For Child Victims, Consider Impact on Future: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation to ₹83.38 Lakh for Infant Left Paralysed for Life

90% Physical Disability Can Mean 100% Functional Disability: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation for Child with Catastrophic Disability;  SC says compensation for disabled children must account for lifelong loss, dependence, future care and loss of quality of life

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Anjaria
Case: Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr.
Civil Appeal No.: 7067 of 2026
Date: 3 August 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 785

Background

The Supreme Court has substantially enhanced compensation payable to a child who suffered catastrophic and permanent disability in a motor accident when she was only six months old.

The case concerned Shreejita Pattnaik, who suffered severe spinal cord and neurological injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 16 June 2015. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia and was assessed as having 90% permanent locomotor disability. The medical evidence established that she would require lifelong medication, care, supervision and assistance.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Cuttack, had awarded compensation of ₹30,12,960. The Orissa High Court subsequently enhanced the amount to ₹45,40,800. The claimant, through her mother, approached the Supreme Court seeking further enhancement.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and enhanced the compensation to ₹83,38,360, with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization.

90% Physical Disability, But 100% Functional Disability

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is the Court's distinction between physical disability and functional disability.

The Court noted that the percentage of physical disability certified by a medical board and the actual impact of that disability on a person's earning capacity need not always be identical.

In Shreejita's case, although her permanent physical disability was assessed at 90%, the Court examined the actual consequences of the disability. She had been only six months old when the accident occurred, was permanently dependent upon others and would be unable to independently perform normal day-to-day activities.

The Court concluded that her future earning capacity had been completely destroyed and held that her functional disability was 100%.

This distinction is important in disability jurisprudence. A medical percentage does not necessarily capture the real-world consequences of disability. The relevant inquiry, particularly while determining loss of earning capacity, is the impact of the disability on the person's ability to pursue livelihood and live independently.

The Court observed that physical disability and functional disability operate in different fields: physical disability concerns medically assessed bodily impairment, whereas functional disability concerns the effect of that impairment upon the person's ability to live a normal life and pursue gainful employment.

A Child with Catastrophic Disability Cannot Be Treated Merely as a Non-Earning Person

The Court emphasised that children who suffer permanent or near-total disability constitute a distinct category in motor accident compensation cases.

A catastrophic injury during childhood does not merely cause an immediate physical impairment. It can alter the entire course of the child's life, affecting education, employment, social participation, independence, relationships and ordinary experiences of childhood and adulthood.

The Court noted that a child suffering catastrophic injury may lose much more than physical capacity. Ordinary activities such as playing, attending school, interacting with friends and participating in social life may become inaccessible.

Importantly, the Court connected these consequences with human dignity, observing that when a catastrophic injury deprives a child of the ability to perform ordinary functions independently, the resulting loss goes beyond physical disability and amounts to a continuing deprivation of dignity.

Minimum Wages of a Skilled Worker to Be Considered

The Court rejected the approach of treating the injured child as an unskilled labourer for calculating future loss of earnings.

Relying upon its earlier decisions, the Court held that in cases involving children who suffer permanent disability, minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the concerned State at the relevant time should be considered rather than simply assigning a notional income.

For the accident in the present case, the applicable skilled-worker wage was calculated at ₹192.50 per day, resulting in an annual income of ₹69,300. After adding 40% towards future prospects and applying a multiplier of 18, the Court calculated the loss of future earning capacity at ₹17,46,360, taking functional disability at 100%.

The Court also restored the multiplier of 18, holding that the recent trend in cases involving severely injured children supports its application.

Lifelong Attendant Charges Must Be Realistically Assessed

The judgment is also significant in its treatment of attendant charges.

The evidence established that Shreejita would remain dependent on others throughout her life and require constant care, supervision and assistance.

The Supreme Court held that attendant charges should not be confined to a nominal amount merely because actual bills or receipts may not have been produced. The Court applied the multiplier method to determine the cost of lifelong attendant care.

Taking the cost of one attendant at ₹6,000 per month and considering the requirement of two attendants, the Court calculated the annual expenditure at ₹1,44,000 and, applying the multiplier of 18, awarded ₹25,92,000 towards attendant charges.

This is particularly important in cases involving persons with severe disabilities who require lifelong personal assistance.

Compensation Must Account for Loss of Quality of Life

The Court further enhanced the amount awarded towards pain, suffering, loss of amenities and loss of marriage prospects.

The Court recognised that pain and suffering include physical discomfort as well as mental and emotional trauma. In the case of a child with catastrophic disability, conventional calculations may fail to adequately capture the lifelong deprivation suffered by the victim.

The amount under the combined heads was therefore enhanced to ₹25 lakh.

The Court emphasised that compensation for such injuries cannot be merely symbolic. The assessment must take into account the unusual deprivation and its consequences throughout the person's life.

Future Medical Needs Cannot Be Underestimated

The Court also found the amount awarded for future medical treatment inadequate.

Given the permanent and debilitating nature of Shreejita's injuries and her requirement for lifelong medical care, the Court enhanced compensation for future medical treatment from ₹5 lakh to ₹10 lakh.

The amount for conveyance and special diet was also enhanced from ₹50,000 to ₹2 lakh, considering the extensive treatment already undergone and the continuing requirement for medical care.

Compensation Enhanced to ₹83.38 Lakh

The Supreme Court ultimately recalculated the compensation as follows:

Head	Compensation
Loss of future earning capacity	₹17,46,360
Attendant charges	₹25,92,000
Pain, suffering, loss of amenities & marriage prospects	₹25,00,000
Medical expenses	₹3,00,000
Future medical treatment	₹10,00,000
Conveyance and special diet	₹2,00,000
Total	₹83,38,360

The compensation was accordingly enhanced from ₹45,40,800 to ₹83,38,360, along with 9% annual interest from the date of filing of the claim until realization. The insurer was directed to deposit the amount within six weeks.

Significance

The judgment is important beyond the quantum of compensation awarded in the individual case.

First, it reinforces that the percentage of medically assessed disability cannot automatically determine the extent of loss of earning capacity. The functional impact of disability must be examined.

Second, children with catastrophic disabilities cannot be treated simply as persons who had no income because they had not yet entered employment. Their future earning capacity and the future that has been irreversibly altered by the injury must be taken into account.

Third, compensation must realistically account for lifelong attendant care, medical treatment, loss of amenities, pain and suffering and other consequences of disability.

Most importantly, the Court's observations recognise that catastrophic disability in childhood affects the person's entire life trajectory. The loss is not limited to physical impairment or immediate medical expenditure. It can affect independence, education, employment, relationships, social participation and dignity.

The judgment therefore strengthens the principle that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act must be “just, fair and reasonable”, and must not become either a token amount or an inadequate approximation of lifelong loss. The Court reiterated that the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial legislation and requires a liberal and purposive interpretation.

DRI Perspective

The judgment is a significant reminder that disability is experienced in the context of a person's entire life, and compensation law must account for that reality.

For a child who acquires catastrophic disability before even beginning school, the consequences cannot be assessed by looking only at present medical expenses or the income the child happens to earn at the time of the accident—which, in the case of an infant, is obviously zero.

The Supreme Court's approach correctly looks forward: What earning capacity has been lost? What care will be required throughout life? What medical expenses are likely to continue? What ordinary experiences and opportunities have been taken away?

The Court's recognition of 100% functional disability despite 90% physical disability is particularly significant. It reinforces that disability assessment for compensation purposes must not become a purely medical exercise divorced from the person's actual life and livelihood.

Equally important is the Court's recognition of human dignity and lifelong deprivation. Compensation is necessarily incapable of restoring the life that was lost or altered by catastrophic injury. But the law must nevertheless make a genuine attempt to provide financial security commensurate with the deprivation suffered.

The judgment consequently moves the assessment of compensation closer to a rights-based and life-course approach to disability, where the objective is not merely to reimburse past expenditure but to provide meaningful financial security for the lifelong consequences of catastrophic disability.

Read the judgement

Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr. Civil Appeal No. : 7067 of 2026 [PDF 377KB]

Supreme Court Sets Four-Week Deadline for Appointment of Independent Disability Commissioners in the States and Centre in Rajive Raturi Vs Union of India

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case: Rajive Raturi v. Union of India & Others, W.P. (C) No. 243 of 2005 (along with connected matters)
Order Date: 29 July 2026

Next Date of Hearing: 20 January 2027

Statutory Provisions Involved

Provision	Subject	Relevance in this Order
Section 74, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities and Additional Commissioners	The Supreme Court directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with this provision.
Section 79, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Appointment of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities	The Court directed ten States/UTs to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks and clarified that the appointments must be made with independent charge, not as an additional charge.
Section 89, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016	Punishment for contravention of the Act, Rules or Regulations	The Court noted the absence of an effective mechanism for recovery of penalties under this provision and urged the Union Government to address this while finalising the Rules.
Rule 30, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017	Qualifications and eligibility for appointment of the Chief Commissioner	The Court specifically referred to Rule 30 and reminded the Union Government that a serving Government officer must retire from service before appointment as Chief Commissioner, thereby reinforcing the independence of the office.

Background

More than three years after the Supreme Court directed all States and Union Territories to appoint independent Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities by 31 August 2023, the issue has once again come before the Court owing to continued non-compliance by several Governments. In its order dated 17 July 2023 in Seema Girija Lal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had recognised that Commissioners perform crucial statutory functions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and directed all defaulting States and Union Territories to make appointments within a fixed timeline. Despite those directions, vacancies have continued in several jurisdictions, while the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also remained without a regular incumbent since 2019.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, while monitoring implementation of its landmark accessibility judgment in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, has once again intervened to strengthen the institutional framework under the RPwD Act. By its order dated 29 July 2026, the Court directed ten States and Union Territories to appoint independent State Commissioners within four weeks, directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within the same period, and issued further directions concerning the finalisation of accessibility rules and enforcement of the Act.

The matter has remained under continuous monitoring to ensure effective implementation of the judgment. Earlier, by an order dated 11 February 2026, the Court had sought detailed status reports from the Union Government regarding progress made in framing the new accessibility framework.

When the matter was taken up on 29 July 2026, the Court considered the latest status report filed by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD) and issued several important directions concerning the implementation of the RPwD Act. The order addresses three significant issues: the appointment of statutory disability commissioners, progress in framing accessibility rules, and strengthening enforcement mechanisms under the Act.

Accessibility Rules Under the RPwD Act

The Union Government informed the Court that substantial progress had been made in framing the new accessibility rules pursuant to the Supreme Court's judgment.

According to the status report placed before the Court:

• the draft notification relating to the built environment is ready for final notification;
• draft rules relating to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have already been published; and
• a draft report relating to assistive technologies, services and products has also been prepared.

Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that before the draft rules are finalised and notified, the suggestions already submitted by disability organisations and domain experts should be meaningfully considered so that no deficiencies remain in the final framework.

Accepting this submission, the Court observed that there should be no difficulty in ensuring that the Rules effectively fulfil the objectives of the RPwD Act. Noting that several stakeholders had already submitted detailed suggestions before the committees constituted by the Ministry, the Court urged the Union Government to carefully examine those recommendations before finalising the Rules.

The Bench observed that once the Rules are notified, shortcomings should not subsequently emerge that could have been addressed during the drafting stage itself.

The Court further requested the learned Additional Solicitors General to provide copies of the latest status report along with the draft Rules to all stakeholders so that they may examine the proposals and submit their responses at the earliest.

Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Independent State Commissioners

One of the most important aspects of the order concerns the continued absence of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities in several States and Union Territories.

During the hearing, Advocate Rahul Bajaj pointed out that despite the statutory requirement contained in Section 79 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several States had still not appointed State Commissioners. It was submitted that these authorities perform a crucial role in ensuring effective implementation of the Act and in providing an institutional mechanism for grievance redressal and monitoring compliance.

The Court recorded that the following States and Union Territories had not appointed State Commissioners:

• Delhi
• Haryana
• Rajasthan
• Himachal Pradesh
• Karnataka
• Tamil Nadu
• Sikkim
• Nagaland
• Puducherry
• Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed all these Governments to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with Section 79 of the RPwD Act. The Court made it clear that the direction must be strictly complied with, observing that any laxity would be viewed "very strictly".

Commissioner Must Hold Independent Charge

The Court also clarified an important aspect that has frequently arisen in disability governance.

Many States have, in the past, assigned the office of State Commissioner to serving officers as an additional charge, rather than appointing an independent statutory authority.

The Supreme Court expressly disapproved this practice and clarified:

"The State concerned shall appoint the Commissioner with an independent charge. The State should not appoint anyone as a Commissioner holding additional charge."

