Court of SCPD expresses displeasure on indifference and arrogant behaviour shown by bureaucrats in implementing RPwD Act 2016 [Judgement Included]

Dear colleagues,

The present case is a classic example of how the siloed approach on the part of the responsible officers at the helm makes it extremely difficult for a statutory authority like the Court of State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (SCPD) to perform their statutory functions.  The Hon'ble Court raises concern in its order in the present case on arrogantly irresponsive, indifference and ineffective approach  which as per the court is indeed a matter of grave concern and can have serious consequences for the persons with disabilities as an extremely proactive approach is needed to facilitate implementation of the socially beneficial Act. 

In the instant case, titled as Case No. 324/1101/2018/06/6061-6064  Dated: 24.09.2019 Suo Motu Vs. Commissioner (T&T), Delhi initiated on the complaint of a decorated Air Force veteran named Group Captain Prabal Malakar (Retd.), who is a wheelchair user and happens to be the Honorary Secretary, Multiple Sclerosis Society of India-Delhi Chapter about the problems of accessibility he faces while visiting hotels and cinema halls in the city. While most respondents took immediate action on the advise of the Hon'ble Court, the respondent  The Commissioner (Trade and Taxes), Govt. of NCT of Delhi who deals with the hotels in the city, did not respond even to several record of proceedings. 

Though the Hon'ble Court of SCPD could have easily enforced the attendance of the respondent under Section 82 of the Act or could have taken punitive provision under section 93 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, it chose to express its displeasure in its order in the following terms: 

"This reminds me of Dr. Naresh Chandra Saxena, former IAS Officer’s recent Book, “What Ails the IAS and Why It Fails to Deliver” in which he describes how the new reforms that are initiated fail to make any impact because most officers resist change and or are indifferent to the poor and the marginalised ones.  In the context of this case and a few others that I have dealt with as the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities during the last two and a half years, much of the deprivation of the rights and entitlements of persons with disabilities happens due to inadequate awareness, sensitivity, indifference to their plight and shying away from their responsibility at almost all the levels.  Its preponderance and pervasiveness at higher echelons has most detrimental effect.   

It further goes on to record,  "I am recording my unpleasant experience and the observations in this order with much reluctance and anguish and I am not relishing having to do so. In fact, I am doing so with a heavy heart and under a painful necessity respecting the call of my bounden duty. I feel that I will be failing in my duty if I let go of the lackadaisical approach, apathy and irresponsiveness for as long a period as five months by Commissioner of Excise, Entertainment and Luxury Tax in November 2018 and eight months by the Commissioner of Trade and Taxes in July 2019 only to say that they cannot and would not do anything in the matter coupled with the arrogance on the part of the public authority especially at the helm of affairs. This manifests abdication of obligation and shying away from the responsibility is a matter of serious concern. No effort should be spared to ensure that the credibility quotient of public/govt. authorities is kept at an all-time high if the RPwD Act is to be implemented in letter and spirit."

The Hon'ble Court of SCPD has passed its order as below:

(i) The respondent Department should send out at least a communication to all the Hotels and Restaurants operating in NCT of Delhi and to the President of the Federation of the Hotels and Restaurants Associations of India to ensure accessibility to their premises (built environment) by 15th June, 2022 and provide accessible public facilities and services to persons with disabilities with immediate effect as the date for the same is already over on 15th June, 2019 as mandated in the RPwD Act, 2016 under intimation to the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities.  I will of course continue taking up with them as well as with the civic authorities and make appropriate recommendations.

(ii)  I reiterate my recommendation to the worthy Chief Secretary, Govt. of NCT of Delhi that a workshop should be organised urgently for officers at all levels in the NCT of Delhi/Corporations etc. and at regular intervals thereafter to make them aware of  the provisions of the RPwD Act and their obligations under it and review the status of implementation of the provisions of the Act.  Need for such workshops has been brought to my notice by various stakeholders, more particularly by the primary stakeholders based on their bitter experiences and the feedback of the participants of the 9 workshops that this court has organised on the provisions of the RPwD Act and reservation for persons with disabilities in collaboration with UTCS since July 2017.

The respondent is duty bound under Section 81 of the RPwD Act 2016 to inform the court of the action taken on the recommendations made by the court within three months.

Read the Court Judgement in the above Case No. 324/1101/2018/06/6061-6064 Dated: 24.09.2019 here (in Word file)  and here (in PDF file)

Delhi High Court Order on recognition of Indian Sign Language as one of the Official Languages

Court: Delhi High Court

Bench: Justice D.N. Patel and Justice C. Hari Shankar

Case No. :WP(C) No. 9546/2018

Case Title: Nipun Malhotra Vs. Union of India

Date of Decision: 09 July 2019

Authored by: Justice DN Patel

 Download:   [PDF 1 MB]

Ensure Equal Opportunity in Sports under RPWD Act : Delhi High Court Reinforces the Rights of Para Athletes

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice A.K. Chawla
Case No.: W.P.(C) 12060/2018
Case Title: Sunil Tanwar v. Union of India & Ors.
Decided on: 1 July 2019
Neutral Citation: 2019:DHC:4583

Background

The Delhi High Court, in Sunil Tanwar v. Union of India, addressed a significant issue concerning the recognition, governance, and promotion of para sports in India. The petition was instituted by Sunil Tanwar, an internationally acclaimed para athlete and Arjuna Award recipient, who sought effective implementation of the rights of persons with disabilities in the field of sports.

The petition highlighted systemic deficiencies in the administration of para sports, including disputes over the recognition of National Sports Federations (NSFs), inadequate governmental oversight, lack of institutional support for para athletes, and the consequent impact on India's participation in international para sporting events.

The petitioner argued that despite the enactment of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) and India's obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), persons with disabilities continued to face significant barriers in accessing sporting opportunities on an equal basis with others.

During the proceedings, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports informed the Court about various steps taken to streamline the administration of para sports and to recognize appropriate National Sports Federations for disabled athletes.

Issues Before the Court

The principal issues before the Court were:

• Whether the Union Government had fulfilled its statutory obligations to promote and regulate para sports in accordance with the RPwD Act, 2016.
• Whether adequate institutional mechanisms existed for recognition and governance of para sports federations.
• Whether persons with disabilities were receiving equal opportunities in sporting activities as mandated under domestic and international law.
• Whether further judicial directions were required to strengthen the administration of para sports.

Key Observations of the Court

The Delhi High Court emphasized that sports constitute an important dimension of social inclusion, dignity, rehabilitation, and empowerment for persons with disabilities.

The Court observed that the RPwD Act, particularly Section 30, casts a statutory obligation upon the appropriate Government and sports authorities to ensure effective participation of persons with benchmark disabilities in sporting activities at every level.

The Bench noted that India has also undertaken binding international commitments under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, requiring equal participation of persons with disabilities in recreational, leisure, and sporting activities.

During the hearing, the Union Government placed before the Court various measures undertaken to improve the governance of para sports, including:

• Recognition of appropriate National Sports Federations.
• Development of transparent mechanisms for participation in international competitions.
• Financial assistance and training support for para athletes.
• Institutional reforms intended to improve administration and eliminate disputes affecting athletes.

The Court appreciated the efforts undertaken by the Government and observed that the reforms initiated would significantly strengthen India's para sports ecosystem.

Recognizing that the executive had already initiated corrective measures, the Court considered it unnecessary to issue further mandatory directions.

Directions Issued by the Court

The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition after recording the assurances and submissions made by the Union Government. The Court:

• Took note of the policy measures introduced for better governance of para sports.
• Recorded the Government's commitment to ensuring transparent administration of National Sports Federations dealing with disability sports.
• Expected the authorities to continue implementing the reforms in accordance with the RPwD Act and international obligations.
• Disposed of the writ petition while leaving it open to affected parties to seek appropriate remedies if future grievances arose.

Significance of the Judgment

The judgment is significant because it reaffirmed that promotion of sports for persons with disabilities is not merely a welfare measure but a statutory and constitutional obligation.

First, the Court recognized the importance of Section 30 of the RPwD Act, 2016, which requires Governments and sports authorities to facilitate participation of persons with disabilities in mainstream and disability-specific sporting activities.

Secondly, the judgment underscored India's obligations under the UNCRPD, reinforcing that disability rights extend beyond education and employment to include equal opportunities in sports.

Thirdly, by recording the Government's commitments, the Court encouraged administrative reforms without unnecessarily interfering in policy formulation, thereby respecting the separation of powers.

Finally, the decision contributed to strengthening institutional accountability in the governance of para sports, an area that had long been affected by administrative uncertainty and federation disputes.

Commentary

The judgment in Sunil Tanwar v. Union of India represents an important stage in the evolution of disability rights jurisprudence relating to sports governance in India.

Unlike many disability rights cases focused on accessibility or reservation in public employment, this litigation emphasized the importance of equal sporting opportunities as an essential component of dignity, inclusion, and social participation.

The Court's approach was pragmatic. Rather than issuing extensive mandatory directions, it monitored the Government's response, ensured that reforms were placed on record, and emphasized continued compliance with statutory obligations under the RPwD Act.

The decision also highlights that the success of disability rights depends not only upon legislative guarantees but equally upon robust institutional mechanisms capable of supporting athletes throughout their sporting careers.

Subsequent developments in India's para sports framework—including greater governmental recognition of para athletes, improved financial support, enhanced training infrastructure, and increased participation in international competitions—reflect the broader movement toward inclusive sports governance, of which this litigation formed an important part.

The judgment thus reinforces the principle that persons with disabilities have an equal right to participate, compete, excel, and represent the nation in sports, and that governments bear a continuing responsibility to create an enabling environment where talent is recognized irrespective of disability.

Read the Judgement

W.P.(C) 12060/2018, Sunil Tanwar v. Union of India & Ors. dated 01 July 2019

Supreme Court agrees that people above 50% of hearing and visual disability can not perform as judge!! [Judgement included]

Post Script Note: - The judgement below in V. Surendra Mohan (2019) has been overruled by the Hon'ble  Supreme Court in Vikash Kumar v.U.P.S.C (2021)

Dear Colleagues,

Please recall my earlier posts "Can a blind person work as a judge?" and subsequently  "Want to become a judge?" and "A step further to ensure that Blind can function effectively in Courts" on this subject. 

However, a Supreme Court bench of Justice Ashok Bhushan and Justice KM Joseph on 22 Jan 2019 in the case titled V. Surendra Mohan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, shattered all my progressive writings and efforts to see more blind judges in India. The bench upheld the Tamil Nadu State’s policy of restricting the eligibility of blind and deaf candidates for the reserved posts of 'civil judge' to those with 40-50% of their respective disabilities. The SC Bench held,   "A judicial officer in a state has to possess reasonable limit of the faculties of hearing, sight and speech in order to hear cases and write judgments and, therefore, stipulating a limit of 50% disability in hearing impairment or visual impairment as a condition to be eligible for the post is a legitimate restriction i.e. fair, logical and reasonable  and that it does not contravene any of the provisions of the Disabilities Act 1995 or any other statutory provision."

I have seen judges's inherent biases and pre-conceived notions about disabling conditions often reflected in their judgements referring to persons with disabilities as unfortunate, handicapped, crippled, wheelchair bound or confined to a wheelchair. This only shows their lack of awareness on disabling conditions and disability rights, however, this judgement has left me totally shaken. A common man's ignorance is pardonable, but for Milord's, whose pen has the ability to impact fate of millions of Indians with disabilities, it can be devastating for the hopes of many of them. The judges need to be well read and aware about the evolving capabilities of persons with disabilities with the advent of technology and science and the concept of reasonable accommodation that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provide. It is easier to label some one as 'incompetent' than set your own house in order. That is what the judiciary has done through this judgement despite the post of a judge identified as suitable to be held by a blind persons by the Expert Committee constituted  by Govt. of India, a bench renders them unsuitable!. Technically the bench should have refrained from stepping in to the shoes of the Expert Committee.

In the instant case, a person with seventy (70) percent blindness was denied appointment as a judge because he was more than fifty (50) percent threshold, the specified outer limit set by the Tamil Nadu State. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion in this case that persons with more than the specified range of blindness are not eligible because they cannot perform functions of a judge!

In the background that several blind lawyers and judges are functioning well and the post is also identified as suitable for persons with disabilities by an Expert Committee under the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 and that the Act makes no restrictions of degree of  percentage of disabilities for providing job reservations and other benefits etc which are equally available to all persons above 40% disabilities, this judgement looks absurd and unreasonable.  Instead of holding that differentiation based on extent of blindness is invalid and the judiciary should be  working towards facilitating accessibility of ICT, processes and reasonable accommodations for judges with blindness, the Court decided to justify the decision of the Government and the Madras High Court, which took an erroneous stand that completely blind persons cannot perform the so called strenuous tasks of reading, writing, communicating, examining witnesses, following procedures, advising advocates, etc.

Background of the case

In 2012, the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission received a requisition from the State Government for filling up the vacancy posts of Civil Judge. The Commission wrote a letter to both the State Government as well as the High Court proposing to notify the percentage of disability as 40%-50% for partially blind and partially deaf for selection. The High Court communicated its approval to the aforesaid proposal which was also consented to, by the State of Tamil Nadu. The TNPC subsequently went on to publish the notification.

V. Surendra Mohan applied for the role of civil judge, however, his application was rejected on the ground that he was 70% blind (instead of below 50%). He challenged this decision in the Madras High Court upon which he was permitted to sit for the interview. Following his interview, Mohan’s application was again rejected. As a result, V. Surendra Mohan filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court. In 2015, the High Court held that the TNPC’s decision was lawful as it was in line with the State’s policy.

In 2019, Mohan appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the rejection of his application as well as the policy on the basis of which his application was rejected, alleging it as arbitrary and unjustified.

The Bench comprising Justice Ashok Bhushan and Justice KM Joseph rejected this submission. It remarked that “a judicial officer in a State has to possess reasonable limit of the faculties of hearing, sight and speech in order to hear cases and write judgments and, therefore, stipulating a limit of 50% disability in hearing impairment or visual impairment as a condition to be eligible for the post is a legitimate restriction”.

The Supreme Court’s view that a totally blind person cannot function as a judge is trashed by live examples of  several successful blind judges in India and beyond. Accessible work place, computers with screen reading softwares, pleadings and documents in accessible format and reasonable accommodations is what is needed for their inclusion and this makes so many lawyers and judges do wonderfully well in their workplace.

Surprisingly, neither the State government or the High Court nor the Supreme Court have given any reasons as to justification of  50% disability cut-off when Persons with Disabilities Act makes so such distinction. No empirical evidence or research has been put forward to support that beyond the 50% threshold, a person would not be able to effectively perform his duties as a judge.  Supreme Court blindly relies on the government wisdom on this 50% cut-off, without questioning its scientific basis. It is also unclear as to how an advertisement by TNPSC pursuant to a “letter” from the government attained the status of an overriding legal norm. This matter wasn't referred to by the State to the Experts Committee. Decision was taken by babus based on their own whims and fancies and since it affected judiciary, the court also felt safe as they had not to change any infrastructure to accommodate a blind judge in their system. It is almost another level of apartheid visible in the present order. 

The present judgement also literally backtracks its own judgement dated 22 January 2019 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had set deadlines to make public places accessible to persons with visual impairment. It had expressed that “it becomes imperative to provide such facilities so that these persons also are ensured level playing field and not only they are able to enjoy life meaningfully, they contribute to the progress of the nation as well.”  Instead of providing level playing field, this judgement deprives blind candidates from their established legal right  arbitrarily. This order is a black spot on the image of Indian Supreme Court which has otherwise been very proactive for the rights of marginalised communities and has always batted for their inclusion in constitutional spirit. Therefore, this needs to be remedied soon in coming days.

Read the judgement in V. Surendra Mohan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, Civil Appeal No. of 83 of 2019:

Post Script Note: - The judgement below in V. Surendra Mohan (2019) has been overruled by the Hon'ble  Supreme Court in Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C (2021)

Insurance Company denies health insurance on the basis of disability - Court of Chief Commissioner approached

Dear Colleagues,

Please refer to my earlier posts "IRDA proposes life insurance cover for persons with disabilities" and "Extra premium or reduced insurance cover, both discriminatory against disabled". 

