Showing posts with label Section 20 of RPWD Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Section 20 of RPWD Act. Show all posts

Monday, July 13, 2026

Supreme Court Reaffirms Duty to Accommodate Employees Acquiring Disabilities: CRPF Constable Awarded ₹1.25 Crore Compensation

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih
Case: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 689
Date of Judgment: 13 July 2026

In a landmark judgment reaffirming the right of employees who acquire disabilities during service to continue in employment with dignity, the Supreme Court has dismissed the Union Government's appeal against a visually impaired CRPF constable and upheld the statutory protection contained in Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“PwD Act”). The Court awarded the respondent, Bali Ram, a consolidated compensation of ₹1.25 crore towards back wages, interest and litigation costs.

The judgment is significant not merely for the relief granted to an individual constable who was unlawfully invalidated from service nearly three decades ago, but for its emphatic reiteration that government employers are under a positive obligation to accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Facts of the Case

Bali Ram joined the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as a Constable (Driver) in 1985 after being found medically fit. In 1996, while in service, he developed an ophthalmic condition diagnosed as Disseminated Choroiditis with retinal atrophic patches and macular involvement, resulting in complete blindness in his left eye and partial impairment in his right eye.

Following medical examinations, the Departmental Rehabilitation Board declared him unfit for driving and combatant duties. Subsequently, the Medical Board at the CRPF Base Hospital in Hyderabad concluded that he was permanently incapacitated and unfit for further service in any capacity within the force.

On 11 March 1998, Bali Ram was medically invalidated from service. His subsequent representations seeking redress were rejected, with the authorities taking the position that his disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by service and that he was entitled only to a lump-sum payment of ₹15,000 under the applicable rules.

Aggrieved, Bali Ram approached the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

High Court's Intervention

The Single Judge of the High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, held that the CRPF had acted in violation of Section 47 of the PwD Act. The Court quashed the order of invalidation and directed that Bali Ram be deemed to have remained in service with all consequential benefits.

The Division Bench affirmed the decision in 2014, rejecting the CRPF's appeal.

The Union of India then carried the matter to the Supreme Court.

Section 47: A Mandatory Obligation, Not a Matter of Choice

At the heart of the case lay Section 47 of the PwD Act, which prohibits an establishment from dispensing with the services of an employee who acquires a disability during service. If the employee becomes unsuitable for the post he occupies, the employer must shift him to another post carrying the same pay and service benefits or retain him on a supernumerary post until retirement.

Reiterating the principles laid down in Kunal Singh, the Supreme Court observed:

“The duty imposed by the PwD Act being mandatory and not discretionary, the law did not leave the appellants with an option to discharge their duty at their convenience. Appellants were required to find a chair for the respondent, and not wait for the respondent to beg for one.”

The Court held that Section 47 imposes a positive duty upon the employer to identify suitable alternative employment and that the obligation cannot be shifted onto the employee.

Relief Beyond Pleadings: A Significant Pronouncement

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the Court's discussion on whether constitutional courts can grant relief that has not been specifically sought.

The Supreme Court noted that Bali Ram had originally sought invalid pension and related benefits and had not expressly invoked Section 47. Nevertheless, the High Court had granted him broader relief. The Supreme Court upheld this approach and laid down an important principle:

“Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.”

The Court held that where the record clearly demonstrates that a litigant is entitled to wider relief, and denial of such relief would perpetuate injustice merely because of defective pleadings or inadequate legal assistance, constitutional courts may mould relief appropriately.

This part of the judgment will have implications extending far beyond disability jurisprudence.

Waiver of Disability Rights Rejected

The Union Government argued that Bali Ram had waived his right under Section 47 because he had accepted pensionary benefits and had never specifically sought reinstatement.

Rejecting the argument, the Court held that waiver requires conscious and informed relinquishment of a known right. Since there was no evidence that Bali Ram was ever informed of his statutory rights under the PwD Act, the plea of waiver was untenable.

The Court also observed that waiver of statutory rights under welfare legislation is generally disfavoured.

Exemption Notification Could Not Operate Retrospectively

The Union further relied upon a notification dated 10 September 2002 exempting combatant personnel of the Central Para Military Forces from the operation of Section 47.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument outright. It held that the notification was prospective and could not validate an action that had already become illegal in 1998.

The Court observed:

“The right of the respondent crystallised on the date of ouster; and a later exemption from the statutory mandate cannot efface the breach already committed.”

