Supreme Court Advances Rehabilitation Framework for Cadets Disabled During Military Training

ECHS benefits extended for life; Court recognises Section 34 reservation and asks States to consider out-boarded cadets under Ex-MP quota

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon’ble Mrs. Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manmohan
Case: In Re: Cadets Disabled in Military Training Struggle
Case No.: Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 6 of 2025
Order Date: 4 August 2026
Status: Proceedings continuing, to be listed on 08 Sep 2026

Background

The Supreme Court is continuing its suo motu proceedings concerning the rights and rehabilitation of military cadets who suffer disabling injuries during military training and are consequently discharged before completion of training or commissioning.

The issue assumes significance because such cadets occupy a peculiar position in law and policy. They have been selected for and have entered military training, but disability acquired during the course of training prevents them from completing the training and pursuing a military career. At the same time, they may not fall within the conventional definition of an “ex-serviceman” for purposes of reservation in civilian employment.

As reported earlier on Disability Rights India in October 2025, the Court had taken cognizance of the peculiar position of such “out-boarded” cadets, who, despite sustaining disability during official military training, could fall outside several welfare and rehabilitation measures available to personnel injured after entering regular service.

The earlier proceedings had focused on the absence of an adequate institutional framework addressing their medical care, financial security, rehabilitation, resettlement and other long-term needs. The Court had appointed Senior Advocate Rekha Palli as Amicus Curiae and directed the concerned authorities to examine the recommendations placed before it.

The present order dated 4 August 2026 records important developments since then. The Court has noted that the Ministry of Defence has extended Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) benefits to invalidated cadets, with their medical expenses being taken care of throughout their lives. The Court described this as a “laudable measure.”

The Court has also begun examining the financial assistance available to out-boarded cadets and, importantly, has addressed their access to employment reservation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

ECHS Benefits Extended for Life

One of the most significant developments recorded in the latest order concerns healthcare.

The Ministry of Defence has informed the Court that, pursuant to its earlier directions, ECHS benefits have been extended to invalidated cadets, with their medical expenses being taken care of throughout their lifetime.

The Court expressly appreciated this measure as a “laudable” one. This represents an important movement from the earlier position identified in the proceedings, where out-boarded cadets could face uncertainty regarding long-term medical support after their discharge.

For a cadet whose disability is acquired during military training and may require lifelong treatment, rehabilitation or assistive support, continuity of healthcare is a fundamental component of any meaningful rehabilitation framework.

The latest order therefore records a concrete measure that has emerged from the Court's continuing intervention.

Disparity in Monthly Disability Benefits

The Court was also apprised of a disparity in the monthly disability benefits available to different categories of trainees.

The Amicus Curiae pointed out that the monthly disability benefit being paid to an officer trainee (Army Cadet), plus DA, is ₹12,240, whereas a Jawan trainee/recruitee before attestation (Army) receives ₹18,000 per month.

The Amicus also brought to the Court's notice disparity in the payment of ex gratia amounts to out-boarded cadets.

In response, the Additional Solicitor General informed the Court that the Eighth Pay Commission has been constituted and would consider enhancement of the rates of ex gratia payment payable to out-boarded cadets.

The Court accordingly reserved liberty to the concerned persons to make representations before the Eighth Pay Commission and expressed the expectation that the Commission would consider the matter from all aspects and may suitably enhance the monthly ex gratia payment.

Thus, while the Court has not itself determined a revised amount, the issue has now been placed before the Eighth Pay Commission for consideration.

Section 34 of the RPwD Act Applies to Out-Boarded Cadets with Benchmark Disabilities

A major development in the latest proceedings concerns the application of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 to out-boarded cadets.

The Court noted that questions had arisen regarding the applicability of the Act, particularly in relation to cadets whose benchmark disability is below 40%.

In relation to cadets with 40% or more disability, however, the Court expressly recognised the operation of the statutory reservation framework.

The Court referred to Section 34 of the RPwD Act, under which the appropriate Government is required to reserve not less than 4% of the total number of vacancies in the cadre strength in each group of posts for persons with benchmark disabilities.

The Court held:

“We find that the out boarded cadets ought to be entitled to the benefit of the said provision and make their applications for employment accordingly in the reserved category in terms of the aforesaid Act.”

This is a significant development in the proceedings.

The Court has thus recognised that an out-boarded cadet who satisfies the statutory benchmark-disability requirement can seek employment under the horizontal reservation framework under Section 34.

States Asked to Consider Out-Boarded Cadets Under Ex-MP Quota

The Court also considered the position of States which had already taken steps to include out-boarded cadets within the category of “ex-servicemen” for purposes of employment.

The Court placed on record its appreciation of those States which had considered out-boarded cadets in the ex-servicemen category for employment through the reserved category.

The Court then issued an important direction to the States:

“The States are directed to consider granting reservation to out boarded cadets in the quota of ‘Ex-Military Personnel (Ex-MP)’...”

The purpose identified by the Court is to enhance the employment prospects of out-boarded cadets within the State and Union Territory cadres.

The Court further directed its Registry to send a copy of the order to the Chief Secretaries of the States for consideration and implementation in terms of Section 34 of the RPwD Act.

Consideration to be Independent of DoPT Definition of Ex-Servicemen

An important qualification accompanies this direction.

The Supreme Court clarified that the consideration by States for extending the Ex-MP reservation to out-boarded cadets shall be “de hors” the definition of “Ex-Servicemen” adopted by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) of the Central Government.

This is significant because the difficulty faced by out-boarded cadets arises partly from their unusual status. They have undergone military training and acquired disability in the course of that training but may not satisfy the conventional administrative definition of an ex-serviceman having completed certain number of years of military service as a combatant member.

The Court has therefore separated the State-level consideration of their employment reservation from the technical definition adopted by DoPT at the Central level.

Cadets Below 40% Disability: A Separate Scheme Under Consideration

The Court has also kept open the question of rehabilitation of cadets whose disability is below 40%.

The Court noted that the RPwD Act benefits of reservation in jobs etc. may not apply to cadets whose benchmark disability is below the statutory threshold. It therefore observed that a suitable scheme may be prepared and extended to such cadets.

The learned Additional Solicitor General informed the Court that instructions would be sought on this aspect.

This distinction is important. While Section 34 reservation is linked to the statutory concept of benchmark disability, the Court has recognised the need for a separate welfare response for cadets who have been out-boarded because of disability but do not meet the 40% threshold.

The question of their rehabilitation therefore remains part of the continuing proceedings.

Sabharwal Committee Recommendations to be Reconsidered

The Court has also directed the respondent Departments to reconsider the recommendations made by the Sabharwal Committee in light of the fact that the matter is now before the Supreme Court with the objective of ameliorating the conditions of out-boarded cadets.

