Thursday, May 1, 2025

Supreme Court issues directions to make the process of Digital KYC accessible for persons With disabilities, declares it an integral part of fundamental right under Article 21

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan 
Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 289/2024 & W.P.(C) No. 49/2025
Case Title: Pragya Prasun v. Union of India & Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgement: 30 April 2025

Published on: May 1, 2025
By: Disability Rights India Team

Background

The proceedings before the Supreme Court arose from writ petitions filed by persons with disabilities highlighting accessibility barriers in the digital KYC and e-KYC verification processes used by several financial institutions, telecommunications providers and other service platforms. The petitioners argued that the design and functioning of these digital verification systems prevented persons with visual impairments and facial disfigurements from independently completing identity verification procedures.

According to the petitioners, many digital KYC mechanisms relied on technological requirements such as capturing live photographs, facial recognition and other verification steps that were not compatible with the needs of persons using assistive technologies. These systems often required actions such as blinking or visually aligning documents, which created significant barriers for persons with blindness or severe eye injuries.

The petitioners contended that such barriers effectively excluded persons with disabilities from accessing essential services including banking facilities, telecommunications connections and other digital governance platforms. They argued that this failure violated the obligations imposed on public authorities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which requires government institutions and regulated entities to ensure accessibility in information and communication technologies.

In a historic and far-reaching judgment delivered on April 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of India declared that the right to digital access is an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. This precedent-setting decision is a major milestone in the struggle for disability rights in India, specifically addressing the systemic digital exclusion faced by persons with disabilities (PwDs), especially those with visual impairments and facial disfigurements.

The judgment was delivered in two writ petitions:
Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 289/2024 and Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 49/2025  —filed by advocates and disability rights activists seeking digital accessibility in the e-KYC process for individuals with blindness and acid attack survivors.

Key Directions Issued by the Court

A two-judge bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan issued 20 binding directions that mark a significant overhaul of the digital architecture for service delivery, with inclusivity and accessibility at the center.

Here are some of the landmark directives:

Digital KYC Must Be Inclusive

  • The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) must issue new guidelines that incorporate alternative methods to verify "liveness" or live photographs, moving beyond the default “blinking of eyes” method.
  • Entities must now accept thumb impressions as valid authentication for visually impaired users during the e-KYC process.

Right to Reasonable Accommodation

  • All reporting entities (REs), whether public or private, are directed to adhere to accessibility standards, appoint digital accessibility nodal officers, and undergo periodic audits by certified professionals.
  • All apps, websites, and platforms must involve persons with visual impairments in user acceptance testing for any new digital service.

Mandatory Accessibility for Government and Private Services

  • All government websites and digital services must comply with Section 46 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016, which mandates both electronic and print media be accessible.
  • WCAG 2.1 and Guidelines for Indian Government Websites (GIGW) are now mandatory for all government platforms.

Communication and Service Delivery

  • Public services must provide information in alternative formats—including Braille, easy-to-read formats, and audio-described content.
  • Helplines, grievance redressal mechanisms, and human review of rejected KYC applications must be set up for PwDs.

Sensitization and Training

  • Disability awareness and inclusion modules must be part of training for employees of all regulated entities.
  • RBI is directed to monitor implementation and regularly conduct public awareness campaigns about inclusive KYC processes.

A Game-Changer for Digital Equality

This judgment unequivocally affirms that access to digital services is no longer a privilege—but a constitutional right, especially for persons with disabilities who have been persistently side-lined in India’s digital revolution. The Court has not only addressed the how (mechanisms and guidelines) but also the why—the deep need to treat persons with disabilities as equal citizens entitled to dignity, convenience, and autonomy.

This move will have far-reaching consequences across all sectors—from banking and governance to education and healthcare. It is a wake-up call to both government and private entities that accessibility is not an afterthought—it is a non-negotiable obligation under the law.

Next Steps and Accountability

As disability rights advocates, it is now essential to monitor the implementation of these directions and hold entities accountable. Civil society must collaborate with regulators, tech developers, and service providers to translate these orders into practice on the ground.

The judgment reinforces the principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and aligns with the Accessible India Campaign. It is now up to us—activists, organizations, and allies—to ensure that these rights are not just declared but delivered.

Download/Read the judgement 

Thursday, April 3, 2025

Railways Requires Compliance with RPwD Accessibility Standards for Accessible Transportation : CCPD Reviews Accessibility of Divyang Coaches

Court: Court  of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD)
Case No.: 14089/1103/2023
Case Title: Rakesh Kumar v. Secretary, Railway Board, Ministry of Railways
Date of Order: 03 April 2025

Background

The proceedings before the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities arose from a complaint filed by a person with disability regarding the accessibility of railway transport services. The complainant highlighted that certain railway services lacked essential accessibility features required under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

According to the complaint, Train Nos. 12324 (Howrah–Barmer) and 12323 (Barmer–Howrah) were operating without a Divyang-friendly coach, thereby preventing persons with disabilities from accessing the trains with adequate support facilities. The complainant submitted that the absence of such coaches limited the ability of persons with disabilities to travel independently and safely.

The complainant argued that such deficiencies effectively restricted access to railway services for persons with disabilities. It was contended that the failure to ensure accessible railway facilities undermined the statutory obligations imposed on transport authorities under the RPwD Act. 

Key Observations

The Chief Commissioner emphasised that access to transportation is an important component of social participation and independent living. Without accessible transport systems, persons with disabilities may face barriers in accessing employment, education and essential services.

The authority observed that the RPwD Act places obligations on governments and public transport providers to progressively ensure accessibility of transportation infrastructure. This includes the design of vehicles, stations and passenger facilities in a manner that accommodates the needs of persons with disabilities.

The Commissioner also examined the explanation provided by the railway authorities regarding the operational configuration of the trains and the ongoing electrification process affecting the availability of Divyang-friendly coaches.

Importantly, the CCPD noted that although accessibility concerns raised in the complaint were legitimate, the complaint did not satisfy the maintainability requirement of personal grievance under Rule 38 of the RPwD Rules, 2017. 

