised disability commissions. The petition cites several examples where litigants had to seek constitutional remedies despite obtaining favourable findings from disability commissions.

Institutional Weakening of Disability Commissions

Beyond enforcement concerns, the PIL paints a troubling picture regarding the functioning and resourcing of disability commissions.

The petition notes that since 2019, the post of Chief Commissioner has not been occupied by a full-time appointee, with the position reportedly being handled as an additional charge by the Secretary, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. The petitioner argues that this arrangement is inconsistent with the scheme of the RPwD Act and Rules, which contemplate an independent statutory office.

The petition further points out that only one of the two Additional Commissioner posts contemplated under Section 74(2) is presently filled, effectively reducing what should be a three-member leadership structure to a significantly weakened arrangement.

These vacancies, it is argued, contribute to delays in complaint adjudication despite the RPwD Rules envisaging disposal of complaints within three months.

Budgetary and Staffing Concerns

The PIL also raises concerns regarding financial and human resource allocation.

According to the petition, the CCPD's office received only ₹5.5 crore in budgetary allocation for 2025–26, substantially lower than allocations made to several other statutory commissions. For 2026–27, the allocation reportedly stands at ₹6.5 crore.

The petitioner argues that such limited resources affect the ability of disability commissions to discharge their statutory responsibilities effectively.

The petition further alleges that many State Commissions suffer from acute staffing shortages. Some reportedly lack even basic support personnel such as legal consultants, clerical staff, stenographers, and accountants necessary for efficient grievance redressal.

Digital Accessibility and Online Grievance Redressal

The PIL also highlights deficiencies in the digital infrastructure of disability commissions.

According to the petition, a large number of State Disability Commissions do not maintain functional websites. The petitioner further alleges that only four states presently provide a functioning online mechanism for registration of complaints, while most states and Union Territories either lack such systems altogether or operate dysfunctional portals.

For a rights enforcement framework intended to serve persons with disabilities across the country, the absence of accessible digital complaint mechanisms raises serious access-to-justice concerns.

Missing Advisory Committees

Another issue flagged in the PIL concerns the advisory committees mandated under Sections 74(8) and 79(7) of the RPwD Act.

The Act requires both the CCPD and SCPDs to be assisted by advisory committees comprising experts from the disability sector. However, the petitioner asserts that such committees are presently either non-existent or non-functional at both the central and state levels.

Reliefs Sought

The petitioner has requested the Supreme Court to:

1. Frame guidelines ensuring effective and time-bound compliance with recommendations issued by disability commissions and ensure meaningful utilisation of penalty provisions under Sections 89 and 93 of the RPwD Act.
2. Direct the Union Government to fill vacancies in the Office of the Chief Commissioner, including the vacant post of Additional Commissioner.
3. Ensure constitution of advisory committees at both central and state levels.
4. Order an independent audit of the offices of the CCPD and SCPDs to identify infrastructural, staffing and resource gaps and ensure their timely rectification.

Why This PIL Matters

The case raises a question that goes to the heart of disability rights enforcement in India: What value do statutory rights have if the institutions created to enforce them lack the authority, resources, or willingness to ensure compliance?

The RPwD Act established a specialised grievance redressal mechanism precisely to provide persons with disabilities a faster and more accessible alternative to conventional court litigation. If recommendations issued after inquiry can be routinely ignored without consequence, the effectiveness of that mechanism becomes seriously undermined.

The outcome of this PIL may therefore have implications extending far beyond the offices of the CCPD and SCPDs. It could determine whether disability commissions function merely as recommendatory bodies or evolve into robust institutions capable of securing meaningful compliance with disability rights obligations across the country.

With notice now issued and the matter scheduled for hearing on 21 July 2026, the Supreme Court's consideration of these issues will be closely watched by the disability rights community.

Delhi High Court Backs CCPD Concerns on SBI Promotion Policy, Orders Fresh Consideration of Barriers Faced by Blind Officers and examine alternative promotion pathways stressing that disability cannot be a ground to deny career advancement.

Published by: Disability Rights India (DRI)

Category: Employment Rights | Banking Sector | Reasonable Accommodation

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia
Case No.: W.P.(C) 6027/2025
Case Title: Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association v. State Bank of India & Others
Date of Judgment: 29 May 2026 

Background

More than three years after the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) found SBI's promotion policy discriminatory towards blind employees, the Delhi High Court has directed the State Bank of India to formally revisit the issue and examine solutions to prevent career stagnation of officers with visual disabilities.

The litigation was initiated by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA), challenging SBI's promotion policy that requires officers aspiring for promotion to Senior Management Grades (Scale IV and V) to first serve as Branch Managers or in Credit, Trade Finance or Forex assignments.

The Association argued that these assignments involve functions that are presently inaccessible to visually impaired officers because of the absence of assistive technology, inaccessible documentation systems, physical inspection requirements and unresolved questions of legal liability.

A Battle That Started Before the CCPD

This litigation did not emerge overnight.

The controversy traces its origins to proceedings initiated before the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) in 2022 by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA). The complaint challenged SBI's promotion policy on the ground that mandatory Branch Manager and Credit-related assignments effectively excluded blind officers from promotional opportunities because the duties associated with those roles were not accessible under existing systems and technologies.

After examining the issue, the CCPD accepted the core concerns raised by VIBEWA and held that the promotion criteria had the effect of disadvantaging visually impaired employees. The CCPD recommended that SBI modify its promotion policy, provide reasonable accommodation, recognise alternative assignments performed by blind officers and review exclusionary provisions that impeded career progression.

SBI, however, declined to implement the recommendations, resulting in the dispute eventually reaching the Delhi High Court.

Significantly, while the High Court stopped short of striking down the promotion policy, it accepted the legitimacy of the concerns underlying the CCPD proceedings. The Court noted that seemingly neutral promotion criteria can operate in a discriminatory manner against persons with disabilities and directed SBI's Board of Directors to reconsider the issue after examining detailed proposals to be submitted by VIBEWA.

Thus, nearly three-and-a-half years after the CCPD's intervention, the concerns first raised before the disability rights watchdog have now received judicial recognition from the Delhi High Court.

The Real Issue: Equal Criteria or Equal Opportunity?

The case raises a recurring question in disability rights jurisprudence: Does treating everyone identically always amount to equality?

SBI argued that the same promotion criteria apply to all officers and that several visually impaired officers are already performing the mandatory assignments.

VIBEWA, however, contended that equality cannot mean forcing blind officers to satisfy requirements that are designed around visual functions.

The Association pointed out that Branch Managers and Credit Officers are required to:

• Verify original title deeds and signatures;
• Conduct physical inspections of business premises and collateral properties;
• Monitor CCTV footage and strong rooms;
• Verify stocks and securities;
• Certify regulatory compliance carrying personal liability.

In the absence of accessible systems and clear accountability mechanisms, blind officers face barriers that their sighted counterparts do not. The result is not merely inconvenience—it is exclusion from promotion itself.

High Court Recognises the Principle of Indirect Discrimination

While the Court did not strike down SBI's policy, it accepted an important legal principle.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Leesamma Joseph and In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court recognised that a seemingly neutral rule can still operate in a discriminatory manner if it disproportionately disadvantages persons with disabilities.

The Court observed:

"Any provision that creates an impediment to the promotion of visually impaired officers would run contrary to the provisions of the RPwD Act."

This observation is significant because it shifts the focus from formal equality to substantive equality—the cornerstone of modern disability rights law.

Why the Court Did Not Strike Down the Policy

The Court ultimately refrained from invalidating the promotion criteria because it found that the Association had not placed before it sufficient details regarding specific officers adversely affected by the policy or concrete proposals capable of addressing SBI's operational concerns.

However, instead of rejecting the claim, the Court adopted a solution-oriented approach.

It directed VIBEWA to submit a comprehensive representation identifying affected officers, detailing the barriers they face, and proposing alternative pathways, accommodations and best practices adopted by other public sector banks. SBI's Board of Directors has been directed to examine these proposals and consider implementing feasible measures consistent with the RPwD Act.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment is important for reasons extending far beyond SBI.

First, it represents judicial recognition that career stagnation can itself amount to disability discrimination.

Second, it reinforces the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence that indirect discrimination is as harmful as explicit exclusion.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, it breathes fresh life into the CCPD's 2022 findings, which SBI had effectively ignored for over three years.

The Court has not given SBI a clean chit. Instead, it has required the country's largest public sector bank to engage with the concerns raised by blind employees, revisit the CCPD's recommendations, and seriously examine whether alternative pathways and reasonable accommodations can be devised.

For thousands of employees with disabilities working in the banking sector, the judgment sends a clear message: promotion policies cannot be insulated from scrutiny merely because they are framed in neutral language. If a rule creates barriers that prevent persons with disabilities from progressing in their careers, institutions must justify those barriers and actively seek solutions.

The next chapter of this battle will now unfold before SBI's Board of Directors.

Editor's Disclosure: The author of this blog post, Advocate Subhash Chandra Vashishth, represented the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA) in the proceedings before the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities that culminated in the CCPD's recommendations discussed in this article. The CCPD recommendations were covered in our blog post titled "Court of CCPD holds the SBI's Promotion Policy to grades of SMGS IV and SMGS V (2022-23) as discriminatory to employees with visual disabilities, recommends review" dated 01 Dec 2022.

Read the High Court Judgement  in VIBEWA Vs. SBI & Others

Disability Developed After 14 Years of Army Service Cannot Be Denied Attributability Without Adequate Reasoning: J&K and Ladakh High Court Upholds Disability Pension

Court: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh

Bench: Justice Sindhu Sharma and Justice Shahzad Azeem

Case Title: Union of India & Others v. Ex Naik Roshan Lal
Case No.: WP(C) No. 1885/2023 (before the J&K and Ladakh High Court challenging the AFT order)
Neutral Citation: 2026:JKLHC-JMU:1651
Decided on: 29 May 2026

Background

The present case arose from a challenge by the Union of India to an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) granting disability pension to Ex Naik Roshan Lal, a former Army personnel who had developed a disability during the course of his military service.

Roshan Lal had served in the Indian Army for approximately fourteen years before being invalided out of service on account of a medical condition. Upon his discharge, the competent authorities denied disability pension on the ground that the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service.

Aggrieved by the denial, the respondent approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, which held that the disability pension claim had been wrongly rejected and directed the authorities to grant disability benefits. The Union of India challenged the Tribunal's order before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.

Issues Before the Court

The High Court was called upon to determine:

1. Whether the disability suffered by the respondent could be denied attribution to military service despite having manifested after fourteen years of active service.
2. Whether the Release Medical Board had provided sufficient reasons to conclude that the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service.
3. Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal was justified in directing the grant of disability pension to the respondent.
4. Whether the rejection of disability pension complied with the principles governing entitlement under military pension regulations and judicial precedents.

Key Observations of the Court

The Court emphasized that when a disability develops after a long period of military service, the authorities cannot mechanically deny attributability without furnishing cogent and convincing reasons.

The Bench noted that the respondent had rendered approximately fourteen years of service before the onset of the medical condition. The record did not disclose any adequate reasoning demonstrating why the disability was completely unrelated to military service.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that members of the Armed Forces are presumed to be in sound physical and mental condition at the time of their enrolment unless a contrary medical condition is recorded. Therefore, where a disability manifests during service, the burden lies on the authorities to establish, through clear medical evidence and reasoning, that the condition was neither attributable to nor aggravated by service.

The High Court found that the Medical Board's conclusions were unsupported by sufficient analysis and failed to explain how the disability was entirely disconnected from the respondent's prolonged military service.

The Bench observed that a mere assertion that a disease is not attributable to service cannot substitute a reasoned determination, particularly when such a finding deprives a serviceman of valuable pensionary benefits.

Directions Issued by the Court

The High Court upheld the order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the Union of India was dismissed. The Court affirmed the respondent's entitlement to disability pension and declined to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal. As a consequence, the directions issued by the Armed Forces Tribunal for grant of disability benefits remained operative.

Significance of the Judgment

This judgment carries considerable significance for disability rights within the armed forces and for the jurisprudence governing disability pensions.

• First, it reinforces the principle that military personnel who develop disabilities during service cannot be deprived of pensionary benefits through unreasoned or mechanical findings of Medical Boards.
• Second, the judgment strengthens the presumption in favour of servicemen whose disabilities arise after years of active duty. It recognizes the unique physical and psychological demands of military service and places an obligation upon authorities to justify any denial of attributability with substantial evidence.
• Third, the decision underscores the importance of reasoned administrative decision-making. Medical Boards and pension authorities must provide clear and rational explanations rather than relying upon conclusory observations.
• Finally, the ruling aligns with the broader constitutional values of fairness, dignity, and social security for individuals who have served the nation in uniform.

Commentary

The judgment is a welcome reaffirmation of the protective framework developed by constitutional courts and the Armed Forces Tribunal in matters concerning disability pensions.

Over the years, courts have consistently recognized that disability pension is not merely a financial benefit but a measure of social justice for personnel who suffer health impairments during military service. The denial of such benefits often has severe consequences for veterans and their families.

The High Court's insistence on reasoned medical findings serves as an important safeguard against arbitrary administrative action. The ruling sends a clear message that disability pension claims cannot be rejected on the basis of vague or unsupported conclusions, particularly where the disability emerges after prolonged service.

The decision also reflects a humane and purposive interpretation of pension regulations. Rather than adopting a narrow technical approach, the Court focused on the realities of military service and the obligation of the State to protect the welfare of former servicemen.

From a disability rights perspective, the judgment advances the principle that individuals who acquire disabilities during service must receive fair treatment and meaningful access to statutory benefits. It contributes to a growing body of jurisprudence emphasizing accountability, transparency, and reasoned decision-making in disability-related adjudication.

Read the Judgement

Supreme Court Clarifies RPwD Act: Persons Forcibly Made to Ingest Acid Also Entitled to Recognition as Acid Attack Victims [Judgement included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1112 of 2025

Case Title: Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

Date of Order: 04 May 2026

In an important and expansive interpretation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”), the Supreme Court has ruled that persons who are forcibly made to ingest acid must also be treated as “acid attack victims” under the law, even if they do not suffer visible external disfigurement.

The order significantly broadens the protection available to survivors of acid violence by recognizing that acid attacks are not confined to incidents involving acid being thrown on a victim’s body. The Court also clarified that persons suffering internal injuries caused by acid ingestion are equally entitled to the protections and statutory benefits available under the RPwD Act.

Background

The matter arose in ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the rights, rehabilitation, and protection of acid attack survivors. During the hearing, senior advocate and Amicus Curiae Mukul Rohatgi pointed out a significant gap in the statutory framework.

Under the Schedule to the RPwD Act, “acid attack victims” are recognized as persons with specified disabilities. However, the definition referred to persons disfigured due to violent assaults involving the “throwing of acid or similar corrosive substances.” This wording unintentionally excluded victims who were forced to ingest acid or suffered internal injuries without visible external disfigurement.

The Court noted that both Section 326B of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code and Section 124(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 expressly recognize not only the throwing of acid but also the administration of acid by other means as a criminal offence.

Supreme Court’s Observations

The Bench observed that the present wording of the RPwD Act created an artificial distinction between categories of acid attack survivors. The Court specifically noted:

“A plain reading of the above indicates that victims to whom acid has been administered are not encompassed within the expression ‘acid attack victims’.”

The Court further acknowledged that the law’s current emphasis on “disfigurement” improperly restricted the scope of protection:

“Further, the use of the term ‘disfigured’ appears to confine the scope to external disfigurement of the body, thereby excluding cases involving internal injuries or scarring caused by the administration of acid.”

Recognizing the serious implications of such exclusion, the Court adopted a purposive and rights-oriented interpretation of the RPwD Act.

Key Directions Issued by the Court

Pending a formal amendment to the Schedule of the RPwD Act, the Supreme Court directed that:

“for all intents and purposes, and in order to give full effect to the legislative scheme underlying the 2016 Act, the expression ‘acid attack victims’ shall be construed to include victims to whom acid has been administered.”

The Court went further and clarified that the protection would also extend to survivors suffering internal injuries:

“It shall further include those who have suffered internal injuries, irrespective of whether there is any external disfigurement of the body.”

Importantly, the Bench declared that this interpretation would operate retrospectively from the inception of the RPwD Act:

“This clarificatory interpretation shall be deemed to have been incorporated at Serial No. 1A(e) of the Schedule from the inception of the 2016 Act.”

The Court also recorded the submission of the Solicitor General that the concerned Ministry had already initiated steps to formally amend the Schedule to the Act.

Significance of the Judgment

This order is a major step toward a more inclusive and realistic understanding of acid violence under Indian disability law. By recognizing survivors of forced acid ingestion and those with internal injuries, the Supreme Court has ensured that the RPwD Act is interpreted in line with its social welfare and human rights objectives.

The judgment also reinforces an important principle in disability jurisprudence: disability rights protections cannot be denied merely because an injury is not externally visible. Internal injuries, chronic pain, organ damage, and long-term medical consequences can be equally disabling and deserving of legal recognition and support.

The ruling is likely to have a substantial impact on access to disability certificates, reservations, rehabilitation schemes, healthcare benefits, compensation, and social protection measures available to acid attack survivors under the RPwD Act and allied welfare schemes.

At a broader level, the decision reflects the Supreme Court’s continuing move toward purposive interpretation of disability legislation so that statutory benefits are not defeated by narrow or technical readings of definitions. However, we still see that the definition "Acid Attack Victim" It doesn't yet cover the Thermal Burn victims due to throwing of kerosene or petrol or a similar material.

Read the Order/Judgement in Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.