Delhi High Court Examines Diversion of Unfilled Disability Reservation Seats in Higher Education.

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1975/2023
Case Title: Ms. Jahanvi Nagpal v. Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 16 September 2025

Background

The Delhi High Court examined an important issue concerning implementation of reservation for persons with disabilities in higher educational institutions under Section 32 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The petitioner Jahanvi Nagpal filed this petition challenging the manner in which seats reserved for Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) were being dealt with during the NEET-UG 2022 admission process.

Initially, the petitioner sought allocation of a medical seat under the PwBD category and also questioned the restriction of reservation benefits only to persons with benchmark disabilities under Section 32 of the RPwD Act.

However, during the proceedings, the focus shifted to a larger systemic issue — what happens to reserved PwBD seats when sufficient eligible benchmark disability candidates are not available. While in employment reservation, seats are carried forward to subsequent years and rotated to other disabilities, but in higher education such seats were routinely diverted to general or other categories instead of being offered to persons with disabilities who may not meet the benchmark disability threshold.

According to the petitioner, this practice defeats the purpose of disability reservation and weakens the statutory guarantee of inclusion in higher education.

The issue assumed wider significance because it directly concerned the implementation of disability reservation in highly competitive professional courses such as medical education.

Earlier, the High Court had observed that the case raised an important question regarding diversion of unfilled disability reservation seats and required detailed consideration by the Union of India and the National Medical Commission.

Key Observations of the Court

The Delhi High Court examined the legislative intent behind Section 32 of the RPwD Act, which mandates a minimum 5% reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities in higher educational institutions receiving government aid.

The Court noted that while the law provides for reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities, it does not clearly specify the mechanism to be followed when enough eligible benchmark disability candidates are unavailable.

A major issue before the Court was whether unfilled disability reservation seats should continue within the broader disability category or be diverted to non-disabled candidates.

The proceedings highlighted a recurring concern in disability reservation policies — although reservation quotas formally exist, administrative practices often dilute their practical effect through diversion mechanisms.

The Court recognised that the issue involved important questions relating to:

• Meaningful implementation of disability reservation;
• Substantive inclusion in higher education;
• Interpretation of Section 32 of the RPwD Act; and
• Equality and participation rights of persons with disabilities.

The case also brought attention to the distinction between “persons with disabilities” and “persons with benchmark disabilities” under the RPwD Act. The petitioner questioned whether disability reservation seats could be transferred to non-disabled candidates merely because candidates did not satisfy the benchmark disability threshold.

Importantly, the proceedings also reflected the Court’s attention towards accessibility within the judicial process itself. In an earlier order, the Court directed that pleadings and documents be supplied to the petitioner in accessible Word format, recognising the importance of accessible digital documents for effective participation in legal proceedings.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court directed the Union of India, the National Medical Commission and other respondents to file detailed responses regarding the policy and legal basis for diversion of unfilled PwBD seats.

The Court observed that:

• The petition raised an important issue concerning implementation of disability reservation in higher education;
• The respondents must explain the legal and policy framework governing diversion of unfilled disability reservation seats; and
• The issue required judicial examination because diversion of reserved disability seats may undermine the purpose of Section 32 of the RPwD Act.
• Court refered this issue to the Law Commission of India for conducting a study and accordingly to make recommendations for appropriate amendment(s) in the RPwD Act.

The Court also directed that documents and pleadings be provided to the petitioner in accessible Word format.

Commentary

The proceedings in Ms. Jahanvi Nagpal v. Union of India & Ors. raise an important issue concerning the effectiveness of disability reservation in higher education.

One of the key concerns highlighted in the case is that disability reservation may become merely symbolic if reserved seats are routinely diverted to non-disabled candidates whenever eligible benchmark disability candidates are unavailable unlike in job reservations.

The case is significant because it questions whether administrative practices can dilute the broader objective of educational inclusion under the RPwD Act.

It also highlights a deeper issue within the statutory framework — the distinction between “persons with disabilities” and “persons with benchmark disabilities.” While reservation under Section 32 is limited to benchmark disabilities, the broader constitutional goal of inclusion extends to persons with disabilities generally.

The proceedings therefore raise important questions about whether disability reservation should be interpreted narrowly through medical thresholds or more broadly in favour of substantive inclusion and representation.

The case additionally underscores the need for clearer rules regarding carry-forward of seats, interchangeability mechanisms and treatment of unfilled disability reservation seats in higher education institutions.

Another important aspect of the proceedings is the Court’s recognition of procedural accessibility. By directing supply of documents in accessible Word format, the Court reinforced that accessibility obligations also apply to courts and legal processes.

Overall, the proceedings contribute to the growing disability rights jurisprudence recognising that reservation for persons with disabilities is not a welfare concession but an enforceable right linked to equality, dignity and meaningful participation in education.

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Hostel Accommodation is Part of Inclusive Education: Delhi High Court Upholds Rights of Visually Impaired JNU Student

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice C. Hari Shankar
Case No.: W.P.(C) 75/2024
Case Title: Sanjeev Kumar Mishra v. Jawaharlal Nehru University & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 26 February 2024

Background

In an important judgment concerning accessibility and inclusive education, the Delhi High Court held that hostel accommodation for students with disabilities cannot be treated merely as a discretionary facility and forms an integral part of ensuring equal access to higher education under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”).

The petitioner, Sanjeev Kumar Mishra, a student with 100% visual disability, approached the Court seeking hostel accommodation from Jawaharlal Nehru University during his M.A. Sociology programme.

The petitioner had earlier pursued multiple academic programmes within the University. Initially admitted in 2017 to a five-year B.A.-M.A. programme in German, he had been provided hostel accommodation during the course. Thereafter, he enrolled in another Master’s programme in Political Science with specialisation in International Studies and continued to reside in university accommodation, including a room in Sabarmati Hostel designated for students with disabilities.

However, after securing admission to a third programme — M.A. Sociology — the petitioner was denied hostel accommodation despite repeated requests.

Aggrieved by the denial, the petitioner approached the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities alleging violation of Section 16 of the RPwD Act, which mandates inclusive education and non-discrimination against students with disabilities.

The University resisted the claim by relying upon provisions of the JNU Hostel Manual. According to the University, students pursuing a second Master’s degree were not entitled to hostel accommodation under the prevailing rules and priority criteria.

JNU also attempted to rely upon allegations concerning the petitioner’s conduct and previous disputes with hostel authorities. However, these allegations bore no connection with the legal issue regarding accessibility and entitlement under disability rights law.

The legal question

The case therefore raised a broader and significant question — whether residential accommodation for students with disabilities is merely an administrative privilege or an essential component of accessible and inclusive higher education.

Key Observations of the Court

The bench delivered a significant ruling affirming that accessibility within higher education extends beyond classroom participation and includes residential and institutional support systems necessary for meaningful educational access.

At the outset, the Court rejected the University’s attempt to rely upon allegations regarding the petitioner’s conduct. The Bench observed that such allegations were wholly irrelevant to the issue of entitlement under disability rights law. The Court clarified that if disciplinary proceedings were warranted, the University remained free to proceed in accordance with law, but such allegations could not justify denial of statutory rights guaranteed under the RPwD Act.

A particularly important aspect of the judgment lies in the Court’s recognition that hostel accommodation for a visually impaired student directly impacts accessibility, mobility, participation, and safety within the educational environment.

The Court examined Section 16 of the RPwD Act and emphasised that educational institutions are under a statutory obligation to ensure inclusive education for students with disabilities. Importantly, the Court adopted a purposive and rights-based interpretation of the provision rather than a narrow administrative approach.

The judgment recognised that denial of hostel accommodation to a student with 100% visual disability could substantially impair the student’s ability to effectively pursue higher education. Residential accommodation within the university campus facilitates access to academic resources, mobility support, peer interaction, and participation in campus life.

The Court also examined the relationship between institutional regulations and statutory disability rights obligations. It held that internal hostel policies cannot be interpreted or enforced in a manner that defeats the objectives of the RPwD Act.

Importantly, the Bench recognised that substantive equality may require differential accommodation and affirmative institutional support. Applying hostel rules mechanically without considering the impact upon disabled students would amount to formal equality devoid of fairness and inclusion.

The Court thereby reaffirmed that disability rights law imposes positive obligations upon educational institutions requiring active institutional adaptation rather than passive non-discrimination.

The judgment also acknowledged the importance of dignity and equal participation, recognising that exclusion from hostel accommodation may lead to isolation, logistical hardship, and reduced participation in university life for students with disabilities.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court granted relief in favour of the petitioner and directed Jawaharlal Nehru University to provide hostel accommodation to him.

The Court effectively held that:

• Hostel accommodation for students with disabilities cannot be denied through rigid or mechanical application of hostel eligibility criteria.
• Institutional rules must yield where necessary to fulfil obligations under the RPwD Act.
• Inclusive education under Section 16 of the RPwD Act includes ancillary and supportive facilities necessary for meaningful participation in higher education.
• Students with disabilities are entitled to reasonable accommodation and equal participation within university environments.

The judgment thereby reinforced that educational inclusion extends beyond admission to classrooms and encompasses the broader ecosystem necessary for participation, accessibility, and dignity.

Commentary

The decision in Sanjeev Kumar Mishra v. Jawaharlal Nehru University & Ors. is an important contribution to disability rights jurisprudence because it expands the understanding of inclusive education from a purely academic concept to a holistic institutional obligation encompassing residential accessibility and campus integration.

One of the most significant aspects of the ruling is its recognition that barriers within higher education are not confined to classrooms alone. For students with disabilities — particularly students with visual impairments — access to residential accommodation within campus premises may fundamentally determine their ability to participate in educational life on equal terms.

The judgment meaningfully advances the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Formal equality would simply apply hostel rules identically to all students irrespective of disability. The Court instead recognised that identical treatment in unequal circumstances can itself produce discrimination.

Another important aspect of the ruling is its affirmation that internal institutional regulations cannot override statutory rights under the RPwD Act. Universities frequently rely upon administrative rules, hostel manuals, or infrastructural limitations to deny accommodations to disabled students. The present judgment correctly places disability rights obligations above rigid administrative formalism.

The Court’s reasoning also aligns with evolving international disability jurisprudence under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which conceptualises accessibility and inclusion as encompassing the entire educational environment rather than mere admission into educational institutions.

Importantly, the judgment rejects attempts to indirectly stigmatise disabled students through unrelated allegations or administrative objections. By refusing to allow the petitioner’s alleged conduct to influence adjudication of accessibility rights, the Court reaffirmed that disability rights cannot be made contingent upon institutional convenience.

The ruling also highlights broader structural shortcomings within Indian universities, where hostel accessibility, mobility support, assistive technologies, and inclusive campus infrastructure continue to remain inadequately addressed despite statutory obligations.

At a broader constitutional level, the judgment reinforces that education under the RPwD Act must be understood as a participatory and dignitarian right. Inclusion requires not merely permitting disabled students to enrol in universities, but ensuring that they can genuinely live, study, interact, and participate within institutional spaces on equal terms with others.

The decision therefore stands as an important precedent affirming that accessibility in higher education necessarily includes residential inclusion, institutional accommodation, and removal of barriers that impede full and effective participation of students with disabilities within university life.

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Hearing-Impaired Candidates Cannot Be Excluded from MBBS Admissions: Delhi HC

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Siddharth Mridul
Case No.: W.P.(C) 7820/2018
Case Title: Tina Sharma (Minor) Through Her Father Bhagwati Prasad Sharma v. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 31 July 2018

Background

The present writ petition before the Delhi High Court raised important questions concerning the rights of hearing-impaired candidates seeking admission to MBBS courses under the reservation framework created by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”).

The petition was filed on behalf of Tina Sharma, a hearing-impaired student aspiring to pursue medical education under the category of persons with benchmark disabilities.

The petitioner had successfully completed her Class XII examination conducted by the CBSE and had also appeared in the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET-UG) 2018 for admission to medical colleges.

The NEET information bulletin specifically provided that 5% of seats in medical institutions would be reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities in accordance with the RPwD Act.

The petitioner fell within the statutory definition of “person with benchmark disability” under Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act. Hearing impairment was recognised under the statute as a specified disability where an individual suffers hearing loss of 70 decibels or more in speech frequencies in both ears.

However, the controversy arose because the Expert Committee constituted by the Medical Council of India (“MCI”) had recommended exclusionary standards concerning hearing-impaired candidates seeking admission to MBBS courses.

The case therefore raised a broader constitutional issue — whether candidates with hearing disabilities could be denied access to medical education despite statutory guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, and inclusive education under the RPwD Act.

Key Observations of the Court

Justice Siddharth Mridul adopted a purposive and rights-oriented interpretation of the RPwD Act while examining the issue.

At the outset, the Court recognised the RPwD Act as a transformative legislation intended to mainstream persons with disabilities within educational institutions and professional spaces.

The Court emphasised that the statute embodies the principles of:

• equality of opportunity;
• respect for inherent dignity;
• individual autonomy;
• freedom of choice;
• non-discrimination; and
• full and effective participation in society.

The Bench observed that persons with benchmark disabilities possess enforceable statutory and constitutional rights to access educational institutions recognised or funded by the Government.

Importantly, the Court clarified that the RPwD Act is not merely a welfare-oriented concessionary framework but a rights-based legislation intended to secure substantive equality and dismantle systemic barriers faced by persons with disabilities.

A particularly important aspect of the order lies in the Court’s recognition that exclusionary educational standards affecting disabled candidates must be subjected to strict scrutiny and cannot be justified on the basis of stereotypical assumptions regarding capability or competence.

The Court underscored that the RPwD Act had been enacted in consonance with constitutional guarantees as well as Directive Principles of State Policy and was intended to ensure equal participation of persons with disabilities within higher education.

The Bench further recognised that the legislation reflects India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which obligates States to ensure accessibility, inclusion, and equal opportunity for persons with disabilities across all sectors, including education.

Importantly, the Court acknowledged the larger social importance of enabling persons with disabilities to enter professional domains that have historically remained inaccessible because of institutional prejudice, inflexible eligibility standards, and medically deterministic assumptions.

The order implicitly rejected the assumption that disability necessarily equates to incapacity and recognised that persons with disabilities possess equal aspirations, dignity, and entitlement to participate in professional education systems.

Interpretation of the RPwD Act

One of the most significant aspects of the order is the Court’s interpretation of the RPwD Act as a progressive social legislation intended to promote inclusion rather than perpetuate exclusion.

The Court recognised that:

• benchmark disability status creates enforceable legal rights;
• educational inclusion forms part of substantive equality; and
• institutional policies must conform to constitutional morality and disability rights jurisprudence.

The Bench treated the RPwD Act as a transformative legal framework intended to shift Indian disability jurisprudence away from paternalistic and medicalised approaches toward a human-rights-based model centred upon dignity, participation, autonomy, and equal opportunity.

The Court thereby reaffirmed that professional educational institutions cannot adopt exclusionary standards inconsistent with statutory guarantees under the RPwD Act.

Commentary

The decision in Tina Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. represents an important judicial affirmation of inclusive professional education and disability rights in India.

One of the most significant contributions of the ruling lies in its recognition that disability rights are integral to constitutional equality and cannot be treated merely as welfare concerns.

Historically, persons with disabilities — especially candidates with sensory disabilities such as hearing impairment — have faced structural barriers in accessing professional education due to rigid eligibility standards and stereotypical assumptions regarding competence.

The present case reflects the judiciary’s growing recognition that exclusion from educational institutions often arises not because of disability itself, but because of inaccessible institutional structures and discriminatory policies.

A transformative aspect of the Court’s reasoning is its movement away from the traditional medical model of disability toward a rights-based approach. Instead of reducing disabled individuals to impairment percentages or medical conditions, the judgment recognised persons with disabilities as rights-bearing individuals entitled to dignity, autonomy, and equal participation.

The ruling also strengthens the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Formal equality merely permits disabled candidates to compete; substantive equality requires active dismantling of institutional barriers that prevent meaningful participation.

Another important aspect of the decision is the Court’s insistence that statutory protections under the RPwD Act must receive liberal and purposive interpretation consistent with constitutional values.

The judgment additionally contributes to the evolving disability rights jurisprudence in India recognising accessibility and educational inclusion as indispensable components of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Importantly, the case carries wider implications for representation of persons with disabilities within medicine and allied professions. Professional spaces have historically remained inaccessible because of infrastructural barriers, rigid institutional norms, and assumptions regarding bodily ability. Judicial interventions such as the present one challenge these exclusionary structures and promote democratisation of access to professional education.

At a broader constitutional level, the decision reinforces the vision of an inclusive society where educational and professional opportunities are not conditioned upon conformity with narrow notions of bodily normalcy.

The order therefore stands as an important reaffirmation that disability rights jurisprudence in India must continue evolving in favour of dignity, inclusion, autonomy, and substantive equality rather than exclusion rooted in stereotypes or restrictive institutional assumptions.

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Private School Autonomy Cannot Override Disability Rights: Delhi High Court

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Manmohan
Case No.: W.P.(C) 2699/2016
Case Title: Siddharth International Public School v. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal & Anr.
Date of Judgment: 26 August 2016

Background

In a significant judgment strengthening the principles of inclusive education and disability rights, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed that educational institutions cannot deny admission to children with disabilities on the basis of institutional inconvenience, infrastructural limitations, or rigid procedural requirements.

The case arose from proceedings concerning Master Priyanshu, a child who had suffered amputation following a motor accident and thereafter used a prosthetic leg. Proceedings relating to his rehabilitation and compensation had earlier been initiated before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT).

Taking note of the child’s educational deprivation and rehabilitation needs, the Tribunal directed facilitation of his admission in Siddharth International Public School under the Economically Weaker Section (“EWS”) and Disadvantaged Group (“DG”) category with appropriate relaxation in age criteria.

Aggrieved by these directions, the petitioner-school approached the High Court challenging the legality and jurisdictional basis of the orders passed by the Tribunal.

The school argued that:

• the MACT lacked jurisdiction to direct admission of the child;
• no vacant EWS seats were available;
• the directions interfered with institutional autonomy in admission matters;
• the child exceeded the prescribed age limit for Class I admission;
• the school could not be compelled to provide special educators or barrier-free infrastructure; and
• transportation facilities for the child were unavailable.

The school further contended that admitting a ten-year-old child into Class I would adversely affect the educational environment for other students.

On the other hand, the respondents argued that the school had failed to comply with its obligations under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (“RTE Act”) and that inclusive education required accommodation of the child under the EWS/DG framework.

The matter therefore raised an important constitutional issue — whether institutional rules and administrative barriers could override the educational rights of a child with disability.

Key Observations of the Court

Justice Manmohan adopted a rights-based and constitutionally sensitive approach while examining the dispute.

At the outset, the Court clarified that the matter could not be treated merely as a technical controversy concerning admission procedures or seat allocation. Instead, the Court viewed the issue through the broader constitutional framework of equality, dignity, inclusion, and access to education.

A particularly important aspect of the judgment lies in the Court’s rejection of the petitioner-school’s attempt to invoke institutional autonomy to deny admission to a child with disability.

While private educational institutions often rely upon autonomy in administrative matters, the Court made it clear that such autonomy cannot override constitutional obligations flowing from welfare legislation and the rights of vulnerable children.

The judgment recognised that private schools performing public educational functions remain bound by constitutional values and statutory obligations aimed at ensuring social justice and educational inclusion.

The Court also rejected the school’s infrastructural objections, including its contention that it could not be compelled to provide special educators, barrier-free access, or disability-sensitive accommodations.

In doing so, the Court effectively affirmed the principle of reasonable accommodation — now recognised as a foundational component of disability rights jurisprudence. The judgment makes it clear that educational institutions cannot refuse admission merely because inclusion requires institutional adaptation or infrastructural effort.

Another important feature of the ruling is the Court’s purposive and child-centric interpretation of the educational framework under the RTE Act.

The Court declined to adopt a rigid approach regarding age eligibility and instead prioritised the child’s right to education and rehabilitation. It recognised that mechanical insistence upon procedural requirements, especially in cases involving vulnerable children facing extraordinary circumstances, may itself amount to exclusionary discrimination.

The Bench thereby embraced the principle of substantive equality rather than mere formal equality.

Importantly, the Court recognised that educational inclusion for children with disabilities is not a matter of charity or benevolence but a constitutional and statutory entitlement flowing from Articles 14, 21, and 21A of the Constitution of India.

The judgment also acknowledged the larger social importance of inclusive education. Implicit within the ruling is the understanding that schools must reflect constitutional values of fraternity, diversity, empathy, and equal participation.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court upheld the essential objective underlying the directions passed for the child’s educational inclusion and rejected the challenge raised by the petitioner-school.

The Court effectively affirmed:

• that children with disabilities cannot be denied educational access on the basis of institutional inconvenience or infrastructural inadequacy;
• that private schools remain obligated to comply with inclusive education mandates under welfare legislation;
• that procedural and technical barriers cannot defeat the fundamental right to education of vulnerable children; and
• that educational institutions are under a duty to facilitate inclusion through reasonable accommodation and supportive measures.

The judgment thereby reinforced that educational access for children with disabilities must be interpreted in a rights-based and constitutionally sensitive manner.

Commentary

The decision in Siddharth International Public School v. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal & Anr. is an important reaffirmation of inclusive education as a constitutional obligation rather than a matter of institutional discretion.

One of the most significant contributions of the ruling lies in its rejection of the assumption that disability accommodation is optional or dependent upon institutional convenience. The Court instead recognised accessibility and inclusion as indispensable components of the right to education itself.

The judgment meaningfully advances the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Formal equality would merely allow disabled children to apply for admission; substantive equality requires dismantling the structural and institutional barriers that prevent meaningful participation in educational spaces.

Another transformative aspect of the ruling is its recognition of the doctrine of reasonable accommodation. Rather than expecting disabled children to adjust themselves to inaccessible educational systems, the judgment places responsibility upon institutions to become inclusive and responsive to diverse educational needs.

The decision also contributes significantly to the evolution of disability rights jurisprudence in India by rejecting bureaucratic and procedural formalism when dealing with vulnerable children. The Court recognised that rigid adherence to age norms, infrastructural limitations, or admission procedures cannot override constitutional guarantees of dignity, equality, and educational opportunity.

Importantly, the ruling departs from traditional charity-based understandings of disability and instead adopts a rights-based framework grounded in inclusion, autonomy, and equal citizenship.

The judgment also carries broader implications for private educational institutions across India. In an increasingly privatised educational landscape, vulnerable groups are often excluded through administrative and procedural barriers. The present decision acts as an important constitutional safeguard against such exclusionary practices.

The ruling further aligns with the principles embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which recognises inclusive education as a fundamental human right requiring equal participation within mainstream educational systems.

At a broader constitutional level, the judgment reinforces that schools are not merely academic institutions but constitutional spaces where values of equality, dignity, fraternity, and social justice must be realised in practice.

The decision therefore stands as a powerful affirmation that children with disabilities cannot be excluded from educational opportunities on the basis of inconvenience, inflexible procedures, or institutional reluctance. The Constitution requires accommodation, accessibility, and meaningful inclusion — not exclusion disguised as administrative limitation.

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