Directions Issued

  • The matter relating to the accessibility of Train Nos. 12323 and 12324 was reviewed in light of the accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act.
  • The Railway Board was advised to examine the accessibility status of the trains and consider providing Divyang-friendly coaches or alternate accessible arrangements.
  • Authorities were recommended to align railway accessibility measures with the Railway Accessibility Guidelines issued by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (12 March 2024).
  • The respondent authority was requested to submit an Action Taken Report within three months outlining the steps taken to address accessibility concerns. 

Commentary

The order underscores the important role that accessible transportation plays in enabling persons with disabilities to participate fully in society. Mobility is often a prerequisite for accessing employment, education, healthcare and community life. When transport systems remain inaccessible, persons with disabilities may face significant limitations in everyday activities.

Despite the statutory framework established by the RPwD Act, accessibility in railway transport continues to face practical challenges related to infrastructure, operational constraints and implementation timelines. These challenges often delay the realisation of accessible travel facilities across different routes and services.

By examining the accessibility concerns raised in the complaint and referring to the broader accessibility guidelines issued by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, the CCPD highlighted the continuing obligation of public transport authorities to move toward inclusive transport systems.

The order therefore contributes to the broader effort to ensure that accessibility principles are progressively integrated into the planning and operation of railway infrastructure. Accessible transport systems remain essential for enabling persons with disabilities to live independently and participate meaningfully in social and economic life.

Read the judgement [PDF 134  KB]

All Disabilities Must Get Equal Treatment: Supreme Court Strikes Down Discriminatory Retirement Policy

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan

Case Title: Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr. 

Case No.: Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).1091-1092/2023

Date of Judgement: 03 April 2025

Brief

In a landmark judgment reinforcing the principle of equality for persons with disabilities, the Supreme Court has ruled that prescribing different retirement ages based on the type of disability amounts to unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that all benchmark disabilities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) constitute a single homogenous class for the purposes of service-related benefits—and must be treated equally.

Case Background:

The case arose when Kashmiri Lal Sharma, an electrician with 60% locomotor disability, was compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board. However, under an Office Memorandum (OM) dated March 29, 2013, employees with visual impairments were permitted to serve up to 60 years of age. Aggrieved by this differential treatment, the appellant challenged the policy as arbitrary and discriminatory, invoking both the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and the RPwD Act, 2016.

After unsuccessful representations before the State Administrative Tribunal and the Himachal Pradesh High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Ruling:

A Bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan ruled in the appellant’s favour. The Court struck down the impugned policy, declaring that prescribing different retirement ages solely based on the nature of disability lacks any rational basis and violates Article 14.

“There is no intelligible differentia to justify extending the retirement age benefit to only one category of benchmark disability while denying it to others. Such discrimination is arbitrary,” the Court observed.

The Court emphasized that all benchmark disabilities listed under the 1995 and 2016 disability laws must receive uniform service benefits, including retirement age.

Reference to Precedent:

The Bench relied on its earlier approval of the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014), which also upheld the principle of parity in service benefits across all recognized disability categories.

Relief Granted:

While the State had later withdrawn the 2013 OM on November 4, 2019, the Court held that the appellant had a legitimate expectation to continue in service until that withdrawal. As a result, the Court ruled:

“The appellant shall be entitled to the benefit of continuance in service until 04.11.2019. He is also entitled to full wages from 01.10.2018 to 04.11.2019, along with all consequential benefits impacting his pension.”

The Court thus partly allowed the appeal and set aside the Himachal Pradesh High Court’s decision dated 28.07.2021, which had earlier upheld the retirement.

Significance:

This judgment is a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory mandate of non-discrimination in employment policies affecting persons with disabilities. It sends a strong message that disability-based classifications in service benefits must meet the test of reasonableness and equality.

The decision underscores the spirit of the RPwD Act, which aims to ensure equal opportunity, protection of rights, and full participation of persons with disabilities in all spheres of life—including public employment.

Read the Judgement

Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr. 

Wednesday, April 2, 2025

Delhi HC Clarifies CCPD’s Powers Under RPwD Act, 2016: Interim Recommendations Are Binding Unless Validly Rejected

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar
Case Title: Mukesh Kumar vs. National Power Training Institute & Ors.
Case No.: LPA 980 of 2024
Date of Judgment: 02 April 2025
Relevant Law: Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (Sections 75 and 76)
Cases Referred:

Introduction

In a significant judgment delivered on 2 April 2025, the Delhi High Court examined the powers and authority of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act), especially regarding the issuance of interim recommendations in service-related matters.

One of the important mandate of the CCPD is to provide a platform for Persons with Disabilities (PwDs) to raise their grievances against the government and even private bodies. The CCPD and its state counterparts (SCPDs) have continuously discharged an important function: lending a sensitive ear to the plights of persons with disabilities that are often overlooked in our ableist world

However, for past several years (before the RPWD Act 2016), there was no clarity about the exact nature of CCPD's powers due to conflicting judgements from different courts. Many of then simply stayed the CCPD's judgements citing  it had no power to issue injunctions. More recently, it got further complicated and also important. The boiling questions for example were: 

  • Can the CCPD interfere in service matters? This becomes critical as more than 70% of the grievances received by the CCPD office pertains to service conditions/ matters. 
  • If the CCPD passes an order directing an authority to do something, is that authority bound to follow it? This is even more relevant since the CCPD offers something that other tribunals/bodies do not really have with them : the expertise in the domain of disability rights, and a decision informed by empathy and understanding. And therefore, if a CCPD order is given no binding power whatsoever, the society effectively loses on this deep expertise and empathy-informed decision making. 

Through this judgment, the Delhi High Court has clarified the law on both these questions. Most importantly, it has held that the CCPD's recommendations are binding on respondent-authorities, with the only narrow exception where valid reasons exist for not accepting such recommendations. The judgment doesn't go in to detail explaining what circumstances would constitute a 'valid reason' for the same. 

On the tricky question of service matters, the Court held that generally speaking, service matters are something between an employer and an employee. However, of course, if the employer violates any rights available to a PwDs under the 2016 Act, the CCPD can look into it. Similarly, the CCPD can issue (binding) recommendations on more general matters (as compared to individual cases) such as when an organisation has not reserved PwD seats where it was required to do so. 

Facts of the Case

The appellant, Mukesh Kumar, a government employee with locomotor disability, was posted at the National Power Training Institute (NPTI), Faridabad. He was transferred to NPTI's regional centre at Durgapur, which he challenged as being unreasonable, discriminatory, and in violation of his rights under the RPwD Act.

Alleging mala fide intent and harassment due to frequent transfers, he filed a complaint before the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD). The CCPD, after preliminary review, directed the Institute to keep the transfer order in abeyance. NPTI challenged this direction before a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, who set aside the CCPD’s order, prompting the present intra-court appeal.

Issues Considered

  1. Whether the CCPD can interfere in service matters such as transfers under the RPwD Act?
  2. Whether orders or recommendations of the CCPD are binding on authorities?
  3. Whether the CCPD can issue interim directions during the pendency of proceedings?

Court’s Analysis and Findings

The Court undertook a comparative reading of the 1995 and 2016 disability laws. Under the 1995 Act, the Chief Commissioner’s powers were primarily recommendatory and lacked enforceability. However, the 2016 Act brought a “remarkable change”, especially under Section 76, which prescribes that authorities must provide valid reasons if they choose not to implement the recommendations made by the Chief Commissioner.

The Court observed:

“The law now mandates not merely that the recommendations be considered, but that they are presumed to be binding unless compelling reasons are given for their non-acceptance.”

It further clarified that even interim recommendations—like directing an employer to defer a transfer—are within the scope of CCPD’s authority, provided they are aimed at preventing potential violations of rights under the RPwD Act.

Importantly, the judgment reaffirms that service-related matters, while generally the employer’s domain, become subject to the scrutiny of the CCPD if they infringe upon statutory rights of persons with disabilities, including the right to non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation.

Final Order

The Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the earlier Single Judge order. It held that:

  • The CCPD’s direction to keep the transfer in abeyance should be treated as an “interim recommendation” under Sections 75 and 76 of the RPwD Act.
  • The respondent, National Power Training Institute, is bound to consider this interim recommendation and, if rejecting it, must furnish valid reasons to both the CCPD and the complainant, Mukesh Kumar.

Significance of the Judgment

This is a landmark clarification on the enforceability of the CCPD’s role under the RPwD Act, 2016:

  • Affirms the CCPD’s powers to intervene and issue interim relief.
  • Elevates the status of its recommendations from mere advice to conditionally binding directives.
  • Empowers persons with disabilities with a more robust and responsive mechanism for redress.

The ruling strengthens the quasi-judicial character of the office of the Chief Commissioner and reinforces the statutory teeth of the RPwD Act, particularly in employment and service-related disputes involving persons with disabilities.

Read the Judgment below:



Monday, March 3, 2025

Supreme Court Upholds Equal Access to Judicial Services for Persons with Disabilities [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan

Case Title:  Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, Vs. The Registrar General , The High Court of Madhya Pradesh  (Suo-Motu)

Case No.: SMW(C) No. 2/2024  (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2 of 2024

Date of Judgement: 03 March 2025

Brief: 

In a landmark judgment delivered on March 3, 2025, the Supreme Court of India reaffirmed the rights of persons with disabilities (PWDs) by holding that no candidate can be denied consideration for judicial service recruitment solely due to their disability. The ruling strikes down discriminatory provisions and upholds the principles of equality and affirmative action enshrined in the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

A Victory for Inclusive Judiciary

The judgment is a significant milestone in the journey toward an inclusive and equitable judicial system. The Supreme Court explicitly held that persons with disabilities must not face discrimination while seeking employment in the judiciary and that the state is responsible for ensuring an inclusive framework. The Court emphasized that any indirect discrimination—such as unreasonable cutoffs or procedural barriers—must be removed to uphold substantive equality.

By striking down a provision in the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Rules that barred visually impaired and low vision candidates from judicial service, the Court has sent a strong message against systemic exclusion. The ruling makes it clear that visually impaired candidates are fully eligible to participate in the selection process for judicial positions.

Key Highlights of the Judgment

  • The Supreme Court invalidated Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Services Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Services) Rules, 1994, which disqualified visually impaired candidates.

  • Rule 7, which imposed additional requirements such as a three-year practice period or a minimum of 70% aggregate marks, was also struck down to the extent that it discriminated against PWD candidates.

  • The Court held that reasonable accommodations must be provided to PWD candidates during the recruitment process, in line with the RPwD Act, 2016.

  • The judgment extends relief to PWD candidates in Rajasthan who were denied a separate cutoff in the Rajasthan Judicial Service preliminary exams, ensuring they will be considered in future recruitments.

Background of the Case

The case originated when the mother of a visually impaired candidate wrote to then-Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud about the exclusion of her son from the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination. Taking cognizance of the matter, the Supreme Court converted the letter into a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court subsequently issued notices to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the Union of India.

The issue gained prominence after the Civil Judge Class-II examination in 2022 failed to provide reservation slots for visually impaired candidates, contradicting the provisions of the RPwD Act. Interim measures were taken by the Court to ensure participation of visually impaired aspirants, but their selection was made subject to the final outcome of the case.

A Step Forward for Disability Rights

The judgment underscores a rights-based approach to disability inclusion in the judiciary. It affirms that disability is not a limitation but a social barrier that must be addressed through reasonable accommodations and affirmative action. The Court recognized that once recruited, judicial officers with disabilities must be provided the necessary training and support to discharge their duties effectively.

The ruling aligns with Section 34 of the RPwD Act, which mandates reservation for PWDs in government jobs, including judicial positions. Senior Advocate Gaurav Agarwal, acting as Amicus Curiae, argued that the Madhya Pradesh Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, already provide for a 6% reservation in state services, further reinforcing the need for compliance with disability rights legislation.

Implications for the Future 

The Supreme Court’s verdict sets a crucial precedent for other states and institutions in India. It reaffirms that arbitrary barriers preventing PWDs from equal participation in public service must be dismantled. Moreover, it highlights the judiciary’s commitment to ensuring substantive equality for persons with disabilities.

For aspiring judges with disabilities, this ruling is a ray of hope. It not only paves the way for their rightful inclusion in the legal profession but also strengthens the foundation of a truly representative and diverse judiciary.

This judgment is a reminder that the fight for disability rights is far from over, but each legal victory brings us closer to a more inclusive society.

Judgement

Read the Judgement below:

Thursday, February 20, 2025

Hyper-Technical Recruitment Rules Cannot Override Disability Rights: Delhi High Court Upholds Relief to Disabled Candidate

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Ajay Digpaul
Case No.: W.P.(C) 2238/2025
Case Title: Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) v. Sumit
Date of Judgment: 20 February 2025

The Delhi High Court has reaffirmed that procedural technicalities cannot be used to deny reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities in public employment. Dismissing a challenge filed by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, the Court upheld relief granted to a candidate with 63% orthopaedic disability who had been denied exemption from a qualifying typing test despite being otherwise eligible for such exemption. The Court ruled that rigid insistence on procedural formalities must give way where it defeats the substantive guarantees of equality, inclusion and reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Background

The dispute arose from recruitment to the post of DASS Grade IV conducted by DSSSB. Candidates were required to clear a typing skill test, which was only qualifying in nature. Merit for final selection depended entirely on marks obtained in the written examination.

The respondent, who has 63% permanent orthopaedic disability affecting his left elbow joint, appeared for the typing test but failed to qualify. He later asserted that he had requested exemption during the examination because pain and restricted movement in his left arm prevented him from completing the test effectively. However, he did not physically produce his disability certificate before the examiner at that time.

Subsequently, DSSSB granted exemption from the typing test to several other candidates with orthopaedic disabilities who had submitted the required disability documents. Many of those candidates had scored lower marks than the respondent in the written examination but were nevertheless selected.

Aggrieved by the denial of similar accommodation, the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking exemption from the typing test and consideration for appointment on the basis of his written examination performance. The Tribunal accepted his claim and directed DSSSB to extend the benefit of exemption. DSSSB then challenged the Tribunal’s order before the High Court.

Findings of the High Court

The High Court refused to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision. It noted that DSSSB itself did not dispute the genuineness of the respondent’s disability or his eligibility for exemption under the applicable Office Memorandum.

The Court emphasised that the typing test was merely qualifying in nature and had no bearing on comparative merit. Since the respondent had scored higher than several candidates who ultimately received appointments after being granted exemption, denying him the same accommodation solely on procedural grounds would produce an arbitrary and exclusionary result.

Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC and Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that disability rights jurisprudence requires a liberal, purposive and rights-based interpretation of legal and administrative provisions.

The Bench strongly cautioned against hyper-technical application of procedural requirements in disability matters. It observed that insisting upon strict procedural compliance in every situation may defeat the very purpose of reasonable accommodation and undermine the protective framework established under the RPwD Act.

Importantly, the Court accepted that the respondent had in fact sought exemption during the typing test. In these circumstances, refusing accommodation merely because the disability certificate was not physically shown at that precise moment would amount to elevating form over substance.

At the same time, the Court clarified that its ruling turned on the specific facts of the case and should not be read as dispensing with procedural requirements altogether in all disability-related matters.

Directions

  • The writ petition filed by DSSSB was dismissed.
  • The Tribunal’s order granting exemption from the typing test was upheld.
  • The respondent became entitled to consideration for appointment according to his written examination merit, subject to the limitations imposed by the Tribunal regarding consequential benefits.

Commentary

This judgment significantly strengthens the principle that reasonable accommodation cannot be reduced to a mechanical administrative formality. The Court recognised that once the existence of disability and entitlement to accommodation were undisputed, procedural lapses could not be used as a tool to exclude a disabled candidate from public employment.

The ruling also advances the shift in Indian disability jurisprudence from formal equality to substantive equality. The Court acknowledged that recruitment systems designed around able-bodied assumptions often create barriers for persons with disabilities unless authorities adopt a flexible and disability-sensitive approach.

Equally important is the Court’s reaffirmation that reasonable accommodation is not a concession or discretionary benefit. It is a statutory and constitutional obligation flowing from dignity, equality, inclusion and equal participation under the RPwD Act and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

By rejecting a hyper-technical interpretation of procedural rules, the judgment sends a clear message that administrative processes must serve the objectives of disability rights law rather than frustrate them. At the same time, the Court carefully balanced inclusion with administrative discipline by limiting the ruling to the peculiar facts before it.

The decision therefore stands as an important precedent for inclusive recruitment practices and reinforces that procedural frameworks must operate in harmony with the substantive rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities.

Read the Judgement


Friday, February 7, 2025

Accessibility in Residential Societies: Delhi High Court’s Narrow Reading of the RPwD Act Overlooks Housing as a Public Facility

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Hon’ble Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Hon’ble Justice Amit Mahajan
Case Title : Jayant Singh Raghav v. Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors.
Case No.: W.P.(C) 7642/2022
Date of Decision: 7 February 2025
Citation: 2025:DHC:906-DB

Background

DRI had earlier covered this matter when the Delhi High Court issued notice concerning accessibility in residential societies. The case arose from the efforts of Jayant Singh Raghav, a person with 100% visual impairment, to secure accessibility in Chandanwari Apartments, Dwarka, where he resides.

The case has now culminated in a judgment which holds that the statutory obligation under Section 45 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) to make existing public buildings accessible does not extend to an old private residential apartment complex.

While the judgment records the several accessibility improvements undertaken by the Society during the proceedings, its reasoning raises serious concerns from the perspective of the broader statutory scheme of the RPwD Act, the Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India – 2021 (HG-2021), Article 21 of the Constitution and India's obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD).

In our view, the judgment adopts an unduly narrow interpretation of the accessibility framework, particularly because Section 2(x) of the RPwD Act expressly includes “housing” within “public facilities and services”—a provision which does not appear to have been considered in the judgment.

The case before the Court

The petitioner had complained before the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities alleging violation of accessibility requirements in the residential complex.

The State Commissioner, by order dated 8 September 2021, directed the DDA to conduct an access audit of Chandanwari Apartments and required the Society to ensure accessibility in common areas and lift areas, including appropriate signage and tactile facilities.

The Society subsequently undertook several measures, including installation of tactile pavers, handrails and a reserved parking space. The petitioner, however, remained dissatisfied and continued to pursue the matter.

During the High Court proceedings, further accessibility measures were undertaken. These included installation of a talk-back system and braille markings in lifts, tactile pavers, ramps and other improvements. The DDA's inspection report recorded, among other things, installation of a ramp, braille markings and a floor announcement system in one of the lifts.

A meeting facilitated by the High Court in August 2024 identified as many as 38 issues relating to accessibility. These covered lifts, tactile pathways, ramps, handrails, signage, lighting, parking, accessible entrances, common facilities, the RWA office, parks, roads and other aspects of the residential environment.

The Delhi High Court's reasoning

The principal issue before the Court was whether the existing residential complex, constructed in the 1990s, was required to be retrofitted in accordance with the accessibility framework under the RPwD Act.

The petitioner relied, inter alia, on Section 45 of the RPwD Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, contending that the buildings were required to be made accessible.

The Court focused on Section 2(w) of the RPwD Act, which defines “public building” as a Government or private building used or accessed by the public at large.

It reasoned that entry into a residential apartment complex is restricted to bona fide residents and persons authorised by them, such as guests, visitors and domestic help. The Court therefore held that the residential buildings in question were not “public buildings” within the meaning of Section 2(w) and Rule 15(1)(a).

The Court consequently held that Section 45, which specifically refers to existing public buildings, did not apply to the residential complex. It observed that although accessibility improvements may be desirable, it was not mandatory to retrofit the existing residential buildings by virtue of Section 45.

The Court also held that buildings completed and occupied before the Unified Building Bye-Laws, 2016 came into force were not required to be modified or rebuilt in accordance with those later bye-laws.

But Section 2(x) expressly includes “housing”

This is the most significant concern with the judgment.

The Court's analysis focuses on whether the apartment complex is a “public building” under Section 2(w). However, Parliament has created a separate statutory category in Section 2(x): “public facilities and services.”

Section 2(x) expressly provides:

“public facilities and services” includes all forms of delivery of services to the public at large, including housing, educational and vocational trainings, employment and career advancement, shopping or marketing, religious, cultural, leisure or recreational, medical, health and rehabilitation, banking, finance and insurance, communication, postal and information, access to justice, public utilities, transportation.

The inclusion of housing is explicit.

It is therefore difficult to understand why the accessibility of residential housing should be determined solely by asking whether the building is a “public building” under Section 2(w), without separately considering the statutory recognition of housing as a public facility or service. This is not a distinction without substance.

“Public building” and “public facilities and services” are different statutory concepts

Section 2(w) defines a public building.

Section 2(x), separately, defines public facilities and services, expressly including housing.

The fact that a residential building may not satisfy the definition of a “public building” under Section 2(w) does not, by itself, answer the separate question of the applicability of the accessibility framework to housing as a public facility or service.

The Delhi HC judgment, however, appears to have treated the Section 2(w) analysis as effectively determinative of the issue.

In our view, this leaves a significant part of the statutory scheme unexamined.

The Harmonised Guidelines themselves expressly cover residential buildings

There is an additional and important reason why the issue cannot be reduced to the definition of “public building”.

The Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India – 2021 (HG-2021) expressly recognise residential buildings as a building typology.

The Guidelines' Table 6.1 includes under “Residential Buildings”:

  • public housing including low-income housing;
  • apartments;
  • independent housing/builder floors;
  • group housing;
  • gated communities;
  • old age homes;
  • youth hostels;
  • working women/men hostels;
  • Dharamshalas;
  • co-living spaces; and others.

In other words, apartments, group housing and gated communities—the very forms of housing with which the present case is concerned—are expressly contemplated by the national accessibility guidelines.

This is important because Rule 15(1)(a) of the RPwD Rules specifically refers to the standards for public buildings contained in HG-2021. The Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities confirms that the HG-2021 was notified under Rule 15.

Table 6.2 goes considerably further

The significance of HG-2021 becomes even clearer in Table 6.2: “Minimum Accessibility Provisions in Different Building Occupancies”

For residential buildings, the Guidelines prescribe minimum accessibility provisions including:

a. Common and communal areas:
All common and communal areas—such as approaches, entrances/exits, lifts, stairs, lobbies, clubs, religious facilities, parking, sports facilities, parks and recreation areas, together with associated sanitary and other facilities—are required to meet accessibility requirements.

b. Accessible houses:
5% of houses must be accessible, preferably on the ground floor, supported by an appropriate allotment policy.

c. Universal design in the remaining houses:
The remaining 95% of houses are to incorporate minimum universal-design features, including minimum clear door widths at the main entrance, rooms, kitchen and at least one toilet/sanitary room, together with a bedroom.

d. Adaptable sanitary facilities:
The relevant toilet and sanitary room is to have access from the living/drawing room and comply with prescribed dimensions to enable occupants to adapt it to their needs, facilitating ageing-in-place and a disability-friendly environment.

e. Accessible recreational spaces:
Open spaces for play and recreation are to be accessible to children, elderly persons and others with special needs.

f. Adaptability of all housing:
Most significantly, all housing is to be designed and implemented with a concept of adaptability, so that spaces and elements can subsequently be retrofitted for adaptive functions according to the needs of persons with disabilities, elderly persons and persons with vulnerable health conditions.

These are not merely abstract principles. They specifically contemplate residential housing, common areas and future adaptation of housing for disability-related needs.

The significance of reading these provisions together

The statutory and regulatory framework therefore presents a much broader picture:

ProvisionRelevance
Section 2(w), RPwD ActDefines “public building”
Section 2(x), RPwD ActDefines “public facilities and services” and expressly includes housing
Section 40, RPwD ActProvides for accessibility standards for the physical environment and other facilities and services
Section 44, RPwD ActRequires accessibility compliance before building permission/completion certification
Section 45, RPwD ActDeals specifically with accessibility of existing public buildings
Rule 15, RPwD RulesPrescribes accessibility standards
HG-2021, Table 6.1Specifically identifies residential buildings including apartments, group housing and gated communities
HG-2021, Table 6.2Prescribes minimum accessibility provisions for residential buildings
HG-2021, Table 6.2(f)Requires adaptability of all housing, including the possibility of future retrofitting

This makes it problematic, in our view, to treat the absence of “public building” status as the end of the accessibility inquiry.

The accessibility framework itself expressly contemplates residential housing.

Section 45 is not the whole accessibility story

It is important to make one legal distinction clear.

The Delhi High Court may be correct that the specific language of Section 45, which refers to “existing public buildings”, does not automatically impose a five-year retrofit mandate on every old private residential building.

But that does not necessarily mean that private residential housing falls outside the accessibility framework of the RPwD Act altogether.

The broader question is what obligations arise from the Act's provisions concerning public facilities and services, accessibility standards, building permissions, service providers, reasonable accommodation, universal design and community life, read together with the applicable standards.

The judgment's conclusion that “it is not mandatory to retrofit the buildings” under Section 45 should therefore not be read as establishing a general proposition that accessibility is merely optional in private residential communities.

That would go much further than what Section 45 itself says.

Accessibility is fundamental to independent living

The deeper problem with a purely building-centric approach is that it overlooks the lived reality of disability. For a person with a disability, a home is not merely the four walls of an apartment.

The ability to live independently may depend upon being able to:

  • reach the building entrance from the road or parking area;
  • enter the building without encountering steps or other barriers;
  • independently use the lift;
  • move along common corridors and pathways;
  • access parking;
  • use community and recreational facilities;
  • access religious or cultural facilities within the complex; and
  • participate in the ordinary social life of the residential community.

An inaccessible route from parking to the lift can make an otherwise accessible apartment effectively inaccessible.

A lift without appropriate accessibility features can mean that a resident cannot independently reach their own home.

A barrier at the entrance to a community facility can prevent a resident from participating in the life of the very community in which they live.

The accessibility of the residential environment is therefore inseparable from the right to live independently.

Article 21: Accessible housing and the right to live with dignity

This also brings the issue squarely within the constitutional framework.

Article 21 protects not merely physical existence but a life of dignity, autonomy and meaningful participation.

For persons with disabilities, accessibility is a precondition for exercising those rights. The question is not simply whether a person has been provided with a physical dwelling. The question is whether they can enter it, leave it, move within it and participate in the surrounding community independently and with dignity.

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence under Article 21 has recognised the importance of the conditions necessary for meaningful life and mobility. The Allahabad High Court has now expressly applied this constitutional principle to residential community living.

Allahabad High Court: Accessibility in Residential Complexes is a Fundamental Right

The significance of the Delhi judgment is heightened by a subsequent decision of the Allahabad High Court in M/s SCC Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Others, WP(C) No. 5663 of 2026, decided on 26 February 2026.

DRI has separately reported this important judgment. DRI's coverage of the Allahabad High Court judgment.

The case concerned a homebuyer with 90% locomotor disability whose allotted parking space in a residential project had subsequently been divided, adversely affecting her convenient access to the lift.

The Allahabad High Court took a significantly broader approach. It held that the right to accessibility cannot be confined to public places and extends to structures involving community living.

The Court recognised accessibility to common facilities in residential buildings—including parking, lifts, pavements, playgrounds, community centres and gymnasiums—as a fundamental right of persons with disabilities under Article 21.

The Court also directed the authorities in Uttar Pradesh to incorporate accessibility requirements in housing projects and to ensure compliance at the stages of building permission and completion certification.

This is a significant constitutional development. It recognises a simple but fundamental proposition:

A person's home does not end at the front door of the apartment. The residential environment is an integral part of the person's home and community life.

The UNCRPD perspective

The narrow approach in the Delhi judgment is also difficult to reconcile with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which the RPwD Act was enacted to implement.

The long title of the RPwD Act expressly states that it is legislation enacted to give effect to the UNCRPD.

The Convention places accessibility, equality, dignity, autonomy, participation and independent living and inclusion in the community at the centre of the disability-rights framework.

Accessibility therefore cannot logically be limited to places that a person visits.

For a person with a disability, the ability to live in a home and participate in the community on an equal basis is at the heart of independent living.

A narrow interpretation under which accessibility protection substantially ends once a person crosses into a private residential community sits uneasily with this rights-based understanding.

The irony of the present case

There is also an important irony in the present case.

Although the Delhi High Court ultimately declined to issue further directions, the litigation itself resulted in substantial accessibility improvements.

The Society undertook measures relating to tactile pathways, braille buttons, talk-back systems, ramps, signage, lighting, parking, accessible entrances and other common facilities. The Court itself acknowledged that extensive efforts had been made by the Society to make modifications and improvements for the convenience of the petitioner. These improvements are welcome.

But accessibility in residential communities should not depend solely upon the goodwill of a housing society—or upon the ability and persistence of an individual person with disability to undertake prolonged litigation.

Accessibility should be understood as a right, supported by clear and enforceable standards.

DRI's View

The Delhi High Court judgment is important, but in our respectful view, its interpretation of the RPwD Act is unduly narrow and warrants reconsideration.

The Court's conclusion that Section 45's specific requirement concerning existing “public buildings” does not extend to an old private residential complex may follow from the language of Section 45.

However, the larger question of accessibility in residential housing cannot be answered merely by asking whether the building is a “public building” under Section 2(w).

Three aspects of the statutory and regulatory framework require attention.

First, Section 2(x) of the RPwD Act expressly includes housing within “public facilities and services”.

Second, the HG-2021 expressly covers apartments, group housing and gated communities and prescribes detailed minimum accessibility requirements for residential buildings—including accessible common areas, accessible housing units, universal-design features and adaptability for future retrofitting.

Third, accessibility is not merely a technical building requirement. For persons with disabilities, it is integral to dignity, autonomy, independent living and participation in community life, engaging Article 21 of the Constitution and the principles underlying the UNCRPD.

The subsequent Allahabad High Court judgment reinforces this rights-based approach by expressly recognising accessibility in residential community living as a fundamental right.

In our view, therefore, the Delhi judgment's failure to engage with Section 2(x), the residential provisions of HG-2021 and the constitutional dimension of accessible community living results in an interpretation that is difficult to reconcile with the object and spirit of the RPwD Act.

The larger question

The issue ultimately goes beyond the particular apartment complex in this case.

If Parliament has expressly included “housing” within “public facilities and services”, and the Government's own accessibility guidelines expressly cover apartments, group housing and gated communities, can residential accessibility be treated as merely optional because the building is not open to the public at large?

And, constitutionally:

Can the right to live independently and with dignity mean anything if a person with a disability cannot independently access the very environment in which they live?

For persons with disabilities, accessible housing is not a luxury or an additional amenity. It is a precondition for independent living.

The RPwD Act recognises housing within the framework of public facilities and services. HG-2021 recognises residential buildings and prescribes minimum accessibility and adaptability requirements. Article 21 protects life with dignity and autonomy. The UNCRPD recognises accessibility and independent living as central to equality and inclusion.

These principles should be read harmoniously—not placed in separate compartments.

The real test of an accessible India cannot merely be whether a person with a disability can enter a public building.

It must also be whether that person can get home—and live there independently, safely and with dignity.

That is why accessibility in residential societies is not merely a matter of building regulation.

It is a disability-rights issue, an independent-living issue, and a constitutional rights issue.

Read the Judgement

in Jayant Singh Raghav v. Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors.
W.P.(C) 7642/2022 dated 07 Feb 2025


Monday, February 3, 2025

Indian Supreme Court expands Access to Scribes in Examinations for All Persons with disabilities who need it, Benchmark threshold not a pre-requisite [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan

Case No. : W.P.(C) No. 1018/2022

Case Title: Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection

Date of Judgement: 03 February  2025

Background

The Supreme Court, in a significant ruling, has reaffirmed the rights of persons with disabilities (PwD) by allowing all disabled candidates to use scribes for writing exams, regardless of whether they meet the benchmark disability criteria. The decision comes in response to a writ petition filed by a candidate diagnosed with Focal Hand Dystonia, a chronic neurological condition, who was denied the facility of a scribe in various examinations.

The petitioner had a 25% permanent disability, certified by the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro-Sciences Centre (NIMHANS), Bangalore. Despite this, recruitment bodies refused him the accommodations typically granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD). He challenged the restrictive guidelines issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, which failed to ensure reasonable accommodation for candidates with disabilities below the 40% benchmark.

Supreme Court's Analysis and Decision

A Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan ruled in favor of the petitioner, citing key provisions of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act, 2016). The Court emphasized that restricting scribe facilities to only those with benchmark disabilities was discriminatory and contradicted the principle of reasonable accommodation.

The ruling referenced several landmark judgments, including:

  • Vikas Kumar v. UPSC (2021) – Held that denying a scribe to candidates below the benchmark disability threshold was discriminatory.

  • Avni Prakash v. NTA (2021) – Reinforced the importance of reasonable accommodation in examinations.

  • Arnab Roy v. Consortium of National Law Universities (2024) – Strengthened the principle of equality in educational assessments.

The Court also considered international precedents, such as Moore v. British Columbia (Education) and Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v. Bulgaria, which advocate for inclusive policies ensuring equal access to education and employment opportunities for disabled individuals.

Key Directives from the Supreme Court

To address inconsistencies in examination accommodations, the Court issued the following directives to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment:

  1. Revise the Office Memorandum (OM) dated August 10, 2022 – Remove restrictions and provide reasonable relaxations to all PwD candidates.

  2. Ensure uniform implementation – All examination authorities must strictly adhere to updated guidelines.

  3. Periodic sensitization programs – Educational institutions must conduct awareness programs to train examination officials on implementing disability accommodations.

  4. Establish a grievance redressal portal – A centralized platform should be created to handle accessibility-related complaints before legal escalation.

  5. Review and re-notify guidelines – Authorities must standardize scribe provisions across different examination bodies.

  6. Extend validity of scribe certification – Increase validity beyond the current six-month period to reduce administrative delays.

  7. Incentivize scribes – Provide training and financial incentives to ensure an adequate supply of scribes.

  8. Enhance candidate familiarity with scribes – Allow pre-exam interactions to ensure effective communication during tests.

  9. Offer multiple accessibility modes – Enable candidates to choose between scribes, braille, large print, or audio recording of answers.

  10. Penalize non-compliance – Take strict action against examination bodies that fail to implement the prescribed guidelines.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision marks a significant victory for disability rights in India. By extending scribe accommodations to all disabled candidates, the ruling ensures greater inclusivity and fairer opportunities in competitive examinations. This judgment reinforces the core principles of the RPwD Act, 2016, and underscores the importance of implementing reasonable accommodation as a legal and ethical obligation.

Read the Judgement

Tuesday, January 7, 2025

Delhi HC says, Medical Board Silence Generates Presumption of Attributability, in a Disability Pension Case of CRPF

 Disability Pension & Attributability Case 

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Ms. Justice Shalinder Kaur
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3227/2021
Date of Judgment: January 7, 2025
Citation: 2025:DHC:7-DB
Case Title: Kuldeep Singh v. Director General CRPF and Ors.

Cases Referred: Mohan Lal v. Union of India & Anr. (2018 SCC OnLine Del 11948); Manvir Singh v. Union of India (W.P.(C) 11442/2016); State of Jharkhand & Ors v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava & Anr. ((2013) 12 SCC 210); Union of India & Anr. v. Rajbir Singh ((2015) 12 SCC 264); Prahallad Mohanty v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P.(C) 28470/2013); Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India.


Summary and Brief Background

The petitioner joined the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as a Constable/ Driver on April 5, 1995, passing a thorough medical examination at the time of his selection and induction. In 1999, while deployed with the 52nd Battalion in Imphal, he suddenly experienced severe redness in his left eye, which was clinically diagnosed as a corneal ulcer. Although a Department Rehabilitation Board (DRB) initially found him fit to continue on light duties in 2003 , his condition progressively deteriorated.
On February 2, 2010, a Medical Board convened at the Composite Hospital, CRPF, New Delhi, declared the petitioner completely and permanently incapacitated for any form of active service as a combatant due to "Corneal Opacity with failed penetrating keratoplasty left eye". His permanent physical disability was evaluated at 40%. The respondents served him with a show-cause notice for invalidation. Despite his formal plea requesting to be retained in service for five more years to complete the 20-year threshold required for a regular pension, the authorities rejected his request and invalidated him out of service on April 21, 2010. Following his invalidation, his persistent requests for a statutory Disability Pension were ignored, forcing him to approach the High Court.

Core Arguments & Institutional Contradiction

  1. The Environmental Exclusivity Defence: The respondents contested the claim by arguing that the petitioner’s condition was fully covered under Category 'A' of Schedule-II of the Central Civil Services (Extraordinary Pension) Rules. They contended that because corneal ulcers and eye opacities are organic conditions not normally impacted by external service profiles or environmental stressors, his condition did not meet the criteria for a Disability Pension. Consequently, they claimed that granting him a standard invalidation pension under Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension) Rules fulfilled their statutory obligations.
  2. The Omission Contradiction: The petitioner argued that he entered the force in a completely healthy and uncompromised medical state. He highlighted that the Medical Board and the formal Invalidation Order omitted any administrative or clinical explanations indicating that the eye disease was either pre-existing, genetic, or dormant at the time of his recruitment. The petitioner notes the institutional contradiction where the force accepts that the medical deterioration occurred directly while on active service, yet refuses to acknowledge its attributability for pension benefits.

Key Issues Addressed

  • Whether an medical impairment arising during active military or paramilitary service can be denied a Disability Pension because the medical authorities omitted an explicit declaration regarding its attributability to service conditions.
  • Whether the state can ignore the statutory benefit of reasonable doubt and broad-banding principles when computing the financial components of an invalidation medical layout.

Observations & Findings of the Court

The Division Bench allowed the petition, explaining that administrative silence cannot be used to deny statutory disability benefits to paramilitary personnel:

The Presumption of Attributability: The Court reviewed the findings of the DRB and the Medical Board, noting that the authorities failed to record any evidence showing that the petitioner's eye condition was independent of his deployment. The Court ruled that when a soldier is certified as fully fit at induction and develops a debilitating disease during service, the condition is legally presumed to be attributable to or aggravated by service if the medical board remains silent on the cause:

 "The dictum of law clearly provides that in absence of any reason recorded by the Medical Board or the Invalidation Order, the petitioner cannot be denied the grant of Disability Pension."

The Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt: The Bench highlighted Rule 2 of the Guidelines for Conceding Attributability of Disablement or Death to Government Service under the Central Civil Service (Extraordinary Pension) Rules. This rule mandates that a liberal interpretation must be applied to support the service member:

"In deciding on the issue of entitlement, all the evidence (both direct and circumstantial) will be taken into account and the benefit of reasonable doubt will be given to the claimant. This benefit will be given more liberally to the claimant in field service cases"


Application of the Broad-Banding Principle: The Court analysed the financial computation rules under Rule 5(i) of the revised CCS (EOP) provisions. The statutory framework dictates a mandatory rounding-off system for establishing disability pension layers. Under these rules, any evaluated disability layout measured at "Less than 50%" must be rounded off to a base level of 50% for calculating the final disability pension element.

Directions Issued

Concluding that the rejection of the petitioner's disability benefits lacked legal basis, the High Court issued the following directions to the respondents:
  1. The respondents are ordered to grant a formal Disability Pension to the petitioner by legally rounding off his 40% medical disability rating to the 50% benchmark.
  2. The administration must finalize the re-computation calculations and release all outstanding pensionary benefits to the petitioner within two months from the date of the judgment.
  3. Due to the delay in filing the writ petition, the recovery of retroactive pension arrears was restricted. The respondents are directed to calculate and release the accumulated arrears commencing from a period three years prior to the date of filing the petition, with payments continuing regularly going forward.

Legal Disclaimer: The summaries provided on this platform are for informational and academic purposes, aimed at increasing awareness of disability legislation and rights across Indian jurisprudence.


Read the judgement in Kuldeep Singh v. DG CRPF and Ors.


Madras High Court Upholds Rights of Policeman Acquiring Disability, Orders Reinstatement

Court: Madras High Court, Madurai Bench

Bench: Justice R.VIJAYAKUMAR

Case No. W.P.(MD)No. 26560 of 2024

Case title: Ganesan   Vs. The Commandant, Tamil Nadu Special Police Force

Date of Judgement: 07 January 2025

Brief Summary

In a landmark judgment reinforcing disability rights in India, the Madras High Court has ordered the reinstatement of a visually impaired policeman who acquired his disability during service. Justice R. Vijayakumar, presiding over the Single-Judge Bench, ruled that the Tamil Nadu Special Police Force Nayak, discharged from service on medical grounds, must be reinstated with alternative employment and pay protection, as mandated by Section 20(4) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

Case Background

The petitioner, initially appointed as a Police Constable in 2010, sustained severe injuries to his head and eyes during election duty. Following the accident, his vision deteriorated, prompting his reassignment to light duty, which he performed for a decade. Despite his promotion to Nayak, a Medical Board later declared him completely unfit for service, leading to his discharge and eviction from government quarters.

Court’s Observations

The Bench noted that Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act prohibits the termination of employees who acquire disabilities during service and mandates their reassignment to suitable roles. The Police Department failed to provide evidence of exemption from this provision. The Court emphasized that the law applies to uniformed services, and the petitioner must be offered alternative employment with pay protection.

Judgment

The Court quashed the discharge order and directed the Police Department to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service, pay protection, and an alternative light-duty role.

This judgment underscores the commitment of Indian courts to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities, ensuring dignity, equal opportunity, and protection under the law.

Read or Download judgement: Ganesan v. The Commandant (W.P.(MD) No. 26560 of 2024)