Monday, August 3, 2026

For Child Victims, Consider Impact on Future: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation to ₹83.38 Lakh for Infant Left Paralysed for Life

90% Physical Disability Can Mean 100% Functional Disability: Supreme Court Enhances Compensation for Child with Catastrophic Disability;  SC says compensation for disabled children must account for lifelong loss, dependence, future care and loss of quality of life

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Anjaria
Case: Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr.
Civil Appeal No.: 7067 of 2026
Date: 3 August 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 785

Background

The Supreme Court has substantially enhanced compensation payable to a child who suffered catastrophic and permanent disability in a motor accident when she was only six months old.

The case concerned Shreejita Pattnaik, who suffered severe spinal cord and neurological injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 16 June 2015. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia and was assessed as having 90% permanent locomotor disability. The medical evidence established that she would require lifelong medication, care, supervision and assistance.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Cuttack, had awarded compensation of ₹30,12,960. The Orissa High Court subsequently enhanced the amount to ₹45,40,800. The claimant, through her mother, approached the Supreme Court seeking further enhancement.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and enhanced the compensation to ₹83,38,360, with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization.

90% Physical Disability, But 100% Functional Disability

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is the Court's distinction between physical disability and functional disability.

The Court noted that the percentage of physical disability certified by a medical board and the actual impact of that disability on a person's earning capacity need not always be identical.

In Shreejita's case, although her permanent physical disability was assessed at 90%, the Court examined the actual consequences of the disability. She had been only six months old when the accident occurred, was permanently dependent upon others and would be unable to independently perform normal day-to-day activities.

The Court concluded that her future earning capacity had been completely destroyed and held that her functional disability was 100%.

This distinction is important in disability jurisprudence. A medical percentage does not necessarily capture the real-world consequences of disability. The relevant inquiry, particularly while determining loss of earning capacity, is the impact of the disability on the person's ability to pursue livelihood and live independently.

The Court observed that physical disability and functional disability operate in different fields: physical disability concerns medically assessed bodily impairment, whereas functional disability concerns the effect of that impairment upon the person's ability to live a normal life and pursue gainful employment.

A Child with Catastrophic Disability Cannot Be Treated Merely as a Non-Earning Person

The Court emphasised that children who suffer permanent or near-total disability constitute a distinct category in motor accident compensation cases.

A catastrophic injury during childhood does not merely cause an immediate physical impairment. It can alter the entire course of the child's life, affecting education, employment, social participation, independence, relationships and ordinary experiences of childhood and adulthood.

The Court noted that a child suffering catastrophic injury may lose much more than physical capacity. Ordinary activities such as playing, attending school, interacting with friends and participating in social life may become inaccessible.

Importantly, the Court connected these consequences with human dignity, observing that when a catastrophic injury deprives a child of the ability to perform ordinary functions independently, the resulting loss goes beyond physical disability and amounts to a continuing deprivation of dignity.

Minimum Wages of a Skilled Worker to Be Considered

The Court rejected the approach of treating the injured child as an unskilled labourer for calculating future loss of earnings.

Relying upon its earlier decisions, the Court held that in cases involving children who suffer permanent disability, minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the concerned State at the relevant time should be considered rather than simply assigning a notional income.

For the accident in the present case, the applicable skilled-worker wage was calculated at ₹192.50 per day, resulting in an annual income of ₹69,300. After adding 40% towards future prospects and applying a multiplier of 18, the Court calculated the loss of future earning capacity at ₹17,46,360, taking functional disability at 100%.

The Court also restored the multiplier of 18, holding that the recent trend in cases involving severely injured children supports its application.

Lifelong Attendant Charges Must Be Realistically Assessed

The judgment is also significant in its treatment of attendant charges.

The evidence established that Shreejita would remain dependent on others throughout her life and require constant care, supervision and assistance.

The Supreme Court held that attendant charges should not be confined to a nominal amount merely because actual bills or receipts may not have been produced. The Court applied the multiplier method to determine the cost of lifelong attendant care.

Taking the cost of one attendant at ₹6,000 per month and considering the requirement of two attendants, the Court calculated the annual expenditure at ₹1,44,000 and, applying the multiplier of 18, awarded ₹25,92,000 towards attendant charges.

This is particularly important in cases involving persons with severe disabilities who require lifelong personal assistance.

Compensation Must Account for Loss of Quality of Life

The Court further enhanced the amount awarded towards pain, suffering, loss of amenities and loss of marriage prospects.

The Court recognised that pain and suffering include physical discomfort as well as mental and emotional trauma. In the case of a child with catastrophic disability, conventional calculations may fail to adequately capture the lifelong deprivation suffered by the victim.

The amount under the combined heads was therefore enhanced to ₹25 lakh.

The Court emphasised that compensation for such injuries cannot be merely symbolic. The assessment must take into account the unusual deprivation and its consequences throughout the person's life.

Future Medical Needs Cannot Be Underestimated

The Court also found the amount awarded for future medical treatment inadequate.

Given the permanent and debilitating nature of Shreejita's injuries and her requirement for lifelong medical care, the Court enhanced compensation for future medical treatment from ₹5 lakh to ₹10 lakh.

The amount for conveyance and special diet was also enhanced from ₹50,000 to ₹2 lakh, considering the extensive treatment already undergone and the continuing requirement for medical care.

Compensation Enhanced to ₹83.38 Lakh

The Supreme Court ultimately recalculated the compensation as follows:

HeadCompensation
Loss of future earning capacity₹17,46,360
Attendant charges₹25,92,000
Pain, suffering, loss of amenities & marriage prospects₹25,00,000
Medical expenses₹3,00,000
Future medical treatment₹10,00,000
Conveyance and special diet₹2,00,000
Total₹83,38,360

The compensation was accordingly enhanced from ₹45,40,800 to ₹83,38,360, along with 9% annual interest from the date of filing of the claim until realization. The insurer was directed to deposit the amount within six weeks.

Significance

The judgment is important beyond the quantum of compensation awarded in the individual case.

First, it reinforces that the percentage of medically assessed disability cannot automatically determine the extent of loss of earning capacity. The functional impact of disability must be examined.

Second, children with catastrophic disabilities cannot be treated simply as persons who had no income because they had not yet entered employment. Their future earning capacity and the future that has been irreversibly altered by the injury must be taken into account.

Third, compensation must realistically account for lifelong attendant care, medical treatment, loss of amenities, pain and suffering and other consequences of disability.

Most importantly, the Court's observations recognise that catastrophic disability in childhood affects the person's entire life trajectory. The loss is not limited to physical impairment or immediate medical expenditure. It can affect independence, education, employment, relationships, social participation and dignity.

The judgment therefore strengthens the principle that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act must be “just, fair and reasonable”, and must not become either a token amount or an inadequate approximation of lifelong loss. The Court reiterated that the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial legislation and requires a liberal and purposive interpretation.

DRI Perspective

The judgment is a significant reminder that disability is experienced in the context of a person's entire life, and compensation law must account for that reality.

For a child who acquires catastrophic disability before even beginning school, the consequences cannot be assessed by looking only at present medical expenses or the income the child happens to earn at the time of the accident—which, in the case of an infant, is obviously zero.

The Supreme Court's approach correctly looks forward: What earning capacity has been lost? What care will be required throughout life? What medical expenses are likely to continue? What ordinary experiences and opportunities have been taken away?