This clarification reinforces the independent character of the statutory office created under the RPwD Act.

Appointment of Chief Commissioner and Additional Commissioners

The Court also considered submissions regarding the prolonged vacancy in the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD). It was pointed out that since 2019 there has been no full-time Chief Commissioner, with the Secretary, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, functioning only as an officer holding additional charge.

Reference was made to Section 74 of the RPwD Act and Rule 30 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, which contemplate appointment of an independent Chief Commissioner and provide that a serving Government officer must retire from Government service before assuming the office.

Accepting these submissions, the Court directed the Union Government to complete the appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities; and two Additional Commissioners, within four weeks, in accordance with Section 74 of the RPwD Act. The Court also specifically invited the attention of the Union Government to Rule 30 while making these appointments.

Effective Recovery of Penalties Under Section 89

Another issue raised before the Court related to Section 89 of the RPwD Act, which prescribes penalties for contravention of the Act and the Rules.

Counsel submitted that although the Act provides for monetary penalties, it does not prescribe any effective mechanism for recovery of those fines, thereby limiting practical enforcement.

The Supreme Court requested the Union Government to consider incorporating an appropriate recovery mechanism while finalising the new Rules so that penalties under Section 89 can be effectively enforced.

Existing Accessibility Standards Continue to Apply

The Court also reiterated an important clarification contained in paragraph 83 of its judgment dated 8 November 2024.

The Bench noted the submission that while new accessibility standards are being framed, compliance with existing accessibility obligations must continue.

The Court reiterated that:

"progressive compliance with the standards listed in the existing Rule 15(1) and the progress towards the targets of the Accessible India Campaign must continue unabated."

This clarification is significant because it prevents authorities from postponing compliance on the ground that revised accessibility standards are under preparation.

Non-Negotiable Accessibility Norms to be Finalised Within Six Months

The Court directed that the issuance of the non-negotiable accessibility norms envisaged in the main judgment must be completed within six months. The matter has been directed to be listed on 20 January 2027 for reporting compliance with all directions issued by the Court.

Significance

The order strengthens the institutional framework established under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. For nearly seven years, the office of the Chief Commissioner has remained without a full-time incumbent, while several States have either failed to appoint State Commissioners altogether or have entrusted the office to officials holding additional charge. By directing appointments within a fixed time frame and expressly requiring independent charge, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that these statutory authorities are intended to function as independent oversight institutions rather than as additional responsibilities assigned to serving bureaucrats.

The order also ensures that the ongoing process of framing accessibility rules remains consultative and participatory by directing meaningful consideration of stakeholder inputs before final notification. At the same time, the Court has reiterated that existing accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act and the Accessible India Campaign remain fully enforceable until the new framework comes into force.

The proceedings will now continue on 20 January 2027, when the Supreme Court will examine compliance with these directions.

Read the Order dated 27 July 2026

Supreme Court Declares Right to Walk on Safe, Demarcated Footpaths a Fundamental Right: Accessibility and Inclusion Take Centre Stage

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Case: Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 4665–4666 of 2025
Date of Judgment: 19 June 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 647

In a landmark judgment with far-reaching implications for urban planning, disability rights, and inclusive mobility, the Supreme Court of India has declared that the right to walk on safe and demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.

The Court held that this right flows from Article 19(1)(d), which guarantees freedom of movement (All citizens shall have the right…to move freely throughout the territory of India), read together with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), and Article 21.

Significantly, the Court declared that the rights of pedestrians have primacy over motorised transport, marking a decisive shift away from the long-standing vehicle-centric approach to urban development.

Tragic Facts, Transformative Jurisprudence

The case arose from the death of a five-year-old child who was walking to school with his father when a tanker struck him from behind. The Court noted that there was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing on the road where the accident occurred.

While adjudicating the compensation claim, the Court moved beyond the immediate facts to examine a larger constitutional question: whether citizens possess an enforceable right to safe walking infrastructure.

Answering in the affirmative, the Court observed:

"The right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. The fundamental right to walk will take within its sweep the right to demarcated footpaths. These rights are primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles."

Walking Is Not a Privilege—It Is a Constitutional Right

In a powerful articulation of the constitutional value of walking, the Court observed that the right to move under Article 19(1)(d) cannot be reduced to movement on wheels.

The judgment recognises that walking is deeply connected to human dignity, expression, association, participation in public life, and access to opportunities. It noted that Indian cities and towns have systematically prioritised motor vehicles at the cost of pedestrians, resulting in the exclusion of millions of citizens from public spaces.

The Court lamented that pedestrians are often treated as "a nuisance" on roads that should belong to everyone.

Accessibility: A Major Win for Persons with Disabilities

Although the case did not arise directly under the disability rights framework, the judgment has profound implications for persons with disabilities, older persons, children, and all vulnerable road users.

For persons with disabilities, the right to walk on demarcated footpaths cannot be interpreted merely as the existence of a physical pathway. The constitutional guarantee necessarily requires accessible, continuous, unobstructed, and universally designed pedestrian infrastructure.

This includes:

• Step-free and barrier-free footpaths;
• Accessible kerb ramps at crossings;
• Tactile guiding and warning indicators;
• Adequate width for wheelchair users and persons using mobility aids;
• Audible pedestrian signals;
• Non-slip surfaces;
• Removal of encroachments and street-level obstacles;
• Accessible wayfinding and signage.

The judgment reinforces the obligations already imposed under the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities' notified accessibility standards, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Rules framed thereunder, and the Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India.

A footpath that cannot be used safely and independently by persons with disabilities cannot be regarded as a constitutionally compliant footpath.

Duty Bearers Identified

The Court clearly identified the authorities responsible for ensuring the right to walk:

• Urban Development Authorities;
• Municipal Corporations;
• Municipalities; and
• Panchayats.

The Court held that where a road exists, there is a corresponding obligation to ensure the existence and maintenance of safe and demarcated footpaths.

This is not a matter of policy discretion but a constitutional duty.

Constitutional Remedies Beyond Motor Accident Claims

In an important clarification, the Court held that remedies under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, are not sufficient to protect pedestrian rights.

Citizens whose right to walk is violated can seek constitutional remedies, including restitution and compensation, directly against the authorities responsible for creating and maintaining pedestrian infrastructure.

The Court observed that these remedies are independent of claims available under the Motor Vehicles Act.