The Court expressed the expectation that favourable recommendations would emerge from the respondent Departments.

This direction is significant because it indicates that the Court's intervention is not confined to individual monetary or employment benefits but continues to examine the broader institutional framework governing the rehabilitation of out-boarded cadets.

Individual Writ Remedies Remain Open

The Supreme Court also clarified that the pendency of the suo motu proceedings will not prevent individual cadets from pursuing their own writ petitions before the High Courts.

The Court directed that individual writ petitions should be considered on their own merits notwithstanding the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings.

Where an individual petition had earlier been disposed of because of the pendency of the present suo motu proceedings, liberty has been granted to the concerned petitioner to seek revival of the petition before the respective High Court.

This ensures that the continuing systemic proceedings before the Supreme Court do not operate to the prejudice of individual cadets seeking case-specific relief.

A Rights-Based Approach to Rehabilitation

The order reflects a broader understanding of rehabilitation under disability law. Rehabilitation cannot be limited to medical treatment or financial assistance. It must also encompass employment, economic independence, dignity and meaningful participation in society.

For military cadets, employment rehabilitation assumes particular importance because acquiring a disability during training may permanently close the career pathway for which they were selected and trained.

The Supreme Court's intervention seeks to ensure that such cadets are not left in a legal vacuum merely because their disability occurred before completion of formal military service.

The order also demonstrates the importance of substantive equality. A rigid application of conventional classifications may leave out persons whose circumstances do not fit neatly within existing administrative categories. The Court has instead sought to ensure that the underlying purpose of disability and rehabilitation law is not defeated by such classifications.

What Has Changed Since the October 2025 Proceedings?

The latest order shows that the proceedings have moved beyond the initial stage of identifying the problem and seeking a rehabilitation framework.

Some concrete developments have now been placed before the Court:

Healthcare: ECHS benefits have been extended to invalidated cadets, with lifetime medical expenses being taken care of.

Financial assistance: The disparity in monthly disability benefits and ex gratia payments has been placed before the Eighth Pay Commission for consideration.

Employment: The Court has expressly recognised the entitlement of out-boarded cadets with 40% or more benchmark disability to seek the benefit of Section 34 reservation.

State-level reservation: States have been directed to consider reservation for out-boarded cadets under the Ex-MP quota.

Below 40% disability: The Union Government has been asked to consider a suitable scheme for cadets who fall outside the benchmark-disability threshold.

Existing recommendations: The respondent Departments have been directed to reconsider the Sabharwal Committee recommendations.

The proceedings therefore appear to be moving towards a more comprehensive framework addressing medical care, financial support, employment and rehabilitation.

DRI Perspective

The latest order is an important development in the continuing proceedings concerning out-boarded military cadets.

When the Supreme Court first took up the issue in 2025, the principal concern was the existence of a gap in the institutional framework for persons who acquire serious disabilities during military training but are discharged before commissioning. The October 2025 proceedings highlighted the absence of adequate recognition and a comprehensive rehabilitation framework for this category.

The order of 4 August 2026 indicates that the intervention is beginning to produce tangible outcomes.

The extension of lifetime ECHS coverage addresses one of the most immediate concerns—continuity of healthcare after discharge. The consideration of enhanced ex gratia assistance addresses the economic consequences of disability. Most significantly, the Court has now connected the rehabilitation of out-boarded cadets with the statutory framework of the RPwD Act by recognising their access to Section 34 reservation where they have benchmark disability.

The direction concerning the Ex-MP quota is also noteworthy. Rather than allowing the technical definition of “Ex-Servicemen” to become an obstacle, the Court has asked States to consider an employment reservation framework specifically capable of accommodating the peculiar position of out-boarded cadets.

At the same time, the Court has not treated the 40% benchmark as the end of the rehabilitation inquiry. Its direction for consideration of a separate scheme for cadets below 40% disability is important in this regard. A statutory threshold for a particular benefit should not be confused with the absence of disability or the absence of rehabilitation needs.

The proceedings therefore continue to move towards a broader conception of rehabilitation—one that includes healthcare, financial security, employment and long-term support, rather than merely a one-time compensation payment.

The Supreme Court has not yet finally disposed of the matter. The directions contained in the 4 August 2026 order are part of continuing proceedings, and the precise contours of the final rehabilitation framework remain to be determined.

The matter is next listed for 8 September 2026.

Read the Earlier DRI Coverage

Supreme Court Examines Rights of Officer Cadets Disabled During Military Training; Seeks Rehabilitation Framework — Disability Rights India, 7 October 2025.

For Child Victims, Consider Impact on Future: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation to ₹83.38 Lakh for Infant Left Paralysed for Life

90% Physical Disability Can Mean 100% Functional Disability: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation for Child with Catastrophic Disability;  SC says compensation for disabled children must account for lifelong loss, dependence, future care and loss of quality of life

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Anjaria
Case: Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr.
Civil Appeal No.: 7067 of 2026
Date: 3 August 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 785

Background

The Supreme Court has substantially enhanced compensation payable to a child who suffered catastrophic and permanent disability in a motor accident when she was only six months old.

The case concerned Shreejita Pattnaik, who suffered severe spinal cord and neurological injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 16 June 2015. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia and was assessed as having 90% permanent locomotor disability. The medical evidence established that she would require lifelong medication, care, supervision and assistance.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Cuttack, had awarded compensation of ₹30,12,960. The Orissa High Court subsequently enhanced the amount to ₹45,40,800. The claimant, through her mother, approached the Supreme Court seeking further enhancement.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and enhanced the compensation to ₹83,38,360, with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization.

90% Physical Disability, But 100% Functional Disability

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is the Court's distinction between physical disability and functional disability.

The Court noted that the percentage of physical disability certified by a medical board and the actual impact of that disability on a person's earning capacity need not always be identical.

In Shreejita's case, although her permanent physical disability was assessed at 90%, the Court examined the actual consequences of the disability. She had been only six months old when the accident occurred, was permanently dependent upon others and would be unable to independently perform normal day-to-day activities.

The Court concluded that her future earning capacity had been completely destroyed and held that her functional disability was 100%.

This distinction is important in disability jurisprudence. A medical percentage does not necessarily capture the real-world consequences of disability. The relevant inquiry, particularly while determining loss of earning capacity, is the impact of the disability on the person's ability to pursue livelihood and live independently.

The Court observed that physical disability and functional disability operate in different fields: physical disability concerns medically assessed bodily impairment, whereas functional disability concerns the effect of that impairment upon the person's ability to live a normal life and pursue gainful employment.

A Child with Catastrophic Disability Cannot Be Treated Merely as a Non-Earning Person

The Court emphasised that children who suffer permanent or near-total disability constitute a distinct category in motor accident compensation cases.

