Supreme Court of India | Civil Appeal No. 213 of 2013 | State of Punjab Vs. Jagjit Singh & Ors | Dated 26 Oct 2016

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 213 OF 2013

Appellants:       State of Punjab & Ors.   
Respondents:    Jagjit Singh & Ors.
Bench:             Hon'ble Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar
                        Hon'ble Justice S.A. Bobde)
Order Date:     26 October 2016
Status :            Reportable

US Supreme Court to hear ground breaking case involving what is "appropriate education" for students with Autism in public schools

Dear Colleagues,

The origins of this potentially lank mark case stretch back to 2010 when the parents of a child with autism in Douglas County of USA had to withdraw their child from "Summit View Elementary" -  a public school  after the child (now 17) began to exhibit severe behavioral issues, including banging his head, dropping to the floor, disrobing and running away from school. The parents having been convinced the school wasn’t doing enough to help their son with autism progress academically, pulled the child out of Summit View and enrolled him in Firefly Autism, a Denver school that specializes in working with autistic children.

The parents have argued in the petition they submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court late last year that the intent of the IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) was to provide a meaningful education to disabled students, not simply a “just-above-trivial” benefit. They noted that federal judges from several circuits across the country have issued conflicting rulings over the years on what is the "appropriate standard" to be used to assess the proper level of educational benefit a disabled student should get. The petition of the parents argues that this case presents an ideal vehicle for this Court to resolve the circuit split and provide lower courts with guidance in applying the IDEA.

It is pertinent to note that the U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t spoken on the issue since the 1982 Board of Education Versus Rowley ruling, when it affirmed that IDEA guaranteed disabled students access to the public school classroom but didn’t address the quality of that education.

Even in India, we have been facing this issue of what is 'appropriate education' for children with disabilities, particularly those with intellectual and developmental disabilities. While the government schools in India are woefully ill-equipped in absence of trained educators, lack of teaching learning material in the schools given the large number of students. The situation is equally grim in the private schools as well who charge a considerable amount in the name of tuition fee and other counts, however, have made the education of disabled children an affair to be managed by Shadow Teachers (paid by parents). In the name of inclusion, children do remain in the school but there is hardly an effort to include them in the classroom or the learning outcomes. Children with disabilities are also not included in play or extra-curricular activities. This is surely not inclusion. This is a clear violation of the spirit of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act 1995 and in particular Section 30 of the Act.

Entire world will be watching this case with great curiosity as to what Supreme Court of USA decides. But one thing is sure, Supreme Court had made up its mind to speak its mind on the issue and likely to grant Certiorari to the parents. This case is truly about equal opportunity for the special needs children that the law requires. And this is likely to help realize inclusive education as enshrined in the IDEA.

Brief about IDEA 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a four-part (A-D) piece of American legislation that ensures students with a disability are provided with Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) that is tailored to their individual needs. IDEA was previously known as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA) from 1975 to 1990. In 1990, the United States Congress reauthorized EHA and changed the title to IDEA (Public Law No. 94-142). Overall, the goal of IDEA is to provide children with disabilities the same opportunity for education as those students who do not have a disability.

IDEA is composed of four parts, the main two being part A and part B.[1] Part A covers the general provisions of the law, Part B covers assistance for education of all children with disabilities, Part C covers infants and toddlers with disabilities which includes children from birth to age three, and Part D is the national support programs administered at the federal level. Each part of the law has remained largely the same since the original enactment in 1975.

In practice, IDEA is composed of six main elements that illuminate its main points. These six elements are: Individualized Education Program (IEP), Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), Least Restrictive Environment (LRE), Appropriate Evaluation, Parent and Teacher Participation, and Procedural Safeguards. To go along with those six main elements there are also a few other important components that tie into IDEA: Confidentiality of Information, Transition Services, and Discipline. Throughout the years of IDEA being reauthorized these components have become key concepts when learning about IDEA.

Here is the coverage in Denver on the issue

U.S. Supreme Court will hear Douglas County student with disabilities case

Origins of potentially landmark case stretch back to 2010

The U.S. Supreme Court announced Thursday that it will hear a potentially groundbreaking case brought by a Douglas County couple who claim that their autistic son was not provided an adequate education in the public school system as required by federal law.

The high court’s ruling on the case, which likely wouldn’t come down until next year, could have substantial implications for students with disabilities across the country in terms of the standard school districts will be required to meet when providing instruction and services. At issue is whether schools must provide an education equal to other students.

The family, whose last name is not used in court documents, told The Denver Post on Thursday that they were “shell-shocked and giddy” about the decision by the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to their case, which has dragged on for half a dozen years.

“It’s about equal opportunity for special-needs kids that the law requires,” said Joe F., father of Endrew F., whose name anchors the Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District case file. “If we can change any families’ lives, that’s our goal.”

The district released a statement on the high court’s decision late Thursday.

“It would be inappropriate to discuss the specifics of the case while it is still being litigated, but the Court’s decision today is not a decision on the merits, and we look forward to addressing the issues before the Court,” district spokeswoman Paula Hans said.

The roots of the case go back to 2010, when the Highlands Ranch couple pulled Endrew, now 17, out of Summit View Elementary after he began to exhibit severe behavioral issues, including banging his head, dropping to the floor, disrobing and running away from school. Convinced the school wasn’t doing enough to help their son progress academically, the couple pulled him out of Summit View and enrolled him in Firefly Autism, a Denver school that specializes in working with autistic children.

“If he was able to show up to school and say ‘good morning,’ that was good enough for them,” Joe F. said of the Douglas County School District. “They weren’t moving his education forward.”

The family has asked that their last name not be used.

The parents, who said their son has made progress in his learning since attending Firefly, asked the district to reimburse them for the tuition they paid for Endrew’s private schooling. They claimed that the Douglas County School District did not do enough to provide their son with a “free appropriate public education” as required by the 1975 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

But an administrative law judge, a federal judge and the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals backed the district, claiming in separate rulings that the federal statute only requires that schools provide students with “some educational benefit,” a standard they determined Douglas County had met with Endrew.

The family argued in the petition they submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court late last year that the intent of the IDEA was to provide a meaningful education to disabled students, not simply a “just-above-trivial” benefit. They noted that federal judges from several circuits across the country have issued conflicting rulings over the years on what is the appropriate standard to be used to assess the proper level of educational benefit a disabled student should get.

“This case presents an ideal vehicle for this Court to resolve the circuit split and provide lower courts with guidance in applying the IDEA,” their petition argued.

The U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t spoken on the issue since the 1982 Board of Education v. Rowley ruling, when it affirmed that IDEA guaranteed disabled students access to the public school classroom but didn’t address the quality of that education.

The family received a boost last month when the Office of the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to take up the case. It said that the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had set the bar — a standard of “merely … more than de minimis” educational benefit — too low.

“No parent or educator in America would say that a child has received an ‘appropriate’ or a ‘specially suitable’ or ‘proper’ education ‘in the circumstances’ when all the child has received are benefits that are barely more than trivial,” the solicitor general’s office wrote.

But Kathleen Sullivan, chief counsel for the Colorado Association of School Boards, said it would be better for Congress to clarify its statutes than for the court to impose an order. A uniform standard handed down by the Supreme Court would prove “disruptive” to what is today an individually tailored analysis and decision between educators, parents and students, she said.

“The disruption is in shoving aside more than 30 years of case law that we have in helping us understand what the IDEA means for students,” Sullivan said. “I think we would see a wave of litigation to define and apply that new standard.”

The district, in a brief it filed earlier this month urging the Supreme Court not to take up the case, argued that in passing the IDEA, Congress guaranteed access to public education for students with disabilities but did not specify what the level of that education should be.

“Thus, for over 30 years, this Court has held that if a State provides a program ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,’ then it ‘has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more,’ ” the brief argued.

But Jack Robinson, an attorney for Endrew F.’s family, said one of the IDEA’s stated goals is readying a student with disabilities for the workforce or independent living, something that can’t be achieved with a minimal education offering.

“There has to be a more heightened and robust standard than a little more than nothing,” Robinson said. “This case has the potential of recognizing that children with disabilities have a right to a substantive education.”

Source : Denverpost 

Note: This post is also reproduced on " Subhash Vashishth's Blog"

Disabled Soldiers & Politics of their Disability Pension

Dear Colleagues,

Here is a wonderful article by  Maj Navdeep Singh, a veteran and a fellow lawyer at Punjab and Haryana High Court. In this connection, you may also refer to  my earlier post dt. 26 Feb 2014 "DESW works against Ex-Servicemen disabled during service are worst hit".

Questions of compensation

India has the distinction of exhibiting disdain towards the cause of disabled soldiers

India is quite a paradox. There is excessive chest-thumping for our men and women in uniform on the one hand and pride in laying constant siege to the benefits and legal rights of those very personnel whom we superficially cheer while on parades on the other.

And bearing the brunt of this all are our disabled soldiers. The deleterious effect the stress and strain of military service has on a soldier’s health is a universally recognised phenomenon. In fact, most nations go out of the way to make the lives of their troops more comfortable — as seen in rising payouts for their loss of health. However, India has the distinction of exhibiting utter disdain towards the cause of disabled soldiers. At a very rudimentary level, for example, one has defence services accountants asking how ailments such as heart disease, neurosis, backache, seizures — common in civilians too — can be affected or aggravated by military service.

The service-disability connection

It is not difficult to discern that a highly unsettled and regimented life, away from family most of the year, and at times under the shadow of the gun, the inability to cope with domestic commitments, and a lack of community living, sexual fulfilment and physical proximity, curtailed freedoms and rights, can all lead to an aggravation of common medical conditions. The life of military personnel or even paramilitary troopers who are on duty almost 24 hours a day and who require permission to use even a washroom or visit a market after signing multiple registers, cannot be compared with civilians who live with their families and have fixed and reasonable working hours in a week.

Disability rules in India and other democracies are balanced and work on the presumption of a military service-disability connection. But the army of accountants and financial wizards often rejects such disability claims leading to numerous instances of judicial intervention. When disability benefits are awarded by courts and tribunals, there is more shock in store. The Ministry of Defence appeals against the claims of disabled, at times over amounts as little as a few hundred rupees. Between 2012-2013, 90 per cent of all appeals filed in the Supreme Court by the Ministry of Defence were against disabled soldiers. The efforts of the Defence Minister to control the litigation malaise are being met with strong resistance from the official-legal ecosystem which thrives on the miseries of disabled soldiers.

Paring pension rates

A recent example was the recommendation made in the Seventh Central Pay Commission to slash disability pension rates. The observation was that as there was an increase in the percentage of disabled officers in the defence services vis-à-vis the lower ranks, benefits needed to be slashed from the “percentage of pay system” to a “slab system” which would be more equitable for ranks other than officers. The recommendation was that from the current formula of “30% of pay for 100% disability”, the disability element should now be granted at the fixed rate of Rs. 27,000, Rs.17,000 and Rs.12,000 for Commissioned Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks respectively for 100 per cent disability, and proportionately reduced for lesser disability. Surprisingly, no such corresponding “equitable” change was recommended for civilian disability pensioners, including those from the Central Armed Police Forces, who continue to receive benefits on the basis of “percentage of pay”.

Statistically, there is a higher probability of officers incurring disability than jawans since the latter start retiring in their 30s after about 15-plus years of service. Officers retire in their 50s after a service period spanning 30 years or more. It shocks one that those who are maimed and infirm have to bear insults when instead there should be concern about the rise in stress and strain and a deteriorating health profile among defence personnel.

The recommendation was made suo motu based on data by the Defence Accounts Department to the commission and without being authenticated by the defence services. No opportunity was granted to discuss the issue. The accounting jugglery is even more jarring since the slab system would result in a better payout only to those rare cases where those in the lower ranks are medically boarded out at the start of their careers, while it results in a loss to all jawans who are released on completion of regular service terms. In the higher ranks, the difference is more glaring. A Lieutenant General who is 100 per cent disabled and drawing a disability element of Rs.52,560 as of December 31, 2015, would now get Rs.27,000 on January 1, 2016. His civilian counterpart, on a par earlier, would now get Rs.67,500. While the pay commission has handsomely increased all pensions, which includes civil disability, it has slashed those for military disability; in some instances by more than half. The fact that vested interests have twisted the issue on social media citing ‘government sources’ makes this even more unfortunate.

What is the use of all the pomp and show at military displays or basking in the glory of our military achievements if we cannot take care of our disabled soldiers? They may form a minuscule percentage, but they certainly deserve much better.

About Major Navdeep Singh - Major Singh is a veteran and an advocate at the Punjab and Haryana High Court. He was the founding President of the Armed Forces Tribunal Bar Association, Chandigarh., and is Member of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War at Brussels

Source: The Hindu

Supreme Court while upholding the Karnataka HC decision directs Karnataka Govt not to deny Primary School Teacher jobs to Visually Impaired Candidatesto

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble the Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon'ble Dr. Justice DY Chandrachud

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 3910 of 2009 (Against the final order and judgment of the Karnataka High Court in PIL Writ Petition No. 16396 of 2005 dt. 29.09.2007)

Case Title: Selection Authority and Deputy Director  Vs. Akhila Karnataka S.K. Andha Sangha

Date of Judgement: 01 Sep 2016

Supreme Court directs Karnataka Govt. to not keep visually impaired persons out of primary school teacher jobs while dismissing the appeal filed by the Karnataka Govt.

Supreme Court of India upheld the ruling of the Karnataka High Court in PIL Writ petition No. 16396 of 2005, directing the Karnataka State Government to ensure reservation for visually impaired persons in the role of primary school teachers and to execute this through a dedicated recruitment drive. This decision marked the culmination of a legal battle that saw the state government arguing that individuals with blindness or low vision were unsuitable for the role of primary school teachers and should not be entitled to reservation in these positions.

The repercussions of this Supreme Court ruling are significant, as it will necessitate the recruitment of hundreds of blind and low vision individuals to address the shortfall in reserved vacancies that had persisted since 2005.

This legal victory was achieved through the efforts of a non-governmental organization (NGO) representing blind individuals, known as the "Akhila Karnataka Andha S.K. Sangha", with the able representation of Advocate Jayna Kothari. The organization had previously succeeded in petitioning the Karnataka High Court, where the state had argued that primary school teacher positions were ill-suited for visually impaired persons. In an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court in July 2016, the state contended that students in primary schools could not be effectively taught by teachers with blindness or low vision. They further claimed that many government primary schools, out of a total of 44,000, had only one or two teachers without additional support staff, making it difficult for such schools to function if reservations were granted to visually impaired persons.

However, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected these arguments put forth by the Karnataka State Government. The bench, led by the Chief Justice of India, pointed out that the Persons with Disabilities Act of 1995 mandates that a minimum of 3% of all government job vacancies should be reserved for disabled individuals. Of this quota, at least 1% should be allocated for persons with impaired vision. Moreover, both the Central and Karnataka State Governments had recognized primary school teaching positions as suitable for blind and low vision individuals in accordance with the said Act. The court maintained that placing visually impaired individuals in schools equipped with other teachers and support staff would not disrupt the schools' functioning, particularly given the availability of modern technology-based aids and appliances for blind and low vision individuals. Thus, the Supreme Court held the state government responsible for fulfilling its obligation to employ visually impaired persons in these positions and dismissed their appeal.

Below the Supreme Court's order dated 01.09.2016 dismissing the appeal of the State Govt. of Karnataka:

"We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length who have taken us through the orders impugned in these appeals. We are of the considered view that the impugned orders do not suffer from any error much less any perversity to compel our interference in exercise of our powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. These civil appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed."

Access the Karnataka HC Judgement:

Private School Autonomy Cannot Override Disability Rights: Delhi High Court

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Manmohan
Case No.: W.P.(C) 2699/2016
Case Title: Siddharth International Public School v. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal & Anr.
Date of Judgment: 26 August 2016

Background

In a significant judgment strengthening the principles of inclusive education and disability rights, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed that educational institutions cannot deny admission to children with disabilities on the basis of institutional inconvenience, infrastructural limitations, or rigid procedural requirements.

The case arose from proceedings concerning Master Priyanshu, a child who had suffered amputation following a motor accident and thereafter used a prosthetic leg. Proceedings relating to his rehabilitation and compensation had earlier been initiated before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT).

Taking note of the child’s educational deprivation and rehabilitation needs, the Tribunal directed facilitation of his admission in Siddharth International Public School under the Economically Weaker Section (“EWS”) and Disadvantaged Group (“DG”) category with appropriate relaxation in age criteria.

Aggrieved by these directions, the petitioner-school approached the High Court challenging the legality and jurisdictional basis of the orders passed by the Tribunal.

The school argued that:

• the MACT lacked jurisdiction to direct admission of the child;
• no vacant EWS seats were available;
• the directions interfered with institutional autonomy in admission matters;
• the child exceeded the prescribed age limit for Class I admission;
• the school could not be compelled to provide special educators or barrier-free infrastructure; and
• transportation facilities for the child were unavailable.

The school further contended that admitting a ten-year-old child into Class I would adversely affect the educational environment for other students.

On the other hand, the respondents argued that the school had failed to comply with its obligations under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (“RTE Act”) and that inclusive education required accommodation of the child under the EWS/DG framework.

The matter therefore raised an important constitutional issue — whether institutional rules and administrative barriers could override the educational rights of a child with disability.

Key Observations of the Court

Justice Manmohan adopted a rights-based and constitutionally sensitive approach while examining the dispute.

At the outset, the Court clarified that the matter could not be treated merely as a technical controversy concerning admission procedures or seat allocation. Instead, the Court viewed the issue through the broader constitutional framework of equality, dignity, inclusion, and access to education.

A particularly important aspect of the judgment lies in the Court’s rejection of the petitioner-school’s attempt to invoke institutional autonomy to deny admission to a child with disability.

While private educational institutions often rely upon autonomy in administrative matters, the Court made it clear that such autonomy cannot override constitutional obligations flowing from welfare legislation and the rights of vulnerable children.

The judgment recognised that private schools performing public educational functions remain bound by constitutional values and statutory obligations aimed at ensuring social justice and educational inclusion.

The Court also rejected the school’s infrastructural objections, including its contention that it could not be compelled to provide special educators, barrier-free access, or disability-sensitive accommodations.

In doing so, the Court effectively affirmed the principle of reasonable accommodation — now recognised as a foundational component of disability rights jurisprudence. The judgment makes it clear that educational institutions cannot refuse admission merely because inclusion requires institutional adaptation or infrastructural effort.

Another important feature of the ruling is the Court’s purposive and child-centric interpretation of the educational framework under the RTE Act.

The Court declined to adopt a rigid approach regarding age eligibility and instead prioritised the child’s right to education and rehabilitation. It recognised that mechanical insistence upon procedural requirements, especially in cases involving vulnerable children facing extraordinary circumstances, may itself amount to exclusionary discrimination.

The Bench thereby embraced the principle of substantive equality rather than mere formal equality.

Importantly, the Court recognised that educational inclusion for children with disabilities is not a matter of charity or benevolence but a constitutional and statutory entitlement flowing from Articles 14, 21, and 21A of the Constitution of India.

The judgment also acknowledged the larger social importance of inclusive education. Implicit within the ruling is the understanding that schools must reflect constitutional values of fraternity, diversity, empathy, and equal participation.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court upheld the essential objective underlying the directions passed for the child’s educational inclusion and rejected the challenge raised by the petitioner-school.

The Court effectively affirmed:

• that children with disabilities cannot be denied educational access on the basis of institutional inconvenience or infrastructural inadequacy;
• that private schools remain obligated to comply with inclusive education mandates under welfare legislation;
• that procedural and technical barriers cannot defeat the fundamental right to education of vulnerable children; and
• that educational institutions are under a duty to facilitate inclusion through reasonable accommodation and supportive measures.

The judgment thereby reinforced that educational access for children with disabilities must be interpreted in a rights-based and constitutionally sensitive manner.

Commentary

The decision in Siddharth International Public School v. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal & Anr. is an important reaffirmation of inclusive education as a constitutional obligation rather than a matter of institutional discretion.

One of the most significant contributions of the ruling lies in its rejection of the assumption that disability accommodation is optional or dependent upon institutional convenience. The Court instead recognised accessibility and inclusion as indispensable components of the right to education itself.

The judgment meaningfully advances the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Formal equality would merely allow disabled children to apply for admission; substantive equality requires dismantling the structural and institutional barriers that prevent meaningful participation in educational spaces.

Another transformative aspect of the ruling is its recognition of the doctrine of reasonable accommodation. Rather than expecting disabled children to adjust themselves to inaccessible educational systems, the judgment places responsibility upon institutions to become inclusive and responsive to diverse educational needs.

The decision also contributes significantly to the evolution of disability rights jurisprudence in India by rejecting bureaucratic and procedural formalism when dealing with vulnerable children. The Court recognised that rigid adherence to age norms, infrastructural limitations, or admission procedures cannot override constitutional guarantees of dignity, equality, and educational opportunity.

Importantly, the ruling departs from traditional charity-based understandings of disability and instead adopts a rights-based framework grounded in inclusion, autonomy, and equal citizenship.

The judgment also carries broader implications for private educational institutions across India. In an increasingly privatised educational landscape, vulnerable groups are often excluded through administrative and procedural barriers. The present decision acts as an important constitutional safeguard against such exclusionary practices.

The ruling further aligns with the principles embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which recognises inclusive education as a fundamental human right requiring equal participation within mainstream educational systems.

At a broader constitutional level, the judgment reinforces that schools are not merely academic institutions but constitutional spaces where values of equality, dignity, fraternity, and social justice must be realised in practice.

The decision therefore stands as a powerful affirmation that children with disabilities cannot be excluded from educational opportunities on the basis of inconvenience, inflexible procedures, or institutional reluctance. The Constitution requires accommodation, accessibility, and meaningful inclusion — not exclusion disguised as administrative limitation.

Read the judgement

Bombay HC favours aspiring candidates with cerebral palsy for admission to MBBS; Orders re-constitution of Medical Board with 2 Neuro-specialists [Judgement Included]

Dear colleagues,

This petition by two candidates with cerebral palsy who are aspiring to become doctors/ surgeons revolves around three larger questions often faced by many candidates with disabilities aspiring to be doctors:

(a) Whether a person with cerebral palsy can be a doctor?
(b) Whether the 40-70% disability criteria set by MCI for admission to MBBS courses is constitutionally valid ?
(c) Whether  a team of ophthalmologist, a pathologist, an orthopaedic, a general physician and a surgeon can assess the disability of a person with cerebral palsy in absence of a neuro specialist?

The Medical Board set up by State Directorate of Medical Education and Research mechanically assessed the candidates above 70% disability looking at the etiology of their disability i.e. cerebral palsy. The Board did not have neuro-specialists. Hon'ble Bench ordered to re-examine the candidates citing that the Medical Board was not competent to even assess the candidates with cerebral palsy. The court expressed that the Medical Board should include two doctors who have a specialization in neuroscience and asked for re-constitution of the same to assess the disability and to keep two seats vacant for them.  However, it seems the judgement doesn't address the impugned criteria of 40-70% disability!  Another area that is worth our concern is the tendency of authorities to adjust candidates with disabilities in disability quota even when the candidates have scored higher marks in the common entrance test like general candidates. This must be checked at every stage.

It is pertinent to mention that the candidates did not have functional impediment of upper limbs, they had a restriction of the lower limbs while walking. However, since the disability is a result of cerebral palsy, the medical board often indicates all four limbs involved. Same is the case with the List of identified posts by Govt. of India wherein the assessment or identification doesn't highlight the functional abilities as it mechanically goes with categories as One Arm, One Leg, Both Legs. Merely on the basis of slight involvement of limbs the candidates are declared ineligible even where the affected limb hasn't lost its functional competence. (Eg. a person with a deformed feet but with no functional limitation in walking is declared as ineligible for a post not meant for both leg affected candidate.) These inconsistencies in the list of identified jobs and their mechanical implementation by departments is causing more harm than good.

Click here for the Combined Court Order dt 22 Aug 2016 in WP(C) 9299/2016 titled Rajnandinee P. Mane Versus State of Maharashtra and Ors.  ;  WP(C) 9556/2016 titled Rutuja D. Raut Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 

Here is the brief coverage by Times of India of this specific case.

Can a student with cerebral palsy become a doctor?

Girl with Cerebral Palsy gets HC nod to pursue medicine
 

Indian Currency not friendly to Blind, NAB files petition in Bombay High Court

Dear Colleagues,

Coins of various denominations and notes of Rs 100 and Rs 500 have no different identification marks which will help blind persons in differentiating among them claims a petition filed by the National Association for Blind (NAB), before the Bombay High Court. Advocate Uday Warunjikar, who has moved the petition, said: "Under provisions of the Persons with Disabilities Act, there are various provisions which have been made by the government for safeguarding the interest of the disabled. Several provisions are also there for ensuring a disable-friendly environment. However, in the present coins and notes it is difficult for persons who are blind or with low vision to differentiate between them."

The petition states that the problems of identification have been aggravated in the last few years. Earlier, blind or low vision person were easily able to identify coins and notes. There were unique marks on each coin; some coins were raised/embossed and tactile. Moreover, on a written request sent by RBI and Mint asking for feedback from NAB on the shape of coins and notes. A detailed suggestion was forwarded to the government in which it was said that there is no much difference between Rs 100 and Rs 500 notes. Coins of Rs 2, Rs 1 and Rs 50 paise are similar, there should be coins with proper borders, different designs, shapes, different textures for avoiding confusion, nothing is being done.

The plea says the suggestions were given last year and it was expected that appropriate decision would be taken. However, till now nothing is being done to address the issue. Earlier, the association would teach blind persons to identify currency notes. Now, it has become difficult to educate them. The petition prays for directions to the authorities to place on record steps it has taken to protect the rights of blind persons to have access to information about the currency notes and coins. Direct the respondents to make changes in the currency notes and coins to help blind persons easily identify them.

Source: DNA

Travelodge sued for discriminating with a deaf customer with guide dog in USA

Dear Colleagues,

A deaf woman who uses a service dog is suing the Travelodge of La Mesa, alleging discrimination for how she was treated when she tried unsuccessfully to check into the hotel earlier this year.

The Travelodge though did not initially bar her from staying overnight with her guide dog, it demanded that she sign a damage policy form for pets that she and her lawyers say is discriminatory, according to a lawsuit filed last week in U.S. District Court.

When she protested during the check-in process, the desk clerk informed her that she and herguide dog were no longer welcome to stay at the hotel, the suit says. She asked for a refund but was denied one at the time because the hotel stay was booked on Expedia, the desk clerk told her.

The plaintiff, Naomi Sheneman, of Rochester, New York, is alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons Act.

She is seeking a court order requiring Travelodge to comply with policies prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and to train its staff on a regular basis about the rights of individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing under state and federal laws. The suit also seeks compensatory damages.

“There are a lot of hotels out there that don’t follow the law and require additional burdens for people with service animals,” said attorney Andrew Rozynski of Eisenberg & Baum Law Center For The Deaf and Hard of Hearing, which is representing Sheneman. “This suit is to show that you can’t have these additional burdens for people with disabilities because that’s the law. To require her to sign this form and say she can’t stay there and embarrass her is humiliating.”

Travelodge said it was reviewing the complaint with its attorneys. “However, we want to make it clear that Ms. Sheneman, who was a returning guest and totally familiar with the policies and rules of the hotel, was not presented any additional requirements because of her service animal,” the hotel said in a statement. “She was asked for the same deposit as any customer and presented the same information that would be given to any guest with a non-service animal.”

The La Mesa hotel said it did not refuse service to Sheneman, and that it “has never discriminated against persons with service animals. We welcome service animals as advertised on our website, and guests with service animals are staying on a regular basis at the Travelodge of La Mesa.”

While the Travelodge of La Mesa does not permit pets, it notes on its website that “ADA defined service animals are welcome at this hotel.” When Sheneman checked in, she was told that a damage deposit for the room was required, which she provided.

But when she was given a form setting forth additional charges to be applied specifically to damage caused by a guest’s animal, she said she was uncomfortable signing it because it “appeared to impose additional terms or obligations on her because of her service animal,” states the suit.

Sheneman was forced to stay at another hotel and ultimately received a full refund from Travelodge of the $185.53 she had paid.

Source: The San Diego Union Tribune

Delhi High Court Protects Para Athletes from Sports Federation Disputes

Court: Delhi High Court

Bench: Justice Manmohan

Case No.: W.P.(C) 6815/2016

Case Title: Karamjyoti v. Union of India & Ors.

Decided on: 11 August 2016

Neutral Citation: 2016:DHC:4198

Background

The Delhi High Court, in Karamjyoti v. Union of India & Ors., dealt with an important issue concerning the participation of persons with disabilities in national sporting events and the responsibility of the Government to ensure fair and inclusive sports governance.

The petitioner, Karamjyoti, a para athlete, approached the Court alleging that administrative disputes relating to the recognition of sports federations and lack of coordination among governmental authorities were adversely affecting the participation of athletes with disabilities in national and international competitions.

The grievance centered around the uncertainty regarding the organization of para sporting events and the recognition of the competent National Sports Federation (NSF), which had the potential to deprive athletes with disabilities of opportunities to compete and qualify for international championships.

The petitioner sought judicial intervention to ensure that disputes between sporting bodies did not prejudice the rights and careers of para athletes.

Issues Before the Court

The principal questions before the Court were:

1. Whether administrative disputes concerning recognition of sports federations could adversely affect the participation of athletes with disabilities.
2. Whether the Union Government was under an obligation to ensure uninterrupted sporting opportunities for para athletes.
3. Whether immediate directions were necessary to protect the interests of persons with disabilities participating in national sporting events.
4. Whether sports governance should prioritize athletes' rights over institutional disputes.

Key Observations of the Court

The Delhi High Court observed that persons with disabilities should not become victims of administrative or organizational disputes between sports bodies.

The Court emphasized that sporting careers are time-sensitive. Athletes train for years to participate in national and international competitions, and any delay or uncertainty in organizing events or recognizing federations could irreparably prejudice their careers.

The Bench noted that disputes regarding recognition of National Sports Federations are matters to be resolved by the competent governmental authorities. However, such disputes cannot justify depriving athletes of opportunities to compete.

The Court stressed that governmental authorities must ensure continuity in sports administration so that athletes with disabilities are able to participate in competitions, improve their rankings, and qualify for international tournaments without unnecessary disruption.

Recognizing the importance of sports as a means of empowerment and social inclusion, the Court highlighted that administrative processes should facilitate—not hinder—the participation of persons with disabilities.

Directions Issued by the Court

After considering the submissions of the parties, the Delhi High Court issued appropriate directions to safeguard the interests of para athletes.

The Court directed the concerned authorities to:

• Ensure that sporting events for persons with disabilities are conducted without interruption.
• Resolve disputes regarding recognition of sports federations expeditiously.
• Ensure that athletes are not prejudiced because of conflicts between sports organizations.
• Take necessary administrative measures so that eligible para athletes are able to participate in national and international sporting competitions.

The writ petition was disposed of with directions emphasizing the protection of athletes' interests.

Significance of the Judgment

The judgment is significant because it recognizes that sports administration must ultimately serve athletes rather than sporting institutions.

First, the Court acknowledged that delays caused by administrative disputes can seriously affect the careers of athletes with disabilities.

Secondly, the decision reinforces the obligation of the Government to ensure continuity in sports governance and prevent institutional conflicts from undermining disability rights.

Thirdly, the judgment contributes to the evolving jurisprudence recognizing sports participation as an important component of equality, dignity, and social inclusion for persons with disabilities.

Finally, the decision paved the way for subsequent reforms in the governance of para sports and highlighted the need for transparent and athlete-centric administration.

Commentary

Karamjyoti v. Union of India represents an important judicial recognition that disability rights extend beyond accessibility and employment to include meaningful participation in sporting life.

Although the dispute arose in the context of administrative recognition of sports federations, the Court correctly shifted the focus to the individuals most affected—the athletes themselves.

For para athletes, missing even a single national championship can mean losing opportunities for international qualification, sponsorship, rankings, scholarships, or career advancement. The Court's insistence that athletes should not suffer because of bureaucratic disagreements reflects a rights-based approach to sports governance.

The judgment also anticipates later developments under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, particularly Section 30, which mandates Governments and sports authorities to promote effective participation of persons with disabilities in sporting activities at every level.

Viewed alongside later decisions such as Sunil Tanwar v. Union of India (2019), Virender Singh v. Union of India (2023), and Ragula Naresh Yadav v. State of Telangana (2023), this judgment forms part of the growing body of Indian jurisprudence emphasizing that persons with disabilities must receive equal opportunities, institutional support, and fair treatment in sports administration.

It serves as a reminder that the ultimate purpose of sports governance is to facilitate athletic excellence and inclusion, and that governmental authorities must ensure that administrative disputes never come at the cost of an athlete's aspirations or constitutional rights.

Read the Judgement

Karamjyoti v. Union of India & Ors. W.P.(C) 6815/2016