This finding significantly expands accountability for inaccessible and unsafe public infrastructure.

Continuing the Trajectory of Pedestrian Rights

The present judgment builds upon the Supreme Court's earlier interventions in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India concerning road safety and pedestrian infrastructure.

Notably, in 2025, the Supreme Court recognised that footpaths must remain unobstructed and accessible to all users, including persons with disabilities. The Court directed authorities across the country to ensure the removal of encroachments and the creation of disability-friendly pedestrian infrastructure.

Disability Rights India had previously covered that important development in its article, "Supreme Court of India Upholds Right to Accessible and Obstruction-Free Footpaths for Persons with Disabilities."

Today's judgment elevates that principle to a higher constitutional plane by expressly declaring the right to walk on demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right.

Call for a Dedicated Legislative Framework

Recognising the absence of a comprehensive legal framework governing pedestrian rights, the Court directed that copies of the judgment be forwarded to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways, as well as the Law Commission of India.

The Court emphasised the need for legislation that:

• Formally recognises the right to walk;
• Clearly identifies duty bearers;
• Establishes enforcement mechanisms;
• Provides effective remedies; and
• Creates an independent regulatory framework for pedestrian infrastructure.

Why This Judgment Matters

For decades, persons with disabilities have argued that inaccessible footpaths deny them the ability to access education, employment, healthcare, recreation, justice, and participation in community life. The Supreme Court has now unequivocally recognised that walking infrastructure is not merely a matter of urban design—it is a matter of constitutional rights.

This judgment also speaks to the everyday reality faced by millions of families across India. In the absence of safe, continuous and dedicated pedestrian footpaths, parents are often compelled to use private vehicles or hire school transport services merely to drop and pick up their children from schools located less than a kilometre away. This dependence on motorised transport is not a matter of choice but a consequence of unsafe public spaces. It discourages walking, increases traffic congestion, worsens air pollution, and deprives children and families of the well-documented physical and mental health benefits associated with regular walking. 

As the Court reminds us, walking is far more than a mode of transport—it is a social, cultural and democratic act deeply embedded in India's collective consciousness, from Mahatma Gandhi's historic Dandi March to countless everyday journeys that connect people to their communities. 

The true measure of this judgment will lie in whether governments and local bodies transform this constitutional promise into universally accessible, safe and walkable streets for everyone. The right to walk must now mean the right of every person—including persons with disabilities, children, older persons and other vulnerable road users—to move safely, independently and with dignity.

Read the Judgment: 

Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., 2026 INSC 647 (19 June 2026).

Supreme Court Clarifies RPwD Act: Persons Forcibly Made to Ingest Acid Also Entitled to Recognition as Acid Attack Victims [Judgement included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1112 of 2025

Case Title: Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

Date of Order: 04 May 2026

In an important and expansive interpretation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”), the Supreme Court has ruled that persons who are forcibly made to ingest acid must also be treated as “acid attack victims” under the law, even if they do not suffer visible external disfigurement.

The order significantly broadens the protection available to survivors of acid violence by recognizing that acid attacks are not confined to incidents involving acid being thrown on a victim’s body. The Court also clarified that persons suffering internal injuries caused by acid ingestion are equally entitled to the protections and statutory benefits available under the RPwD Act.

Background

The matter arose in ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the rights, rehabilitation, and protection of acid attack survivors. During the hearing, senior advocate and Amicus Curiae Mukul Rohatgi pointed out a significant gap in the statutory framework.

Under the Schedule to the RPwD Act, “acid attack victims” are recognized as persons with specified disabilities. However, the definition referred to persons disfigured due to violent assaults involving the “throwing of acid or similar corrosive substances.” This wording unintentionally excluded victims who were forced to ingest acid or suffered internal injuries without visible external disfigurement.

The Court noted that both Section 326B of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code and Section 124(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 expressly recognize not only the throwing of acid but also the administration of acid by other means as a criminal offence.

Supreme Court’s Observations

The Bench observed that the present wording of the RPwD Act created an artificial distinction between categories of acid attack survivors. The Court specifically noted:

“A plain reading of the above indicates that victims to whom acid has been administered are not encompassed within the expression ‘acid attack victims’.”

The Court further acknowledged that the law’s current emphasis on “disfigurement” improperly restricted the scope of protection:

“Further, the use of the term ‘disfigured’ appears to confine the scope to external disfigurement of the body, thereby excluding cases involving internal injuries or scarring caused by the administration of acid.”

Recognizing the serious implications of such exclusion, the Court adopted a purposive and rights-oriented interpretation of the RPwD Act.

Key Directions Issued by the Court

Pending a formal amendment to the Schedule of the RPwD Act, the Supreme Court directed that:

“for all intents and purposes, and in order to give full effect to the legislative scheme underlying the 2016 Act, the expression ‘acid attack victims’ shall be construed to include victims to whom acid has been administered.”

The Court went further and clarified that the protection would also extend to survivors suffering internal injuries:

“It shall further include those who have suffered internal injuries, irrespective of whether there is any external disfigurement of the body.”

Importantly, the Bench declared that this interpretation would operate retrospectively from the inception of the RPwD Act:

“This clarificatory interpretation shall be deemed to have been incorporated at Serial No. 1A(e) of the Schedule from the inception of the 2016 Act.”

The Court also recorded the submission of the Solicitor General that the concerned Ministry had already initiated steps to formally amend the Schedule to the Act.

Significance of the Judgment

This order is a major step toward a more inclusive and realistic understanding of acid violence under Indian disability law. By recognizing survivors of forced acid ingestion and those with internal injuries, the Supreme Court has ensured that the RPwD Act is interpreted in line with its social welfare and human rights objectives.

The judgment also reinforces an important principle in disability jurisprudence: disability rights protections cannot be denied merely because an injury is not externally visible. Internal injuries, chronic pain, organ damage, and long-term medical consequences can be equally disabling and deserving of legal recognition and support.

The ruling is likely to have a substantial impact on access to disability certificates, reservations, rehabilitation schemes, healthcare benefits, compensation, and social protection measures available to acid attack survivors under the RPwD Act and allied welfare schemes.

At a broader level, the decision reflects the Supreme Court’s continuing move toward purposive interpretation of disability legislation so that statutory benefits are not defeated by narrow or technical readings of definitions. However, we still see that the definition "Acid Attack Victim" It doesn't yet cover the Thermal Burn victims due to throwing of kerosene or petrol or a similar material.

Read the Order/Judgement in Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

Reliance on Outdated Disability Classification Cannot Defeat Right to Employment: Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Candidates with SLD and Mental Illness

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No(s). of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 43728/2025
Case Title: Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 12 March 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 232

In a significant ruling reinforcing the evolving framework of disability rights in public employment, the Supreme Court of India has held that candidates with benchmark disabilities such as Specific Learning Disability (SLD) and mental illness cannot be denied appointment on the basis of outdated identification lists of posts.

The judgment arose from a challenge to the denial of appointment to candidates who had successfully cleared the Combined Graduate Level Examination, 2018 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission for the post of Auditor in the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

Background

The dispute traces back to the recruitment process initiated in 2018. Candidates, including the appellant Sudhanshu Kardam and another candidate, Shri Amit Yadav, had qualified through all stages of the examination and were recommended for appointment under the Persons with Disabilities category.

However, their candidature was rejected by the CAG on the ground that the post of Auditor had not been identified as suitable for persons with mental illness or Specific Learning Disability, relying on the 2013 identification list.

Aggrieved, the candidates relied upon the Gazette Notification dated 4 January 2021 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which updated and expanded the list of identified posts to include these categories of disabilities.

Key Findings of the Court

The Supreme Court took note of the 2021 notification, which superseded the earlier 2013 list and expressly identified Group ‘C’ posts such as Assistant (Audit) and Auditor-II as suitable for persons with benchmark disabilities including mental illness and SLD.

Relying on the affidavit filed by the CAG, the Court recorded that there was no longer any legal or administrative barrier to accommodating the candidates in suitable posts.

Importantly, the Court rejected the continued reliance on outdated classification systems, implicitly affirming that administrative inertia cannot override statutory rights under the RPwD Act.

Directions Issued

The Court issued the following operative directions:

• The Staff Selection Commission was directed to forward the dossiers of the candidates to the CAG within two weeks.

• Upon receipt, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India must consider them for appointment to suitable Group ‘C’ posts.

• If the originally advertised vacancies from 2018 had already been filled, the authorities were directed to create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates.

• The appointments would take effect from the date of joining.

Significance

This ruling is important for several reasons:

1. Dynamic Interpretation of Disability Rights:
   The judgment underscores that identification of posts must reflect current statutory frameworks, particularly the expanded categories introduced under the RPwD Act, 2016.

2. Primacy of Updated Notifications:
   Authorities cannot rely on obsolete identification lists when a subsequent statutory notification has redefined suitability criteria.

3. Substantive Equality in Employment:
   By directing the creation of supernumerary posts, the Court ensured that procedural delays or administrative decisions do not deprive persons with disabilities of their rightful employment opportunities.

4. Recognition of Invisible Disabilities:
   The decision affirms the inclusion of less visible disabilities such as mental illness and Specific Learning Disability within mainstream public employment.

Commentary

The judgment is a clear message that the promise of reservation and inclusion under the RPwD Act cannot be diluted by outdated bureaucratic practices. It aligns with a rights-based approach where identification of posts is not a static exercise but one that must evolve with law and policy.

For disability rights jurisprudence, this decision strengthens the principle that eligibility once recognized by law must translate into actual access to employment, and that the State carries a positive obligation to remove institutional barriers—even if that requires creation of additional posts.

Read the Judgement (PDF 204 KB)

Menstrual Dignity is a Fundamental Right: Supreme Court on MHM in Schools

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1000 of 2022
Case Title: Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors. [PDF 786 KB]
Date of Judgment: 30 January 2026

Background

The petition, filed by Dr. Jaya Thakur, brought to the fore a persistent but under-acknowledged barrier to girls’ education — the absence of menstrual hygiene management (MHM) facilities in schools. The petitioner pointed out that lack of access to sanitary products, private functional toilets, water, and safe disposal mechanisms was leading to absenteeism and, in many cases, girls quietly dropping out of school.

The plea invited the Court to view menstrual health not merely as a matter of policy preference but as a question of constitutional rights.

Key Observations

The Supreme Court located menstrual health squarely within the guarantees of life, dignity, equality, privacy and education. The Bench emphasised that dignity must be experienced in everyday conditions and not remain a constitutional slogan. For menstruating students, the absence of facilities often translates into stigma, embarrassment, and exclusion.

The Court recognised that “period poverty” directly undermines equal access to education. Compelling a girl to miss school or manage menstruation in unsafe ways was held to be a violation of bodily autonomy and privacy. The judgment also noted that autonomy is meaningful only when supported by enabling conditions — functional toilets, water, menstrual products, and hygienic disposal.

Importantly, the Court acknowledged the social dimension of menstruation. It underlined the need to sensitise male teachers and students to normalise conversations around menstruation and prevent harassment or intrusive questioning.

Directions Issued

Through a continuing mandamus, the Court directed States and Union Territories to:

• Provide functional, gender-segregated toilets in all schools, government and private, in both rural and urban areas.

• Ensure toilets are hygienic, have water supply, and safeguard privacy.

• Make oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins available free of cost, preferably through vending machines located within toilet premises.

• Set up designated MHM corners with emergency supplies such as spare uniforms, innerwear and disposal bags.

• Install safe and environmentally compliant disposal systems, including covered bins or incinerators.

• Educate and sensitise male staff and students about menstruation.

The Court also linked compliance to the Right to Education Act. Government schools failing to meet Section 19 norms may invite accountability, while private schools risk de-recognition for non-compliance.

Commentary

This judgment is significant for reframing menstrual health from a welfare measure to a rights-based entitlement. By rooting MHM in Articles 14 and 21, the Court has made the issue justiciable and enforceable.

For the disability rights community, the ruling carries an added layer of importance. The Court’s insistence on privacy, functional infrastructure, and barrier-free access implicitly includes girls with disabilities, who often face compounded exclusion. Accessible toilets, water availability, and dignified spaces are not optional extras but constitutional necessities.

The decision also signals a broader judicial trend: recognising that exclusion in education often happens through design failures and social silence rather than formal denial. Addressing menstruation with candour and constitutional seriousness is a step toward substantive equality in schools. In effect, the Court has said what many girls already knew from lived experience — education cannot be equal if dignity is conditional.

While the judgment speaks in the language of all menstruating students, its implications are particularly profound for girls with disabilities — a group whose experiences around menstruation are rarely centred in policy or law. For many girls with disabilities, menstruation is not only a matter of hygiene but also of accessibility, support, and autonomy.

Girls with locomotor disabilities often encounter toilets that are technically “separate” but not usable — narrow doors, high thresholds, inaccessible taps, or disposal units placed beyond reach. For girls with visual disabilities, poorly designed facilities without tactile cues or consistent layouts can make independent menstrual management difficult. Girls with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities frequently face over-medicalisation, stigma, or denial of information about their own bodies. In some instances, families and institutions resort to restrictive practices out of fear or lack of support systems.

Against this backdrop, the Court’s insistence on dignity, privacy, and enabling conditions becomes highly relevant. When the Bench states that autonomy can only be exercised where infrastructure and resources exist, it indirectly affirms what disability rights advocates have long argued — that bodily autonomy is inseparable from accessible environments.

The reference to barrier-free access under the RTE norms is particularly important. If implemented in its true spirit, this could mean toilets that are accessible, safe, and usable for girls with diverse disabilities. MHM corners, if thoughtfully designed, could include accessible storage, clear signage, and support materials in multiple formats. Sensitisation of teachers and students can also reduce the infantilisation and silence that many girls with disabilities face around menstruation.

This ruling therefore opens a door. It allows future advocacy to explicitly demand disability-inclusive menstrual health frameworks within schools. The judgment may not detail these dimensions, but its rights-based reasoning readily accommodates them.

Menstrual dignity, for girls with disabilities, is not a peripheral concern. It sits at the intersection of education, health, accessibility, and gender justice. The real test now lies in whether implementation will recognise this intersectionality. If it does, the judgment could quietly become a turning point for some of the most marginalised students in the school system.

Read the judgement 

Why Are Disabled Persons Who Make Open Category Cut-Off Not Treated as General Candidates? Supreme Court Asks Centre

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta

Case Title:  Reena Banerjee and Another vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others (I.A. No(s). 130117 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No(s). 11938 of 2016  with

Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 116/1998 
Date of Judgment: September 12, 2025
Law:  Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (Section 34)

Case Summary

On September 12, 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment reinforcing disability rights under the constitutional framework and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPWD Act). The Court intervened on two distinct but connected issues:

1. Upward Movement in Merit Lists for Persons with Disabilities (PWD)
   The Court expressed grave concern over the systemic denial of upward movement in the merit list for PWD candidates in public employment and education recruitment. Despite scoring above the general (unreserved) category cut-off, PWD candidates are treated only as reserved category candidates. This practice leads to lower-scoring PWD candidates occupying reserved seats, which the Court rightly described as "hostile discrimination." The Court directed the Central Government to explain by October 14, 2025, the steps taken to ensure that meritorious candidates are not denied upward movement and that the same principle applies to promotions as well.

2. Project Ability Empowerment: Nationwide Monitoring of Care Institutions
   The Court initiated a comprehensive, independent, nationwide monitoring framework named Project Ability Empowerment. This follows decades of systemic neglect in state-run and private institutions housing persons with cognitive disabilities. The goal is to ensure effective implementation of the RPWD Act, safeguard constitutional rights, and shift away from institutionalisation toward community-based, inclusive models of care.

Key Directions and Distinct Aspects of the Judgment

1. Resident Profiling, Care and Rehabilitation

• Individualized profiling of every resident, including age, gender, disability profile, medical history, education level, vocational skills, and psychosocial needs.
• Creation of Individual Care Plans aligned with best practices to facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.
• Assessment of healthcare access, periodic review of psychiatric prescriptions, and establishment of multidisciplinary care teams.

2. Accessibility, Infrastructure, and Education

• In-depth audits of physical accessibility aligned with the Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility.
• Evaluation of accessible transport, assistive technologies, and communication formats.
• Assessment of access to education for children and vocational training for adults, including institutional support for the National Institute of Open Schooling.

3. Rights, Protection, and Compliance

• Examination of grievance redressal mechanisms, institutional policies, and participatory governance structures.
• Review of use of restraints and behaviour management policies.
• Monitoring compliance with the RPWD Act and the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, including appointment of protection officers and institution registration.

4. Staffing, Resources, and Accountability

• Analysis of staffing strength, qualifications, training, and remuneration.
• Review of institutional record-keeping, transparency mechanisms, and responsiveness to Right to Information (RTI) applications.

5. Documentation and Welfare Access

• Recommendations for maintaining an online presence of institutions with an institutional dashboard containing essential functioning information.
• Facilitation of Aadhaar enrollment for every resident to ensure access to welfare schemes.

6. Reservation under Section 34 of the RPWD Act

• Strong emphasis on a positive and purposive interpretation of the reservation provisions.
• Recognition that disability is not homogeneous, requiring nuanced application of affirmative action.
• Mandate that meritorious PWD candidates should benefit from upward movement, leaving reserved seats for those with greater structural disadvantage.

Implications

This judgment marks a watershed moment in disability rights jurisprudence in India. It firmly rejects outdated medical and charitable paradigms of disability in favour of a rights-based, inclusive constitutional vision. The Court highlighted that reasonable accommodation is not charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The involvement of eight National Law Universities, regionalised across India, introduces a systematic, independent monitoring mechanism. The report due in March 2026 will present a data-driven, actionable pathway toward systemic reforms, including transition from institutional care to community living.

By addressing both affirmative action in public recruitment and the quality of institutional care, the Supreme Court affirmed that the true and substantive benefit of disability reservations and welfare must reach the most marginalized.

Read the judgement dated 12 Sep 2025 here

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For further detailed updates on disability rights and authoritative case summaries, visit disabilityrightsindia.com.

Supreme Court Issues Landmark Guidelines on Rights of Prisoners with Disabilities, calls it "The Muruganantham Doctrine"

Court: The Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan

Case No.: SLP(C) NO. 1785 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP(C) 1785 of 2023)
Case Title: L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others
Citation: 2025 INSC 844
Date of Judgment: July 15, 2025 

Precedents Cited

• Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 – Arrest guidelines violated; factual foundation for compensation.
• Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 12 SCR 311 – Recognised denial of reasonable accommodation as discrimination under Art. 14/21; Court extends principle to prisons.
• Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 4 SCR 638 – Human-rights-based approach to disability; influences Court’s interpretive stance.
• Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons (2017) 10 SCC 658 – Framework of prison reforms adopted and expanded.
• Rama Murthy v. State Of Karnataka (1997) 2 SCC 642 – Need for an All-India Jail Manual and recognition of prisoners’ double handicap (ill-health and incarceration).
• People’s Watch v. Home Secretary, TN (2023) 2 MLJ 478 – Emphasised visitorial oversight; its directives were “re-emphasised”.
• International Instruments: UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD); UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules).