A catastrophic injury during childhood does not merely cause an immediate physical impairment. It can alter the entire course of the child's life, affecting education, employment, social participation, independence, relationships and ordinary experiences of childhood and adulthood.

The Court noted that a child suffering catastrophic injury may lose much more than physical capacity. Ordinary activities such as playing, attending school, interacting with friends and participating in social life may become inaccessible.

Importantly, the Court connected these consequences with human dignity, observing that when a catastrophic injury deprives a child of the ability to perform ordinary functions independently, the resulting loss goes beyond physical disability and amounts to a continuing deprivation of dignity.

Minimum Wages of a Skilled Worker to Be Considered

The Court rejected the approach of treating the injured child as an unskilled labourer for calculating future loss of earnings.

Relying upon its earlier decisions, the Court held that in cases involving children who suffer permanent disability, minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the concerned State at the relevant time should be considered rather than simply assigning a notional income.

For the accident in the present case, the applicable skilled-worker wage was calculated at ₹192.50 per day, resulting in an annual income of ₹69,300. After adding 40% towards future prospects and applying a multiplier of 18, the Court calculated the loss of future earning capacity at ₹17,46,360, taking functional disability at 100%.

The Court also restored the multiplier of 18, holding that the recent trend in cases involving severely injured children supports its application.

Lifelong Attendant Charges Must Be Realistically Assessed

The judgment is also significant in its treatment of attendant charges.

The evidence established that Shreejita would remain dependent on others throughout her life and require constant care, supervision and assistance.

The Supreme Court held that attendant charges should not be confined to a nominal amount merely because actual bills or receipts may not have been produced. The Court applied the multiplier method to determine the cost of lifelong attendant care.

Taking the cost of one attendant at ₹6,000 per month and considering the requirement of two attendants, the Court calculated the annual expenditure at ₹1,44,000 and, applying the multiplier of 18, awarded ₹25,92,000 towards attendant charges.

This is particularly important in cases involving persons with severe disabilities who require lifelong personal assistance.

Compensation Must Account for Loss of Quality of Life

The Court further enhanced the amount awarded towards pain, suffering, loss of amenities and loss of marriage prospects.

The Court recognised that pain and suffering include physical discomfort as well as mental and emotional trauma. In the case of a child with catastrophic disability, conventional calculations may fail to adequately capture the lifelong deprivation suffered by the victim.

The amount under the combined heads was therefore enhanced to ₹25 lakh.

The Court emphasised that compensation for such injuries cannot be merely symbolic. The assessment must take into account the unusual deprivation and its consequences throughout the person's life.

Future Medical Needs Cannot Be Underestimated

The Court also found the amount awarded for future medical treatment inadequate.

Given the permanent and debilitating nature of Shreejita's injuries and her requirement for lifelong medical care, the Court enhanced compensation for future medical treatment from ₹5 lakh to ₹10 lakh.

The amount for conveyance and special diet was also enhanced from ₹50,000 to ₹2 lakh, considering the extensive treatment already undergone and the continuing requirement for medical care.

Compensation Enhanced to ₹83.38 Lakh

The Supreme Court ultimately recalculated the compensation as follows:

Head	Compensation
Loss of future earning capacity	₹17,46,360
Attendant charges	₹25,92,000
Pain, suffering, loss of amenities & marriage prospects	₹25,00,000
Medical expenses	₹3,00,000
Future medical treatment	₹10,00,000
Conveyance and special diet	₹2,00,000
Total	₹83,38,360

The compensation was accordingly enhanced from ₹45,40,800 to ₹83,38,360, along with 9% annual interest from the date of filing of the claim until realization. The insurer was directed to deposit the amount within six weeks.

Significance

The judgment is important beyond the quantum of compensation awarded in the individual case.

First, it reinforces that the percentage of medically assessed disability cannot automatically determine the extent of loss of earning capacity. The functional impact of disability must be examined.

Second, children with catastrophic disabilities cannot be treated simply as persons who had no income because they had not yet entered employment. Their future earning capacity and the future that has been irreversibly altered by the injury must be taken into account.

Third, compensation must realistically account for lifelong attendant care, medical treatment, loss of amenities, pain and suffering and other consequences of disability.

Most importantly, the Court's observations recognise that catastrophic disability in childhood affects the person's entire life trajectory. The loss is not limited to physical impairment or immediate medical expenditure. It can affect independence, education, employment, relationships, social participation and dignity.

The judgment therefore strengthens the principle that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act must be “just, fair and reasonable”, and must not become either a token amount or an inadequate approximation of lifelong loss. The Court reiterated that the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial legislation and requires a liberal and purposive interpretation.

DRI Perspective

The judgment is a significant reminder that disability is experienced in the context of a person's entire life, and compensation law must account for that reality.

For a child who acquires catastrophic disability before even beginning school, the consequences cannot be assessed by looking only at present medical expenses or the income the child happens to earn at the time of the accident—which, in the case of an infant, is obviously zero.

The Supreme Court's approach correctly looks forward: What earning capacity has been lost? What care will be required throughout life? What medical expenses are likely to continue? What ordinary experiences and opportunities have been taken away?

The Court's recognition of 100% functional disability despite 90% physical disability is particularly significant. It reinforces that disability assessment for compensation purposes must not become a purely medical exercise divorced from the person's actual life and livelihood.

Equally important is the Court's recognition of human dignity and lifelong deprivation. Compensation is necessarily incapable of restoring the life that was lost or altered by catastrophic injury. But the law must nevertheless make a genuine attempt to provide financial security commensurate with the deprivation suffered.

The judgment consequently moves the assessment of compensation closer to a rights-based and life-course approach to disability, where the objective is not merely to reimburse past expenditure but to provide meaningful financial security for the lifelong consequences of catastrophic disability.

Read the judgement

Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr. Civil Appeal No. : 7067 of 2026 [PDF 377KB]

Supreme Court Sets Four-Week Deadline for Appointment of Independent Disability Commissioners in the States and Centre in Rajive Raturi Vs Union of India

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case: Rajive Raturi v. Union of India & Others, W.P. (C) No. 243 of 2005 (along with connected matters)
Order Date: 29 July 2026

Next Date of Hearing: 20 January 2027

Statutory Provisions Involved

Provision	Subject	Relevance in this Order
Section 74, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities and Additional Commissioners	The Supreme Court directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with this provision.
Section 79, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities	The Court directed ten States/UTs to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks and clarified that the appointments must be made with independent charge, not as an additional charge.
Section 89, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Punishment for contravention of the Act, Rules or Regulations	The Court noted the absence of an effective mechanism for recovery of penalties under this provision and urged the Union Government to address this while finalising the Rules.
Rule 30, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017	Qualifications and eligibility for appointment of the Chief Commissioner	The Court specifically referred to Rule 30 and reminded the Union Government that a serving Government officer must retire from service before appointment as Chief Commissioner, thereby reinforcing the independence of the office.