The Court's recognition of 100% functional disability despite 90% physical disability is particularly significant. It reinforces that disability assessment for compensation purposes must not become a purely medical exercise divorced from the person's actual life and livelihood.

Equally important is the Court's recognition of human dignity and lifelong deprivation. Compensation is necessarily incapable of restoring the life that was lost or altered by catastrophic injury. But the law must nevertheless make a genuine attempt to provide financial security commensurate with the deprivation suffered.

The judgment consequently moves the assessment of compensation closer to a rights-based and life-course approach to disability, where the objective is not merely to reimburse past expenditure but to provide meaningful financial security for the lifelong consequences of catastrophic disability.

Read the judgement

Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo & Anr. Civil Appeal No. : 7067 of 2026 [PDF 377KB]




Wednesday, July 29, 2026

Supreme Court Sets Four-Week Deadline for Appointment of Independent Disability Commissioners in the States and Centre in Rajive Raturi Vs Union of India

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case: Rajive Raturi v. Union of India & Others, W.P. (C) No. 243 of 2005 (along with connected matters)
Order Date: 29 July 2026
Next Date of Hearing: 20 January 2027

Statutory Provisions Involved

Provision

Subject

Relevance in this Order

Section 74, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities and Additional Commissioners

The Supreme Court directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with this provision.

Section 79, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Appointment of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities

The Court directed ten States/UTs to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks and clarified that the appointments must be made with independent charge, not as an additional charge.

Section 89, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Punishment for contravention of the Act, Rules or Regulations

The Court noted the absence of an effective mechanism for recovery of penalties under this provision and urged the Union Government to address this while finalising the Rules.

Rule 30, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017

Qualifications and eligibility for appointment of the Chief Commissioner

The Court specifically referred to Rule 30 and reminded the Union Government that a serving Government officer must retire from service before appointment as Chief Commissioner, thereby reinforcing the independence of the office.


Background

More than three years after the Supreme Court directed all States and Union Territories to appoint independent Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities by 31 August 2023, the issue has once again come before the Court owing to continued non-compliance by several Governments. In its order dated 17 July 2023 in Seema Girija Lal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had recognised that Commissioners perform crucial statutory functions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and directed all defaulting States and Union Territories to make appointments within a fixed timeline. Despite those directions, vacancies have continued in several jurisdictions, while the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also remained without a regular incumbent since 2019.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, while monitoring implementation of its landmark accessibility judgment in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, has once again intervened to strengthen the institutional framework under the RPwD Act. By its order dated 29 July 2026, the Court directed ten States and Union Territories to appoint independent State Commissioners within four weeks, directed the Union Government to appoint the Chief Commissioner and two Additional Commissioners within the same period, and issued further directions concerning the finalisation of accessibility rules and enforcement of the Act.

The matter has remained under continuous monitoring to ensure effective implementation of the judgment. Earlier, by an order dated 11 February 2026, the Court had sought detailed status reports from the Union Government regarding progress made in framing the new accessibility framework.

When the matter was taken up on 29 July 2026, the Court considered the latest status report filed by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD) and issued several important directions concerning the implementation of the RPwD Act. The order addresses three significant issues: the appointment of statutory disability commissioners, progress in framing accessibility rules, and strengthening enforcement mechanisms under the Act.

Accessibility Rules Under the RPwD Act

The Union Government informed the Court that substantial progress had been made in framing the new accessibility rules pursuant to the Supreme Court's judgment.

According to the status report placed before the Court:

  • the draft notification relating to the built environment is ready for final notification;
  • draft rules relating to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have already been published; and
  • a draft report relating to assistive technologies, services and products has also been prepared.

Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that before the draft rules are finalised and notified, the suggestions already submitted by disability organisations and domain experts should be meaningfully considered so that no deficiencies remain in the final framework.

Accepting this submission, the Court observed that there should be no difficulty in ensuring that the Rules effectively fulfil the objectives of the RPwD Act. Noting that several stakeholders had already submitted detailed suggestions before the committees constituted by the Ministry, the Court urged the Union Government to carefully examine those recommendations before finalising the Rules.

The Bench observed that once the Rules are notified, shortcomings should not subsequently emerge that could have been addressed during the drafting stage itself.

The Court further requested the learned Additional Solicitors General to provide copies of the latest status report along with the draft Rules to all stakeholders so that they may examine the proposals and submit their responses at the earliest.

Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Independent State Commissioners

One of the most important aspects of the order concerns the continued absence of State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities in several States and Union Territories.

During the hearing, Advocate Rahul Bajaj pointed out that despite the statutory requirement contained in Section 79 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several States had still not appointed State Commissioners. It was submitted that these authorities perform a crucial role in ensuring effective implementation of the Act and in providing an institutional mechanism for grievance redressal and monitoring compliance.

The Court recorded that the following States and Union Territories had not appointed State Commissioners:

  • Delhi
  • Haryana
  • Rajasthan
  • Himachal Pradesh
  • Karnataka
  • Tamil Nadu
  • Sikkim
  • Nagaland
  • Puducherry
  • Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed all these Governments to appoint State Commissioners within four weeks in accordance with Section 79 of the RPwD Act. The Court made it clear that the direction must be strictly complied with, observing that any laxity would be viewed "very strictly".

Commissioner Must Hold Independent Charge

The Court also clarified an important aspect that has frequently arisen in disability governance.

Many States have, in the past, assigned the office of State Commissioner to serving officers as an additional charge, rather than appointing an independent statutory authority.

The Supreme Court expressly disapproved this practice and clarified:

"The State concerned shall appoint the Commissioner with an independent charge. The State should not appoint anyone as a Commissioner holding additional charge."

This clarification reinforces the independent character of the statutory office created under the RPwD Act.

Appointment of Chief Commissioner and Additional Commissioners

The Court also considered submissions regarding the prolonged vacancy in the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD). It was pointed out that since 2019 there has been no full-time Chief Commissioner, with the Secretary, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, functioning only as an officer holding additional charge.

Reference was made to Section 74 of the RPwD Act and Rule 30 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, which contemplate appointment of an independent Chief Commissioner and provide that a serving Government officer must retire from Government service before assuming the office.

Accepting these submissions, the Court directed the Union Government to complete the appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities; and two Additional Commissioners, within four weeks, in accordance with Section 74 of the RPwD Act. The Court also specifically invited the attention of the Union Government to Rule 30 while making these appointments.

Effective Recovery of Penalties Under Section 89

Another issue raised before the Court related to Section 89 of the RPwD Act, which prescribes penalties for contravention of the Act and the Rules.

Counsel submitted that although the Act provides for monetary penalties, it does not prescribe any effective mechanism for recovery of those fines, thereby limiting practical enforcement.

The Supreme Court requested the Union Government to consider incorporating an appropriate recovery mechanism while finalising the new Rules so that penalties under Section 89 can be effectively enforced.

Existing Accessibility Standards Continue to Apply

The Court also reiterated an important clarification contained in paragraph 83 of its judgment dated 8 November 2024.

The Bench noted the submission that while new accessibility standards are being framed, compliance with existing accessibility obligations must continue.

The Court reiterated that:

"progressive compliance with the standards listed in the existing Rule 15(1) and the progress towards the targets of the Accessible India Campaign must continue unabated."

This clarification is significant because it prevents authorities from postponing compliance on the ground that revised accessibility standards are under preparation.