A Bengaluru based banker with visual disability has preferred a complaint in the Court of Chief commissioner for Persons with Disabilities against Religare for denying him health insurance policy on the grounds of his blindness. The 63 year-old banker Mr. TR Raghu Kumar has optic nerve atrophy (ONA), a condition of permanent vision loss caused due to damaged optic nerve, in March 1991. 

“I suddenly lost my eyesight; I woke up one morning to know that my vision has been affected. This can happen to anybody,” he said. He bought a health insurance policy from Religare for Rs 5 lakh and paid one-year premium of Rs 16,597 on October 26, 2018. “I had declared my condition in the insurance proposal and submitted a copy of the medical certificate,” he added.

A month later, Raghu received a call from the company stating that his insurance was rejected as he was totally blind and the premium was refunded. Alleging discrimination, Kumar wrote to the commissioner for persons with disabilities on November 29.

Responding to an email query, Religare said Kumar’s insurance proposal was declined due to ONA. “ONA can be caused by multiple reasons and not limited to trauma (including stroke), tumour, decrease in oxygen or blood supply, infections, disorders or hereditary reasons. There was no ascertainment with regard to the cause in his proposal. We cover persons with any kind of disability (physical/visual/hearing), provided there’s no co-existing health condition that’s in contravention with our medical underwriting guidelines,” Religare said.

However, Kumar said the company never asked him anything pertaining to the cause of ONA. “I’ve submitted the disability certificate which is self-explanatory. The company collected money for the premium and rejected my proposal without raising any question. This is nothing but discrimination against a disabled person,” he added.

Source: Times of India 

Delhi HC - JNU should work out the 5% reservation mandate of the RPWD Act, so that every person with disability, who qualifies get admission. [Judgement Included]

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench:  Hon'ble The Chief Justice  and Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3817/2018
Case Title: National Federation of Blind Vs. Union of India
Date of Judgement: 12 Nov 2018

Cases refered:

• Sambhavana v. Union of India and Ors. W.P.(C) 3919/2014 decided on March 4, 2015;
• Students Federation of India and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. W.P(C) 3032/2017 decided on October 1, 2018 
• and the Supreme Court in the cases of Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (2017)14 SCC 1; Union of India and Ors. v. National Federation of Blind and Ors. 2013 10 SCC 772,

Background

The Delhi High Court examined an important issue concerning implementation of the mandatory 5% reservation for persons with disabilities in higher educational institutions under Section 32 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The petition was filed by the National Federation of the Blind challenging the admission policy adopted by Jawaharlal Nehru University for admission to M.Phil./Ph.D. and Ph.D. programmes for the academic session 2018–19.

The main grievance was that JNU had failed to provide the full 5% reservation mandated under the RPwD Act.

According to the petitioner, against a total intake of 723 seats, the University reserved only 32 seats for persons with disabilities instead of approximately 36 seats required under the law.

The petitioner argued that the shortfall arose because the University calculated reservation separately for each School and Centre rather than calculating reservation on the basis of the total seats across the University.

Under this system, departments with fewer than nine seats effectively provided no reservation for persons with disabilities at all. The petitioner contended that such compartmentalised calculation diluted the statutory guarantee under Section 32 of the RPwD Act.

The case also involved denial of admission to candidates with disabilities in courses where reservation was allegedly not implemented due to low departmental seat intake.

JNU defended its methodology by relying upon the reservation framework followed under the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 and its School-wise and Centre-wise reservation calculations.

Key Observations of the Court

The Delhi High Court examined whether disability reservation under Section 32 of the RPwD Act could be calculated separately for each School or Centre even if such calculation reduced the overall reservation below the mandatory 5%.

The Court recognised that Section 32 creates a binding obligation requiring higher educational institutions receiving government aid to reserve “not less than 5%” seats for persons with benchmark disabilities.

Importantly, the Bench observed that this statutory mandate cannot be diluted through administrative formulas or internal institutional calculation methods.

The Court noted that the methodology adopted by JNU resulted in departments with small seat intake effectively excluding persons with disabilities from reservation benefits. As a consequence, the actual reservation available across the University fell below the statutory minimum.

The Bench made it clear that disability reservation cannot be treated as a fragmented or discretionary exercise dependent on departmental seat distribution.

The Court also observed that the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 cannot be interpreted in a manner that defeats the mandate of the RPwD Act.

Another important aspect of the proceedings was the recognition that rigid departmental allocation systems can indirectly exclude students with disabilities from higher education despite formal reservation policies existing on paper.

During the hearing, JNU acknowledged the issue raised by the petitioner and agreed to grant admission to additional candidates with disabilities in compliance with the RPwD Act.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court effectively held that reservation for persons with disabilities must be implemented in a manner that fully ensures the mandatory 5% reservation under Section 32 of the RPwD Act.

The Court:

• Recognised that School-wise or Centre-wise reservation calculations resulting in reservation below 5% are inconsistent with the RPwD Act;
• Took on record JNU’s decision to grant admission to additional PwD candidates;
• Addressed grievances relating to denial of admission arising from departmental seat allocation structures; and
• Reinforced that institutions cannot reduce statutory disability reservation through administrative calculation mechanisms.

Commentary

The judgment in National Federation of the Blind v. Union of India & Ors. is a significant ruling on disability reservation in higher education because it directly addresses one of the most common methods used to dilute reservation for persons with disabilities.

Educational institutions often adopt programme-wise or departmental seat calculations which appear compliant on paper but substantially reduce the actual number of seats available to students with disabilities. The Delhi High Court recognised that such practices undermine both the purpose and the guarantee of the RPwD Act.

A key strength of the judgment is its emphasis that the requirement of “not less than 5%” reservation must be implemented in substance and not merely in form.

The ruling also reinforces that disability reservation is not a matter of administrative convenience. Universities cannot rely on internal departmental structures or technical formulas to reduce opportunities available to persons with disabilities.

Importantly, the judgment situates disability reservation within the broader constitutional framework of equality, dignity and inclusion. Reservation under the RPwD Act is not simply a welfare measure but an enforceable right intended to address historical exclusion from educational spaces.

The case additionally highlights a continuing implementation gap in higher education institutions where statutory reservation exists formally but is weakened in practice through restrictive admission systems and fragmented seat allocation methods.

Overall, the decision remains an important precedent affirming that the full 5% disability reservation mandated under the RPwD Act must be meaningfully implemented and cannot be diluted through administrative practices.

Read the judgement below:

LPG dealership not a poverty alleviation scheme so as to come under Section 37 of The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, opines Bangalore HC

Poverty alleviation is for consumers- says Karnataka High Court, rejecting plea that questioned oil companies reserving only 3 per cent of LPG dealerships for people with physical challenges.

The High Court has refused a plea by an organisation working for the welfare of physically challenged persons to reserve five per cent of LPG dealerships to such people. The HC said that it cannot apply Section 37 of The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 as the LPG dealership given by State-owned oil companies are not government welfare schemes where this rule needs to be applied.

Karnataka Rajya Vikalchetanara Rakshana Samiti approached the HC against Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum and the Union Government challenging a notification by these companies that wanted to select 238 LPG distributors.

As per the RPD Act, the reservation for physically challenged persons is five per cent. But the notification had reserved only 6 distributorships for the physically challenged instead of 11, it was argued. This was less than 3 per cent.

The HC however said that the distributorship is not a welfare measure. It said, “In the overall comprehension of the matter, we are satisfied that even if the award of LPG distributorships, essentially a matter of commercial contract, is a welfare measure and leads to manifold empowerment and all-round development of society, it cannot be termed as a notified scheme for poverty alleviation and development.”

The court also said that poverty alleviation in LPG is directed at consumers and not distributors. So, reservation for distributors under the Act was not possible. It said, “Needless to reiterate that the availability of LPG to the persons below poverty line may be correlated with the poverty alleviation, but that relates to the consumers and not to the distributors.”

The division bench of Chief Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Justice S Sunil Dutt Yadav refused to consider the distributorship licencing as a poverty alleviation scheme. It said, “The award of LPG distributorships is taken up essentially by the three State-owned oil companies and is not any notified scheme of the appropriate Government or local authorities, which could be classified as a poverty alleviation and development scheme.”

Noting that three per cent of the distribution agencies are already reserved for physically challenged persons, the HC said, “The provision for reservation by the respondent Oil Companies, who are the agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, prima facie indicates their attention to the requirements of the persons belonging to different classes and categories. However, for that matter, we find no reason to issue a mandamus to provide for extra reservation for persons with disabilities by operating Section 37” of The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

However, the HC said that claims of other concessions in application fee and financial assistance can be sought by making appropriate representation to the concerned authorities.

Supreme Court: MCI Expert Committee's opinion cannot be allowed to override a statutory provision mandating medical institutions to provide 5% reservation to persons with disabilities.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Justice Arun Mishra and Hon'ble Justice Indira Banerjee

Case No: WRIT PETITION (C) No. 669 OF 2018

Case title: Purswani Ashutosh (Minor) Through Dr. Kamlesh Virumal Purswani Vs Union of India & Ors

Date of Judgement: 28 Aug 2018

Brief:

The Petitioner, who appeared for the NEET UG Examination for the 2018-19 session was denied benefit of reservation for persons with disabilities, despite having low vision impairment and being eligible for 5% reservation for specific benchmark disability under the RPwD Act, 2016 and MCI's Medical Education Regulation 4(3). 

An MCI expert committee determined that individuals with a visual impairment below 40% would not be admitted to the MBBS course.  Aggrieved by this he approached the Court.

The question which arises in this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is, whether a person with benchmark disability of low vision, within the meaning of Section 2(r), read with Clause 1B of the Schedule, of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 can be denied the benefit of reservation for admission to the MBBS Medical Course.

The court said that the argument of MCI that Section 32 is not attracted since it only provides for reservation to higher educational institutions and not to technical institutions imparting technical education, appears to be fallacious since higher educational institution is a generic term which would include institutions imparting all kinds of higher education, including technical education, whereas technical institution is a specific term for those institutions which only impart technical education.

The court, rejecting the opinion of the committee, held that its opinion cannot be allowed to override a statutory provision (Medical Regulations) mandating medical institutions to provide 5% reservation to persons with disabilities. It held that the RPwD Act, 2016 as well as Medical Regulations by MCI was binding on the institution and thus no expert committee's opinion could be given primacy over the same. Thus, it held that the petitioner cannot be denied admission if he qualifies as per his merit in the category of persons with disabilities.

Judgement:

Hearing-Impaired Candidates Cannot Be Excluded from MBBS Admissions: Delhi HC

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Siddharth Mridul
Case No.: W.P.(C) 7820/2018
Case Title: Tina Sharma (Minor) Through Her Father Bhagwati Prasad Sharma v. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 31 July 2018

Background

The present writ petition before the Delhi High Court raised important questions concerning the rights of hearing-impaired candidates seeking admission to MBBS courses under the reservation framework created by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”).

The petition was filed on behalf of Tina Sharma, a hearing-impaired student aspiring to pursue medical education under the category of persons with benchmark disabilities.

The petitioner had successfully completed her Class XII examination conducted by the CBSE and had also appeared in the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET-UG) 2018 for admission to medical colleges.

The NEET information bulletin specifically provided that 5% of seats in medical institutions would be reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities in accordance with the RPwD Act.

The petitioner fell within the statutory definition of “person with benchmark disability” under Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act. Hearing impairment was recognised under the statute as a specified disability where an individual suffers hearing loss of 70 decibels or more in speech frequencies in both ears.

However, the controversy arose because the Expert Committee constituted by the Medical Council of India (“MCI”) had recommended exclusionary standards concerning hearing-impaired candidates seeking admission to MBBS courses.

The case therefore raised a broader constitutional issue — whether candidates with hearing disabilities could be denied access to medical education despite statutory guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, and inclusive education under the RPwD Act.

Key Observations of the Court

Justice Siddharth Mridul adopted a purposive and rights-oriented interpretation of the RPwD Act while examining the issue.

At the outset, the Court recognised the RPwD Act as a transformative legislation intended to mainstream persons with disabilities within educational institutions and professional spaces.

The Court emphasised that the statute embodies the principles of:

• equality of opportunity;
• respect for inherent dignity;
• individual autonomy;
• freedom of choice;
• non-discrimination; and
• full and effective participation in society.

The Bench observed that persons with benchmark disabilities possess enforceable statutory and constitutional rights to access educational institutions recognised or funded by the Government.

Importantly, the Court clarified that the RPwD Act is not merely a welfare-oriented concessionary framework but a rights-based legislation intended to secure substantive equality and dismantle systemic barriers faced by persons with disabilities.

A particularly important aspect of the order lies in the Court’s recognition that exclusionary educational standards affecting disabled candidates must be subjected to strict scrutiny and cannot be justified on the basis of stereotypical assumptions regarding capability or competence.

The Court underscored that the RPwD Act had been enacted in consonance with constitutional guarantees as well as Directive Principles of State Policy and was intended to ensure equal participation of persons with disabilities within higher education.

The Bench further recognised that the legislation reflects India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which obligates States to ensure accessibility, inclusion, and equal opportunity for persons with disabilities across all sectors, including education.

Importantly, the Court acknowledged the larger social importance of enabling persons with disabilities to enter professional domains that have historically remained inaccessible because of institutional prejudice, inflexible eligibility standards, and medically deterministic assumptions.

The order implicitly rejected the assumption that disability necessarily equates to incapacity and recognised that persons with disabilities possess equal aspirations, dignity, and entitlement to participate in professional education systems.

Interpretation of the RPwD Act

One of the most significant aspects of the order is the Court’s interpretation of the RPwD Act as a progressive social legislation intended to promote inclusion rather than perpetuate exclusion.

The Court recognised that:

• benchmark disability status creates enforceable legal rights;
• educational inclusion forms part of substantive equality; and
• institutional policies must conform to constitutional morality and disability rights jurisprudence.

The Bench treated the RPwD Act as a transformative legal framework intended to shift Indian disability jurisprudence away from paternalistic and medicalised approaches toward a human-rights-based model centred upon dignity, participation, autonomy, and equal opportunity.

The Court thereby reaffirmed that professional educational institutions cannot adopt exclusionary standards inconsistent with statutory guarantees under the RPwD Act.

Commentary

The decision in Tina Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. represents an important judicial affirmation of inclusive professional education and disability rights in India.

One of the most significant contributions of the ruling lies in its recognition that disability rights are integral to constitutional equality and cannot be treated merely as welfare concerns.

Historically, persons with disabilities — especially candidates with sensory disabilities such as hearing impairment — have faced structural barriers in accessing professional education due to rigid eligibility standards and stereotypical assumptions regarding competence.

The present case reflects the judiciary’s growing recognition that exclusion from educational institutions often arises not because of disability itself, but because of inaccessible institutional structures and discriminatory policies.

A transformative aspect of the Court’s reasoning is its movement away from the traditional medical model of disability toward a rights-based approach. Instead of reducing disabled individuals to impairment percentages or medical conditions, the judgment recognised persons with disabilities as rights-bearing individuals entitled to dignity, autonomy, and equal participation.

The ruling also strengthens the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Formal equality merely permits disabled candidates to compete; substantive equality requires active dismantling of institutional barriers that prevent meaningful participation.

Another important aspect of the decision is the Court’s insistence that statutory protections under the RPwD Act must receive liberal and purposive interpretation consistent with constitutional values.

The judgment additionally contributes to the evolving disability rights jurisprudence in India recognising accessibility and educational inclusion as indispensable components of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Importantly, the case carries wider implications for representation of persons with disabilities within medicine and allied professions. Professional spaces have historically remained inaccessible because of infrastructural barriers, rigid institutional norms, and assumptions regarding bodily ability. Judicial interventions such as the present one challenge these exclusionary structures and promote democratisation of access to professional education.

At a broader constitutional level, the decision reinforces the vision of an inclusive society where educational and professional opportunities are not conditioned upon conformity with narrow notions of bodily normalcy.

The order therefore stands as an important reaffirmation that disability rights jurisprudence in India must continue evolving in favour of dignity, inclusion, autonomy, and substantive equality rather than exclusion rooted in stereotypes or restrictive institutional assumptions.

Read the Judgement