Background

More than three years after the Supreme Court directed all States and Union Territories to appoint independent Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities by 31 August 2023, the issue has once again come before the Court owing to continued non-compliance by several Governments. In its order dated 17 July 2023 in Seema Girija Lal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had recognised that Commissioners perform crucial statutory functions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and directed all defaulting States and Union Territories to make appointments within a fixed timeline. Despite those directions, vacancies have continued in several jurisdictions, while the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also remained without a regular incumbent since 2019.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, while monitoring implementation of its landmark accessibility judgment in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, has once again intervened to strengthen the institutional framework under the RPwD Act. By its order dated 29 July 2026, the Court directed ten States and Union Territories to appoint independent State Commissioners within four weeks, directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within the same period, and issued further directions concerning the finalisation of accessibility rules and enforcement of the Act.

The matter has remained under continuous monitoring to ensure effective implementation of the judgment. Earlier, by an order dated 11 February 2026, the Court had sought detailed status reports from the Union Government regarding progress made in framing the new accessibility framework.

When the matter was taken up on 29 July 2026, the Court considered the latest status report filed by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD) and issued several important directions concerning the implementation of the RPwD Act. The order addresses three significant issues: the appointment of statutory disability commissioners, progress in framing accessibility rules, and strengthening enforcement mechanisms under the Act.

Accessibility Rules Under the RPwD Act

The Union Government informed the Court that substantial progress had been made in framing the new accessibility rules pursuant to the Supreme Court's judgment.

According to the status report placed before the Court:

• the draft notification relating to the built environment is ready for final notification;
• draft rules relating to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have already been published; and
• a draft report relating to assistive technologies, services and products has also been prepared.

Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that before the draft rules are finalised and notified, the suggestions already submitted by disability organisations and domain experts should be meaningfully considered so that no deficiencies remain in the final framework.

Accepting this submission, the Court observed that there should be no difficulty in ensuring that the Rules effectively fulfil the objectives of the RPwD Act. Noting that several stakeholders had already submitted detailed suggestions before the committees constituted by the Ministry, the Court urged the Union Government to carefully examine those recommendations before finalising the Rules.

The Bench observed that once the Rules are notified, shortcomings should not subsequently emerge that could have been addressed during the drafting stage itself.

The Court further requested the learned Additional Solicitors General to provide copies of the latest status report along with the draft Rules to all stakeholders so that they may examine the proposals and submit their responses at the earliest.

Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Independent State Commissioners

One of the most important aspects of the order concerns the continued absence of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities in several States and Union Territories.

During the hearing, Advocate Rahul Bajaj pointed out that despite the statutory requirement contained in Section 79 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several States had still not appointed State Commissioners. It was submitted that these authorities perform a crucial role in ensuring effective implementation of the Act and in providing an institutional mechanism for grievance redressal and monitoring compliance.

The Court recorded that the following States and Union Territories had not appointed State Commissioners:

• Delhi
• Haryana
• Rajasthan
• Himachal Pradesh
• Karnataka
• Tamil Nadu
• Sikkim
• Nagaland
• Puducherry
• Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed all these Governments to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with Section 79 of the RPwD Act. The Court made it clear that the direction must be strictly complied with, observing that any laxity would be viewed "very strictly".

Commissioner Must Hold Independent Charge

The Court also clarified an important aspect that has frequently arisen in disability governance.

Many States have, in the past, assigned the office of State Commissioner to serving officers as an additional charge, rather than appointing an independent statutory authority.

The Supreme Court expressly disapproved this practice and clarified:

"The State concerned shall appoint the Commissioner with an independent charge. The State should not appoint anyone as a Commissioner holding additional charge."

This clarification reinforces the independent character of the statutory office created under the RPwD Act.

Appointment of Chief Commissioner and Additional Commissioners

The Court also considered submissions regarding the prolonged vacancy in the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD). It was pointed out that since 2019 there has been no full-time Chief Commissioner, with the Secretary, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, functioning only as an officer holding additional charge.

Reference was made to Section 74 of the RPwD Act and Rule 30 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, which contemplate appointment of an independent Chief Commissioner and provide that a serving Government officer must retire from Government service before assuming the office.

Accepting these submissions, the Court directed the Union Government to complete the appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities; and two Additional Commissioners, within four weeks, in accordance with Section 74 of the RPwD Act. The Court also specifically invited the attention of the Union Government to Rule 30 while making these appointments.

Effective Recovery of Penalties Under Section 89

Another issue raised before the Court related to Section 89 of the RPwD Act, which prescribes penalties for contravention of the Act and the Rules.

Counsel submitted that although the Act provides for monetary penalties, it does not prescribe any effective mechanism for recovery of those fines, thereby limiting practical enforcement.

The Supreme Court requested the Union Government to consider incorporating an appropriate recovery mechanism while finalising the new Rules so that penalties under Section 89 can be effectively enforced.

Existing Accessibility Standards Continue to Apply

The Court also reiterated an important clarification contained in paragraph 83 of its judgment dated 8 November 2024.

The Bench noted the submission that while new accessibility standards are being framed, compliance with existing accessibility obligations must continue.

The Court reiterated that:

"progressive compliance with the standards listed in the existing Rule 15(1) and the progress towards the targets of the Accessible India Campaign must continue unabated."

This clarification is significant because it prevents authorities from postponing compliance on the ground that revised accessibility standards are under preparation.

Non-Negotiable Accessibility Norms to be Finalised Within Six Months

The Court directed that the issuance of the non-negotiable accessibility norms envisaged in the main judgment must be completed within six months. The matter has been directed to be listed on 20 January 2027 for reporting compliance with all directions issued by the Court.

Significance

The order strengthens the institutional framework established under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. For nearly seven years, the office of the Chief Commissioner has remained without a full-time incumbent, while several States have either failed to appoint State Commissioners altogether or have entrusted the office to officials holding additional charge. By directing appointments within a fixed time frame and expressly requiring independent charge, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that these statutory authorities are intended to function as independent oversight institutions rather than as additional responsibilities assigned to serving bureaucrats.

The order also ensures that the ongoing process of framing accessibility rules remains consultative and participatory by directing meaningful consideration of stakeholder inputs before final notification. At the same time, the Court has reiterated that existing accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act and the Accessible India Campaign remain fully enforceable until the new framework comes into force.

The proceedings will now continue on 20 January 2027, when the Supreme Court will examine compliance with these directions.

Read the Order dated 27 July 2026

Probationer Also an 'Employee' Under RPwD Act, Can't be Terminated on Acquiring Disability During Service - says Rajasthan HC

Rajasthan High Court Protects Probationer from Termination on Acquiring Disability; Says  Section 20 of RPwD Act protects government employee who acquires disability during service, irrespective of probationary status

Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur
Bench: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Rekha Borana
Case: Sanjay Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Case No.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3504/2026
Date of Judgment: 22 July 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JP:28292

Background

The Rajasthan High Court has held that a government employee cannot be terminated merely because the employee acquires a disability during service, even where the employee is still on probation.

The petitioner, Sanjay Choudhary, was appointed as a Constable on 3 June 2013. During his probation, he met with an accident on 29 June 2014 and subsequently suffered 100% disability, certified by the competent Medical Board.

Despite the disability having been acquired during service, his services were terminated by order dated 19 June 2018 with effect from 29 June 2014 on the ground that he was no longer capable of performing the duties of a Constable.

The petitioner challenged the termination before the High Court, relying upon Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

The State contended that the petitioner was only a probationer-trainee and had not been confirmed in service and, therefore, could not claim the protection available to an employee under Section 20. The High Court rejected this contention.

Protection Under Section 20 Extends to Probationers

Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act prohibits a Government establishment from dispensing with or reducing in rank an employee who acquires a disability during service.

Where the employee becomes unsuitable for the post held, the establishment is required to shift the employee to another post carrying the same pay scale and service benefits. If this is not possible, the employee is to be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post becomes available or until superannuation, whichever is earlier.

Justice Rekha Borana held that the provision uses the expression “employee” and does not exclude a person merely because the appointment is still under probation.

The Court rejected the argument that an employee ceases to receive statutory protection simply because confirmation in service has not yet taken place.

The Court relied, among other precedents, upon decisions concerning the corresponding protection under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, including Union of India v. Pramod Sadashiv Thakre and Pawan Kumar v. Delhi Transport Corporation.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab concerning the legal protection available to probationers.

Recent Supreme Court Judgment in Bali Ram Reinforces the Principle

The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court's recent judgment in Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, 2026 INSC 689, decided on 13 July 2026.

In Bali Ram, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the statutory protection applicable to an employee acquiring disability during service requires the employer to consider alternative employment carrying the same pay and service benefits and, where necessary, a supernumerary post. (See our DRI Post in Bali Ram) 

The Rajasthan High Court applied this principle to the petitioner's case and found that his termination on account of disability was contrary to Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

Termination Contrary to Section 20

The High Court held that the petitioner's termination was in “total contravention” of Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

The Court also rejected reliance upon Clause 10 of the Memorandum dated 9 May 2013, observing that the provision concerned government servants who died during probation and could not be applied to an employee who had acquired a disability during service.

The statutory obligation was to explore suitable alternative employment rather than terminate the petitioner on account of his disability.

Relief Granted

The High Court quashed the termination order dated 19 June 2018 and directed that the petitioner be deemed to be in service and reinstated.

The Court further directed:

• payment of 50% of salary arrears for the period from 29 June 2014 to 11 February 2026;
• grant of consequential service benefits, including increments and promotion, up to the date of superannuation;
• payment of all consequential retiral benefits upon superannuation;
• adjustment of amounts already paid towards gratuity, NPS or other heads against the salary arrears; and
• payment of the arrears within six weeks.
• In case of default beyond the stipulated period, the outstanding amount would carry 6% interest per annum.

Significance

The judgment is significant because it makes clear that probationary status cannot be used to defeat the statutory protection against termination on account of acquired disability.

Section 20 does not distinguish between a confirmed employee and a probationer. Once an employee acquires a disability during service, the Government establishment must examine reasonable accommodation and alternative employment before considering separation.

The judgment also reinforces the principle that the law requires retention rather than ouster. An employee who becomes unsuitable for the existing post because of disability is not to be treated as having lost the right to employment. The statutory scheme requires the employer to explore another suitable post carrying the same pay and service benefits and, where necessary, to retain the employee against a supernumerary post.

The decision is particularly relevant for government establishments, where probationary appointments should not become a means of circumventing the protection guaranteed by Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

It also fits within the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation in Bali Ram (above) that disability acquired during service attracts a positive obligation on the employer to protect continuity of employment rather than simply terminate the employee.

The judgment thus reinforces an important principle of disability rights law: acquiring a disability during service does not terminate the employment relationship; it triggers the employer's obligation to accommodate and retain the employee.

Read the judgement below 

Sanjay Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3504/2026 [PDF 275KB]

Supreme Court Reaffirms Duty to Accommodate Employees Acquiring Disabilities: CRPF Constable Awarded ₹1.25 Crore Compensation

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih
Case: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 689
Date of Judgment: 13 July 2026

In a landmark judgment reaffirming the right of employees who acquire disabilities during service to continue in employment with dignity, the Supreme Court has dismissed the Union Government's appeal against a visually impaired CRPF constable and upheld the statutory protection contained in Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“PwD Act”). The Court awarded the respondent, Bali Ram, a consolidated compensation of ₹1.25 crore towards back wages, interest and litigation costs.

The judgment is significant not merely for the relief granted to an individual constable who was unlawfully invalidated from service nearly three decades ago, but for its emphatic reiteration that government employers are under a positive obligation to accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Facts of the Case

Bali Ram joined the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as a Constable (Driver) in 1985 after being found medically fit. In 1996, while in service, he developed an ophthalmic condition diagnosed as Disseminated Choroiditis with retinal atrophic patches and macular involvement, resulting in complete blindness in his left eye and partial impairment in his right eye.

Following medical examinations, the Departmental Rehabilitation Board declared him unfit for driving and combatant duties. Subsequently, the Medical Board at the CRPF Base Hospital in Hyderabad concluded that he was permanently incapacitated and unfit for further service in any capacity within the force.

On 11 March 1998, Bali Ram was medically invalidated from service. His subsequent representations seeking redress were rejected, with the authorities taking the position that his disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by service and that he was entitled only to a lump-sum payment of ₹15,000 under the applicable rules.

Aggrieved, Bali Ram approached the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

High Court's Intervention

The Single Judge of the High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, held that the CRPF had acted in violation of Section 47 of the PwD Act. The Court quashed the order of invalidation and directed that Bali Ram be deemed to have remained in service with all consequential benefits.

The Division Bench affirmed the decision in 2014, rejecting the CRPF's appeal.

The Union of India then carried the matter to the Supreme Court.

Section 47: A Mandatory Obligation, Not a Matter of Choice

At the heart of the case lay Section 47 of the PwD Act, which prohibits an establishment from dispensing with the services of an employee who acquires a disability during service. If the employee becomes unsuitable for the post he occupies, the employer must shift him to another post carrying the same pay and service benefits or retain him on a supernumerary post until retirement.

Reiterating the principles laid down in Kunal Singh, the Supreme Court observed:

“The duty imposed by the PwD Act being mandatory and not discretionary, the law did not leave the appellants with an option to discharge their duty at their convenience. Appellants were required to find a chair for the respondent, and not wait for the respondent to beg for one.”

The Court held that Section 47 imposes a positive duty upon the employer to identify suitable alternative employment and that the obligation cannot be shifted onto the employee.

Relief Beyond Pleadings: A Significant Pronouncement

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the Court's discussion on whether constitutional courts can grant relief that has not been specifically sought.

The Supreme Court noted that Bali Ram had originally sought invalid pension and related benefits and had not expressly invoked Section 47. Nevertheless, the High Court had granted him broader relief. The Supreme Court upheld this approach and laid down an important principle:

“Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.”

The Court held that where the record clearly demonstrates that a litigant is entitled to wider relief, and denial of such relief would perpetuate injustice merely because of defective pleadings or inadequate legal assistance, constitutional courts may mould relief appropriately.

This part of the judgment will have implications extending far beyond disability jurisprudence.

Waiver of Disability Rights Rejected

The Union Government argued that Bali Ram had waived his right under Section 47 because he had accepted pensionary benefits and had never specifically sought reinstatement.

Rejecting the argument, the Court held that waiver requires conscious and informed relinquishment of a known right. Since there was no evidence that Bali Ram was ever informed of his statutory rights under the PwD Act, the plea of waiver was untenable.

The Court also observed that waiver of statutory rights under welfare legislation is generally disfavoured.

Exemption Notification Could Not Operate Retrospectively

The Union further relied upon a notification dated 10 September 2002 exempting combatant personnel of the Central Para Military Forces from the operation of Section 47.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument outright. It held that the notification was prospective and could not validate an action that had already become illegal in 1998.

The Court observed:

“The right of the respondent crystallised on the date of ouster; and a later exemption from the statutory mandate cannot efface the breach already committed.”

Importantly, the Court noted that the very issuance of the exemption notification in 2002 demonstrated that the Central Government itself recognised that Section 47 fully applied to the CRPF between 1995 and 2002.

A Sharp Rebuke to the CRPF

The judgment contains unusually strong observations regarding the conduct of the CRPF.

The Bench remarked:

“By not offering alternate posting, the appellants failed in their role as a model employer and converted a welfare provision into a dead letter.”

It further expressed surprise that an instrumentality of the State functioning under the Ministry of Home Affairs could ignore statutory protections available to persons with disabilities.

The Court categorically rejected the argument that disability protection applies only where disability is attributable to service:

“Parliament did not limit Section 47 to disabilities attributable to service; the protection is unqualified and unconditional.”

The focus, the Court held, must be on accommodation rather than exclusion.

Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement

The Court noted that Bali Ram had already crossed the age of superannuation and that reinstatement was therefore no longer possible. By the Court's own calculation, he would have received over ₹82 lakh in salary and allowances had he remained in service.

Recognising that Bali Ram had spent nearly three decades outside employment and had suffered economic hardship despite obtaining a favourable High Court judgment in 2008, the Court held:

“The situation of non-employment of the respondent is entirely the appellants’ creation.”

The Supreme Court consequently modified the High Court's order and awarded him ₹1.25 crore, inclusive of back wages, interest and costs, payable within eight weeks.

The Court also directed the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority or the District Legal Services Authority, Kangra, to assist the visually impaired respondent in safely investing the compensation and attending to his future medical needs.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment strengthens disability rights jurisprudence in at least four important ways.

First, it reiterates that Section 47 of the 1995 Act—and its successor provision, Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—creates a mandatory duty to retain and accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Second, it recognises reasonable accommodation as a constitutional imperative flowing from substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21. The Court expressly relied on Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India to underline that disability is socially constructed and that exclusion results from the failure to create enabling conditions.

Third, it rejects procedural technicalities and the doctrine of waiver as tools to defeat welfare legislation.

Finally, the judgment sends a clear message that public employers cannot evade their responsibilities by citing administrative inconvenience or belated exemption notifications.

For persons with disabilities and their advocates, Union of India v. Bali Ram is a powerful reminder that the law requires the State not merely to refrain from discrimination, but to actively create space for inclusion. The Supreme Court's observation that employers must “find a chair” for an employee who acquires a disability may well become one of the defining statements in India's disability rights jurisprudence.

Download the judgement in: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015, decided on 13 July 2026.

Punjab & Haryana High Court Expands the Meaning of "Medical Emergency" for Persons with Progressive Disabilities

Court: Punjab and Haryana High Court
Bench: Mr. Justice Harpreet Singh Brar
Case Title: Sunil Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors., 
Case No. CWP-2098-2026
Decision Date: 07 July 2026

Background

In a significant judgment strengthening the employment and healthcare rights of persons with disabilities, the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that a government employee who acquired 100% locomotor disability due to Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) cannot be denied statutory protections merely because his treatment was taken in a non-empanelled hospital or because the authorities adopted a narrow understanding of the term "emergency."

The petitioner, an Assistant with the Haryana Board of School Education, developed ALS—a progressive and incurable neurological disorder—during service. After undergoing specialised stem cell therapy in Bengaluru, his claim for medical reimbursement was rejected on the ground that the treatment was not certified as an "emergency." He also sought protection of his employment under Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, including accommodation on a suitable post or creation of a supernumerary post.

The Court's Findings

The court articulated its decision through several core legal and humanitarian principles:

1. The Right to Life and Self-Preservation (Article 21)

The court emphasized that the preservation of human life is instinctive, sacred, precious, and inviolable. Under Article 21, the State bears a fundamental obligation to ensure timely medical care to those in need. The court ruled that the State cannot reasonably expect citizens to refrain from seeking life-saving or specialized care simply because a hospital is non-empanelled. Denying reimbursement under these circumstances fails the test of fairness and reasonableness, thereby violating fundamental constitutional rights.

2. A Disability-Inclusive Redefinition of "Emergency"

The state had originally denied the petitioner's claim based on an opinion from the Civil Surgeon stating the treatment was not an "Medical Emergency". The court sharply rejected this narrow interpretation, noting that the conventional understanding of an "emergency"—which looks only for immediate crises or imminent death—is inherently  "able-bodied centric".

For individuals suffering from progressive, degenerative chronic diseases like Motor Neuron Disease / Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), the court ruled that the definition of an emergency must be wider. It must encompass situations where a delay in medical intervention would result in a rapid, irreversible loss of bodily functions and permanent damage. Seeking immediate, specialized stem cell therapy to halt rapid degeneration meets this inclusive standard of an emergency.

3. Protection for Chronic Diseases

Relying on established judicial precedent (State of Haryana vs. Manoj Jain), the court noted that medical reimbursement claims for recognized chronic diseases cannot be denied solely on technical or bureaucratic grounds. Because the petitioner's condition was categorized as a Chronic Disease by the State Government, the test of essentiality was satisfied. The court affirmed that the petitioner could not be faulted for prioritizing immediate, specialized treatment to safeguard their quality of life over waiting for administrative approvals.

On the employment issue, the Court reaffirmed the mandate of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016, holding that an employee who acquires a disability during service is entitled to be shifted to a suitable post with the same pay and service benefits. If no suitable post is immediately available, the employer must consider the statutory mechanism of a supernumerary post rather than depriving the employee of livelihood or forcing prolonged leave without pay. The Court emphasised that reasonable accommodation must be meaningful and not merely symbolic.

Why This Judgment Matters

This decision is important because it moves disability jurisprudence beyond formal equality and recognises that legal concepts such as "medical emergency" must be interpreted through the lived realities of persons with disabilities. The judgment reinforces that administrative rules governing medical reimbursement and employment cannot be applied mechanically where doing so defeats the objectives of the RPwD Act, 2016 and the constitutional promise of dignity under Article 21.

For government employers across India, the judgment serves as a reminder that the duty to provide reasonable accommodation extends beyond physical accessibility and includes fair decisions relating to medical treatment, continuation of service, and protection of livelihood for employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Read the judgement

Sunil Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors. CWP-2098-2026 dated 07 July 2026 [PDF 271 KB]

Supreme Court says Section 33 entitles reservation for employees with disabilities in promotion in Group A,B,C & D alike [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

Case Title: Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others

Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008

Date of Judgement: 30 June 2016

Subject: Reservation in Promotion for Disabled to Group A and B posts; Section 33 of The Persons with Disabilities Act 1995

Brief:

Dear Colleagues,

Please refer to my earlier posts dated 02 March 15 and  10 Oct 14, on the subject. 

In a historic judgment in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008 titled Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30 Jun 2016 has set aside / quashed the two below office memorandums issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, terming them as illegal and inconsistent with the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.:-

•  OM No. 36035/16/91-Estt.(SCT) dated 18.02.1997  and 
•  OM No. No.36035/3/2004-Estt. (RES) dated 29.12.2005 

In the instant case the petitioners, Rajeev Kumar Gupta and seven other persons with disabilities serving as engineers in Prasar Bharti made the grievance that the higher level posts in the engineering cadre were filled mostly by promotion. Although these posts were suitable for persons with disabilities, the Government was denying them 3% reservation in these posts, which amounted to defeating the intent and purpose of reservation provided for in the Persons with Disabilities (equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation) Act, 1995. At the heart of the problem were the DoPT instructions dated 18.2.97 and 29.12.2005, which prohibited reservation in promotion for disabled persons in Group A and B posts. 

Petitioners had argued that a large number of Groups A and B were filled only through promotion and because of the impugned DoPT memorandums, the benefit of reservation under Section 33 of the 1995 Act was denied with respect to those posts. Petitioners therefore lost out on a significant amount of opportunities at the upper end of the organizational hierarchy.

The government opposed concession to the disabled, contending that they have no right to demand reservation in promotion to identified Group A and Group B posts. It also cited the nine-judge bench ruling by the apex court in the Indra Sawhney (Mandal reservation) case, to maintain reservation should be confined to recruitment at the initial level, and not at the stage of promotions.

It may be pertinent to mention that in the Indra Sawhney case while dealing with caste based reservation issue, the Bench had held "Reservation in promotion is constitutionally impermissible as, once the advantaged and disadvantaged are made equal and are brought in one class or group then any further benefit extended for promotion on the inequality existing prior to be brought in the group would be treating equals unequally. It would not be eradicating the effects of past discrimination but perpetuating it."

But the bench dismissed the government’s arguments, noting that once the posts for the disabled have been identified under Section 32 of the Act, the purpose behind such identification cannot be frustrated by prescribing a mode of recruitment which results in denial of statutory reservation.

“It would be a device to defraud persons with disabilities of the statutory benefit. Once a post is identified, it means that a person with disability is fully capable of discharging the functions associated with the identified post. Once found to be so capable, reservation under Section 33 to an extent of not less than 3 per cent must follow. Once the post is identified, it must be reserved for PWD irrespective of the mode of recruitment adopted by the State for filling up of the said post,” it held.

The bench further said that Indra Sawhney’s case shall not impose a bar on reservation for the disabled, since the principle laid down in this case is applicable only when the State seeks to give preferential treatment in the matter of employment to the backward class.

“The basis for providing reservation for persons with disabilities is physical disability and not any of the criteria forbidden under Article 16(1) such as caste, religion etc. The objective behind the 1995 Act is to integrate those living with disabilities into the society and to ensure their economic progress… persons with disabilities are not and cannot be equated with backward classes contemplated under Article 16(4),” it said. Article 16 of the Constitution empowers the state to prescribe preferential treatment to certain classes in matters of public employment.

The judgement is historic and a major milestone in the fight for restoring the rights of persons with disabilities in India. 

The argument in this case were concluded on 17.03.2016  and the bench had reserved the judgement.

The case, represents success in a hard fought battle waged by persons with disabilities for equal opportunity and representation in the higher echelons of Government. Hitherto, disabled persons were likely to stagnate at the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, as their promotion to higher level posts was made difficult because of their physical disadvantage. 

Brief Background of related matters

It may be pertinent to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court  had on 08 Oct 2013 in the case titled Union of India vs. National Federation of the Blind delivered a land mark judgment directing the Govt, of India and State Governments to compute 3% reservation for persons with disabilities in all groups of posts against the total number of vacancies in the cadre strength. The Hon'ble Court also laid down that the computation had to be done in an identical manner in respect of all groups of posts. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its judgement dated 10 Dec 2013 in a case titled as MCD Vs. Manoj Kumar Gupta upheld a judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High court which declared that Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, provided for reservation in promotion for persons with disabilities in Groups A and B also.

But instead of implementing the judgement, the Govt. of India had been contesting the issue through various frivolous litigation which were nipped in the bud each time by the Hon'ble Court. 

Judgement Copy 

Download the Judgement dated 30 June 2016 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008 titled Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others (PDF 326BKB) or read the judgement below:

Updates as on 04 Sep 2017 

The issue of whether persons with disabilities deserve reservation in promotions as well, apart from the reservation that exists in appointment, has been escalated by the Supreme Court to a five-judge bench since it requires interpretation by the Constitution bench.