Non-Negotiable Accessibility Norms to be Finalised Within Six Months

The Court directed that the issuance of the non-negotiable accessibility norms envisaged in the main judgment must be completed within six months. The matter has been directed to be listed on 20 January 2027 for reporting compliance with all directions issued by the Court.

Significance

The order strengthens the institutional framework established under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. For nearly seven years, the office of the Chief Commissioner has remained without a full-time incumbent, while several States have either failed to appoint State Commissioners altogether or have entrusted the office to officials holding additional charge. By directing appointments within a fixed time frame and expressly requiring independent charge, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that these statutory authorities are intended to function as independent oversight institutions rather than as additional responsibilities assigned to serving bureaucrats.

The order also ensures that the ongoing process of framing accessibility rules remains consultative and participatory by directing meaningful consideration of stakeholder inputs before final notification. At the same time, the Court has reiterated that existing accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act and the Accessible India Campaign remain fully enforceable until the new framework comes into force.

The proceedings will now continue on 20 January 2027, when the Supreme Court will examine compliance with these directions.

Read the Order dated 27 July 2026


Wednesday, July 22, 2026

Probationer Also an 'Employee' Under RPwD Act, Can't be Terminated on Acquiring Disability During Service - says Rajasthan HC

Rajasthan High Court Protects Probationer from Termination on Acquiring Disability; Says  Section 20 of RPwD Act protects government employee who acquires disability during service, irrespective of probationary status

Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur
Bench: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Rekha Borana
Case: Sanjay Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Case No.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3504/2026
Date of Judgment: 22 July 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JP:28292

Background

The Rajasthan High Court has held that a government employee cannot be terminated merely because the employee acquires a disability during service, even where the employee is still on probation.

The petitioner, Sanjay Choudhary, was appointed as a Constable on 3 June 2013. During his probation, he met with an accident on 29 June 2014 and subsequently suffered 100% disability, certified by the competent Medical Board.

Despite the disability having been acquired during service, his services were terminated by order dated 19 June 2018 with effect from 29 June 2014 on the ground that he was no longer capable of performing the duties of a Constable.

The petitioner challenged the termination before the High Court, relying upon Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

The State contended that the petitioner was only a probationer-trainee and had not been confirmed in service and, therefore, could not claim the protection available to an employee under Section 20. The High Court rejected this contention.

Protection Under Section 20 Extends to Probationers

Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act prohibits a Government establishment from dispensing with or reducing in rank an employee who acquires a disability during service.

Where the employee becomes unsuitable for the post held, the establishment is required to shift the employee to another post carrying the same pay scale and service benefits. If this is not possible, the employee is to be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post becomes available or until superannuation, whichever is earlier.

Justice Rekha Borana held that the provision uses the expression “employee” and does not exclude a person merely because the appointment is still under probation.

The Court rejected the argument that an employee ceases to receive statutory protection simply because confirmation in service has not yet taken place.

The Court relied, among other precedents, upon decisions concerning the corresponding protection under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, including Union of India v. Pramod Sadashiv Thakre and Pawan Kumar v. Delhi Transport Corporation.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab concerning the legal protection available to probationers.

Recent Supreme Court Judgment in Bali Ram Reinforces the Principle

The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court's recent judgment in Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, 2026 INSC 689, decided on 13 July 2026.

In Bali Ram, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the statutory protection applicable to an employee acquiring disability during service requires the employer to consider alternative employment carrying the same pay and service benefits and, where necessary, a supernumerary post. (See our DRI Post in Bali Ram

The Rajasthan High Court applied this principle to the petitioner's case and found that his termination on account of disability was contrary to Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

Termination Contrary to Section 20

The High Court held that the petitioner's termination was in “total contravention” of Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

The Court also rejected reliance upon Clause 10 of the Memorandum dated 9 May 2013, observing that the provision concerned government servants who died during probation and could not be applied to an employee who had acquired a disability during service.

The statutory obligation was to explore suitable alternative employment rather than terminate the petitioner on account of his disability.

Relief Granted

The High Court quashed the termination order dated 19 June 2018 and directed that the petitioner be deemed to be in service and reinstated.

The Court further directed:

  • payment of 50% of salary arrears for the period from 29 June 2014 to 11 February 2026;
  • grant of consequential service benefits, including increments and promotion, up to the date of superannuation;
  • payment of all consequential retiral benefits upon superannuation;
  • adjustment of amounts already paid towards gratuity, NPS or other heads against the salary arrears; and
  • payment of the arrears within six weeks.
  • In case of default beyond the stipulated period, the outstanding amount would carry 6% interest per annum.

Significance

The judgment is significant because it makes clear that probationary status cannot be used to defeat the statutory protection against termination on account of acquired disability.

Section 20 does not distinguish between a confirmed employee and a probationer. Once an employee acquires a disability during service, the Government establishment must examine reasonable accommodation and alternative employment before considering separation.

The judgment also reinforces the principle that the law requires retention rather than ouster. An employee who becomes unsuitable for the existing post because of disability is not to be treated as having lost the right to employment. The statutory scheme requires the employer to explore another suitable post carrying the same pay and service benefits and, where necessary, to retain the employee against a supernumerary post.

The decision is particularly relevant for government establishments, where probationary appointments should not become a means of circumventing the protection guaranteed by Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

It also fits within the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation in Bali Ram (above) that disability acquired during service attracts a positive obligation on the employer to protect continuity of employment rather than simply terminate the employee.

The judgment thus reinforces an important principle of disability rights law: acquiring a disability during service does not terminate the employment relationship; it triggers the employer's obligation to accommodate and retain the employee.

Read the judgement below 

Sanjay Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3504/2026 [PDF 275KB]

Monday, July 13, 2026

Supreme Court Reaffirms Duty to Accommodate Employees Acquiring Disabilities: CRPF Constable Awarded ₹1.25 Crore Compensation

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih
Case: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 689
Date of Judgment: 13 July 2026

In a landmark judgment reaffirming the right of employees who acquire disabilities during service to continue in employment with dignity, the Supreme Court has dismissed the Union Government's appeal against a visually impaired CRPF constable and upheld the statutory protection contained in Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“PwD Act”). The Court awarded the respondent, Bali Ram, a consolidated compensation of ₹1.25 crore towards back wages, interest and litigation costs.

The judgment is significant not merely for the relief granted to an individual constable who was unlawfully invalidated from service nearly three decades ago, but for its emphatic reiteration that government employers are under a positive obligation to accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Facts of the Case

Bali Ram joined the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as a Constable (Driver) in 1985 after being found medically fit. In 1996, while in service, he developed an ophthalmic condition diagnosed as Disseminated Choroiditis with retinal atrophic patches and macular involvement, resulting in complete blindness in his left eye and partial impairment in his right eye.

Following medical examinations, the Departmental Rehabilitation Board declared him unfit for driving and combatant duties. Subsequently, the Medical Board at the CRPF Base Hospital in Hyderabad concluded that he was permanently incapacitated and unfit for further service in any capacity within the force.

On 11 March 1998, Bali Ram was medically invalidated from service. His subsequent representations seeking redress were rejected, with the authorities taking the position that his disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by service and that he was entitled only to a lump-sum payment of ₹15,000 under the applicable rules.

Aggrieved, Bali Ram approached the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

High Court's Intervention

The Single Judge of the High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, held that the CRPF had acted in violation of Section 47 of the PwD Act. The Court quashed the order of invalidation and directed that Bali Ram be deemed to have remained in service with all consequential benefits.