Overview:

This case highlights the critical need for systemic reforms in Indian prisons to ensure the rights and dignity of prisoners with disabilities. The appellant, L. Muruganantham, a physically challenged advocate with Becker Muscular Dystrophy, autism, and mental illness, was illegally arrested and incarcerated. He alleged that during his custody, he was denied proper food, medical treatment, and accessible facilities, leading to a deterioration of his health.

Issues Before the Court

1. What constitutes “reasonable accommodation” for prisoners with disabilities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act)?
2. Do infrastructural or administrative shortcomings in prisons amount to human rights violations requiring compensation?
3. What structural reforms are constitutionally necessary to safeguard dignity and equality of prisoners with disabilities?

Factual Background and Journey Through Courts:

• Illegal Arrest and Harassment: The appellant was falsely implicated in a criminal case and illegally arrested by Respondent No. 2 (police officer) at the behest of his paternal uncle.
• Incarceration and Alleged Neglect: During his incarceration from February 29, 2020, to March 10, 2020, at Central Prison, Coimbatore, the appellant alleged denial of essential support, including physiotherapy, psychotherapy, protein-rich food, and accessible sanitation facilities. He claimed this aggravated his physical and mental health conditions.
• SHRC Proceedings: The appellant filed a complaint with the SHRC, seeking compensation and action against officials. The SHRC awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- compensation and recommended disciplinary action against Respondent No. 2, but dismissed the complaint against the prison authorities (Respondent No. 3), finding no specific human rights violation attributable to them.
• High Court Proceedings: Aggrieved by the SHRC's limited relief, the appellant filed a writ petition. The High Court partly allowed his petition, enhancing the compensation to Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs. 4,00,000/- from the State and Rs. 1,00,000/- recoverable from Respondent No. 2) and awarding Rs. 25,000/- in costs. However, it upheld the dismissal of the complaint against the prison authorities, stating that while the arrest was a human rights violation, the non-provision of certain amenities during a short incarceration period did not amount to a "serious Human Rights violation" by jail authorities.
• Supreme Court's Findings:
  • The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of illegal arrest and harassment.
  • It found the enhanced compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to be "fair, just, and reasonable," noting that while the appellant did not receive certain appropriate medical and dietary facilities, this stemmed from "institutional limitations" rather than "deliberate neglect or malice" by prison authorities. Thus, these shortcomings did not, "per se, amount to a violation of human rights attributable to the jail authorities."
  • However, the Court expressed "deep concern" over the systemic neglect of incarcerated individuals with disabilities and emphasized the urgent need for comprehensive prison reforms.

Key Takeaways 

This Supreme Court judgment, while affirming existing compensation, serves as a landmark directive for advancing disability rights within the Indian carceral system. Here are the key takeaways for our blog:

1. Reinforcing the Right to Dignity and Accessibility in Prisons: The Court unequivocally states that "Lawful incarceration does not suspend the right to human dignity." It stresses that failure to provide reasonable accommodations and basic care to disabled prisoners is not merely an administrative lapse but a violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and breaches the RPwD Act, 2016, and UNCRPD.
2. Beyond "Deliberate Neglect": Systemic Failure as a Violation: While the Court didn't attribute "human rights violation" to prison authorities in this specific instance due to lack of "deliberate neglect," it highlighted "institutional limitations" as the root cause. This implicitly recognizes that systemic failures leading to deprivation of rights for disabled prisoners are unacceptable and necessitate immediate attention.
3. Mandatory Healthcare and Assistive Devices: The judgment reiterates that persons with disabilities in custody must receive healthcare "equivalent to that available in the general community," including physiotherapy, speech therapy, psychiatric care, and assistive devices. This is a crucial affirmation of their right to comprehensive medical support, explicitly stating that "Logistical or financial limitations cannot be cited to justify a withdrawal of this obligation."
4. Comprehensive Directives for Prison Reforms: The Supreme Court has issued 15 comprehensive, "immediate and time-bound" directives covering:
   • Identification and Information: Prompt identification of disabled prisoners and provision of information in accessible formats.
   • Infrastructure Accessibility: Mandating wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible toilets, ramps, and sensory-safe environments.
   • Therapeutic Services: Dedicated spaces for physiotherapy, psychotherapy, and other therapeutic services.
   • Audits and Compliance: State-level access audits and compliance with accessibility guidelines (Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India – 2021).
   • Training and Sensitization: Comprehensive training for all prison staff and medical officers on disability rights, appropriate handling, and non-discrimination.
   • Dietary Needs: Provision of nutritious and medically appropriate diets tailored to individual needs.
   • Manual Review and Amendment: Review and amendment of the State Prison Manual to conform with the RPwD Act and UNCRPD, prohibiting discrimination and promoting reasonable accommodation.
   • Data Collection and Transparency: Maintenance and public dissemination of disaggregated data on disability status, accessibility, and accommodations (compliance with Article 31 UNCRPD).
   • Consultation and Monitoring: Periodic consultations with civil society organizations and constitution of monitoring committees.
5. Emphasis on International Standards: The judgment frequently references the UNCRPD and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), reinforcing India's commitment to international human rights standards for incarcerated persons with disabilities.
6. Accountability and Public Interest: The Court emphasizes that these directions are "in the larger public interest to uphold the dignity, and healthcare rights of prisoners with disabilities in all custodial settings," underscoring the State's "constitutional and moral obligation." The requirement for compliance reports to the State Human Rights Commission every three months ensures a mechanism for accountability.

This judgment provides a strong judicial push for a "systemic transformation" towards a "humane and just carceral system" that affirms the rights and provides necessary care for the rehabilitation of prisoners with disabilities. It sets a clear roadmap for state governments to implement the RPwD Act and international obligations effectively within their prison systems.

Read the judgement in L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others embedded below:

Supreme Court issues directions to make the process of Digital KYC accessible for persons With disabilities, declares it an integral part of fundamental right under Article 21

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan 

Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 289/2024 & W.P.(C) No. 49/2025

Case Title: Pragya Prasun v. Union of India & Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Judgement: 30 April 2025

Published on: May 1, 2025
By: Disability Rights India Team

Background

The proceedings before the Supreme Court arose from writ petitions filed by persons with disabilities highlighting accessibility barriers in the digital KYC and e-KYC verification processes used by several financial institutions, telecommunications providers and other service platforms. The petitioners argued that the design and functioning of these digital verification systems prevented persons with visual impairments and facial disfigurements from independently completing identity verification procedures.

According to the petitioners, many digital KYC mechanisms relied on technological requirements such as capturing live photographs, facial recognition and other verification steps that were not compatible with the needs of persons using assistive technologies. These systems often required actions such as blinking or visually aligning documents, which created significant barriers for persons with blindness or severe eye injuries.

The petitioners contended that such barriers effectively excluded persons with disabilities from accessing essential services including banking facilities, telecommunications connections and other digital governance platforms. They argued that this failure violated the obligations imposed on public authorities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which requires government institutions and regulated entities to ensure accessibility in information and communication technologies.

In a historic and far-reaching judgment delivered on April 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of India declared that the right to digital access is an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. This precedent-setting decision is a major milestone in the struggle for disability rights in India, specifically addressing the systemic digital exclusion faced by persons with disabilities (PwDs), especially those with visual impairments and facial disfigurements.

The judgment was delivered in two writ petitions:
Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 289/2024 and Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 49/2025  —filed by advocates and disability rights activists seeking digital accessibility in the e-KYC process for individuals with blindness and acid attack survivors.

Key Directions Issued by the Court

A two-judge bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan issued 20 binding directions that mark a significant overhaul of the digital architecture for service delivery, with inclusivity and accessibility at the center.

Here are some of the landmark directives:

Digital KYC Must Be Inclusive

• The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) must issue new guidelines that incorporate alternative methods to verify "liveness" or live photographs, moving beyond the default “blinking of eyes” method.
• Entities must now accept thumb impressions as valid authentication for visually impaired users during the e-KYC process.

Right to Reasonable Accommodation

• All reporting entities (REs), whether public or private, are directed to adhere to accessibility standards, appoint digital accessibility nodal officers, and undergo periodic audits by certified professionals.
• All apps, websites, and platforms must involve persons with visual impairments in user acceptance testing for any new digital service.

Mandatory Accessibility for Government and Private Services

• All government websites and digital services must comply with Section 46 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016, which mandates both electronic and print media be accessible.
• WCAG 2.1 and Guidelines for Indian Government Websites (GIGW) are now mandatory for all government platforms.

Communication and Service Delivery

• Public services must provide information in alternative formats—including Braille, easy-to-read formats, and audio-described content.
• Helplines, grievance redressal mechanisms, and human review of rejected KYC applications must be set up for PwDs.

Sensitization and Training

• Disability awareness and inclusion modules must be part of training for employees of all regulated entities.
• RBI is directed to monitor implementation and regularly conduct public awareness campaigns about inclusive KYC processes.

A Game-Changer for Digital Equality

This judgment unequivocally affirms that access to digital services is no longer a privilege—but a constitutional right, especially for persons with disabilities who have been persistently side-lined in India’s digital revolution. The Court has not only addressed the how (mechanisms and guidelines) but also the why—the deep need to treat persons with disabilities as equal citizens entitled to dignity, convenience, and autonomy.

This move will have far-reaching consequences across all sectors—from banking and governance to education and healthcare. It is a wake-up call to both government and private entities that accessibility is not an afterthought—it is a non-negotiable obligation under the law.

Next Steps and Accountability

As disability rights advocates, it is now essential to monitor the implementation of these directions and hold entities accountable. Civil society must collaborate with regulators, tech developers, and service providers to translate these orders into practice on the ground.

The judgment reinforces the principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and aligns with the Accessible India Campaign. It is now up to us—activists, organizations, and allies—to ensure that these rights are not just declared but delivered.

Download/Read the judgement 

All Disabilities Must Get Equal Treatment: Supreme Court Strikes Down Discriminatory Retirement Policy

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan

Case Title: Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr. 

Case No.: Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).1091-1092/2023

Date of Judgement: 03 April 2025

Brief

In a landmark judgment reinforcing the principle of equality for persons with disabilities, the Supreme Court has ruled that prescribing different retirement ages based on the type of disability amounts to unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that all benchmark disabilities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) constitute a single homogenous class for the purposes of service-related benefits—and must be treated equally.

Case Background:

The case arose when Kashmiri Lal Sharma, an electrician with 60% locomotor disability, was compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board. However, under an Office Memorandum (OM) dated March 29, 2013, employees with visual impairments were permitted to serve up to 60 years of age. Aggrieved by this differential treatment, the appellant challenged the policy as arbitrary and discriminatory, invoking both the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and the RPwD Act, 2016.

After unsuccessful representations before the State Administrative Tribunal and the Himachal Pradesh High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Ruling:

A Bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan ruled in the appellant’s favour. The Court struck down the impugned policy, declaring that prescribing different retirement ages solely based on the nature of disability lacks any rational basis and violates Article 14.

“There is no intelligible differentia to justify extending the retirement age benefit to only one category of benchmark disability while denying it to others. Such discrimination is arbitrary,” the Court observed.

The Court emphasized that all benchmark disabilities listed under the 1995 and 2016 disability laws must receive uniform service benefits, including retirement age.

Reference to Precedent:

The Bench relied on its earlier approval of the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014), which also upheld the principle of parity in service benefits across all recognized disability categories.

Relief Granted:

While the State had later withdrawn the 2013 OM on November 4, 2019, the Court held that the appellant had a legitimate expectation to continue in service until that withdrawal. As a result, the Court ruled:

“The appellant shall be entitled to the benefit of continuance in service until 04.11.2019. He is also entitled to full wages from 01.10.2018 to 04.11.2019, along with all consequential benefits impacting his pension.”

The Court thus partly allowed the appeal and set aside the Himachal Pradesh High Court’s decision dated 28.07.2021, which had earlier upheld the retirement.

Significance:

This judgment is a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory mandate of non-discrimination in employment policies affecting persons with disabilities. It sends a strong message that disability-based classifications in service benefits must meet the test of reasonableness and equality.

The decision underscores the spirit of the RPwD Act, which aims to ensure equal opportunity, protection of rights, and full participation of persons with disabilities in all spheres of life—including public employment.

Read the Judgement

Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr.