When Medical Labels Become Barriers: Delhi High Court Protects UPSC Candidate with Locomotor Disability

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Justice  C. Hari Shankar and Justice Vinod Kumar
Case: Manish Kumar  Vs. Railway Board & Anr.
Case No.: W.P.(C): 18345/2025
Judgment: 08 September 2026
Earlier proceedings: O.A. No. 1409/2019, Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench
Result: CAT judgment and Railway Board's cancellation of candidature set aside.

A neurological condition causing locomotor disability cannot be used to disqualify a candidate who meets the functional requirements of the post.

By Advocate Subhash Chandra Vashishth

In a significant judgment on disability rights and public employment, the Delhi High Court has set aside the cancellation of the candidature of a UPSC Engineering Services Examination candidate whose locomotor disability arose from a neurological condition.

In Manish Kumar v. Railway Board & Anr., W.P.(C) 18345/2025, decided on 8 September 2026, a Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Vinod Kumar held that the Central Administrative Tribunal had erred in treating the petitioner as ineligible for recruitment to the Civil Engineering Service.

The case raises a larger question: Can a medical label become more important than a person's recognised disability, demonstrated functional ability and merit?

From a recognised locomotor disability to a "neurological" candidate

The petitioner had a disability certificate issued by Govind Ballabh Pant Hospital in 2012, certifying 45% permanent locomotor disability. The certificate was issued under the legal framework then applicable, including the 2001 Guidelines for Evaluation of Various Disabilities and Procedure for Certification.

Those Guidelines defined locomotor disability to include inability resulting from an affliction of the musculoskeletal and/or nervous system.

The petitioner's condition—Generalised Dystonia with Myoclonus—had neurological causes and manifested principally through his right upper limb, with some impact on speech. His disability, however, had been recognised and certified as locomotor disability.

He subsequently obtained a Government-issued UDID card recognising 45% locomotor disability.

There was also an important procedural development. After the enactment of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the petitioner obtained another certificate from IHBAS describing the condition as a temporary neurological disability. The petitioner's case was that this newer terminology could not erase or transform the already recognised underlying locomotor disability.

He cleared the UPSC examination. The problem came later.

The petitioner appeared for the Engineering Services Examination, 2017, under the PwD category.

He cleared the Preliminary Examination, Main Examination and Personality Test, securing Rank C-254. For the relevant Civil Engineering posts, the identified categories included OA (one arm affected) and the prescribed functional requirements included sitting, standing, bending, walking, seeing, reading, writing, communication and manipulation by fingers. The petition specifically asserted that the petitioner could perform these functions.

Yet, after clearing the examination, he was subjected to a Railway Board medical examination.

The Medical Board declared him unfit on the ground that “Generalised Dystonia with Myoclonus and Dysarthria” did not qualify within the physical disabilities identified under Annexure I of the ESE Rules, 2017.

He appealed.

The Appellate Medical Board again recognised his neurological condition. Importantly, however, the case record records that he was capable of performing the essential physical functions required for the post. Nevertheless, because the Board treated his condition as a neurological disability for which the relevant posts were not identified, his candidature was not considered.

The argument before the CAT

I represented the petitioner before the Central Administrative Tribunal, where the challenge to the cancellation of his candidature was heard as O.A. No. 1409/2019.

The central argument was that the authorities had fallen into a fundamental error by treating the neurological manifestations of the petitioner's condition as changing the nature of his recognised disability.

The case was not that the petitioner did not have a neurological condition. He did.

The case was that the neurological condition resulted in a locomotor disability, which had already been certified as such. The symptoms did not transform the petitioner's recognised locomotor disability into an entirely different category for the purpose of denying him an identified post.

The petition also pointed out that the neurological symptoms were episodic and that the petitioner remained capable of performing the essential functions of the post. What was required, therefore, was consideration of his functional ability and reasonable accommodation—not exclusion by nomenclature.

The CAT, however, dismissed the application on 27 September 2024, accepting the position that the petitioner's neurological disability did not fall within the identified PwBD categories for Civil Engineering services.

The intervention of the State Commissioner

An important piece of evidence before the High Court was the reasoned order of Shri TD Dhariyal, the then State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, Delhi, dated 18 May 2018, then .

The Commissioner recorded that the petitioner's neurological condition had primarily affected his right arm, with mild speech impairment, and that the condition did not appear to affect his functional ability to the extent that he could not perform the relevant work.

The Commissioner also directed that the disability certificate be corrected/reissued in the appropriate statutory form based on the 45% locomotor disability already assessed in 2012.

Thus, the record contained an important distinction between the medical cause of the impairment and the disability resulting from that impairment. We have seen in our practice that many a times the medical professionals focus more on aetiology of the disabling condition rather than the functional abilities and the disability category recognised in law for the purpose of job identification. This defeats the whole objective of issuance of a disability certificate. And in general there is a huge lack of awareness about neurological conditions among employers.

What did the High Court say?

The Delhi High Court considered five important factors, including:

• the Government-issued UDID recognising the petitioner as having 45% locomotor disability;
• the 2001 Government notification, which expressly included impairments arising from the nervous system within the definition of locomotor disability;
• medical evidence showing that the petitioner's neurological condition affected his movement;
• the order of the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities; and
• the Supreme Court's decision in Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services.

In Om Rathod, the Supreme Court had held that a person possessing a valid disability certificate cannot simply be subjected to another medical examination for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion contrary to the disability recorded in that certificate.

Applying these principles, the Delhi High Court held that the CAT had erred in treating the petitioner as ineligible for recruitment to the Civil Engineering Service.

The Court consequently quashed both the CAT's judgment dated 27 September 2024 and the Railway Board's decision cancelling the petitioner's candidature, and directed consequential relief.

Why this judgment matters

The case illustrates a recurring problem in disability assessment: the tendency to treat diagnostic terminology as if it were synonymous with disability classification and functional capacity.

A person may have a neurological condition. That condition may result in a locomotor disability. The existence of a neurological cause does not, by itself, mean that the person ceases to have a locomotor disability.

More importantly, a new or different medical description or aetiology cannot become a convenient route to exclusion when the person's disability has already been recognised and the person is demonstrably capable of performing the functions of the post.

The petition had specifically challenged the mechanical reliance on the nomenclature of the condition instead of examining the actual functional requirements of the job. It also invoked the RPwD Act's principles of equality, non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation in employment.

The facts make the point particularly stark: the candidate had cleared every stage of a highly competitive examination and secured Rank C-254; the medical record itself recognised his ability to perform the prescribed physical functions; yet his candidature was ultimately rejected because his condition was described under a category which the authorities considered not identified for the post.

Disability classification should enable rights, not become a tool for exclusion

The significance of Manish Kumar lies not merely in the relief granted to one candidate.

It is a reminder that medical assessment in recruitment must not become an exercise in finding a label that excludes a person with disability.

Where a disability has been duly certified, the assessment of suitability should focus on the actual functional requirements of the post, the individual's ability to perform those functions, and reasonable accommodation where required.

A neurological condition causing locomotor disability does not make the person less capable merely because medical terminology has evolved.

The law must look at the person, the disability and the functions of the job—not merely the label attached to the diagnosis.

Read the Judgement in Manish Kumar Vs. Railway Board & Anr

State Inaction Cannot Defeat Disability Pension Rights: Rajasthan High Court Grants 46 Years' Disability Pension Arrears for Ex-IAF Corporal

Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan
Bench: Dr. Justice Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Dr. Justice Nupur Bhati
Case Title: Ratti Ram v. Union of India & Ors.

Case No.: D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 24281/2025 (as reported)

Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JD:26378-DB

Decided on: 16 June 2026

Background

In a significant ruling reaffirming that bureaucratic delay cannot extinguish statutory rights, the Rajasthan High Court directed payment of disability pension arrears spanning nearly 46 years to an ex-Corporal of the Indian Air Force whose pension had been discontinued in 1980.

The petitioner, Ratti Ram, had developed Bronchial Asthma during service and was sanctioned disability pension. The pension, however, was discontinued in 1980 on the ground that his disability required reassessment by a Medical Board. Although the petitioner sought restoration of his pension, the reassessment process remained pending for decades due entirely to administrative inaction.

When a Re-assessment Medical Board was eventually convened, it categorically found that the petitioner's disability had remained unchanged and had continued uninterrupted since the pension was stopped.

The petitioner approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, which restored his entitlement to disability pension but restricted arrears to the year 2019, when the reassessment was finally conducted. Challenging this limitation, the petitioner approached the Rajasthan High Court.

The principal question before the Court was whether a disabled ex-serviceman could be denied decades of pension merely because the authorities failed to conduct the reassessment within a reasonable time.

Issues Before the Court

The Court considered the following issues:

• Whether disability pension should be restored from the date it was discontinued or only from the date of reassessment.

• Whether the consequences of prolonged administrative delay could be imposed upon a disabled ex-serviceman.

• Whether disability pension is a vested legal right that cannot be curtailed because of official inaction.

• Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal was justified in restricting arrears to 2019 despite the Medical Board's finding that the disability had continued since 1980.

Findings of the Court

1. Disability Pension Is a Valuable Legal Right:  The Division Bench reiterated that disability pension is not a discretionary concession or ex gratia payment, but a valuable statutory right accruing to eligible members of the armed forces. Relying upon settled principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Court observed that once entitlement stands established, the benefit must ordinarily relate back to the date on which the right accrued.
2. The State Cannot Benefit from Its Own Inaction:  The Court found that the extraordinary delay in conducting the reassessment medical examination was entirely attributable to the respondents. The petitioner had pursued restoration of his pension, yet the authorities failed to discharge their obligations for decades. The Bench emphatically held that a citizen cannot be penalised for the administrative lapses of the State. Allowing the Government to deny arrears because it failed to conduct the reassessment would amount to permitting the State to benefit from its own wrong.
3. Medical Evidence Established Continuity of Disability: A crucial factor influencing the decision was the finding of the Re-assessment Medical Board that the petitioner's disability had remained constant from the date on which the pension was discontinued. Once continuity of disability stood medically established, the Court held that there remained no legal basis for restricting arrears to the year of reassessment.
4. Continuing Pension Rights Cannot Be Defeated by Technicalities:  The Court also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India through its Secretary v. Sgt. Girish Kumar & Ors., reiterating that disability pension involves a continuing cause of action. The mere fact that proceedings concluded at a later stage could not deprive the petitioner of pension that had lawfully accrued over the intervening period.

Directions Issued

Allowing the writ petition, the Rajasthan High Court:

• set aside the Armed Forces Tribunal's direction restricting arrears to 2019;
• held that the petitioner was entitled to disability pension from the date of its discontinuation in 1980;
• directed the respondents to calculate and release the entire arrears payable; and
• ordered compliance within four months.

Why This Judgment Matters

1. Protection Against Administrative Delay:- The judgment reinforces an important constitutional principle that government inaction cannot extinguish vested statutory rights. Public authorities cannot rely upon their own delay to deny lawful benefits.
2. Strong Recognition of Disability Pension Rights:- The ruling reiterates that disability pension is an enforceable legal entitlement flowing from military service and sacrifice, not a matter of governmental generosity.
3. Strengthening the Doctrine of Continuing Cause of Action:- The Court recognised that pension claims are continuing in nature. Every month during which pension is unlawfully withheld gives rise to a fresh cause of action, preventing legitimate claims from being defeated by procedural delays. 
4. A Welfare-Oriented Interpretation:- The judgment adopts a humane and rights-based approach to disability pension laws, ensuring that former servicemen who have acquired disabilities are not left without support because of bureaucratic indifference.

DRI Commentary

This decision is an important contribution to disability rights jurisprudence, even though it arises in the context of military pension law. At its core lies a broader legal principle that resonates across disability law: the State cannot deprive a person with disability of a statutory entitlement because public authorities failed to perform their legal duties.

The High Court rightly recognised that the petitioner's disability did not begin when the Medical Board finally examined him decades later. The Board merely confirmed what had existed throughout. Restricting arrears to the date of reassessment would therefore have rewarded administrative lethargy while punishing the individual whose rights the law was intended to protect.

The ruling is equally significant for reaffirming that disability pension is an incident of service and a matter of dignity, not charity. By directing payment of nearly 46 years of arrears, the Court restored not only the petitioner's financial entitlement but also the principle that governmental delay cannot override justice.

The judgment is likely to serve as an important precedent for similarly placed ex-servicemen whose disability benefits have been withheld because mandatory medical reviews or administrative procedures were not undertaken in time.

Schizophrenia Presumed Attributable to Military Service Unless Proven Otherwise: Kerala High Court Upholds Disability Pension for Army Veteran

Court: High Court of Kerala
Bench: Justice K. Natarajan and Justice Johnson John
Case Title: Union of India v. Valsala S.
Case No.: W.P.(C) No. 48547 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:36398
Decided on: 26 May 2026

Background

In an important judgment reaffirming the rights of armed forces personnel suffering from mental illness, the Kerala High Court has held that disability pension cannot be denied merely because the Release Medical Board labels schizophrenia as "constitutional in origin" without furnishing any reasons. The Court dismissed the Union of India's challenge to an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal granting disability pension to an Army personnel who had been invalided out of service on account of schizophrenia.

The case was pursued by Valsala S., widow of late Sepoy Sreekandan Nair, who was recruited into the Indian Army on 7 August 1973. He was invalided out of service on 15 July 1979 after being diagnosed with Schizophrenia, with the Release Medical Board assessing his disability at 60% for two years. His claim for disability pension was rejected on the ground that the disease was "constitutional in origin" and neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. His statutory appeal also failed, and he passed away in 1994.

Years later, his widow approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. The Tribunal found that the Medical Board had offered no reasons whatsoever for concluding that the disease was constitutional in origin and consequently granted disability pension. Challenging that decision, the Union of India approached the Kerala High Court.

Issues Before the Court

The High Court considered the following questions:

• Whether disability pension can be denied solely on the basis of an unreasoned opinion of the Release Medical Board.
• Whether statutory presumptions under the Entitlement Rules and Armed Forces Medical Regulations operate in favour of personnel invalided out with schizophrenia.
• Whether courts can interfere where the Medical Board's opinion lacks reasons.
• Whether delay in approaching the Tribunal should defeat the claim of a person suffering from schizophrenia.

Key Findings

1. Presumption Favours the Soldier

The Court reiterated that under the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 and Regulation 423(c) of the Regulations for Medical Services for Armed Forces, 1983, where no note regarding any disease is recorded at the time of enrolment, a disease leading to invalidment is ordinarily presumed to have arisen during military service.

The burden, therefore, lies squarely upon the authorities to rebut that presumption with cogent medical evidence.

2. A Mere Medical Opinion Without Reasons Cannot Defeat Pension Rights

The central reason for dismissing the writ petition was that the Release Medical Board merely recorded that schizophrenia was "constitutional in origin" without explaining how it reached that conclusion.

The High Court held that an unreasoned medical opinion cannot form the basis for denying a valuable statutory benefit such as disability pension.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, the Court observed that where the Medical Board's opinion is devoid of reasons, the consequential administrative decision denying disability pension becomes legally unsustainable.

3. Schizophrenia Requires a Sensitive Judicial Approach

The Court extensively referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Veer Pal Singh v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence, which recognises schizophrenia as a chronic, severe and disabling mental illness affecting cognition, behaviour, perception and the ability to function independently.

The judgment also relied upon the Supreme Court's observations in Rajumon T.M., noting that courts must remain conscious of the debilitating effects of schizophrenia, which often impair an individual's ability to pursue legal remedies or effectively represent his own case. Consequently, delay in approaching judicial forums cannot be viewed in the same manner as ordinary civil litigation.

4. Disability Pension Is Beneficial Legislation

The Bench reaffirmed that provisions relating to disability pension constitute beneficial social welfare legislation and therefore deserve liberal interpretation.

Where two interpretations are possible, courts must adopt the one that advances the object of protecting disabled servicemen rather than defeating their claims on technical grounds.

5. High Courts Can Correct Jurisdictional Errors

Rejecting the Union's contention that the High Court should not interfere with findings of the Armed Forces Tribunal, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass to reiterate that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 remains available where there is a jurisdictional error, denial of fundamental rights or an error apparent on the face of the record.

Decision

The Kerala High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Union of India and upheld the Armed Forces Tribunal's order granting disability pension.

The Court found no error in the Tribunal's conclusion that the Medical Board's unexplained opinion could not displace the statutory presumption that the disease arose during military service.

Why This Judgment Matters

(a) Reinforces the Presumption in Favour of Disabled Servicemen

The decision strengthens the long-established principle that where no disability is recorded at the time of recruitment, diseases leading to invalidment are presumed to have arisen during service unless the Government proves otherwise through reasoned medical evidence.

(b) Advances Mental Health Jurisprudence

The judgment is significant because it recognises the unique nature of schizophrenia and acknowledges that persons suffering from severe mental illness may face substantial barriers in pursuing legal remedies. This represents a welcome move towards a disability-sensitive approach in pension adjudication.

(c) Insists on Reasoned Medical Decision-Making

The ruling makes it clear that Medical Boards cannot deny statutory benefits through conclusory observations. A mere statement that a disease is "constitutional in origin" is insufficient unless supported by scientific reasoning and evidence.

(d) Strengthens Social Security Rights

Disability pension is not an act of governmental generosity but a statutory entitlement forming part of the social security framework available to armed forces personnel invalided out of service.

DRI Commentary

This judgment is another important step in the Supreme Court-led evolution of disability pension jurisprudence relating to mental illness. The Kerala High Court has correctly recognised that statutory presumptions cannot be displaced by unexplained medical conclusions.

Equally significant is the Court's appreciation of schizophrenia as a serious psychosocial disability. Persons living with schizophrenia frequently experience cognitive impairment, difficulty in decision-making, diminished insight and prolonged dependence on caregivers. These realities make it inappropriate to judge delays in asserting legal rights through the conventional lens of limitation.

The judgment also reinforces an essential administrative law principle: reasons are the heartbeat of every decision affecting rights. Where the State seeks to deny disability pension, particularly to personnel invalided out on account of mental illness, it must provide clear, evidence-based reasons. A bare assertion that a disease is constitutional in origin cannot satisfy the standards of fairness required under law.