The Division Bench affirmed the decision in 2014, rejecting the CRPF's appeal.

The Union of India then carried the matter to the Supreme Court.

Section 47: A Mandatory Obligation, Not a Matter of Choice

At the heart of the case lay Section 47 of the PwD Act, which prohibits an establishment from dispensing with the services of an employee who acquires a disability during service. If the employee becomes unsuitable for the post he occupies, the employer must shift him to another post carrying the same pay and service benefits or retain him on a supernumerary post until retirement.

Reiterating the principles laid down in Kunal Singh, the Supreme Court observed:

“The duty imposed by the PwD Act being mandatory and not discretionary, the law did not leave the appellants with an option to discharge their duty at their convenience. Appellants were required to find a chair for the respondent, and not wait for the respondent to beg for one.”

The Court held that Section 47 imposes a positive duty upon the employer to identify suitable alternative employment and that the obligation cannot be shifted onto the employee.

Relief Beyond Pleadings: A Significant Pronouncement

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the Court's discussion on whether constitutional courts can grant relief that has not been specifically sought.

The Supreme Court noted that Bali Ram had originally sought invalid pension and related benefits and had not expressly invoked Section 47. Nevertheless, the High Court had granted him broader relief. The Supreme Court upheld this approach and laid down an important principle:

“Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.”

The Court held that where the record clearly demonstrates that a litigant is entitled to wider relief, and denial of such relief would perpetuate injustice merely because of defective pleadings or inadequate legal assistance, constitutional courts may mould relief appropriately.

This part of the judgment will have implications extending far beyond disability jurisprudence.

Waiver of Disability Rights Rejected

The Union Government argued that Bali Ram had waived his right under Section 47 because he had accepted pensionary benefits and had never specifically sought reinstatement.

Rejecting the argument, the Court held that waiver requires conscious and informed relinquishment of a known right. Since there was no evidence that Bali Ram was ever informed of his statutory rights under the PwD Act, the plea of waiver was untenable.

The Court also observed that waiver of statutory rights under welfare legislation is generally disfavoured.

Exemption Notification Could Not Operate Retrospectively

The Union further relied upon a notification dated 10 September 2002 exempting combatant personnel of the Central Para Military Forces from the operation of Section 47.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument outright. It held that the notification was prospective and could not validate an action that had already become illegal in 1998.

The Court observed:

“The right of the respondent crystallised on the date of ouster; and a later exemption from the statutory mandate cannot efface the breach already committed.”

Importantly, the Court noted that the very issuance of the exemption notification in 2002 demonstrated that the Central Government itself recognised that Section 47 fully applied to the CRPF between 1995 and 2002.

A Sharp Rebuke to the CRPF

The judgment contains unusually strong observations regarding the conduct of the CRPF.

The Bench remarked:

“By not offering alternate posting, the appellants failed in their role as a model employer and converted a welfare provision into a dead letter.”

It further expressed surprise that an instrumentality of the State functioning under the Ministry of Home Affairs could ignore statutory protections available to persons with disabilities.

The Court categorically rejected the argument that disability protection applies only where disability is attributable to service:

“Parliament did not limit Section 47 to disabilities attributable to service; the protection is unqualified and unconditional.”

The focus, the Court held, must be on accommodation rather than exclusion.

Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement

The Court noted that Bali Ram had already crossed the age of superannuation and that reinstatement was therefore no longer possible. By the Court's own calculation, he would have received over ₹82 lakh in salary and allowances had he remained in service.

Recognising that Bali Ram had spent nearly three decades outside employment and had suffered economic hardship despite obtaining a favourable High Court judgment in 2008, the Court held:

“The situation of non-employment of the respondent is entirely the appellants’ creation.”

The Supreme Court consequently modified the High Court's order and awarded him ₹1.25 crore, inclusive of back wages, interest and costs, payable within eight weeks.

The Court also directed the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority or the District Legal Services Authority, Kangra, to assist the visually impaired respondent in safely investing the compensation and attending to his future medical needs.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment strengthens disability rights jurisprudence in at least four important ways.

First, it reiterates that Section 47 of the 1995 Act—and its successor provision, Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—creates a mandatory duty to retain and accommodate employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Second, it recognises reasonable accommodation as a constitutional imperative flowing from substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21. The Court expressly relied on Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India to underline that disability is socially constructed and that exclusion results from the failure to create enabling conditions.

Third, it rejects procedural technicalities and the doctrine of waiver as tools to defeat welfare legislation.

Finally, the judgment sends a clear message that public employers cannot evade their responsibilities by citing administrative inconvenience or belated exemption notifications.

For persons with disabilities and their advocates, Union of India v. Bali Ram is a powerful reminder that the law requires the State not merely to refrain from discrimination, but to actively create space for inclusion. The Supreme Court's observation that employers must “find a chair” for an employee who acquires a disability may well become one of the defining statements in India's disability rights jurisprudence.

Download the judgement in: Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram, Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015, decided on 13 July 2026.


Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Punjab & Haryana High Court Expands the Meaning of "Medical Emergency" for Persons with Progressive Disabilities

Court: Punjab and Haryana High Court
Bench: Mr. Justice Harpreet Singh Brar
Case Title: Sunil Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors.
Case No. CWP-2098-2026
Decision Date: 07 July 2026

Background

In a significant judgment strengthening the employment and healthcare rights of persons with disabilities, the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that a government employee who acquired 100% locomotor disability due to Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) cannot be denied statutory protections merely because his treatment was taken in a non-empanelled hospital or because the authorities adopted a narrow understanding of the term "emergency."

The petitioner, an Assistant with the Haryana Board of School Education, developed ALS—a progressive and incurable neurological disorder—during service. After undergoing specialised stem cell therapy in Bengaluru, his claim for medical reimbursement was rejected on the ground that the treatment was not certified as an "emergency." He also sought protection of his employment under Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, including accommodation on a suitable post or creation of a supernumerary post.

The Court's Findings

The court articulated its decision through several core legal and humanitarian principles:

1. The Right to Life and Self-Preservation (Article 21)

The court emphasized that the preservation of human life is instinctive, sacred, precious, and inviolable. Under Article 21, the State bears a fundamental obligation to ensure timely medical care to those in need. The court ruled that the State cannot reasonably expect citizens to refrain from seeking life-saving or specialized care simply because a hospital is non-empanelled. Denying reimbursement under these circumstances fails the test of fairness and reasonableness, thereby violating fundamental constitutional rights.

2. A Disability-Inclusive Redefinition of "Emergency"

The state had originally denied the petitioner's claim based on an opinion from the Civil Surgeon stating the treatment was not an "Medical Emergency". The court sharply rejected this narrow interpretation, noting that the conventional understanding of an "emergency"—which looks only for immediate crises or imminent death—is inherently  "able-bodied centric".

For individuals suffering from progressive, degenerative chronic diseases like Motor Neuron Disease / Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), the court ruled that the definition of an emergency must be wider. It must encompass situations where a delay in medical intervention would result in a rapid, irreversible loss of bodily functions and permanent damage. Seeking immediate, specialized stem cell therapy to halt rapid degeneration meets this inclusive standard of an emergency.