On Monday (September 4, 2017) the bench of Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices AM Khanwilkar and DY Chandrachud heard deposition by Solicitor General Ranjit Kumar and counsels  requested a larger bench to hear the issue. The three judge bench headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice Dipak Misra agreed to refer the matter to a five-judge bench.

The question that has arisen in this case is whether persons, governed under “The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995”, can be given reservation in promotion. A view had been taken by this Court in Rajeev Kumar Gupta & Others vs Union of India & Others in the affirmative. The Solicitor General had pointed out that the prohibition against reservation in promotion laid down by the majority in Indra Sawhney vs Union of India and Others – (1992) case applies not only to Article 16(4) but also to 16 (1) of the Constitution of India and inference to the contrary is not justified. Persons with disabilities certainly require preferential treatment and such preferential treatment may also cover reservation in appointment but not reservation in promotion. Section 33 of the 1995 Act is required to be read and construed in that background. “We find merit in the contention that the matter needs to be considered by the larger bench,” he said.

Disability Cannot Be Measured Merely by Medical Percentage: Supreme Court Treats Loss of Right Leg of Mason as 100% Functional Disability

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N. V. Anjaria
Case Title: M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd. & Anr.
Case No.: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 35337 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 655
Decided on: 23 June 2026

Background

In a significant judgment on the concept of functional disability, the Supreme Court has held that compensation for accident victims cannot be determined solely on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical disability certified by medical experts. What matters is the actual impact of the disability on the victim's ability to earn a livelihood.

The case arose from a motor accident in which the appellant, M. Paramesh, a mason by profession, suffered amputation of his right leg above the knee. His occupation required prolonged standing, climbing, balancing, carrying construction material and performing physically demanding work.

Although the medical evidence assessed his permanent physical disability, the central question before the Court was whether that medical percentage accurately reflected the loss of his earning capacity. The appellant contended that, for a mason, the amputation had rendered him incapable of continuing his profession and therefore amounted to 100% functional disability.

Accepting this contention, the Supreme Court held that where an occupation is entirely dependent on physical mobility, loss of a limb may result in complete loss of earning capacity irrespective of the percentage of medical disability.

Issues Before the Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

• Whether compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act should be determined solely on the basis of medical disability.
• Whether loss of a leg above the knee constitutes 100% functional disability for a person engaged in manual labour such as masonry.
• Whether assessment of loss of earning capacity must take into account the claimant's occupation and practical ability to continue employment.
• Whether compensation should reflect the real economic consequences of disability rather than merely the certified medical impairment.

Key Findings

(a) Medical Disability and Functional Disability Are Not the Same: 

Reiterating settled principles, the Court observed that physical disability and functional disability are distinct concepts. While medical experts assess bodily impairment, the Court is required to determine how that impairment affects the individual's earning capacity. Such determination depends upon several factors, including:

• the nature of the claimant's occupation;
• educational background and skills;
• age; and
• the practical ability to continue the previous vocation.

The Court observed that identical medical disabilities may produce vastly different consequences depending upon the profession of the injured person.

(b) Functional Disability Depends on the Nature of Employment

The Bench emphasised that disability assessment cannot be undertaken through a mechanical application of medical percentages. A person engaged in sedentary work may continue employment despite losing a limb. However, occupations involving physical labour require a different assessment.

For a mason, mobility is indispensable. Construction work demands standing for long hours, climbing scaffolding, balancing on uneven surfaces, carrying materials and performing strenuous physical tasks. Loss of a leg effectively destroys the ability to pursue such work.

(c) Loss of One Leg Meant Complete Loss of Earning Capacity

Considering the appellant's occupation, the Court held that the amputation resulted in 100% functional disability.

The Bench observed that although the medical disability percentage may be lower, the claimant had effectively lost his capacity to earn as a mason. Compensation therefore had to be computed on the basis of complete loss of earning capacity rather than the medical assessment alone.

(d) Compensation Must Reflect Loss of Livelihood

The Court reiterated that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is intended not merely to compensate bodily injury but to provide just recompense for the economic and social consequences of disability.

A proper assessment must account for:

• loss of future earning capacity;
• loss of livelihood;
• diminished quality of life; and
• inability to continue one's chosen occupation.

The objective is to ensure that compensation reflects the real impact of the accident on the victim's life.

Directions

The Supreme Court:

• held that the appellant had suffered 100% functional disability in relation to his occupation as a mason;
• directed that compensation be assessed on the basis of complete loss of earning capacity;
• rejected a mechanical approach based solely on the percentage of medical disability; and
• reaffirmed that compensation must correspond to the actual consequences of disability on the victim's livelihood.

Why This Judgment Matters

1. Functional Disability Takes Priority Over Medical Percentage: 

The judgment reinforces the well-established principle that compensation law is concerned with loss of earning capacity, not merely the percentage of physical impairment recorded in a medical certificate.

2. Important Protection for Manual Workers

The decision is particularly significant for workers whose livelihood depends upon physical labour, including construction workers, agricultural labourers, drivers, mechanics and others engaged in manual occupations. For such individuals, even a lower medical disability may translate into complete economic disability.

3. Advances a Rights-Based Understanding of Disability

The judgment reflects a shift away from a purely medical model towards a functional assessment that recognises disability in the context of work, participation and independence. It acknowledges that the consequences of disability extend beyond bodily impairment to include exclusion from employment and loss of economic security.

4. Ensures Just Compensation

By rejecting a rigid reliance on medical percentages, the Court has strengthened the principle that accident victims must receive compensation commensurate with the real loss suffered, preventing under-compensation in deserving cases.

DRI Commentary

The Supreme Court's decision is another important milestone in the evolution of disability jurisprudence under compensation law. Although rendered in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act, its reasoning has wider significance for disability rights because it recognises that disability cannot be understood through medical diagnosis alone.

The Court rightly distinguished between medical disability—which measures bodily impairment—and functional disability, which measures the effect of that impairment on a person's ability to earn a livelihood. This distinction lies at the heart of a rights-based approach to disability.

For a mason, the body is the principal tool of trade. Amputation of a leg above the knee is not merely a physical impairment; it effectively ends the ability to undertake masonry work. Treating such loss as anything less than 100% functional disability would ignore the lived reality of workers whose livelihoods depend entirely on physical mobility.

The judgment also serves as an important reminder that the assessment of disability must always be contextual. The same physical impairment may have very different consequences for a mason, a software engineer, a teacher or an accountant. Justice therefore requires courts to look beyond medical percentages and evaluate the actual impact on the individual's life and livelihood.

By reaffirming that compensation must be based on the real consequences of disability rather than a rigid medical formula, the Supreme Court has further strengthened the jurisprudence on functional disability, ensuring that accident survivors receive compensation that is both fair and humane.