When Medical Labels Become Barriers: Delhi High Court Protects UPSC Candidate with Locomotor Disability

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Justice  C. Hari Shankar and Justice Vinod Kumar
Case: Manish Kumar  Vs. Railway Board & Anr.
Case No.: W.P.(C): 18345/2025
Judgment: 08 September 2026
Earlier proceedings: O.A. No. 1409/2019, Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench
Result: CAT judgment and Railway Board's cancellation of candidature set aside.

A neurological condition causing locomotor disability cannot be used to disqualify a candidate who meets the functional requirements of the post.

By Advocate Subhash Chandra Vashishth

In a significant judgment on disability rights and public employment, the Delhi High Court has set aside the cancellation of the candidature of a UPSC Engineering Services Examination candidate whose locomotor disability arose from a neurological condition.

In Manish Kumar v. Railway Board & Anr., W.P.(C) 18345/2025, decided on 8 September 2026, a Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Vinod Kumar held that the Central Administrative Tribunal had erred in treating the petitioner as ineligible for recruitment to the Civil Engineering Service.

The case raises a larger question: Can a medical label become more important than a person's recognised disability, demonstrated functional ability and merit?

From a recognised locomotor disability to a "neurological" candidate

The petitioner had a disability certificate issued by Govind Ballabh Pant Hospital in 2012, certifying 45% permanent locomotor disability. The certificate was issued under the legal framework then applicable, including the 2001 Guidelines for Evaluation of Various Disabilities and Procedure for Certification.

Those Guidelines defined locomotor disability to include inability resulting from an affliction of the musculoskeletal and/or nervous system.

The petitioner's condition—Generalised Dystonia with Myoclonus—had neurological causes and manifested principally through his right upper limb, with some impact on speech. His disability, however, had been recognised and certified as locomotor disability.

He subsequently obtained a Government-issued UDID card recognising 45% locomotor disability.

There was also an important procedural development. After the enactment of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the petitioner obtained another certificate from IHBAS describing the condition as a temporary neurological disability. The petitioner's case was that this newer terminology could not erase or transform the already recognised underlying locomotor disability.

He cleared the UPSC examination. The problem came later.

The petitioner appeared for the Engineering Services Examination, 2017, under the PwD category.

He cleared the Preliminary Examination, Main Examination and Personality Test, securing Rank C-254. For the relevant Civil Engineering posts, the identified categories included OA (one arm affected) and the prescribed functional requirements included sitting, standing, bending, walking, seeing, reading, writing, communication and manipulation by fingers. The petition specifically asserted that the petitioner could perform these functions.

Yet, after clearing the examination, he was subjected to a Railway Board medical examination.

The Medical Board declared him unfit on the ground that “Generalised Dystonia with Myoclonus and Dysarthria” did not qualify within the physical disabilities identified under Annexure I of the ESE Rules, 2017.

He appealed.

The Appellate Medical Board again recognised his neurological condition. Importantly, however, the case record records that he was capable of performing the essential physical functions required for the post. Nevertheless, because the Board treated his condition as a neurological disability for which the relevant posts were not identified, his candidature was not considered.

The argument before the CAT

I represented the petitioner before the Central Administrative Tribunal, where the challenge to the cancellation of his candidature was heard as O.A. No. 1409/2019.

The central argument was that the authorities had fallen into a fundamental error by treating the neurological manifestations of the petitioner's condition as changing the nature of his recognised disability.

The case was not that the petitioner did not have a neurological condition. He did.

The case was that the neurological condition resulted in a locomotor disability, which had already been certified as such. The symptoms did not transform the petitioner's recognised locomotor disability into an entirely different category for the purpose of denying him an identified post.

The petition also pointed out that the neurological symptoms were episodic and that the petitioner remained capable of performing the essential functions of the post. What was required, therefore, was consideration of his functional ability and reasonable accommodation—not exclusion by nomenclature.

The CAT, however, dismissed the application on 27 September 2024, accepting the position that the petitioner's neurological disability did not fall within the identified PwBD categories for Civil Engineering services.

The intervention of the State Commissioner

An important piece of evidence before the High Court was the reasoned order of Shri TD Dhariyal, the then State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, Delhi, dated 18 May 2018, then .

The Commissioner recorded that the petitioner's neurological condition had primarily affected his right arm, with mild speech impairment, and that the condition did not appear to affect his functional ability to the extent that he could not perform the relevant work.

The Commissioner also directed that the disability certificate be corrected/reissued in the appropriate statutory form based on the 45% locomotor disability already assessed in 2012.

Thus, the record contained an important distinction between the medical cause of the impairment and the disability resulting from that impairment. We have seen in our practice that many a times the medical professionals focus more on aetiology of the disabling condition rather than the functional abilities and the disability category recognised in law for the purpose of job identification. This defeats the whole objective of issuance of a disability certificate. And in general there is a huge lack of awareness about neurological conditions among employers.

What did the High Court say?

The Delhi High Court considered five important factors, including:

• the Government-issued UDID recognising the petitioner as having 45% locomotor disability;
• the 2001 Government notification, which expressly included impairments arising from the nervous system within the definition of locomotor disability;
• medical evidence showing that the petitioner's neurological condition affected his movement;
• the order of the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities; and
• the Supreme Court's decision in Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services.

In Om Rathod, the Supreme Court had held that a person possessing a valid disability certificate cannot simply be subjected to another medical examination for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion contrary to the disability recorded in that certificate.

Applying these principles, the Delhi High Court held that the CAT had erred in treating the petitioner as ineligible for recruitment to the Civil Engineering Service.

The Court consequently quashed both the CAT's judgment dated 27 September 2024 and the Railway Board's decision cancelling the petitioner's candidature, and directed consequential relief.

Why this judgment matters

The case illustrates a recurring problem in disability assessment: the tendency to treat diagnostic terminology as if it were synonymous with disability classification and functional capacity.

A person may have a neurological condition. That condition may result in a locomotor disability. The existence of a neurological cause does not, by itself, mean that the person ceases to have a locomotor disability.

More importantly, a new or different medical description or aetiology cannot become a convenient route to exclusion when the person's disability has already been recognised and the person is demonstrably capable of performing the functions of the post.

The petition had specifically challenged the mechanical reliance on the nomenclature of the condition instead of examining the actual functional requirements of the job. It also invoked the RPwD Act's principles of equality, non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation in employment.

The facts make the point particularly stark: the candidate had cleared every stage of a highly competitive examination and secured Rank C-254; the medical record itself recognised his ability to perform the prescribed physical functions; yet his candidature was ultimately rejected because his condition was described under a category which the authorities considered not identified for the post.

Disability classification should enable rights, not become a tool for exclusion

The significance of Manish Kumar lies not merely in the relief granted to one candidate.

It is a reminder that medical assessment in recruitment must not become an exercise in finding a label that excludes a person with disability.

Where a disability has been duly certified, the assessment of suitability should focus on the actual functional requirements of the post, the individual's ability to perform those functions, and reasonable accommodation where required.

A neurological condition causing locomotor disability does not make the person less capable merely because medical terminology has evolved.

The law must look at the person, the disability and the functions of the job—not merely the label attached to the diagnosis.

Read the Judgement in Manish Kumar Vs. Railway Board & Anr

Delhi High Court Backs CCPD Concerns on SBI Promotion Policy, Orders Fresh Consideration of Barriers Faced by Blind Officers and examine alternative promotion pathways stressing that disability cannot be a ground to deny career advancement.

Published by: Disability Rights India (DRI)

Category: Employment Rights | Banking Sector | Reasonable Accommodation

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia
Case No.: W.P.(C) 6027/2025
Case Title: Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association v. State Bank of India & Others
Date of Judgment: 29 May 2026 

Background

More than three years after the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) found SBI's promotion policy discriminatory towards blind employees, the Delhi High Court has directed the State Bank of India to formally revisit the issue and examine solutions to prevent career stagnation of officers with visual disabilities.

The litigation was initiated by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA), challenging SBI's promotion policy that requires officers aspiring for promotion to Senior Management Grades (Scale IV and V) to first serve as Branch Managers or in Credit, Trade Finance or Forex assignments.

The Association argued that these assignments involve functions that are presently inaccessible to visually impaired officers because of the absence of assistive technology, inaccessible documentation systems, physical inspection requirements and unresolved questions of legal liability.

A Battle That Started Before the CCPD

This litigation did not emerge overnight.

The controversy traces its origins to proceedings initiated before the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) in 2022 by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA). The complaint challenged SBI's promotion policy on the ground that mandatory Branch Manager and Credit-related assignments effectively excluded blind officers from promotional opportunities because the duties associated with those roles were not accessible under existing systems and technologies.

After examining the issue, the CCPD accepted the core concerns raised by VIBEWA and held that the promotion criteria had the effect of disadvantaging visually impaired employees. The CCPD recommended that SBI modify its promotion policy, provide reasonable accommodation, recognise alternative assignments performed by blind officers and review exclusionary provisions that impeded career progression.

SBI, however, declined to implement the recommendations, resulting in the dispute eventually reaching the Delhi High Court.

Significantly, while the High Court stopped short of striking down the promotion policy, it accepted the legitimacy of the concerns underlying the CCPD proceedings. The Court noted that seemingly neutral promotion criteria can operate in a discriminatory manner against persons with disabilities and directed SBI's Board of Directors to reconsider the issue after examining detailed proposals to be submitted by VIBEWA.

Thus, nearly three-and-a-half years after the CCPD's intervention, the concerns first raised before the disability rights watchdog have now received judicial recognition from the Delhi High Court.

The Real Issue: Equal Criteria or Equal Opportunity?

The case raises a recurring question in disability rights jurisprudence: Does treating everyone identically always amount to equality?

SBI argued that the same promotion criteria apply to all officers and that several visually impaired officers are already performing the mandatory assignments.

VIBEWA, however, contended that equality cannot mean forcing blind officers to satisfy requirements that are designed around visual functions.

The Association pointed out that Branch Managers and Credit Officers are required to:

• Verify original title deeds and signatures;
• Conduct physical inspections of business premises and collateral properties;
• Monitor CCTV footage and strong rooms;
• Verify stocks and securities;
• Certify regulatory compliance carrying personal liability.

In the absence of accessible systems and clear accountability mechanisms, blind officers face barriers that their sighted counterparts do not. The result is not merely inconvenience—it is exclusion from promotion itself.

High Court Recognises the Principle of Indirect Discrimination

While the Court did not strike down SBI's policy, it accepted an important legal principle.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Leesamma Joseph and In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court recognised that a seemingly neutral rule can still operate in a discriminatory manner if it disproportionately disadvantages persons with disabilities.

The Court observed:

"Any provision that creates an impediment to the promotion of visually impaired officers would run contrary to the provisions of the RPwD Act."

This observation is significant because it shifts the focus from formal equality to substantive equality—the cornerstone of modern disability rights law.

Why the Court Did Not Strike Down the Policy

The Court ultimately refrained from invalidating the promotion criteria because it found that the Association had not placed before it sufficient details regarding specific officers adversely affected by the policy or concrete proposals capable of addressing SBI's operational concerns.

However, instead of rejecting the claim, the Court adopted a solution-oriented approach.

It directed VIBEWA to submit a comprehensive representation identifying affected officers, detailing the barriers they face, and proposing alternative pathways, accommodations and best practices adopted by other public sector banks. SBI's Board of Directors has been directed to examine these proposals and consider implementing feasible measures consistent with the RPwD Act.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment is important for reasons extending far beyond SBI.

First, it represents judicial recognition that career stagnation can itself amount to disability discrimination.

Second, it reinforces the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence that indirect discrimination is as harmful as explicit exclusion.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, it breathes fresh life into the CCPD's 2022 findings, which SBI had effectively ignored for over three years.

The Court has not given SBI a clean chit. Instead, it has required the country's largest public sector bank to engage with the concerns raised by blind employees, revisit the CCPD's recommendations, and seriously examine whether alternative pathways and reasonable accommodations can be devised.

For thousands of employees with disabilities working in the banking sector, the judgment sends a clear message: promotion policies cannot be insulated from scrutiny merely because they are framed in neutral language. If a rule creates barriers that prevent persons with disabilities from progressing in their careers, institutions must justify those barriers and actively seek solutions.

The next chapter of this battle will now unfold before SBI's Board of Directors.

Editor's Disclosure: The author of this blog post, Advocate Subhash Chandra Vashishth, represented the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA) in the proceedings before the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities that culminated in the CCPD's recommendations discussed in this article. The CCPD recommendations were covered in our blog post titled "Court of CCPD holds the SBI's Promotion Policy to grades of SMGS IV and SMGS V (2022-23) as discriminatory to employees with visual disabilities, recommends review" dated 01 Dec 2022.

Read the High Court Judgement  in VIBEWA Vs. SBI & Others

Brain vs. Eye: Delhi HC Rules Ocular Sight Not Required for Legal Roles under RPwD Act in Mudit Gupta v. Airport Authority of India case

Blindness Reservation & Sight Function Case

Court: High Court of Delhi

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Case No.: W.P.(C) 938/2025 & CM APPL. 4579/2025 (Connected with W.P.(C) 61/2025 & W.P.(C) 68/2025)

Case Title: Mudit Gupta v. Airport Authority of India and Anr. (Along with Amit Kumar & Ors v. Airport Authority of India and Deepak Arora & Anr v. Airport Authority of India)
Date of Judgment: October 16, 2025

Citation: 2025:DHC:9207-DB

Cases Referred: Government of India v. Ravi Prakash Gupta (2010) 7 SCC 626; Union of India v. National Federation of the Blind (2013) 10 SCC 772; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370; National Federation of the Blind v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan MANU/DE/7042/2023; In re. Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481; Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission (2011) 1 SCC 150; Ravi Kumar v. Department of Space 316 (2025) DLT 531; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Rathod Anil v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8114; Satyendra Kumar v. UOI 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9529; Pragati Kesharwani v. Union of India 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7924; Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission MANU/SC/0633/2025; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services MANU/SC/1172/2024; Dr (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar (2019) 20 SCC 17;  Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC 576.

Summary & Brief Background

The Airport Authority of India (AAI) issued Advertisement 03/2023 inviting applications for multiple executive-level vacancies, which legally allocated reserved slots under "Category A" for candidates who are blind or experience low vision. The petitioner, Mudit Gupta, who is completely blind, applied for the post of Junior Executive (Law), passed the competitive Computer Based Test (CBT), and was provisionally selected. However, during the document verification stage, AAI withheld his selection to determine whether he satisfied the functional requirements of "Reading & Writing" and "Seeing" stipulated in the advertisement table.

AAI subjected him to a medical examination layout at VMMC & Safdarjung Hospital, which certified that he could not clinically perform functions by "seeing". Invoking Note 8 of the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPWD) Notification dated January 4, 2021, AAI cancelled his candidature on the grounds of functional unsuitability. Identical cancellations occurred for Amit Kumar (aspiring to Junior Executive - Common Cadre) and Deepak Arora (aspiring to Junior Executive - Finance). The aggrieved petitioners filed a batch of writ petitions seeking to quash the cancellations and challenge the constitutional validity of Note 8.

Core Arguments & Institutional Contradiction 

a) The Clinical Ocular Defense: AAI maintained that every administrative post carries essential functional demands. They argued that since "seeing" was explicitly recorded as a foundational requirement, and a specialized medical board certified that the blind candidates could not physically see, the organization was fully justified in disqualifying them. AAI further contended that because the petitioners participated in the selection process with full knowledge of these functional filters, they were legally estopped from challenging the conditions after failing to receive a final appointment.

b) The Structural Reservation Contradiction: The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocate S.K. Rungta (who is himself blind), exposed a major systemic contradiction. They pointed out that the statutory Expert Committee, acting under Section 33 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act), had already reviewed these positions and explicitly identified them as suitable for blind individuals. Therefore, the statutory body had already determined that the functional duties of the office could be successfully handled by a blind officer. To deploy a cold medical exam to exclude a candidate based on the exact impairment for which the slot was reserved creates an absurd, self-defeating layout that nullifies legislative reservations. Strikingly, the Union of India itself supported the petitioners, noting that AAI had entirely misconstrued Note 8 to convert it into a tool of medical exclusion.

Key Issues Addressed

1. Whether an appointing establishment can legally utilize a clinical or medical examination to override statutory identification and disqualify a candidate based on a disability for which the post was explicitly reserved.
2. How the functional requirement of "seeing" must be interpreted within the protective, rights-based regime of the RPwD Act, 2016.
3. Whether the principle of estoppel strips a disabled candidate of their locus to contest discriminatory misconstructions of recruitment guidelines if they participated in the selection process.

Observations & Findings of the Court

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court partly allowed the writ petitions, providing a landmark ruling on inclusive equality and the biological nature of human perception:

• The Cognitive Nature of Sight (Brain vs. Eye): In an extraordinary neuro-legal analysis, the Court dismantled the narrow definition of sight, differentiating between biological ocular functions and real conceptual perception:

"The eye is a sense organ. It processes no power of cognition or discernment. It merely fulfils the function of recording of an image which is before it... The recorded image is then transmitted, through electrical signals, to the brain, via the optic nerve. The function of interpreting and understanding the image that was recorded on the retina is performed by the brain. The power of cognition, discernment and understanding, therefore, vests in the brain, not in the eye. Expressed otherwise, the function of sight, which we otherwise attribute to the eye, is in fact largely performed by the brain." The Court held that if a blind professional is capable of understanding, processing, and navigating legal or financial records through digital assistive frameworks, they legally fulfil the functional attribute of "seeing".

• Repudiation of the Medicalized Model: Drawing heavily from the Apex Court's ruling in In re. Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court observed that assessing a candidate’s functional capacity through clinical metrics completely violates the social model of disability:

"...the principle of reasonable accommodation is a concept that not only relates to affording equal opportunity to the persons with disabilities but also it goes further as to ensuring the dignity of the individual by driving home the message that the assessment of a person's suitability, capacity and capability is not to be tested and measured by medical or clinical assessment of the same but must be assessed after providing reasonable accommodation and an enabling atmosphere."

• The Mandate for Reasonable Accommodation: The Court emphasized that both the DEPWD working remarks and Note 1 explicitly demand that suitability must be evaluated alongside assistive technologies, digital reading software, and customized adaptations. Dismissing a candidate without providing these accommodations is an act of indirect discrimination that forces substantive inequality.
• No Estoppel Against Sacrosanct Rights: Invoking Dr (Major) Meeta Sahai, the Court firmly threw out AAI’s estoppel defense, ruling that participating in a process means accepting standard procedure, not condoning structural illegality:

"In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it... There can be no estoppel against enforcement of such rights. They are sacrosanct, and part of our constitutional ethos."

• Note 8 Upheld under Rights-Based Parameters: The Court refused to strike down Note 8 of the DEPWD Notification, clarifying that when properly read, it simply tasks establishments with verifying certificates and assessing candidate requirements in an enabling framework, rather than acting as a gateway for medical exclusion.

Directions Issued

To enforce structural compliance and secure integration, the High Court issued the following mandatory directions:

• The administrative rejections quashing the candidatures of Mudit Gupta, Amit Kumar, and Deepak Arora were set aside.
• The respondents are directed to conduct a comprehensive non-medical, rights-based re-assessment of the petitioners' functional capabilities within two weeks from the date of the judgment.
• This assessment layout must strictly utilize assistive devices, specialized software, and an enabling atmosphere as mandated by current disability jurisprudence.
• Petitioners who are evaluated as suitable must be extended formal letters of appointment within four weeks of the re-assessment.
• Upon selection, the petitioners will receive notional appointments matching their original batchmates, carrying full continuity of service and all associated seniority benefits, except back wages.

Legal Disclaimer: The summaries provided on this platform are for informational and academic purposes, aimed at increasing awareness of disability legislation and rights across Indian jurisprudence.

Read the Judgement in Mudit Gupta Vs. AAI dt 16 Oct 2025

Variance of High Magnitude in Disability Percentage : Delhi HC Orders Composite Medical Board for PwBD Candidate in Shubham Agarwal v. UOI

Civil Services - Disability Quota- Formation of Independent Expert Medical Board in case of conflicting opinions 

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Madhu Jain
Case No.: W.P.(C) 13162/2025 & CM APPL. 53924/2025
Case Title: Shubham Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors
Date of Decision: October 6, 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8847-DB
Cases Referred: Department of Personnel and Training v. Kore Nihal Pramod (Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 17995/2025).

Post script

• Revision in judgement dated October 06, 2025- The DHC revised the judgement vide its order 24.11.2025 at the request of petitioner herein to have independent medical experts on medical board who were not from any of the hospitals who conducted earlier test fearing bias.

• Note: This matter was subsequently challenged before Supreme Court by UOI and UPSC vide SLP(C) 13947/2026 and the SC was pleased to set aside this  impugned DHC judgement and impugned DHC order 24.11.2025  vide its order on 22 May 2026, after the Petitioner herein failed to appear before the medical boards several times. (see our post dated 22 May 2026).

Summary & Brief Background

The petitioner participated in the Civil Services Examination 2024 under the Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD) category, claiming a permanent hearing impairment exceeding the 40% benchmark. He successfully cleared the examination, securing an All India Rank of 1001. On May 27, 2025, he underwent an initial mandatory medical examination at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), where a medical report dated May 30, 2025, declared him unfit for appointment after measuring his disability at a mere 1%.

Aggrieved by this assessment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the statutory Appellate Disability Medical Board constituted at the Army Hospital (Research & Referral), Delhi. The Appellate Board subjected him to an exhaustive clinical examination between July 3, 2025, and July 11, 2025, ultimately determining that he suffered from a 67.84% hearing disability.

Instead of acting upon the Appellate Board's findings, the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) issued an email directive on August 5, 2025, ordering the petitioner to report to Smt. Sucheta Kriplani Hospital (SSKH), Lady Hardinge Medical College, for a third medical evaluation. The petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, under O.A. No. 3093/2025 to challenge the validity of this additional check. On August 21, 2025, the Tribunal directed the petitioner to comply with the third medical review, while provisionally permitting him to join the training program in the interim. Seeking relief from the directive forcing a third medical test, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court.

Core Arguments & Institutional Contradiction

The Finality of Appellate Checks: The petitioner contended that under the established Civil Services Examination Rules, the assessment rendered by the statutory Appellate Disability Medical Board is final and binding. He argued that the state cannot systematically override the definitive findings of specialized appellate boards to demand endless cycles of examination based on administrative whims. Furthermore, the petitioner distinguished his case from the Supreme Court precedent in Kore Nihal Pramod, explaining that the Apex Court had ordered a neutral panel only because of a direct contradiction where an appellate board had declared a candidate unfit but a subsequent High Court-ordered evaluation declared them fit.

The Variance of High Magnitude: The respondents defended the third test order by exposing a massive contradiction between the two state-run medical evaluations. They highlighted that the initial AIIMS board recorded a negligible 1% impairment layout, while the Army Hospital (R&R) panel calculated a severe 67.84% hearing disability. The state argued that this massive mathematical variance rendered a clarifying, independent third assessment essential to make a final recruitment decision.

Key Issues Addressed

• Whether an appointing authority can legally subject a PwBD candidate to a third medical examination when there is a massive conflict between the initial medical board and the statutory appellate board.
• What legal weight and finality must be ascribed to an Appellate Disability Medical Board's report when its findings conflict extensively with initial assessments.

Observations & Findings of the Court

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition, moulding the relief to balance the structural rules of recruitment with fair medical verification:

• The Reality of a Significant Disparity: The Court recognized that while an Appellate Medical Board's findings are structurally designed to act as final and non-challengeable under standard conditions, the specific numerical indices in this case revealed a stark institutional anomaly.
• Validation of the Magnitude: The Bench observed that the conflict did not represent a routine, minor variation in medical interpretation, but rather a structural contradiction of exceptional proportions: "It is not a matter of just difference in medical opinion, but a difference of opinion of a high magnitude."
• Contextualizing Prior Assessments: The Court noted that earlier medical certificates submitted by the petitioner had independently pegged his permanent hearing disability at 40% and 44%. This made the initial AIIMS finding of 1% and the subsequent appellate finding of 67.84% highly inconsistent, justifying an independent tie-breaker review layout.
• The Balanced Apex Court Model Adopted: Rather than permitting the DoPT to unilaterally select a single local hospital for the third evaluation, the High Court invoked the equitable process mapped out by the Supreme Court in Kore Nihal Pramod. The Bench held that the evaluation must be performed by a jointly constituted, high-level composite independent board to ensure strict transparency.

Directions Issued

To resolve the impasse and eliminate institutional biases, the High Court issued the following time-bound operational directions:

• The petitioner’s third medical evaluation layout was modified. The Court ordered the constitution of a fresh, specialized three-member Expert Medical Board specifically tracking hearing disabilities.
• The Board will consist of three independent experts: one doctor nominated by the Director of AIIMS, one nominated by the Director General of the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS), and one nominated by the Chief of the Army Research and Referral Hospital, New Delhi.
• To preserve absolute neutrality, the Court directed that the respective medical chiefs must not nominate any individual doctors who have previously examined the petitioner in the earlier rounds.
• The respective institutions are requested to formally constitute the specialized board within two weeks, and the Board must deliver its final binding opinion regarding eligibility within one week of conducting the examination.

Clarification on Training Guidelines: The Bench noted the petitioner's complaint that the state had failed to comply with CAT’s interim order allowing him to join the training program. The High Court clarified that its own ad-interim order passed on August 28, 2025, had strictly stayed only the third medical test directive, meaning the remaining parts of the Tribunal's training guidelines remained fully operational and subject to active enforcement before the CAT.

Subsequent Order by High Court: The Delhi High Court revised its judgement dated 06 October 2025 vide its order dated 24.11.2025 on an application by the petitioner herein seeking independent medical experts on medical board who were not from any of the hospitals who conducted earlier test fearing bias to which court agreed. Read the Order dated 24.11.2025. The court made the following revisions to its judgement:

Paragraph 15 of our Order dated 06.10.2025 shall now read as under: “15. The third examination of the petitioner shall be conducted by a Board of doctors having specialisation in the field of assessing hearing disability. One member of the Board would be nominated by the Medical Superintendent of the Guru Tegh Bahadur Hospital, Delhi, one by the Director General of the CGHS, and the third by the Medical Superintendent of the Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital, New Delhi. While nominating the doctors to the Board, we request the Medical Superintendents/DG of the respective hospitals to not nominate the doctors who have already examined the petitioner in the earlier rounds/medical examinations. We further request the Medical Superintendents/DG to constitute the Medical Board within a period of two weeks from today and for the Medical Board to give its final opinion within a period of one week of the examination of the petitioner.”

Read the DHC Judgement 06 Oct 2025 in Shubham Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors

Legal Disclaimer: The summaries provided on this platform are for informational and academic purposes, aimed at increasing awareness of disability legislation and rights across Indian jurisprudence.

Delhi High Court Examines Diversion of Unfilled Disability Reservation Seats in Higher Education.

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1975/2023
Case Title: Ms. Jahanvi Nagpal v. Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 16 September 2025

Background

The Delhi High Court examined an important issue concerning implementation of reservation for persons with disabilities in higher educational institutions under Section 32 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The petitioner Jahanvi Nagpal filed this petition challenging the manner in which seats reserved for Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) were being dealt with during the NEET-UG 2022 admission process.

Initially, the petitioner sought allocation of a medical seat under the PwBD category and also questioned the restriction of reservation benefits only to persons with benchmark disabilities under Section 32 of the RPwD Act.

However, during the proceedings, the focus shifted to a larger systemic issue — what happens to reserved PwBD seats when sufficient eligible benchmark disability candidates are not available. While in employment reservation, seats are carried forward to subsequent years and rotated to other disabilities, but in higher education such seats were routinely diverted to general or other categories instead of being offered to persons with disabilities who may not meet the benchmark disability threshold.

According to the petitioner, this practice defeats the purpose of disability reservation and weakens the statutory guarantee of inclusion in higher education.

The issue assumed wider significance because it directly concerned the implementation of disability reservation in highly competitive professional courses such as medical education.

Earlier, the High Court had observed that the case raised an important question regarding diversion of unfilled disability reservation seats and required detailed consideration by the Union of India and the National Medical Commission.

Key Observations of the Court

The Delhi High Court examined the legislative intent behind Section 32 of the RPwD Act, which mandates a minimum 5% reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities in higher educational institutions receiving government aid.

The Court noted that while the law provides for reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities, it does not clearly specify the mechanism to be followed when enough eligible benchmark disability candidates are unavailable.

A major issue before the Court was whether unfilled disability reservation seats should continue within the broader disability category or be diverted to non-disabled candidates.

The proceedings highlighted a recurring concern in disability reservation policies — although reservation quotas formally exist, administrative practices often dilute their practical effect through diversion mechanisms.

The Court recognised that the issue involved important questions relating to:

• Meaningful implementation of disability reservation;
• Substantive inclusion in higher education;
• Interpretation of Section 32 of the RPwD Act; and
• Equality and participation rights of persons with disabilities.

The case also brought attention to the distinction between “persons with disabilities” and “persons with benchmark disabilities” under the RPwD Act. The petitioner questioned whether disability reservation seats could be transferred to non-disabled candidates merely because candidates did not satisfy the benchmark disability threshold.

Importantly, the proceedings also reflected the Court’s attention towards accessibility within the judicial process itself. In an earlier order, the Court directed that pleadings and documents be supplied to the petitioner in accessible Word format, recognising the importance of accessible digital documents for effective participation in legal proceedings.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court directed the Union of India, the National Medical Commission and other respondents to file detailed responses regarding the policy and legal basis for diversion of unfilled PwBD seats.

The Court observed that:

• The petition raised an important issue concerning implementation of disability reservation in higher education;
• The respondents must explain the legal and policy framework governing diversion of unfilled disability reservation seats; and
• The issue required judicial examination because diversion of reserved disability seats may undermine the purpose of Section 32 of the RPwD Act.
• Court refered this issue to the Law Commission of India for conducting a study and accordingly to make recommendations for appropriate amendment(s) in the RPwD Act.

The Court also directed that documents and pleadings be provided to the petitioner in accessible Word format.

Commentary

The proceedings in Ms. Jahanvi Nagpal v. Union of India & Ors. raise an important issue concerning the effectiveness of disability reservation in higher education.

One of the key concerns highlighted in the case is that disability reservation may become merely symbolic if reserved seats are routinely diverted to non-disabled candidates whenever eligible benchmark disability candidates are unavailable unlike in job reservations.

The case is significant because it questions whether administrative practices can dilute the broader objective of educational inclusion under the RPwD Act.

It also highlights a deeper issue within the statutory framework — the distinction between “persons with disabilities” and “persons with benchmark disabilities.” While reservation under Section 32 is limited to benchmark disabilities, the broader constitutional goal of inclusion extends to persons with disabilities generally.

The proceedings therefore raise important questions about whether disability reservation should be interpreted narrowly through medical thresholds or more broadly in favour of substantive inclusion and representation.

The case additionally underscores the need for clearer rules regarding carry-forward of seats, interchangeability mechanisms and treatment of unfilled disability reservation seats in higher education institutions.

Another important aspect of the proceedings is the Court’s recognition of procedural accessibility. By directing supply of documents in accessible Word format, the Court reinforced that accessibility obligations also apply to courts and legal processes.

Overall, the proceedings contribute to the growing disability rights jurisprudence recognising that reservation for persons with disabilities is not a welfare concession but an enforceable right linked to equality, dignity and meaningful participation in education.

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Post-wise functional safety filters under Section 33 are legally valid- says Delhi HC

 
Court: High Court of Delhi

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Case No.: W.P.(C) 9994/2024 & CM APPL. 40929/2024 (Connected with W.P.(C) 10130/2024, W.P.(C) 10153/2024, & W.P.(C) 10511/2024)

Case Title: Nand Lal Luhar and Ors v. Western Railway and Ors

Date of Judgment: July 1, 2025

Citation: 2025:DHC:5040-DB

Cases Referred: Government of India v. Ravi Prakash Gupta ((2010) 7 SCC 626); Union of India v. National Federation of the Blind ((2013) 10 SCC 772); UOI v. Tara Chauhan (MANU/DE/1943/2014); Aditya Suresh Rao Kaware v. Western Railway Recruitment Cell (2024 SCC OnLine Del 5165); Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar ((2019) 20 SCC 17); Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur (2024 SCC Online SC 2316); Sivanandan CT v. High Court of Kerala ((2024) 3 SCC 799); Tajvir Singh Sodhi v. State of J & K ((2023) 17 SCC 147); Bedanga Talukdar v. Saifudaullah Khan ((2011) 12 SCC 85); State of Tamil Nadu v. G. Hemalatha ((2020) 19 SCC 430); Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar ((2014) 16 SCC 187); L. Chandrakumar v. UOI ((1997) 3 SCC 261); N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission ((1990) 3 SCC 157); B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore (AIR 1966 SC 1942); P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka ((1990) 1 SCC 411).

Summary & Brief Background

The petitioners are 100% Visually Impaired (VI-Blind) individuals who sought recruitment against the statutory quota reserved for visually impaired candidates in Level 1 posts within the Western Railway. They participated in the centralized selection process initiated under Central Employment Notice (CEN) 01/2019, which advertised 10,734 vacancies for the Western Railway division. In compliance with Section 34 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act), a 1% quota amounting to 171 vacancies was explicitly set aside for visually impaired candidates.

The petitioners successfully met the baseline educational and age requirements and scored above the initial selection cut-off mark of 57.27633, qualifying them for document verification and medical screenings. However, when the Western Railway published its subsequent provisional selection panels, the petitioners' names were entirely omitted. Their exclusion stemmed from a specific post parameter matrix annexed to the CEN (Annexure A), which split the 171 reserved vacancies post-wise : 85 posts were designated as functionally suitable for both blind and low vision (LV) candidates, whereas 86 technical/field posts were flagged as suitable only for low vision candidates and completely unsuitable for blind individuals.

The petitioners filed a batch of Original Applications (OAs) before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), contesting that less meritorious low-vision candidates were selected over them for those 86 slots. The Tribunal dismissed their pleas on July 16, 2024, noting that the exclusions were safety-based and that the candidates were estopped from challenging the recruitment terms post-examination. The petitioners subsequently moved the Delhi High Court via writ actions under Article 226.

Core Arguments & Institutional Contradiction

• The Post-Based Bifurcation Challenge: The petitioners, through Senior Advocate S.K. Rungta, argued that Section 34(1)(a) of the RPwD Act treats "blindness and low vision" as a singular, homogenous statutory category entitled to a collective 1% vacancy-based reservation. They contended that further sub-dividing or bifurcated parsing of these 171 reserved vacancies into separate sub-pools based on specific medical sub-disabilities is legally impermissible. They asserted that because the statutory reservation layout is legally vacancy-based and not post-based, completely locking blind candidates out of 86 vacancies in favour of lower-scoring low-vision candidates violated basic administrative equality rules.
• The Executive Identification Stand: The Western Railway countered by pointing out that Section 34 (Reservation) and Section 33 (Identification) represent two separate structural stages under the RPwD Act. They successfully met Section 34 by executing the 1% quota computation on total structural vacancies. However, under Section 33(i), the appropriate government holds explicit statutory powers to perform post-wise identification matrices to verify which roles can realistically be held by specific sub-categories of disabled workers.
• The Safety Contradiction: The respondents emphasized that Level 1 roles in the field (such as Assistant Loco Shed, Signal & Telecom, and Depot tracks) directly entail heavy machinery handling, track lines, and train operations. They maintained that introducing a 100% blind worker into active rail lines or operational shop floors creates severe physical hazards for the worker and compromises public safety. Furthermore, they raised a preliminary waiver objection: the petitioners had applied, sat for exams, and competed with complete visibility of these post boundaries without entering any initial protest or challenge against the parameters of the CEN.

Key Issues Addressed

1. Whether an employer, under the guise of Section 33 post-identification matrices, can legally divide a combined category under Section 34(1)(a) to restrict completely blind candidates from technical, operational posts.
2. Whether a post-wise suitability filter transforms a vacancy-based statutory protection framework into an unauthorized post-based reservation layout.
3. Whether a candidate who participates in a recruitment track without demur is legally barred under the doctrine of estoppel from later disputing the validity of post-suitability allocations after being declared unsuccessful.

Observations & Findings of the Court

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that administrative safety matrices and post-identification choices are fully valid under disability law:

• Distinction Between Vacancies and Posts Upheld: The Court clarified that the petitioners’ challenges blurred the functional boundaries of the statute. Reservation under Section 34 strictly handles vacancies at the macro computation level, whereas Identification under Section 33 deals directly with individual posts. Because the macro 1% vacancy volume was successfully met, the math of Section 34 stood satisfied. The subsequent classification of posts is legally distinct.

• Public Interest Predominates Over Absolute Inclusivity: The Court ruled that judicial review cannot override objective field-level safety assessments crafted by executive expert bodies:

  "We cannot be unmindful of the fact that we are dealing with the Railways, and that the posts to which the petitioners aspire are not desk jobs... The appointment of a person who, owing to one reason or the other, is physically unable to manage the post, in the Railways, can result in untold public harm and may possibly also endanger the life and limb of the public who use the Railways. There is an overwhelming element of public interest involved, which has to be balanced against the rights of the petitioners to inclusion in the mainstream."

• Validation of Post Parameters via Central Guidelines: The Bench noted that the exclusions in Annexure A aligned with earlier central guidelines, including a specialized Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPWD) Office Memorandum dated March 4, 2015, which explicitly categorized operational lines and technical Khalasi tracks as unsuitable for 100% blind operators due to active train movement hazards.

• The Definitive Apply of Estoppel: The High Court strongly applied the principles of waiver and acquiescence. Candidates cannot treat a selection criteria format as flexible, competing under its terms and only challenging its legality when they fail to clear the final merit layout:

  "...candidates, having taken part in the selection process without any demur or protest, cannot challenge the same after having been declared unsuccessful. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time... simply because the result of the selection process is not palatable to a candidate, he cannot allege that the process... was unfair or that there was some lacuna in the process."

Directions Issued

Upholding the previous conclusions of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the High Court issued the following final orders:

1. The common judgment of the Tribunal dismissing the petitioners' applications was upheld in its entirety, and the writ petitions were dismissed without costs.
2. The Limited Caveat for Unfilled Vacancies: To protect the interests of visually impaired workers, the Court added a clear administrative caveat. The Bench reserved complete liberty for the petitioners to file a formal structural representation before the Ministry of Railways to claim the benefits of a subsequently issued corporate circular dated December 16, 2024, which allows for the diversion of unfilled vacancies under CEN 01/2019.
3. The Court specified that if the application of the December 2024 Circular can facilitate an alternative vacancy allocation or appointment slot for any petitioner, this judgment will not act as a legal bar or impediment against the administration executing that relief.

Legal Disclaimer: The summaries provided on this platform are for informational and academic purposes, aimed at increasing awareness of disability legislation and rights across Indian jurisprudence.

Read the Judgement in Nand Lal Luhar and Ors v. Western Railway and Ors