3. Protection for Chronic Diseases

Relying on established judicial precedent (State of Haryana vs. Manoj Jain), the court noted that medical reimbursement claims for recognized chronic diseases cannot be denied solely on technical or bureaucratic grounds. Because the petitioner's condition was categorized as a Chronic Disease by the State Government, the test of essentiality was satisfied. The court affirmed that the petitioner could not be faulted for prioritizing immediate, specialized treatment to safeguard their quality of life over waiting for administrative approvals.

On the employment issue, the Court reaffirmed the mandate of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016, holding that an employee who acquires a disability during service is entitled to be shifted to a suitable post with the same pay and service benefits. If no suitable post is immediately available, the employer must consider the statutory mechanism of a supernumerary post rather than depriving the employee of livelihood or forcing prolonged leave without pay. The Court emphasised that reasonable accommodation must be meaningful and not merely symbolic.

Why This Judgment Matters

This decision is important because it moves disability jurisprudence beyond formal equality and recognises that legal concepts such as "medical emergency" must be interpreted through the lived realities of persons with disabilities. The judgment reinforces that administrative rules governing medical reimbursement and employment cannot be applied mechanically where doing so defeats the objectives of the RPwD Act, 2016 and the constitutional promise of dignity under Article 21.

For government employers across India, the judgment serves as a reminder that the duty to provide reasonable accommodation extends beyond physical accessibility and includes fair decisions relating to medical treatment, continuation of service, and protection of livelihood for employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Read the judgement

Sunil Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors. CWP-2098-2026 dated 07 July 2026 [PDF 271 KB]



Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Supreme Court says Section 33 entitles reservation for employees with disabilities in promotion in Group A,B,C & D alike [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

Case TitleRajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others

Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008

Date of Judgement30 June 2016

Subject: Reservation in Promotion for Disabled to Group A and B posts; Section 33 of The Persons with Disabilities Act 1995

Brief:

Dear Colleagues,

Please refer to my earlier posts dated 02 March 15 and  10 Oct 14, on the subject. 

In a historic judgment in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008 titled Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30 Jun 2016 has set aside / quashed the two below office memorandums issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, terming them as illegal and inconsistent with the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.:-
  •  OM No. 36035/16/91-Estt.(SCT) dated 18.02.1997  and 
  •  OM NoNo.36035/3/2004-Estt. (RES) dated 29.12.2005 
In the instant case the petitioners, Rajeev Kumar Gupta and seven other persons with disabilities serving as engineers in Prasar Bharti made the grievance that the higher level posts in the engineering cadre were filled mostly by promotion. Although these posts were suitable for persons with disabilities, the Government was denying them 3% reservation in these posts, which amounted to defeating the intent and purpose of reservation provided for in the Persons with Disabilities (equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation) Act, 1995. At the heart of the problem were the DoPT instructions dated 18.2.97 and 29.12.2005, which prohibited reservation in promotion for disabled persons in Group A and B posts. 

Petitioners had argued that a large number of Groups A and B were filled only through promotion and because of the impugned DoPT memorandums, the benefit of reservation under Section 33 of the 1995 Act was denied with respect to those posts. Petitioners therefore lost out on a significant amount of opportunities at the upper end of the organizational hierarchy.

The government opposed concession to the disabled, contending that they have no right to demand reservation in promotion to identified Group A and Group B posts. It also cited the nine-judge bench ruling by the apex court in the Indra Sawhney (Mandal reservation) case, to maintain reservation should be confined to recruitment at the initial level, and not at the stage of promotions.

It may be pertinent to mention that in the Indra Sawhney case while dealing with caste based reservation issue, the Bench had held "Reservation in promotion is constitutionally impermissible as, once the advantaged and disadvantaged are made equal and are brought in one class or group then any further benefit extended for promotion on the inequality existing prior to be brought in the group would be treating equals unequally. It would not be eradicating the effects of past discrimination but perpetuating it."

But the bench dismissed the government’s arguments, noting that once the posts for the disabled have been identified under Section 32 of the Act, the purpose behind such identification cannot be frustrated by prescribing a mode of recruitment which results in denial of statutory reservation.

“It would be a device to defraud persons with disabilities of the statutory benefit. Once a post is identified, it means that a person with disability is fully capable of discharging the functions associated with the identified post. Once found to be so capable, reservation under Section 33 to an extent of not less than 3 per cent must follow. Once the post is identified, it must be reserved for PWD irrespective of the mode of recruitment adopted by the State for filling up of the said post,” it held.

The bench further said that Indra Sawhney’s case shall not impose a bar on reservation for the disabled, since the principle laid down in this case is applicable only when the State seeks to give preferential treatment in the matter of employment to the backward class.

“The basis for providing reservation for persons with disabilities is physical disability and not any of the criteria forbidden under Article 16(1) such as caste, religion etc. The objective behind the 1995 Act is to integrate those living with disabilities into the society and to ensure their economic progress… persons with disabilities are not and cannot be equated with backward classes contemplated under Article 16(4),” it said. Article 16 of the Constitution empowers the state to prescribe preferential treatment to certain classes in matters of public employment.

The judgement is historic and a major milestone in the fight for restoring the rights of persons with disabilities in India. 

The argument in this case were concluded on 17.03.2016  and the bench had reserved the judgement.

The case, represents success in a hard fought battle waged by persons with disabilities for equal opportunity and representation in the higher echelons of Government. Hitherto, disabled persons were likely to stagnate at the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, as their promotion to higher level posts was made difficult because of their physical disadvantage. 

Brief Background of related matters

It may be pertinent to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court  had on 08 Oct 2013 in the case titled Union of India vs. National Federation of the Blind delivered a land mark judgment directing the Govt, of India and State Governments to compute 3% reservation for persons with disabilities in all groups of posts against the total number of vacancies in the cadre strength. The Hon'ble Court also laid down that the computation had to be done in an identical manner in respect of all groups of posts. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its judgement dated 10 Dec 2013 in a case titled as MCD Vs. Manoj Kumar Gupta upheld a judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High court which declared that Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, provided for reservation in promotion for persons with disabilities in Groups A and B also.

But instead of implementing the judgement, the Govt. of India had been contesting the issue through various frivolous litigation which were nipped in the bud each time by the Hon'ble Court. 

Judgement Copy 

Download the Judgement dated 30 June 2016 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008 titled Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others (PDF 326BKB) or read the judgement below:



Updates as on 04 Sep 2017 

The issue of whether persons with disabilities deserve reservation in promotions as well, apart from the reservation that exists in appointment, has been escalated by the Supreme Court to a five-judge bench since it requires interpretation by the Constitution bench.

On Monday (September 4, 2017) the bench of Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices AM Khanwilkar and DY Chandrachud heard deposition by Solicitor General Ranjit Kumar and counsels  requested a larger bench to hear the issue. The three judge bench headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice Dipak Misra agreed to refer the matter to a five-judge bench.

The question that has arisen in this case is whether persons, governed under “The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995”, can be given reservation in promotion. A view had been taken by this Court in Rajeev Kumar Gupta & Others vs Union of India & Others in the affirmative. The Solicitor General had pointed out that the prohibition against reservation in promotion laid down by the majority in Indra Sawhney vs Union of India and Others – (1992) case applies not only to Article 16(4) but also to 16 (1) of the Constitution of India and inference to the contrary is not justified. Persons with disabilities certainly require preferential treatment and such preferential treatment may also cover reservation in appointment but not reservation in promotion. Section 33 of the 1995 Act is required to be read and construed in that background. “We find merit in the contention that the matter needs to be considered by the larger bench,” he said.

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

Disability Cannot Be Measured Merely by Medical Percentage: Supreme Court Treats Loss of Right Leg of Mason as 100% Functional Disability

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N. V. Anjaria
Case Title: M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd. & Anr.
Case No.: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 35337 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 655
Decided on: 23 June 2026

Background

In a significant judgment on the concept of functional disability, the Supreme Court has held that compensation for accident victims cannot be determined solely on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical disability certified by medical experts. What matters is the actual impact of the disability on the victim's ability to earn a livelihood.

The case arose from a motor accident in which the appellant, M. Paramesh, a mason by profession, suffered amputation of his right leg above the knee. His occupation required prolonged standing, climbing, balancing, carrying construction material and performing physically demanding work.

Although the medical evidence assessed his permanent physical disability, the central question before the Court was whether that medical percentage accurately reflected the loss of his earning capacity. The appellant contended that, for a mason, the amputation had rendered him incapable of continuing his profession and therefore amounted to 100% functional disability.

Accepting this contention, the Supreme Court held that where an occupation is entirely dependent on physical mobility, loss of a limb may result in complete loss of earning capacity irrespective of the percentage of medical disability.

Issues Before the Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

  • Whether compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act should be determined solely on the basis of medical disability.
  • Whether loss of a leg above the knee constitutes 100% functional disability for a person engaged in manual labour such as masonry.
  • Whether assessment of loss of earning capacity must take into account the claimant's occupation and practical ability to continue employment.
  • Whether compensation should reflect the real economic consequences of disability rather than merely the certified medical impairment.

Key Findings

(a) Medical Disability and Functional Disability Are Not the Same: 

Reiterating settled principles, the Court observed that physical disability and functional disability are distinct concepts. While medical experts assess bodily impairment, the Court is required to determine how that impairment affects the individual's earning capacity. Such determination depends upon several factors, including:

  • the nature of the claimant's occupation;
  • educational background and skills;
  • age; and
  • the practical ability to continue the previous vocation.

The Court observed that identical medical disabilities may produce vastly different consequences depending upon the profession of the injured person.

(b) Functional Disability Depends on the Nature of Employment

The Bench emphasised that disability assessment cannot be undertaken through a mechanical application of medical percentages. A person engaged in sedentary work may continue employment despite losing a limb. However, occupations involving physical labour require a different assessment.

For a mason, mobility is indispensable. Construction work demands standing for long hours, climbing scaffolding, balancing on uneven surfaces, carrying materials and performing strenuous physical tasks. Loss of a leg effectively destroys the ability to pursue such work.

(c) Loss of One Leg Meant Complete Loss of Earning Capacity

Considering the appellant's occupation, the Court held that the amputation resulted in 100% functional disability.

The Bench observed that although the medical disability percentage may be lower, the claimant had effectively lost his capacity to earn as a mason. Compensation therefore had to be computed on the basis of complete loss of earning capacity rather than the medical assessment alone.

(d) Compensation Must Reflect Loss of Livelihood

The Court reiterated that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is intended not merely to compensate bodily injury but to provide just recompense for the economic and social consequences of disability.

A proper assessment must account for:

  • loss of future earning capacity;
  • loss of livelihood;
  • diminished quality of life; and
  • inability to continue one's chosen occupation.

The objective is to ensure that compensation reflects the real impact of the accident on the victim's life.

Directions

The Supreme Court:

  • held that the appellant had suffered 100% functional disability in relation to his occupation as a mason;
  • directed that compensation be assessed on the basis of complete loss of earning capacity;
  • rejected a mechanical approach based solely on the percentage of medical disability; and
  • reaffirmed that compensation must correspond to the actual consequences of disability on the victim's livelihood.

Why This Judgment Matters

1. Functional Disability Takes Priority Over Medical Percentage

The judgment reinforces the well-established principle that compensation law is concerned with loss of earning capacity, not merely the percentage of physical impairment recorded in a medical certificate.

2. Important Protection for Manual Workers

The decision is particularly significant for workers whose livelihood depends upon physical labour, including construction workers, agricultural labourers, drivers, mechanics and others engaged in manual occupations. For such individuals, even a lower medical disability may translate into complete economic disability.

3. Advances a Rights-Based Understanding of Disability

The judgment reflects a shift away from a purely medical model towards a functional assessment that recognises disability in the context of work, participation and independence. It acknowledges that the consequences of disability extend beyond bodily impairment to include exclusion from employment and loss of economic security.

4. Ensures Just Compensation

By rejecting a rigid reliance on medical percentages, the Court has strengthened the principle that accident victims must receive compensation commensurate with the real loss suffered, preventing under-compensation in deserving cases.

DRI Commentary

The Supreme Court's decision is another important milestone in the evolution of disability jurisprudence under compensation law. Although rendered in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act, its reasoning has wider significance for disability rights because it recognises that disability cannot be understood through medical diagnosis alone.

The Court rightly distinguished between medical disability—which measures bodily impairment—and functional disability, which measures the effect of that impairment on a person's ability to earn a livelihood. This distinction lies at the heart of a rights-based approach to disability.

For a mason, the body is the principal tool of trade. Amputation of a leg above the knee is not merely a physical impairment; it effectively ends the ability to undertake masonry work. Treating such loss as anything less than 100% functional disability would ignore the lived reality of workers whose livelihoods depend entirely on physical mobility.

The judgment also serves as an important reminder that the assessment of disability must always be contextual. The same physical impairment may have very different consequences for a mason, a software engineer, a teacher or an accountant. Justice therefore requires courts to look beyond medical percentages and evaluate the actual impact on the individual's life and livelihood.

By reaffirming that compensation must be based on the real consequences of disability rather than a rigid medical formula, the Supreme Court has further strengthened the jurisprudence on functional disability, ensuring that accident survivors receive compensation that is both fair and humane.




Friday, June 19, 2026

Supreme Court Declares Right to Walk on Safe, Demarcated Footpaths a Fundamental Right: Accessibility and Inclusion Take Centre Stage

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Case: Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 4665–4666 of 2025
Date of Judgment: 19 June 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 647

In a landmark judgment with far-reaching implications for urban planning, disability rights, and inclusive mobility, the Supreme Court of India has declared that the right to walk on safe and demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.

The Court held that this right flows from Article 19(1)(d), which guarantees freedom of movement (All citizens shall have the right…to move freely throughout the territory of India), read together with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), and Article 21.

Significantly, the Court declared that the rights of pedestrians have primacy over motorised transport, marking a decisive shift away from the long-standing vehicle-centric approach to urban development.

Tragic Facts, Transformative Jurisprudence

The case arose from the death of a five-year-old child who was walking to school with his father when a tanker struck him from behind. The Court noted that there was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing on the road where the accident occurred.

While adjudicating the compensation claim, the Court moved beyond the immediate facts to examine a larger constitutional question: whether citizens possess an enforceable right to safe walking infrastructure.

Answering in the affirmative, the Court observed:

"The right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. The fundamental right to walk will take within its sweep the right to demarcated footpaths. These rights are primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles."

Walking Is Not a Privilege—It Is a Constitutional Right

In a powerful articulation of the constitutional value of walking, the Court observed that the right to move under Article 19(1)(d) cannot be reduced to movement on wheels.

The judgment recognises that walking is deeply connected to human dignity, expression, association, participation in public life, and access to opportunities. It noted that Indian cities and towns have systematically prioritised motor vehicles at the cost of pedestrians, resulting in the exclusion of millions of citizens from public spaces.

The Court lamented that pedestrians are often treated as "a nuisance" on roads that should belong to everyone.

Accessibility: A Major Win for Persons with Disabilities

Although the case did not arise directly under the disability rights framework, the judgment has profound implications for persons with disabilities, older persons, children, and all vulnerable road users.

For persons with disabilities, the right to walk on demarcated footpaths cannot be interpreted merely as the existence of a physical pathway. The constitutional guarantee necessarily requires accessible, continuous, unobstructed, and universally designed pedestrian infrastructure.

This includes:

  • Step-free and barrier-free footpaths;
  • Accessible kerb ramps at crossings;
  • Tactile guiding and warning indicators;
  • Adequate width for wheelchair users and persons using mobility aids;
  • Audible pedestrian signals;
  • Non-slip surfaces;
  • Removal of encroachments and street-level obstacles;
  • Accessible wayfinding and signage.

The judgment reinforces the obligations already imposed under the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities' notified accessibility standards, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Rules framed thereunder, and the Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India.

A footpath that cannot be used safely and independently by persons with disabilities cannot be regarded as a constitutionally compliant footpath.

Duty Bearers Identified

The Court clearly identified the authorities responsible for ensuring the right to walk:

  • Urban Development Authorities;
  • Municipal Corporations;
  • Municipalities; and
  • Panchayats.

The Court held that where a road exists, there is a corresponding obligation to ensure the existence and maintenance of safe and demarcated footpaths.

This is not a matter of policy discretion but a constitutional duty.

Constitutional Remedies Beyond Motor Accident Claims

In an important clarification, the Court held that remedies under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, are not sufficient to protect pedestrian rights.

Citizens whose right to walk is violated can seek constitutional remedies, including restitution and compensation, directly against the authorities responsible for creating and maintaining pedestrian infrastructure.

The Court observed that these remedies are independent of claims available under the Motor Vehicles Act.

This finding significantly expands accountability for inaccessible and unsafe public infrastructure.

Continuing the Trajectory of Pedestrian Rights

The present judgment builds upon the Supreme Court's earlier interventions in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India concerning road safety and pedestrian infrastructure.

Notably, in 2025, the Supreme Court recognised that footpaths must remain unobstructed and accessible to all users, including persons with disabilities. The Court directed authorities across the country to ensure the removal of encroachments and the creation of disability-friendly pedestrian infrastructure.

Disability Rights India had previously covered that important development in its article, "Supreme Court of India Upholds Right to Accessible and Obstruction-Free Footpaths for Persons with Disabilities."

Today's judgment elevates that principle to a higher constitutional plane by expressly declaring the right to walk on demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right.

Call for a Dedicated Legislative Framework

Recognising the absence of a comprehensive legal framework governing pedestrian rights, the Court directed that copies of the judgment be forwarded to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways, as well as the Law Commission of India.

The Court emphasised the need for legislation that:

  • Formally recognises the right to walk;
  • Clearly identifies duty bearers;
  • Establishes enforcement mechanisms;
  • Provides effective remedies; and
  • Creates an independent regulatory framework for pedestrian infrastructure.

Why This Judgment Matters

For decades, persons with disabilities have argued that inaccessible footpaths deny them the ability to access education, employment, healthcare, recreation, justice, and participation in community life. The Supreme Court has now unequivocally recognised that walking infrastructure is not merely a matter of urban design—it is a matter of constitutional rights.

This judgment also speaks to the everyday reality faced by millions of families across India. In the absence of safe, continuous and dedicated pedestrian footpaths, parents are often compelled to use private vehicles or hire school transport services merely to drop and pick up their children from schools located less than a kilometre away. This dependence on motorised transport is not a matter of choice but a consequence of unsafe public spaces. It discourages walking, increases traffic congestion, worsens air pollution, and deprives children and families of the well-documented physical and mental health benefits associated with regular walking. 

As the Court reminds us, walking is far more than a mode of transport—it is a social, cultural and democratic act deeply embedded in India's collective consciousness, from Mahatma Gandhi's historic Dandi March to countless everyday journeys that connect people to their communities. 

The true measure of this judgment will lie in whether governments and local bodies transform this constitutional promise into universally accessible, safe and walkable streets for everyone. The right to walk must now mean the right of every person—including persons with disabilities, children, older persons and other vulnerable road users—to move safely, independently and with dignity.

Read the Judgment: 

Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., 2026 INSC 647 (19 June 2026).


Tuesday, June 16, 2026

State Inaction Cannot Defeat Disability Pension Rights: Rajasthan High Court Grants 46 Years' Disability Pension Arrears for Ex-IAF Corporal

Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan
Bench: Dr. Justice Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Dr. Justice Nupur Bhati
Case Title: Ratti Ram v. Union of India & Ors.
Case No.: D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 24281/2025 (as reported)
Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JD:26378-DB
Decided on: 16 June 2026

Background

In a significant ruling reaffirming that bureaucratic delay cannot extinguish statutory rights, the Rajasthan High Court directed payment of disability pension arrears spanning nearly 46 years to an ex-Corporal of the Indian Air Force whose pension had been discontinued in 1980.

The petitioner, Ratti Ram, had developed Bronchial Asthma during service and was sanctioned disability pension. The pension, however, was discontinued in 1980 on the ground that his disability required reassessment by a Medical Board. Although the petitioner sought restoration of his pension, the reassessment process remained pending for decades due entirely to administrative inaction.

When a Re-assessment Medical Board was eventually convened, it categorically found that the petitioner's disability had remained unchanged and had continued uninterrupted since the pension was stopped.

The petitioner approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, which restored his entitlement to disability pension but restricted arrears to the year 2019, when the reassessment was finally conducted. Challenging this limitation, the petitioner approached the Rajasthan High Court.

The principal question before the Court was whether a disabled ex-serviceman could be denied decades of pension merely because the authorities failed to conduct the reassessment within a reasonable time.

Issues Before the Court

The Court considered the following issues:

  • Whether disability pension should be restored from the date it was discontinued or only from the date of reassessment.

  • Whether the consequences of prolonged administrative delay could be imposed upon a disabled ex-serviceman.

  • Whether disability pension is a vested legal right that cannot be curtailed because of official inaction.

  • Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal was justified in restricting arrears to 2019 despite the Medical Board's finding that the disability had continued since 1980.

Findings of the Court

  1. Disability Pension Is a Valuable Legal Right:  The Division Bench reiterated that disability pension is not a discretionary concession or ex gratia payment, but a valuable statutory right accruing to eligible members of the armed forces. Relying upon settled principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Court observed that once entitlement stands established, the benefit must ordinarily relate back to the date on which the right accrued.
  2. The State Cannot Benefit from Its Own Inaction:  The Court found that the extraordinary delay in conducting the reassessment medical examination was entirely attributable to the respondents. The petitioner had pursued restoration of his pension, yet the authorities failed to discharge their obligations for decades. The Bench emphatically held that a citizen cannot be penalised for the administrative lapses of the State. Allowing the Government to deny arrears because it failed to conduct the reassessment would amount to permitting the State to benefit from its own wrong.
  3. Medical Evidence Established Continuity of Disability: A crucial factor influencing the decision was the finding of the Re-assessment Medical Board that the petitioner's disability had remained constant from the date on which the pension was discontinued. Once continuity of disability stood medically established, the Court held that there remained no legal basis for restricting arrears to the year of reassessment.
  4. Continuing Pension Rights Cannot Be Defeated by Technicalities:  The Court also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India through its Secretary v. Sgt. Girish Kumar & Ors., reiterating that disability pension involves a continuing cause of action. The mere fact that proceedings concluded at a later stage could not deprive the petitioner of pension that had lawfully accrued over the intervening period.

Directions Issued

Allowing the writ petition, the Rajasthan High Court:

  • set aside the Armed Forces Tribunal's direction restricting arrears to 2019;
  • held that the petitioner was entitled to disability pension from the date of its discontinuation in 1980;
  • directed the respondents to calculate and release the entire arrears payable; and
  • ordered compliance within four months.

Why This Judgment Matters

  1. Protection Against Administrative Delay:- The judgment reinforces an important constitutional principle that government inaction cannot extinguish vested statutory rights. Public authorities cannot rely upon their own delay to deny lawful benefits.
  2. Strong Recognition of Disability Pension Rights:- The ruling reiterates that disability pension is an enforceable legal entitlement flowing from military service and sacrifice, not a matter of governmental generosity.
  3. Strengthening the Doctrine of Continuing Cause of Action:- The Court recognised that pension claims are continuing in nature. Every month during which pension is unlawfully withheld gives rise to a fresh cause of action, preventing legitimate claims from being defeated by procedural delays. 
  4. A Welfare-Oriented Interpretation:- The judgment adopts a humane and rights-based approach to disability pension laws, ensuring that former servicemen who have acquired disabilities are not left without support because of bureaucratic indifference.

DRI Commentary

This decision is an important contribution to disability rights jurisprudence, even though it arises in the context of military pension law. At its core lies a broader legal principle that resonates across disability law: the State cannot deprive a person with disability of a statutory entitlement because public authorities failed to perform their legal duties.

The High Court rightly recognised that the petitioner's disability did not begin when the Medical Board finally examined him decades later. The Board merely confirmed what had existed throughout. Restricting arrears to the date of reassessment would therefore have rewarded administrative lethargy while punishing the individual whose rights the law was intended to protect.

The ruling is equally significant for reaffirming that disability pension is an incident of service and a matter of dignity, not charity. By directing payment of nearly 46 years of arrears, the Court restored not only the petitioner's financial entitlement but also the principle that governmental delay cannot override justice.

The judgment is likely to serve as an important precedent for similarly placed ex-servicemen whose disability benefits have been withheld because mandatory medical reviews or administrative procedures were not undertaken in time.


Supreme Court Moves Beyond Welfare: Ensures Social Security, Dignity and Rehabilitation for Visually Impaired Man Living in Extreme Poverty

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench:  Hon’ble Chief Justice Surya Kant and Hon’ble Justice V. Mohana
Case Title: In Re: Ensuring Basic Human Dignity and Social Security for Differently Abled Citizens Living in Extreme Poverty and Other Ancillary Issues
Case No.: Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 18 of 2026
Neutral Citation: Not Available
Decided on: 16 June 2026

Background

In an important suo motu intervention, the Supreme Court took cognisance of media reports concerning the plight of Japa Bhue, a man who has been blind since birth, and his 80-year-old mother Radhika Bhue, who were living in extreme poverty in Odisha despite being eligible for multiple government welfare schemes.

Treating the issue as one involving constitutional rights rather than an isolated grievance, the Court registered suo motu proceedings to examine whether the State had discharged its obligation to ensure social security, dignity, and basic human necessities for persons with disabilities living in conditions of extreme vulnerability.

The proceedings underscore that constitutional guarantees cannot remain merely theoretical where persons with disabilities are unable to access welfare schemes because of poverty, disability, age, or administrative barriers.

Issues Before the Court

The Supreme Court examined whether:

  • State authorities had failed to provide social security and welfare benefits to the visually impaired petitioner and his elderly mother.
  • The constitutional guarantee of dignity under Articles 14 and 21 requires proactive State intervention for persons with disabilities living in poverty.
  • Disability pensions, old-age pensions, housing assistance, healthcare and other welfare entitlements had actually reached the beneficiaries.
  • Immediate and long-term measures were necessary to restore dignity and ensure rehabilitation.

Court's Observations

1. Right to Life Includes the Right to Live with Dignity: The Court reiterated that Article 21 is not confined to mere survival. Persons with disabilities are entitled to live with dignity, security and basic necessities. The Bench recognised that individuals living with both disability and extreme poverty often cannot independently navigate complex governmental procedures to claim benefits.

2. Welfare Schemes Must Reach Beneficiaries:- The Court observed that creating welfare schemes is only the first step. Constitutional obligations are fulfilled only when eligible beneficiaries actually receive the intended assistance. Accordingly, the State was directed to verify whether every available benefit had been extended to the family.

3. Disability Rights Demand a Rights-Based Approach:- The proceedings reflect the continuing shift from a charity or welfare model towards a rights-based understanding of disability. The Court recognised that persons with disabilities are entitled to dignity, autonomy, participation and equal protection under the Constitution and disability law.

4. State Has a Positive Constitutional Duty:- The judgment recognises that where disability intersects with poverty and old age, governments must proactively identify beneficiaries and facilitate access to social security instead of expecting vulnerable citizens to approach public authorities on their own.

Directions Issued

The Supreme Court directed the State of Odisha to:

  • File a detailed affidavit through an officer not below the rank of Additional Chief Secretary regarding disability pension, old-age pension, arrears, housing assistance and all other welfare benefits.
  • Ensure that all immediate basic amenities are provided to the mother and son pending further proceedings.
  • Enable the Odisha State Legal Services Authority to personally interact with the family and submit a report.
  • Coordinate with health authorities to provide any necessary medical assistance.
  • Consider engaging Japa Bhue as a Para-Legal Volunteer to create awareness among persons with disabilities regarding their legal rights and available welfare schemes, with payment of an appropriate honorarium consistent with minimum wage standards.

Why this Judgment Matters

Although passed in an individual case, the order carries wider significance for disability rights jurisprudence.

First, it recognises that disability and poverty are often intersecting forms of disadvantage requiring affirmative State action.

Secondly, it reinforces that Article 21 encompasses not only physical survival but also access to social security, housing, healthcare and conditions necessary for living with dignity.

Thirdly, the Court shifts the focus from the mere existence of welfare schemes to their effective implementation. Governments cannot claim compliance simply because schemes exist on paper; constitutional accountability requires ensuring that eligible persons actually receive the benefits.

Finally, the direction to engage the visually impaired petitioner as a Para-Legal Volunteer is particularly noteworthy. Rather than treating him merely as a recipient of welfare, the Court recognised his capacity to contribute meaningfully to disability rights awareness within the community. This reflects the modern understanding of persons with disabilities as rights holders and active participants in society.

Disability Rights India View

The order is a welcome reminder that constitutional equality is meaningful only when it reaches those living at the margins. Across India, many persons with disabilities remain excluded from pensions, housing schemes, healthcare and other statutory entitlements because of administrative inaccessibility, poverty and lack of institutional support.

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that governments have a positive obligation not merely to frame welfare schemes but to identify vulnerable persons, remove barriers to access, and ensure that constitutional promises translate into lived realities. The emphasis on rehabilitation, dignity and empowerment—rather than charity alone—marks another important step in the evolution of India's disability rights jurisprudence.

Read the Judgement in this Suo Motu case