For disability rights advocates, the decision is significant beyond military pension law. It affirms that mental disabilities deserve the same evidentiary fairness, statutory protection and rights-based interpretation as physical disabilities. It also reiterates that beneficial legislation intended to secure social protection must be interpreted liberally in favour of persons with disabilities rather than narrowly to defeat legitimate claims.

The ruling is likely to strengthen future challenges where disability pension has been denied solely on the basis of unreasoned opinions of Medical Boards, particularly in cases involving mental illnesses such as schizophrenia.

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Supreme Court: Citing Reasonable Accommodation provisions, bench directs a person with defective colour vision to be appointed as Assistant Engineer Electrical

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aravind Kumar

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12671 of 2022]

Case Title: Mohamed Ibrahim Vs. The Chairman & Managing Director & Ors.

Date of Judgement: 16 October 2023

Brief:

The Supreme Court granted relief to the appellant - a person with colour blindness - who was denied appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer applying the principle of "reasonable accommodation" as defined in the RPwD Act. Incidently, colour blindness is not an identified or defined disability in the schedule to the Act.

The Court highlighted that the provisions of the RPwD Act are specifically designed to foster the participation and empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (PwDs). However, it expressed its concern that the benefits arising from affirmative action are confined to a specific category of PwDs, including those with orthopedic, visual, hearing, and mental disabilities, among others covered in the schedule to the Act. These benefits are intricately linked to the concept of "benchmark" disabilities, which grants affirmative action and similar benefits to PwDs who meet a defined threshold of disability, typically 40 percent or more. This distinction based on specified categories and threshold conditions, as per the topc court, creates substantial barriers.

It bench observed, “The actual benefits in the form of affirmative action are defined by a specific category of PwDs (orthopaedical, visual, hearing, mental, etc.) and tied to the context of “benchmark” disabilities, which entitles those PwDs who qualify with a certain threshold of disability (40 percent or more) to the affirmative action and other similar benefits. The nature of inclusion of specified categories only to the exclusion of other categories of disabilities, on the one hand, and the eligibility of a threshold, in the opinion of this court, constitute barriers.”

"The twin conditions of falling within defined categories, and also a threshold condition of a minimum percentage, of such disabilities, in fact are a barrier," opined the court. The Court emphasized the necessity of a more rational and inclusive approach to accommodate individuals who may not it into the established categories of PwDs in the schedule to the Act.

“The facts of this case demonstrate that the appellant is fit, in all senses of the term, to discharge the duties attached to the post he applied and was selected for. Yet, he is denied the position, for being “disabled” as he is color blind. At the same time, he does not fit the category of PwD under the lexicon of the universe contained within the Act. These challenge traditional understandings of what constitutes “disabilities”. The court has to, therefore, travel beyond the provisions of the Act and discern a principle that can be rationally applied.”

The bench was hearing an appeal against the Madras HC judgment which had ruled in favour of the respondent(TANGEDCO) asserting its right to reject the appellant's candidature on the grounds of colour blindness. The case revolved around a job application for the position of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) by the appellant. The appellant, who was initially considered qualified for the role, was subsequently found to be color blind during a medical examination. This raised concerns about his ability to fulfill the responsibilities of an engineer, which frequently involve working with color-coded power cables and wires.

As a result of these concerns, TANGEDCO rejected the appellant's candidature. The appellant challenged this decision under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the Madras High Court initially ruled in his favor, directing TANGEDCO to offer him the position. However, in appeal before the division bench, the decision highlighted the evolving doctrine of proportionality, indicating that TANGEDCO's decision had a reasonable basis, even by this modern standard. Consequently, the division bench's judgment reversed the previous order, leading the appellant to seek redress from the Supreme Court. 

The SC bench noted that respondent TANGEDCO had not explicitly indicated that colour vision deficiency, in any form or degree, serves as a disqualifying factor for the role of an Assistant Engineer. It emphasized that the appellant, being a graduate in electrical engineering, possessed knowledge and experience related to the role's functions. Additionally, practical experience during the course exposed the candidate to equipment defects and solutions for breakdowns. Thus, the SC bench established the need for some form of accommodation.

The Court relied on Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 4 SCR 638 to highlight that when public facilities and services are designed with standards inaccessible to persons with disabilities, it results in their exclusion and a denial of rights. The concept of equality goes beyond merely preventing discrimination; it involves addressing systematic discrimination through positive rights, affirmative action, and reasonable accommodation.

The Court also cited the case of Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India  2021 (13) SCR 823, which distinguishes between formal equality and substantive equality. Substantive equality aims to achieve equal outcomes, and the principle of reasonable accommodation plays a critical role in this.

The Court observed that reasonable accommodation entails accommodating disabled individuals based on their capacities. It also relied on Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission  2021 (12) SCR 311, which held “The principle of reasonable accommodation acknowledges that if disability” should be remedied and opportunities are “to be affirmatively created for facilitating the development of the disabled. Reasonable accommodation is founded in the norm of inclusion. Exclusion results in the negation of individual dignity and worth or they can choose the route of reasonable accommodation, where each individual's dignity and worth is respected.”

The court also cited Ashutosh Kumar v. Film and Television Institute of India (2022),  where the Supreme Court directed the FTII to accommodate students with colour blindness saying, "The respondent institute is a premier institute and one would expect it to encourage liberate thought process and not put courses connected with films in any conformist box".

While  acknowledging the resondent's concerns about colour vision impairment, the Court reminded the TANGEDCO of its obligation to operate within the framework of "reasonable accommodation" as defined by Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act. Resultantly, the court set aside the impugned judgement of the Division bench of Madras High Court saying, “The impugned judgment cannot stand; it is set aside. TANGEDCO, the respondent corporation, is directed to appoint and continue the appellant in its service, as AE (Electrical) at the appropriate stage of the grade of pay,”.

During the hearing, the Court learnt that a member of the bar, Mr. Mehmoud Yumar Faruqi had life experiences of colour blindness -as someone living with a condition of colour blindness and had collected considerable case law and literature. The court had, therefore, requested his assistance for the proceedings. The court expressed its gratitude for his assistance.  

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Supreme Court Restores Full Pension Benefits to Army Veteran: Refusal to Undergo High-Risk Surgery Cannot Curtail Disability Pension

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar
Case Title: Ex L/Nk Rajput Ajit Singh v. Union of India & Ors.
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 420 of 2020
Decided on: 12 September 2023

Background

In an important judgment strengthening disability pension jurisprudence for armed forces personnel, the Supreme Court held that a soldier cannot be denied or deprived of disability pension merely because he declined to undergo a life-threatening surgical procedure.

The appellant, an Ex-Lance Naik of the Indian Army, rendered 15 years of exemplary service before being discharged in 1987 after developing a serious cardiac condition diagnosed as Complete Heart Block (4–6). The Medical Board assessed his disability at 100% and placed him in a permanent low medical category. Subsequently, a pacemaker was implanted, and he sought reassessment of his disability pension. While the Armed Forces Tribunal held that he was entitled to disability pension, it restricted the benefit to one year. Aggrieved by this limitation, he approached the Supreme Court.

Issues Before the Court

The Supreme Court considered:

• Whether disability pension could be restricted to one year despite the Medical Board recording a permanent disability.
• Whether refusal to undergo a risky surgical procedure could justify limiting disability pension.
• Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal had correctly applied Rule 185 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.

Key Findings

1) Refusal of Surgery Is Not Misconduct

The Court noted that the Medical Board itself had recorded that the appellant's disability was not attributable to any misconduct or negligence on his part and that his military record was exemplary.

The only circumstance that appeared to have weighed against him was his unwillingness to undergo surgery, which, at the relevant time, carried life-threatening risks. The Supreme Court found no justification for treating this refusal as a ground to curtail his pensionary entitlement.

2) Permanent Disability Cannot Attract Temporary Pension Without Reasons

The Bench observed that the appellant had been discharged because of permanent disablement. In such circumstances, the Armed Forces Tribunal's decision to confine disability pension to one year was found to be illogical and unsupported by reasons.

3) Rule 185 Must Be Followed

The Court relied on Rule 185 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, which provides that where a disability is certified as incapable of improvement, disability pension should ordinarily be sanctioned for ten years in the first instance, followed by reassessment. Only in specified permanent conditions is life-long disability pension granted immediately.

The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had either overlooked or failed to apply this statutory scheme while limiting the benefit to one year.

Directions

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court:

• set aside the Armed Forces Tribunal's direction restricting disability pension to one year;
• directed that disability pension be granted in accordance with Rule 185 for ten years, subject to reassessment thereafter;
• directed payment of arrears restricted to three years prior to the filing of proceedings before the Tribunal, together with future disability pension in accordance with the Rules.

Why This Judgment Matters

a) Protects Bodily Autonomy

The decision reinforces the principle that a service member cannot be compelled—directly or indirectly—to undergo hazardous medical treatment in order to preserve pensionary rights. A refusal to undertake risky surgery cannot by itself become a basis for reducing disability benefits.

b) Ensures Faithful Application of Pension Regulations

The judgment reiterates that adjudicating authorities must apply the Pension Regulations as they stand. Departure from the statutory scheme requires cogent reasons, particularly where the disability has been assessed as permanent.

c) Strengthens Disability Pension Jurisprudence

The ruling adds to the growing body of Supreme Court decisions adopting a liberal and rights-based interpretation of disability pension provisions for armed forces personnel.

DRI Commentary

Although brief, the judgment underscores two important principles in disability rights and military pension law.

First, medical autonomy is an integral component of dignity. An individual cannot be penalised for declining a surgical intervention, particularly where the procedure carries significant risks. Pension entitlements cannot be made contingent upon acceptance of invasive medical treatment.

Secondly, the judgment reinforces the rule of law in disability pension adjudication. Once the Medical Board records permanent disability and there is no finding of misconduct or negligence, adjudicatory bodies cannot arbitrarily restrict pensionary benefits contrary to the governing Pension Regulations.

While the Supreme Court did not direct life-long disability pension, it ensured that the appellant received the benefit contemplated under Rule 185 and prevented an unjustified curtailment of his statutory entitlement.

The decision serves as another reminder that disability pension is a legal right flowing from service and sacrifice—not a discretionary concession dependent upon medical choices made by the disabled veteran.

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Functional Disability, Not Medical Percentage, Determines Compensation: Supreme Court Restores 100% Compensation for Injured Woman Labourer

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra
Case Title: Indra Bai v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr.
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 4492 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 138 of 2023)
Neutral Citation: 2023 INSC 624
Decided on: 17 July 2023

Background

In a significant ruling on the concept of functional disability under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, the Supreme Court held that compensation must be based on the injured worker's loss of earning capacity rather than the percentage of physical disability certified by a Medical Board.

The appellant, Indra Bai, was employed as a loading and unloading labourer. During the course of her employment, a chain pulley snapped while heavy concrete poles were being loaded onto a truck, causing severe injuries to her left arm. The injuries resulted in nerve damage, loss of grip, wrist drop and permanent loss of movement in the fingers of her left hand. The Medical Board assessed her permanent physical disability at 50% but also certified that she was "unfit for labour work."

The Commissioner for Employees' Compensation treated the disability as 100% functional disability, holding that she had become permanently incapable of performing the work she was engaged in at the time of the accident, and awarded compensation accordingly. However, the Madhya Pradesh High Court reduced the disability to 40%, substantially reducing the compensation.

The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court was justified in substituting the Commissioner's factual finding on functional disability.

Issues Before the Court

The Supreme Court considered:

• Whether "total disablement" under the Employees' Compensation Act is determined by medical disability or functional disability.
• Whether a labourer rendered permanently unfit for manual labour can be treated as suffering 100% functional disability despite a lower medical disability.
• Whether the High Court could interfere with the Commissioner's findings in an appeal under Section 30 of the Employees' Compensation Act in the absence of a substantial question of law.

Key Findings

1) Functional Disability Is the Governing Test

The Court reiterated that the concept of "total disablement" under Section 2(1)(l) of the Employees' Compensation Act is not confined to the percentage of physical impairment.

The decisive question is whether the injury has incapacitated the workman from performing the work he or she was capable of performing at the time of the accident.

2) Loss of One Functional Limb Can Mean Total Disablement

Although the appellant retained the use of her right hand, the Court noted that loading and unloading work ordinarily requires effective use of both hands.

Since the Medical Board itself certified that she was unfit for labour work and there was no evidence that she possessed any alternative vocational skills, the Commissioner rightly concluded that she had suffered 100% functional disability.

3) Medical Percentage Does Not Determine Compensation

The Court clarified that the Medical Board's assessment of 50% permanent physical disability did not conclude the issue.

Medical disability measures bodily impairment, whereas compensation law is concerned with loss of earning capacity. A person may have a lower percentage of physical disability yet suffer complete functional disablement if the injury destroys the ability to continue the occupation pursued before the accident.

4) High Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner had appreciated the evidence and recorded a factual finding that the appellant was permanently incapable of performing labour work.

In an appeal under Section 30 of the Act, interference is permissible only where a substantial question of law arises. Since no perversity was shown in the Commissioner's findings, the High Court erred in reassessing the extent of disability and reducing the compensation.

Decision

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court:

• set aside the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court;
• restored the Commissioner's award treating the appellant as suffering 100% functional disability; and
• reinstated the original compensation awarded under the Employees' Compensation Act.

Why This Judgment Matters

a) Reinforces Functional Disability Jurisprudence

The judgment reaffirms that compensation laws focus on loss of earning capacity, not merely the medical percentage of disability.

b) Important Protection for Manual Workers

The decision is particularly significant for workers engaged in physically demanding occupations such as labourers, construction workers, drivers and mechanics, where even partial physical impairment may completely eliminate the ability to continue in the same employment.

c) Limits Appellate Interference

The Court also clarifies that appellate courts cannot routinely re-evaluate findings of fact recorded by Commissioners under the Employees' Compensation Act unless a substantial question of law is involved.

DRI Commentary

The Supreme Court's decision in Indra Bai is another important affirmation of the principle that functional disability—not medical disability—is the true measure of compensation.

The judgment recognises that disability must be evaluated in the context of the worker's occupation. For a loading and unloading labourer, effective use of both hands is indispensable. Once the Medical Board certified that the appellant was permanently unfit for labour work, reducing her compensation merely because the physical disability was assessed at 50% would have defeated the purpose of the Employees' Compensation Act.

The decision builds upon earlier rulings such as Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata and Chanappa Nagappa Muchalagoda v. Divisional Manager, New India Insurance Co. Ltd., reaffirming that courts must assess the real impact of an injury on livelihood rather than mechanically applying medical percentages.

Although decided under the Employees' Compensation Act, the judgment carries broader significance for disability rights jurisprudence. It reflects the growing judicial acceptance of a functional and rights-based understanding of disability, where the focus is on the individual's ability to participate in work and society, rather than on clinical measurements alone.

Read the Judgement

Delhi HC directs Reserved Accessible Parking for Disabled across City of Delhi

Dear Colleagues,

The Delhi High Court on 11 Feb 2015, ordered civic agencies to reserve space for the disabled in every parking space across the city and punish errant contractors and attendants.

A bench of Chief Justice G Rohini and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw  while hearing the PIL W.P.(C) No.1977/2014 titled Vinod Kumar Bansal Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, said the agencies have till now only “paid lip service“ to several rules enacted to ensure access to the disabled and ordered them to “reserve parking spaces most suitable for persons with disability and in sufficient number after assessing the need.“

Indicating its seriousness, the HC directed the state government and its agencies to include a penalty clause in rules so that a parking attendant or contractor who doesn't reserve space for disabled is punished and the contract is cancelled immediately. However, the court left it to the discretion of the three corporations, DDA, NDMC and the government to explore the number of reserved spaces to be kept for the disabled.

On what moved the Hon'ble Court to rule in favour of the rights of disabled, it expressed, “Our own experience in Delhi shows that at several places though ramps have been provided to enable access to wheelchairs, they are there merely for namesake as the gradient is very steep. We want to draw the attention of all concerned agencies that they must standardize the gradient...We find the ramps to be inaccessible in certain places owing to the storm water drain on the sides of the roads which acts as a barrier between the road and the ramp leading to the pavement. All this comes in the way of optimum and intended use of our roads and pavements, with the same being congested, dusty , blocked, uneven and full of potholes, impeding movement."

Directions passed by the Court 

(a) all the concerned agencies to within six months hereof, in each of the parking spaces presently available, reserve parking space/s most suitable for persons with disability and in sufficient number after assessing the need and to on the board reserving the said parking space itself also give the name and phone number of the person with whom the complaint with respect to misuse of the said parking space is to be lodged; 

(b) feasibility of making a provision for action against the contractor / attendant of manned parking lots / places viz. of cancellation of contract etc. for allowing such reserved parking spaces to be used for parking by others be considered; 

(c) feasibility of providing for identification of vehicles of persons with disability be also explored so that it can be identified whether the vehicle parked in the said reserved parking space is of a person with disability or of some other person;

(d) the process of installation of auditory signals at all traffic lights be completed within six months; 

(e) all the concerned agencies to within the said time of six months ensure that all pavements are accessible to persons with disabilities, taking into consideration the observations made hereinabove; 

(f) dedicated phone lines/ e-mail address or other user ID for cross-platform mobile messaging applications for receiving complaints/images/videos of blocking the access to the pavements by encroaching thereon be provided and the telephone number for each district be widely advertised for enabling the citizens to make complaints with respect thereto and the name of the person responsible for dealing with the said complaint and the time within which the complaint is to be dealt with shall also be provided;

(g) each of the concerned agencies to within four weeks hereof file affidavits in the Court naming the person responsible for complying with the directions issued by us and such person shall be responsible for non-compliance of the directions."

Case not completely closed

Though the matter has been disposed off so far as reliefs claimed by the petitioner, but broadening the scope of the intervention, the Hon'ble High Court fixed the next date for hearing on 19 May 2015 with directions that the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and the Chief Secretary, Govt. of NCT of Delhi should present their views in this respect before  the Hon'ble Court by filing affidavits, within a period of four weeks from today including as to the consultant / think tank / expert who / which can be entrusted with the said task.

Court expressed its dissatisfaction saying "It is sad that despite expending huge funds and the best intention of the officials and employees, the city is not able to achieve the world class status which it aspires...We are sure that a competent consultant assigned the said task would be able to devise a structure for better governance of the city".

Get a copy of Court Judgement in accessible format here

W.P.(C) No.1977/2014 Vinod Kumar Bansal Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi


Media Coverage

(a) Here is a related Media coverage from Times of India in image format.



(b) To read the media coverage from source in accessible format click here: Times of India 

Delhi High Court directs ICAI to form panel of Scribes / Writers for candidates with Disabilities

Dear colleagues,

This is further to my earlier posts dated 01 May 2013, 03 May 2012 & 06 April 2012 on the issue of Scribes / Writers facility for the candidates with disabilities (Visually Impaired / Blind Candidates) appearing in ICAI examinations  and frequent legal cases against the august institution. 

A candidate Ms. Reena Bhatia, a visually impaired  candidate was denied facility of multiple writers and also a writer who is from the same field due to rigid rules. The recent guidelines of Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Govt. of India, make it amply clear that there shall be no restriction of age, relationship, educational qualification etc on the scribe. on the contrary, the exam system will have to strengthened to see that the system is not misused among the other things.

Now a single judge bench of the Delhi High Court headed by Justice VK Jain has, on a petition by Ms. Reena Bhatia, directed the ICAI to have a panel of scribes in all major cities so that the same could be provided to the students by the ICAI. The court has also directed the ICAI to also bear the cost of scribes as is done by JNU and Delhi University and also prepare a schedule of charge within three months. 

The judgement also agrees that there should be no restriction on the number of scribes and the candidate can use multiple scribes, however, the judgement still fall short of expectations in light of very progressive Scribe Guidelines from the Ministry of Social Justice Govt. of India issued in February 2013.

Judgment has two inherent contradictions with the new Scribe Guidelines of GOI, Feb 2013.

(a) Firstly the GOI guidelines insist that the candidate should have the discretion of opting for his own scribe/reader/ lab assistant or request the Examination Body for the same. The examining  body may also identify the scribe/ reader/lab assistant to make panels at the District/Division/ State level as per the requirements of the examination. In such instances the candidates should be allowed to meet the scribe a day before the examination so that the candidates get a chance to check and verify whether the scribe is suitable or not. 

Contradiction: The judgement seem to granting leave to the respondent ICAI to  amend its own guidelines so as to deny the facility of engaging private scribes/ writers to the candidates at the places where a panel of scribes/ writers is prepared by it, provided one or more writers/ scribes from such panel are provided to the candidates. This leave is likely to take away the discretion of the candidate of choosing scribe and may counter productive to the intent of policy makers. The courts fails to recognise that in certain disabling conditions, such as cerebral palsy who also use the scribe services, the speech of the candidate is often affected and only a private scribe with experience of working with the person would be able to reduce the dictation to writing. A new scribe with no experience with that person may not even understand properly what is being dictated!

(b) Secondly, the GOI guideline insist that criteria like educational qualification, marks scored, age or other such restrictions for the scribe/reader/lab assistant should not be fixed. Instead, the invigilation system should be strengthened, so that the candidates using scribe/reader/lab assistant do not indulge in malpractices like copying and cheating during the examination.

Contradiction: The judgement on the contrary says that the qualifications of the scribes/ writers shall continue to be governed by the existing guidelines (of ICAI) which may work counter productive from the perspective that the writers given to them or allowed under the existing ICAI guidelines may have no knowledge of accountancy and mathematics hence will not be able to write correctly even after correct dictation given to them. In absence of any mechanism, it would be difficult to cross check whether what has been dictated by the candidate has been correctly reproduced by such a scribe. This defeats the very purpose of GOI Guideline which talks of strengthening the existing examination system. 

To access the judgement (uploaded on Google Drive in PDF), please click here: Reena Bhatia Versus ICAI (Writ Petition No. 4540 of 2013) Delhi High Court, Judgement Delivered on 18 November 2013.  

Here is the news coverage in the Times of India

ICAI asked to set up scribes panel for sightless

TNN | Nov 19, 2013, 12.12 AM IST

NEW DELHI: The Delhi high court on Monday directed The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) to prepare within six months its own panel of scribes to assist disabled students, including the visually impaired, in writing chartered accountancy exams conducted by it.

Justice V K Jain said that the institute should either empanel appropriate persons to function as scribes or engage the panel of scribes prepared by other universities such as JNU and Delhi University that maintain their own panels. The court's order came on a petition filed by a visually impaired chartered accountant student Reena Bhatia, who sought direction to the institute to prepare a panel of competent scribes to be provided to differently-abled candidates during their exams.

ICAI had told the court that it has not maintained it own panel of scribes as it did not had its own campus and had to conduct examination at as many as in 377 centres spread over 96 cities throughout the country as well as in four cities outside the country. On this, the court directed ICAI to prepare a panel of the scribes to differently abled person at least in the "major cities where examinations are held by it".

Source: Times of India

Disabilities can't be restricted to those in the PwD Act 1995

Dear Colleages,

The present medical model of disability in the Disability Act and as understood by the Courts has some serious shortcomings. The etiology based labels or medical condition based labels are counterproductive so far as the constitutional mandate of ensuring equality and non-discrimination is concerned. The benefits of schemes meant for social justice can not be just restricted to persons whose condition or type of disability reflects in the law.

What is needed is to look at the restrictions that the person faces in the community due to the particular condition. The forumula that Amended Americans with Disabilities Act (came in to force on Jan 01, 2009) adopts is quite reasonable. It accepts you for the disability benefits if :

(a) If you have a physical or mental problem that substantially limits one or more of your “major life activities”.

(b) You have a record of having had such a problem in the past.

(c) Other people think you have such a problem, even if you do not actually have it.

What are major life activities

Some of the “major life activities” covered by ADA include but are not limited to caring for yourself, doing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.

The amended ADA has made some major changes to the way the definition of disability had been interpreted under ADA in the past. The 2008 Amendments Act includes major body functions, including but not limited to functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, brain and nervous system, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive systems. These changes can help people with cancer, because in the past they often had a hard time meeting the definition of disability.

Bombay High Court sets a precedent

The Bombay HC has in the below case issued notices to the Coordination Committees  - both Centre and State - established under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal opportunities, proteciton of Rights and full participation) Act 1995 Central Govt.to respond to a similar case wherein the petitioner Vinod Tambe - a personal rehabilitated after cancer  -   has sought benefits available to persons with disabities under the Act.

Hon'ble Chief Justice Mohit Shah has been known to be a very sensitive judge so far as  matter related to those with disabilities and marginalised segments are concerned. He has been known to take suo moto notice of matters affecting the rights of disabled while he was with Gujarat High Court and championed the cause of persons with disabilities.

Disabilities Act not superseding but supplementing

The Maharasthra Government had through a circular issued by the director of employment exchange on November 21, 1983, instructed all district employment officers to register cancer-cured persons as handicapped persons. And the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 being a beneficial legislation only supplemented what existed before and by its enactment, no pre-existing right  could be taken away by the state in such a blatant manner. Therefore, even if if caner-cured is not included in the medical definitions of the Disabilities Act, the said category continues to get the benefits, technically.

Other unreported cases

I personally know of a case in Valsad, Gujarat where a gentleman met with a serious car accident during which a metal rod of the car entered his body from a little lower than the urinal part on the front side of the body and came out from the spinal cord i.e. back side of his body thereby tearing his body and damaging the sphincter, anus, rectum and the spinal cord. He was somehow saved but with a colostomy. 

The Disability Certificate granted by Civil Hospital Valsad says he is a case of "Permanent Colostomy  + L1 Vertebra Fracture (Old)" and degree of disability is quanitified as "66%" .  

He sought benefits of Tax Concession to buy an adapted car available to persons with Disabiliites. However, the Government authorities refused him the benefit saying that he is not a person with disability according to the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 since he is not suffering from blindness, low vision, mental illness, mental retardation, hearing impairment or locomotor impairment! This is despite that fact that the gentleman has no voluntary control over his stools and has problems in independent mobility.

Lessons

Even the draft of the new Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2012 which is to replace the existing Disabilities Act 1995 doesn't address this issue and still revolves around the etiology and types of disabilities without looking at the effect of the disability on the normal living of the person affected and the accommodations required by the person to be able to functional on an equal basis with others to ensure his fundamental right of equality to him. We need to move beyond types of impairment to the effects of the impairment the person faces in terms of disabilities while interacting with the social and environmental barriers and derive the accommodations that the person may require. 

The amended Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) even recognises a disability which may not be actually there but may be perceived by others in addition to the major body functions, including but not limited to functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, brain and nervous system, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive systems. 

We seriously need to consider this before the present bill gets passed in the present form. Below is the news coverage on Bombay High Court admitting a case of  person recovered from Cancer with residual impairments/ disabilities.

TREAT CANCER - CURED AS DISABLED: PLEA IN COURT

Rosy Sequeira, TNN | Aug 5, 2013, 01.40 AM IST

MUMBAI: The Bombay high court has sought responses from the central and state coordination committees for persons with disabilities after a teacher cured of cancer approached it, demanding the same rights granted to disabled people. 

Solapur resident Vinod Tambe was diagnosed with blood cancer in 1977 at the age of seven. He was treated at Tata Memorial Hospital, and on March 16, 2005, issued a certificate by Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Central Hospital in Solapur declaring him "cancer-cured handicap". Still, in spite of this, Tambe found that he was not allowed to access facilities for handicapped people. The primary school teacher subsequently moved court. 

Tambe is seeking the benefits accorded to disabled persons in healthcare, public transportation, education and employment. "The government should be considerate towards someone who has gone to the doorsteps of death and returned. Even though I am cured I still go through body pain. I am not like a normal person," he said. 

Tambe's advocate M S Karnik, during a hearing on July 12, pointed out that a circular issued by the director of employment exchange on November 21, 1983, instructed all district employment officers to register cancer-cured persons as handicapped persons. 

But the Maharashtra government maintains that the circular was superseded by the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. The definitions of disabilities listed in the act do not cover Tambe's case, it says. 

Karnik argued that the authorities erred in applying a narrow definition of the term "disability": "A person who has suffered from blood cancer even after getting cured does suffer from disabilities arising from weakness of the bones, joints or muscles, leading to substantial restriction of the movement of limbs." Karnik added that Tambe's case can be classified under locomotor disability, which is recognised under the 1995 act. 

The advocate contended that various additional forms of disabilities should be covered under the act and the Right of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2012. Because of the current narrow definitions, he said, many people are getting deprived of disability benefits. 

Agreeing with him, a division bench of Chief Justice Mohit Shah and Justice M S Sanklecha gave the instance of the rare genetic disorder Hunter's syndrome. In this, an enzyme the body needs is missing or insufficiently generated, the judges said, leading to progressive damage, affecting development and organ function. 

Karnik said among the responsibilities of the central and state coordination committees is to continuously evolve policies to solve the problems faced by disabled people and to advise Central and state governments. The judges issued notices to the committees and posted the next hearing on August 7.

MAKING A CASE

THE PETITIONER

Vinod Tambe was diagnosed with blood cancer in 1977 and treated at Tata Memorial Hospital. In 2005, he was issued a certificate by Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Central Hospital in Solapur declaring him 'cancer-cured handicap'

THE PLEA

Cancer survivors should be granted the rights given to disabled people

Disabilities Under Right of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2012

1) Autism spectrum disorder 2) Blindness 3) Cerebral palsy 4) Chronic neurological conditions 5) Deafblindness 6) Haemophilia 7) Hearing impairment 8) Intellectual disability 9) Leprosy cured 10) Locomotor disability 11) Low vision 12) Mental illness 13) Muscular dystrophy 14) Multiple sclerosis 15) Specific learning disability 16) Speech and language disability 17) Thalassaemia 18) Multiple disabilities (two or more disabilities listed as one to 17 occurring in a person at the same time)

Disabilities Defined Under Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995

1) Blindness 2) Low vision 3) Leprosy-cured 4) Hearing impairment 5) Locomotor disability 6) Mental retardation 7) Mental illness

Times View


The government should treat such cases with utmost sympathy instead of going purely by the rulebook. And, if need be, rules should change to provide relief to people in distress. The court has done the right thing by indicating there may be a need to take a fresh look at the law.

Source: Times of India