Importantly, the Court noted that the very issuance of the exemption notification in 2002 demonstrated that the Central Government itself recognised that Section 47 fully applied to the CRPF between 1995 and 2002.

A Sharp Rebuke to the CRPF

The judgment contains unusually strong observations regarding the conduct of the CRPF.

The Bench remarked:

“By not offering alternate posting, the appellants failed in their role as a model employer and converted a welfare provision into a dead letter.”

It further expressed surprise that an instrumentality of the State functioning under the Ministry of Home Affairs could ignore statutory protections available to persons with disabilities.

The Court categorically rejected the argument that disability protection applies only where disability is attributable to service:

“Parliament did not limit Section 47 to disabilities attributable to service; the protection is unqualified and unconditional.”

The focus, the Court held, must be on accommodation rather than exclusion.

Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement

The Court noted that Bali Ram had already crossed the age of superannuation and that reinstatement was therefore no longer possible. By the Court's own calculation, he would have received over ₹82 lakh in salary and allowances had he remained in service.

Recognising that Bali Ram had spent nearly three decades outside employment and had suffered economic hardship despite obtaining a favourable High Court judgment in 2008, the Court held:

“The situation of non-employment of the respondent is entirely the appellants’ creation.”

The Supreme Court consequently modified the High Court's order and awarded him ₹1.25 crore, inclusive of back wages, interest and costs, payable within eight weeks.

The Court also directed the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority or the District Legal Services Authority, Kangra, to assist the visually impaired respondent in safely investing the compensation and attending to his future medical needs.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment strengthens disability rights jurisprudence in at least four important ways.

First, it reiterates that Section 47 of the 1995 Act—and its successor provision, Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—creates a mandatory duty to retain and accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Second, it recognises reasonable accommodation as a constitutional imperative flowing from substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21. The Court expressly relied on Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India to underline that disability is socially constructed and that exclusion results from the failure to create enabling conditions.

Third, it rejects procedural technicalities and the doctrine of waiver as tools to defeat welfare legislation.

Finally, the judgment sends a clear message that public employers cannot evade their responsibilities by citing administrative inconvenience or belated exemption notifications.

For persons with disabilities and their advocates, Union of India v. Bali Ram is a powerful reminder that the law requires the State not merely to refrain from discrimination, but to actively create space for inclusion. The Supreme Court's observation that employers must “find a chair” for an employee who acquires a disability may well become one of the defining statements in India's disability rights jurisprudence.

Download the judgement in: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015, decided on 13 July 2026.


Friday, December 19, 2025

Acquired Disability Not a Ground to Push Employees Out of Service: P&H High Court

Court: Punjab & Haryana High Court
Bench: Justice Sandeep Moudgil
Case No.: CWP-31286-2024
Case Title: Brij Bhushan v. State of Haryana & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 19 December 2025
Cases Referred: Kunal Singh v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 524; Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (2025)

In a significant reaffirmation of the rights of employees acquiring disability during service, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that denying service protection on account of disability strikes at the very foundation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The Court emphasised that such an approach not only violates statutory protections but also erodes human dignity.

Background

The petitioner, a long-serving employee of Haryana Roadways, was initially appointed in 1986 and later promoted as a Painter. During his service, he suffered a brain haemorrhage and was assessed with 70% disability by a competent medical authority, rendering him unable to perform his original duties.

Invoking Section 20 of the RPwD Act, he sought retention in service on a supernumerary or suitable alternative post with full service benefits until superannuation. Despite a legal notice and earlier directions, the authorities rejected his claim on the ground that his disability was not “permanent” and further initiated disciplinary proceedings alleging unauthorised absence.

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court challenging both the rejection order and the charge-sheet.

Key Issues

  • Whether an employee acquiring disability during service can be denied protection due to absence of a “permanent” disability certificate
  • Scope and application of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016
  • Legality of disciplinary action in the context of disability-related absence

Court’s Analysis

The Court rejected the State’s narrow interpretation of disability certification. It held that the petitioner clearly fell within the statutory definition of a “person with disability,” given the extent of functional limitations affecting his ability to work and perform daily activities.

Importantly, the Court noted that the disability certificate—valid up to 2029—covered the remaining period of the petitioner’s service, making the distinction between “temporary” and “permanent” disability irrelevant in the facts of the case.

Reiterating the mandate of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, the Court underscored that:

  • An employee acquiring disability cannot be removed, reduced in rank, or denied promotion
  • If unable to perform existing duties, the employee must be shifted to a suitable post
  • Where no such post exists, the employee must be retained on a supernumerary post with full benefits

The Court also drew upon Supreme Court jurisprudence to reinforce that reasonable accommodation is not discretionary but a legal obligation flowing from constitutional principles of equality and dignity.

Observations on State as a Model Employer

In a strongly worded observation, the Court held that public authorities must act with sensitivity and responsibility when dealing with employees who acquire disabilities during service. It cautioned against bureaucratic rigidity and emphasised that institutional responses must prioritise inclusion over exclusion.

The judgment highlights that beneficial legislation like the RPwD Act must be interpreted purposively, ensuring that employees are not pushed out of service due to circumstances beyond their control.

Decision

Allowing the petition, the Court:

  • Quashed the rejection order and the charge-sheet
  • Directed the State to retain the petitioner on a supernumerary or suitable post
  • Ensured continuity of service, full salary, and all consequential benefits
  • Ordered payment of arrears with interest
  • Directed that the period of absence due to disability be treated as duty

Commentary

This judgment is a crucial addition to the growing body of jurisprudence reinforcing employment security for persons who acquire disabilities during service. It decisively rejects technical objections—such as the nature of disability certification—that are often used to deny statutory protections.

The ruling aligns with earlier Supreme Court precedents and strengthens the principle that reasonable accommodation and service continuity are enforceable rights, not administrative concessions.

For disability rights practitioners, the judgment is particularly important in addressing a recurring issue: the misuse of procedural or certification-based grounds to dilute the protections under Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

At a broader level, the decision reiterates that the State’s role as a model employer must be measured not by formal compliance, but by its commitment to dignity, inclusion, and substantive equality.

Read the Judgement (PDF 140 KB)


Tuesday, January 7, 2025

Madras High Court Upholds Rights of Policeman Acquiring Disability, Orders Reinstatement

Court: Madras High Court, Madurai Bench

Bench: Justice R.VIJAYAKUMAR

Case No. W.P.(MD)No. 26560 of 2024

Case title: Ganesan   Vs. The Commandant, Tamil Nadu Special Police Force

Date of Judgement: 07 January 2025

Brief Summary

In a landmark judgment reinforcing disability rights in India, the Madras High Court has ordered the reinstatement of a visually impaired policeman who acquired his disability during service. Justice R. Vijayakumar, presiding over the Single-Judge Bench, ruled that the Tamil Nadu Special Police Force Nayak, discharged from service on medical grounds, must be reinstated with alternative employment and pay protection, as mandated by Section 20(4) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

Case Background

The petitioner, initially appointed as a Police Constable in 2010, sustained severe injuries to his head and eyes during election duty. Following the accident, his vision deteriorated, prompting his reassignment to light duty, which he performed for a decade. Despite his promotion to Nayak, a Medical Board later declared him completely unfit for service, leading to his discharge and eviction from government quarters.

Court’s Observations

The Bench noted that Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act prohibits the termination of employees who acquire disabilities during service and mandates their reassignment to suitable roles. The Police Department failed to provide evidence of exemption from this provision. The Court emphasized that the law applies to uniformed services, and the petitioner must be offered alternative employment with pay protection.

Judgment

The Court quashed the discharge order and directed the Police Department to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service, pay protection, and an alternative light-duty role.

This judgment underscores the commitment of Indian courts to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities, ensuring dignity, equal opportunity, and protection under the law.

Read or Download judgement: Ganesan v. The Commandant (W.P.(MD) No. 26560 of 2024)

Tuesday, August 2, 2022

Triputa HC: Employer's Failure To Meet Needs Of Disabled Persons Breaches Norms of "Reasonable Accommodation" [Judgement included]

Court: Tripura High Court, Agartala, India

Bench/Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arindam Lodh

Case Title:   WP(C) 694 of 2020 | Sri Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl v. Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited (TSECL) and Ors.

Date of Judgement:  01 Aug 2022

Cases Referred/quoted : Vikash Kumar Vrs. Union Pulbic Service Commission & Ors., (2021) 5 SCC 370. 

The case in brief

The petitioner was an employee of Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited. During the course of performing his duties, he met with an accident which rendered him disabled. He was not paid salary by the Corporation because he could not perform the duties he owed to the Corporation as their employee, though he was willing to join and perform duties which would be commensurate with his disability.

The Tripura High Court observed that employers must "reasonably accommodate" persons with disabiliteis into service and that failure to do so violates their rights under  The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The Court also refered to Secction 47 of the Persons with Disabilties  Act 1995 (now repealed) and a DoPT Memorandum dated 25 Feb 2015 on subject "Amendment to Central Civil Service (Leave) Rules, 1972 - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (PWD Act, 1995)- regarding" and  expressed that the aforesaid memorandum dated 25th February, 2015 was further reviewed in the year 2016 where the rights of persons with disabilities were not in any way diluted rather expanded the rights of such persons. It mandates that the State-employer must create conditions in which the barriers posed by disability can be overcome.

It is pertinent to note that the protections available under Secction 47 of the PWD Act 1995 have been contined in Section 20(4) of the RPWD Act 2016 as below:

"20. Non-discrimination in employment. - (1) No Government establishment shall discriminate against any person with disability in any matter relating to employment:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.

(2) Every Government establishment shall provide reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free and conducive environment to employees with disability.

(3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability.

(4) No Government establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his or her service:

Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

(5) The appropriate Government may frame policies for posting and transfer of employees with disabilities."


The single bench presided by Mr. Justice Arindam Lodh in his order remarked,  "The conduct of the concerned officer is not in consonance with the object the legislatures wanted to achieve. Keeping in mind the objectives of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the respondents should realize the challenge the petitioner has been facing and accommodate him with humane approach. Any failure to meet the needs of disabled person will definitely breach the norms of reasonable accommodation."

It is the case of the petitioner that while the petitioner was discharging his duties he suffered an accident and out of that accident, he became disabled. Due to such disability, he could not attend his duties. It is the contention of the respondents that the salary of the petitioner was duly paid upto 16.03.2020. Thereafter, no salary was paid to the petitioner though he was all along willing to join to perform his duties commensurate to his disability. From the report of the Standing Medical Board, it is clear that the petitioner was not in a position to perform his official and field level activities which may work out throughout the State. In spite of that report, the petitioner was not paid his due salary and other allowances treating his absence from duty as unauthorized.

Court noted that a plea has been taken that the respondents did not accept his joining report or leave application as he did not report to the joining authority in person. He expressed his willingness to join his duties by submitting an application to the authority concerned. But it was refused on the pretext that the petitioner was not physically appeared before the concerned authority which is not at all expected. The conduct of the concerned officer is not in consonance with the object the legislatures wanted to achieve.

Keeping in view the above objective, the court directed the respondents to "reasonably accommodate" the petitioner and passed the folloiwng order:

"(i) the respondents are to pay all the cumulative dues such as salary, allowances, etc. which were payable to the petitioner under his service conditions within a period of three month from today;

(ii) the salary and allowances payable to the petitioner shall be released from this month and regularize his service conditions by way of recalling all the earlier orders passed by TSECL treating his absence from duty as unauthorized absence. Those unauthorized absence period, according to the TSECL, shall be regularized and that would not have any bearing to the service of the petitioner;
 
(iii) if it is found that the petitioner is eligible to perform his duty, then, he may be permitted to undertake such duties. Further, if the petitioner is found to be unfit to perform the nature of duties, which he was performing before being disabled, then, he should be assigned/adjusted with such suitable duties which he would be able to discharge;

(iv) if the petitioner is found incapable of performing any kind of duties, then, the respondents are under obligation and shall pay all service benefits including the promotion to the petitioner by creating a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation;

(v) the respondents shall utilize capacity of the petitioner by providing and environment around him and ensure reasonable accommodation by way of making appropriate modifications and adjustments in the spirit of the discussions and observations made here-inabove;

(vi) the petitioner shall appear before the constituted Medical Board of the State Government within 7 (seven) days from today. The Medical Board shall examine and issue necessary certificate mentioning the extent of his disability in consonance with the RPwD Act; and

(vii) it is not advisable to send the petitioner to the Medical Board time and again."


What is missed in this judgement.

The judgement though extends relief to the petitioner, it  adopts some very poor legal reasoning for the relief provided.

Firstly, the judgement fails to appropriately explain the “reasonable accommodation” & its relation to the employment rules. In fact there was no reference needed to be made with reasonable accommodation since the law is clear on the protections available under the Act to a person acquirng disability while in service. It ensures that such a person will not be discriminated against merely because of the disabilty acquired and his job, post and related benefits would be protected even when the person is unable to perform any functions. 

Secondly, it presents that the barriers faced by disabled persons arise from their medical condition of disability, rather than the disabling environment around them which mmay be inform of inaccessible built environment, discriminatory employment policies and practices.

Thus the thought processs and the reasoning given in the judgemement doesn't gel with the overal scheme of the RPWD Act and jurisprudence developed through various case laws since 1996.

 
Read the judgement embedded below: