Inclusive Medical Education Requires Accommodation: Delhi High Court on Rights of Disabled Students

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Prathiba M. Singh
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1712/2025
Case Title: Sahil Arsh v. National Medical Commission & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 4 February 2026

 

Background

 

The petition before the Delhi High Court was filed by a medical student with a disability who challenged certain regulatory restrictions imposed by the National Medical Commission (NMC) that limited the ability of persons with disabilities to pursue medical education. The petitioner contended that the eligibility criteria and institutional practices adopted by medical authorities did not adequately account for the needs of students with disabilities.

 

According to the petitioner, despite the statutory protections provided under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several medical institutions continued to apply rigid eligibility requirements that effectively excluded candidates with disabilities from pursuing medical education or completing their training on equal terms. The petitioner argued that such practices were inconsistent with the principle of reasonable accommodation mandated by the RPwD Act.

 

The matter therefore raised an important question regarding the obligations of regulatory bodies governing professional education. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether professional standards could be interpreted in a manner that excluded persons with disabilities or whether institutions must adapt their systems to ensure inclusive participation.

 

Key Observations

 

The Delhi High Court emphasised that professional education, including medical education, must be governed by the principles of equality, accessibility and reasonable accommodation recognised under the RPwD Act. The Court observed that regulatory bodies cannot frame or enforce rules that have the effect of systematically excluding persons with disabilities from professional courses.

 

Justice Prathiba M. Singh noted that the purpose of disability legislation is to ensure that educational institutions adopt inclusive practices that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively. This includes not only physical accessibility but also modifications in academic procedures, evaluation systems and institutional support mechanisms.

 

The Court further observed that professional competence should not be assessed through rigid assumptions about disability. Instead, institutions must examine whether reasonable accommodations and assistive technologies can enable students with disabilities to perform the essential functions required in the profession.

 

Importantly, the Court emphasised that regulatory frameworks governing medical education must be interpreted in a manner that advances the objective of inclusion rather than reinforcing outdated perceptions about the capabilities of persons with disabilities.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Court directed the National Medical Commission to reconsider the petitioner’s case in light of the principles of reasonable accommodation under the RPwD Act.

• Authorities were instructed to ensure that regulatory guidelines governing medical education are consistent with the statutory rights of persons with disabilities.

• The Court emphasised that institutions must adopt inclusive policies that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively in professional education.

 

Commentary

 

The judgment represents an important development in the evolving discourse on disability rights in professional education. Historically, certain professions—including medicine—have been governed by rigid eligibility criteria that often excluded persons with disabilities based on assumptions about their abilities.

 

However, contemporary disability rights law recognises that such exclusion frequently reflects institutional barriers rather than inherent limitations. Advances in assistive technologies, adaptive learning systems and inclusive teaching methods have significantly expanded the possibilities for persons with disabilities to participate in professional fields.

 

By emphasising the obligation of regulatory bodies to incorporate reasonable accommodation into professional education frameworks, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed the transformative vision underlying the RPwD Act. The statute seeks not merely to remove formal barriers but to reshape institutional practices so that diversity becomes a normal and expected feature of educational environments.

 

The decision also signals a broader shift in judicial thinking. Rather than treating disability as a ground for exclusion from demanding professions, courts increasingly recognise that institutions must adapt their structures to accommodate diverse forms of participation. In doing so, the judgment contributes to the development of a more inclusive model of professional education in India.

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Substantive Equality over Technicalities- SC Grants Relief to Woman with Benchmark Disability saying Reasonable Accommodation is a Fundamental Right [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026

Case Title: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors.  [PDF 289 KB]

Date of Judgment: 13 January 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 53

Cases Referred: Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India (2024 INSC 775); Anmol v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 387); Om Rathod v. DGHS (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130); Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592); Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC; Avni Prakash v. NTA; Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625; Jane Kaushik v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257)

Brief 

In a significant judgment reinforcing the centrality of reasonable accommodation and substantive equality in public employment, the Supreme Court in Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited held that technicalities such as expiry of a recruitment panel cannot defeat the fundamental and statutory rights of persons with disabilities (PwDs). The Court directed Coal India Limited (CIL) to appoint the appellant, a woman with benchmark disability, by creating a supernumerary post and ensuring a suitable, accessible desk job with assistive infrastructure. 

Background

Coal India Limited had issued a recruitment notification in 2019 for Management Trainees. Sujata Bora applied under the visually disabled category, qualified for interview, and was later called for document verification and an Initial Medical Examination (IME) in 2021. She was declared medically unfit on the ground of visual disability coupled with residual partial hemiparesis.

Challenging this, she approached the Calcutta High Court. The Single Judge quashed the IME result and held that CIL could not deny appointment in the multiple disabilities category, but limited relief by directing consideration in the subsequent recruitment cycle since the earlier process had concluded. The Division Bench, however, set aside even this relief, primarily on the ground that the panel had expired.

Before the Supreme Court, detailed medical assessment was ordered through an AIIMS medical board. The final report assessed her disability at 57%, above the 40% benchmark threshold, making her eligible under the RPwD Act. The Court also interacted with the appellant and noted her determination and capability. 

Key Directions

The Supreme Court:

• Set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court.
• Held that the appellant had been wrongly denied employment through no fault of her own.
• Directed creation of a supernumerary post for her appointment.
• Requested that she be given a suitable desk job, with a separate computer and keyboard consistent with universal design under the RPwD Act.
• Requested posting at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam.
• Exercised powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. 

Reasonable Accommodation as a “Gateway Right”

One of the most important contributions of this judgment is its strong articulation of reasonable accommodation. The Court reaffirmed that:

• Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right.
• It is a gateway right enabling PwDs to enjoy all other rights.
• Denial of reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination and undermines substantive equality.

The Court rejected a narrow view of accommodation limited to devices or physical aids, instead endorsing a broad, purposive interpretation aligned with dignity, autonomy, and participation.

Intersectionality: Gender and Disability

The Court expressly recognised intersectional discrimination, noting that the appellant was a single woman with disability striving to overcome compounded barriers. It held that equality analysis cannot be unidimensional where multiple axes of disadvantage operate together. This acknowledgment strengthens the evolving Indian jurisprudence on intersectionality in disability rights.

Directive Principles and the Right to Work

Linking disability rights with constitutional philosophy, the Court invoked Articles 14, 21, 39(a), and 41, reiterating that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are “two wheels of a chariot.” The right to livelihood and work was treated as integral to a meaningful life.

Corporate Responsibility and Disability

Notably, the judgment situates disability inclusion within Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and ESG frameworks, referencing UN Guiding Principles and ILO materials. It emphasises that disability rights are human rights and must be addressed from a non-discrimination perspective, not merely as diversity optics. 

Significance

This ruling is a landmark for several reasons:

• Panel expiry cannot defeat disability rights where injustice is evident.
• Reasonable accommodation is firmly embedded as a fundamental right.
• Supernumerary posts are validated as a remedy in appropriate cases.
• Intersectionality receives explicit judicial recognition.
• Public sector employers are reminded that exclusion at the threshold, without exploring accommodations, is unlawful.

The Court’s opening line—“Lack of physical sight does not equate to a lack of vision”—aptly captures the spirit of the decision. The judgment sends a clear message: disability rights are not charity, nor mere policy preferences; they are enforceable legal and constitutional guarantees.

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Hyper-Technical Recruitment Rules Cannot Override Disability Rights: Delhi High Court Upholds Relief to Disabled Candidate

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Ajay Digpaul

Case No.: W.P.(C) 2238/2025
Case Title: Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) v. Sumit
Date of Judgment: 20 February 2025

The Delhi High Court has reaffirmed that procedural technicalities cannot be used to deny reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities in public employment. Dismissing a challenge filed by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, the Court upheld relief granted to a candidate with 63% orthopaedic disability who had been denied exemption from a qualifying typing test despite being otherwise eligible for such exemption. The Court ruled that rigid insistence on procedural formalities must give way where it defeats the substantive guarantees of equality, inclusion and reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Background

The dispute arose from recruitment to the post of DASS Grade IV conducted by DSSSB. Candidates were required to clear a typing skill test, which was only qualifying in nature. Merit for final selection depended entirely on marks obtained in the written examination.

The respondent, who has 63% permanent orthopaedic disability affecting his left elbow joint, appeared for the typing test but failed to qualify. He later asserted that he had requested exemption during the examination because pain and restricted movement in his left arm prevented him from completing the test effectively. However, he did not physically produce his disability certificate before the examiner at that time.

Subsequently, DSSSB granted exemption from the typing test to several other candidates with orthopaedic disabilities who had submitted the required disability documents. Many of those candidates had scored lower marks than the respondent in the written examination but were nevertheless selected.

Aggrieved by the denial of similar accommodation, the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking exemption from the typing test and consideration for appointment on the basis of his written examination performance. The Tribunal accepted his claim and directed DSSSB to extend the benefit of exemption. DSSSB then challenged the Tribunal’s order before the High Court.

Findings of the High Court

The High Court refused to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision. It noted that DSSSB itself did not dispute the genuineness of the respondent’s disability or his eligibility for exemption under the applicable Office Memorandum.

The Court emphasised that the typing test was merely qualifying in nature and had no bearing on comparative merit. Since the respondent had scored higher than several candidates who ultimately received appointments after being granted exemption, denying him the same accommodation solely on procedural grounds would produce an arbitrary and exclusionary result.

Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC and Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that disability rights jurisprudence requires a liberal, purposive and rights-based interpretation of legal and administrative provisions.

The Bench strongly cautioned against hyper-technical application of procedural requirements in disability matters. It observed that insisting upon strict procedural compliance in every situation may defeat the very purpose of reasonable accommodation and undermine the protective framework established under the RPwD Act.

Importantly, the Court accepted that the respondent had in fact sought exemption during the typing test. In these circumstances, refusing accommodation merely because the disability certificate was not physically shown at that precise moment would amount to elevating form over substance.

At the same time, the Court clarified that its ruling turned on the specific facts of the case and should not be read as dispensing with procedural requirements altogether in all disability-related matters.

Directions

• The writ petition filed by DSSSB was dismissed.
• The Tribunal’s order granting exemption from the typing test was upheld.
• The respondent became entitled to consideration for appointment according to his written examination merit, subject to the limitations imposed by the Tribunal regarding consequential benefits.

Commentary

This judgment significantly strengthens the principle that reasonable accommodation cannot be reduced to a mechanical administrative formality. The Court recognised that once the existence of disability and entitlement to accommodation were undisputed, procedural lapses could not be used as a tool to exclude a disabled candidate from public employment.

The ruling also advances the shift in Indian disability jurisprudence from formal equality to substantive equality. The Court acknowledged that recruitment systems designed around able-bodied assumptions often create barriers for persons with disabilities unless authorities adopt a flexible and disability-sensitive approach.

Equally important is the Court’s reaffirmation that reasonable accommodation is not a concession or discretionary benefit. It is a statutory and constitutional obligation flowing from dignity, equality, inclusion and equal participation under the RPwD Act and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

By rejecting a hyper-technical interpretation of procedural rules, the judgment sends a clear message that administrative processes must serve the objectives of disability rights law rather than frustrate them. At the same time, the Court carefully balanced inclusion with administrative discipline by limiting the ruling to the peculiar facts before it.

The decision therefore stands as an important precedent for inclusive recruitment practices and reinforces that procedural frameworks must operate in harmony with the substantive rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities.

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Supreme Court: Citing Reasonable Accommodation provisions, bench directs a person with defective colour vision to be appointed as Assistant Engineer Electrical

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aravind Kumar

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12671 of 2022]

Case Title: Mohamed Ibrahim Vs. The Chairman & Managing Director & Ors.

Date of Judgement: 16 October 2023

Brief:

The Supreme Court granted relief to the appellant - a person with colour blindness - who was denied appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer applying the principle of "reasonable accommodation" as defined in the RPwD Act. Incidently, colour blindness is not an identified or defined disability in the schedule to the Act.

The Court highlighted that the provisions of the RPwD Act are specifically designed to foster the participation and empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (PwDs). However, it expressed its concern that the benefits arising from affirmative action are confined to a specific category of PwDs, including those with orthopedic, visual, hearing, and mental disabilities, among others covered in the schedule to the Act. These benefits are intricately linked to the concept of "benchmark" disabilities, which grants affirmative action and similar benefits to PwDs who meet a defined threshold of disability, typically 40 percent or more. This distinction based on specified categories and threshold conditions, as per the topc court, creates substantial barriers.

It bench observed, “The actual benefits in the form of affirmative action are defined by a specific category of PwDs (orthopaedical, visual, hearing, mental, etc.) and tied to the context of “benchmark” disabilities, which entitles those PwDs who qualify with a certain threshold of disability (40 percent or more) to the affirmative action and other similar benefits. The nature of inclusion of specified categories only to the exclusion of other categories of disabilities, on the one hand, and the eligibility of a threshold, in the opinion of this court, constitute barriers.”

"The twin conditions of falling within defined categories, and also a threshold condition of a minimum percentage, of such disabilities, in fact are a barrier," opined the court. The Court emphasized the necessity of a more rational and inclusive approach to accommodate individuals who may not it into the established categories of PwDs in the schedule to the Act.

“The facts of this case demonstrate that the appellant is fit, in all senses of the term, to discharge the duties attached to the post he applied and was selected for. Yet, he is denied the position, for being “disabled” as he is color blind. At the same time, he does not fit the category of PwD under the lexicon of the universe contained within the Act. These challenge traditional understandings of what constitutes “disabilities”. The court has to, therefore, travel beyond the provisions of the Act and discern a principle that can be rationally applied.”

The bench was hearing an appeal against the Madras HC judgment which had ruled in favour of the respondent(TANGEDCO) asserting its right to reject the appellant's candidature on the grounds of colour blindness. The case revolved around a job application for the position of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) by the appellant. The appellant, who was initially considered qualified for the role, was subsequently found to be color blind during a medical examination. This raised concerns about his ability to fulfill the responsibilities of an engineer, which frequently involve working with color-coded power cables and wires.

As a result of these concerns, TANGEDCO rejected the appellant's candidature. The appellant challenged this decision under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the Madras High Court initially ruled in his favor, directing TANGEDCO to offer him the position. However, in appeal before the division bench, the decision highlighted the evolving doctrine of proportionality, indicating that TANGEDCO's decision had a reasonable basis, even by this modern standard. Consequently, the division bench's judgment reversed the previous order, leading the appellant to seek redress from the Supreme Court. 

The SC bench noted that respondent TANGEDCO had not explicitly indicated that colour vision deficiency, in any form or degree, serves as a disqualifying factor for the role of an Assistant Engineer. It emphasized that the appellant, being a graduate in electrical engineering, possessed knowledge and experience related to the role's functions. Additionally, practical experience during the course exposed the candidate to equipment defects and solutions for breakdowns. Thus, the SC bench established the need for some form of accommodation.

The Court relied on Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 4 SCR 638 to highlight that when public facilities and services are designed with standards inaccessible to persons with disabilities, it results in their exclusion and a denial of rights. The concept of equality goes beyond merely preventing discrimination; it involves addressing systematic discrimination through positive rights, affirmative action, and reasonable accommodation.

The Court also cited the case of Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India  2021 (13) SCR 823, which distinguishes between formal equality and substantive equality. Substantive equality aims to achieve equal outcomes, and the principle of reasonable accommodation plays a critical role in this.

The Court observed that reasonable accommodation entails accommodating disabled individuals based on their capacities. It also relied on Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission  2021 (12) SCR 311, which held “The principle of reasonable accommodation acknowledges that if disability” should be remedied and opportunities are “to be affirmatively created for facilitating the development of the disabled. Reasonable accommodation is founded in the norm of inclusion. Exclusion results in the negation of individual dignity and worth or they can choose the route of reasonable accommodation, where each individual's dignity and worth is respected.”

The court also cited Ashutosh Kumar v. Film and Television Institute of India (2022),  where the Supreme Court directed the FTII to accommodate students with colour blindness saying, "The respondent institute is a premier institute and one would expect it to encourage liberate thought process and not put courses connected with films in any conformist box".

While  acknowledging the resondent's concerns about colour vision impairment, the Court reminded the TANGEDCO of its obligation to operate within the framework of "reasonable accommodation" as defined by Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act. Resultantly, the court set aside the impugned judgement of the Division bench of Madras High Court saying, “The impugned judgment cannot stand; it is set aside. TANGEDCO, the respondent corporation, is directed to appoint and continue the appellant in its service, as AE (Electrical) at the appropriate stage of the grade of pay,”.

During the hearing, the Court learnt that a member of the bar, Mr. Mehmoud Yumar Faruqi had life experiences of colour blindness -as someone living with a condition of colour blindness and had collected considerable case law and literature. The court had, therefore, requested his assistance for the proceedings. The court expressed its gratitude for his assistance.  

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Delhi High Court holds EPFO's action discriminatory in denying typing speed exemption to a candidate with upper limb disability.

Court: Delhi High Court 

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameshwar Rao & Honb'le Mr. Justice Anoop Kumar Mendiratta

Case No.: W.P.(C) 9255/2019

Case title: Raju Ranjan Vs. Union of India & Anr.

Date of Decision: 11 July 2023

Brief:

A division bench of the Delhi High Court ruled in favor of an disabled individual's on the issue of exemption from the computer typing test for individuals with upper limb disabilities in a case involving the Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO). 

The Court acknowledged that when a clerical position is designated as suitable for individuals with upper limb impairments, it becomes impermissible to subject such individuals to a pre-employment computer typing test. This is because persons with disabilities in their arm or hand may face significant challenges in maintaining the required typing speed. Consequently, such a typing test would be deemed arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible.

As a result of this judgment, the Delhi High Court directed the Employees Provident Fund Organization to grant an exemption to a candidate with a disability in one arm from the computer skill test for the position of Social Security Assistant. The candidate's employment eligibility would be determined solely based on their performance in the written examination.

The petitioner, who has a 40% Locomotor Disability affecting one arm, argued that the EPFO failed to appreciate the nature of their disability, despite presenting an Exemption Certificate issued by the Competent Authority.

It was observed that the EPFO had identified the Social Security Assistant position as suitable for individuals with one arm disabilities, thereby fulfilling their legal obligation under the 1995 Act. However, the recruitment rules for this position required a typing speed of at least 5000 Key Depressions Per Hour (KDPH) for data entry work. This requirement was deemed arbitrary and discriminatory toward individuals with physical handicaps, particularly those with one arm affected, as it would be virtually impossible for them to achieve this typing speed.

The only logical application of the job advertisement would have been to grant an exemption to physically handicapped individuals with one arm affected. Regrettably, this was not done, and the EPFO did not prescribe relaxed standards for candidates with such disabilities. The petitioner, for instance, was able to achieve a typing speed of only 1935 KDPH.

The petitioner argued that the EPFO's conduct revealed that they had identified the position as a mere formality to show compliance with legal provisions, rather than a genuine intention to extend the benefits of the Act to potential beneficiaries.

Furthermore, the EPFO's actions were found to be arbitrary and discriminatory. Internally, the EPFO had granted an exemption from the computer skill test to all physically challenged Lower Division Clerks (LDCs) for their promotion or absorption into the Social Security Assistant position, even if the disability affected both hands or had an impact on computer operations. 

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CCPD directs IBPS to allow examinee with vision disabilities to use digital magnifier during examination as a reasonable accommodation

Court: Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities

Date of Judgement: 03 July 2023

In a significant ruling, the Court of Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) addressed the case of a complainant with substantial hearing and visual disabilities seeking accommodation during the Institute of Banking and Personnel Services (IBPS) examination. The complainant, facing 93% hearing impairment and 75% visual impairment, requested the use of a digital magnifier to participate in the examination, crucial for reading questions displayed on a computer screen and subsequently recording answers on paper with the aid of a scribe.

IBPS, however, denied the use of the digital magnifier citing concerns over potential unfair advantages due to its photo capture and storage capabilities.

Legal Framework and Decision:

Under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the CCPD emphasized the obligation of the government to provide "reasonable accommodation" to persons with disabilities. The Commissioner underscored that such accommodation is not discretionary but a mandated protection against discrimination. The refusal to accommodate the complainant’s request was deemed discriminatory under this provision.

Commissioner’s Recommendation:

In response to the case, the CCPD directed IBPS to either vet the complainant's digital magnifier prior to the examination or alternatively provide an appropriate device themselves. This decision underscores the importance of accommodating technological aids that enable persons with disabilities to participate fully and fairly in competitive examinations.

This ruling sets a precedent for ensuring equitable access and opportunity for persons with disabilities in public examinations, reinforcing the principles of inclusivity and non-discrimination as enshrined in Indian disability rights law particularly teh concept of 'reasonable accommodation'.

Triputa HC: Employer's Failure To Meet Needs Of Disabled Persons Breaches Norms of "Reasonable Accommodation" [Judgement included]

Court: Tripura High Court, Agartala, India

Bench/Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arindam Lodh

Case Title:   WP(C) 694 of 2020 | Sri Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl v. Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited (TSECL) and Ors.

Date of Judgement:  01 Aug 2022

Cases Referred/quoted : Vikash Kumar Vrs. Union Pulbic Service Commission & Ors., (2021) 5 SCC 370. 

The case in brief

The petitioner was an employee of Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited. During the course of performing his duties, he met with an accident which rendered him disabled. He was not paid salary by the Corporation because he could not perform the duties he owed to the Corporation as their employee, though he was willing to join and perform duties which would be commensurate with his disability.

The Tripura High Court observed that employers must "reasonably accommodate" persons with disabiliteis into service and that failure to do so violates their rights under  The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The Court also refered to Secction 47 of the Persons with Disabilties  Act 1995 (now repealed) and a DoPT Memorandum dated 25 Feb 2015 on subject "Amendment to Central Civil Service (Leave) Rules, 1972 - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (PWD Act, 1995)- regarding" and  expressed that the aforesaid memorandum dated 25th February, 2015 was further reviewed in the year 2016 where the rights of persons with disabilities were not in any way diluted rather expanded the rights of such persons. It mandates that the State-employer must create conditions in which the barriers posed by disability can be overcome.

It is pertinent to note that the protections available under Secction 47 of the PWD Act 1995 have been contined in Section 20(4) of the RPWD Act 2016 as below:

"20. Non-discrimination in employment. - (1) No Government establishment shall discriminate against any person with disability in any matter relating to employment:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.

(2) Every Government establishment shall provide reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free and conducive environment to employees with disability.

(3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability.

(4) No Government establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his or her service:

Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

(5) The appropriate Government may frame policies for posting and transfer of employees with disabilities."

The single bench presided by Mr. Justice Arindam Lodh in his order remarked,  "The conduct of the concerned officer is not in consonance with the object the legislatures wanted to achieve. Keeping in mind the objectives of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the respondents should realize the challenge the petitioner has been facing and accommodate him with humane approach. Any failure to meet the needs of disabled person will definitely breach the norms of reasonable accommodation."

It is the case of the petitioner that while the petitioner was discharging his duties he suffered an accident and out of that accident, he became disabled. Due to such disability, he could not attend his duties. It is the contention of the respondents that the salary of the petitioner was duly paid upto 16.03.2020. Thereafter, no salary was paid to the petitioner though he was all along willing to join to perform his duties commensurate to his disability. From the report of the Standing Medical Board, it is clear that the petitioner was not in a position to perform his official and field level activities which may work out throughout the State. In spite of that report, the petitioner was not paid his due salary and other allowances treating his absence from duty as unauthorized.

Court noted that a plea has been taken that the respondents did not accept his joining report or leave application as he did not report to the joining authority in person. He expressed his willingness to join his duties by submitting an application to the authority concerned. But it was refused on the pretext that the petitioner was not physically appeared before the concerned authority which is not at all expected. The conduct of the concerned officer is not in consonance with the object the legislatures wanted to achieve.

Keeping in view the above objective, the court directed the respondents to "reasonably accommodate" the petitioner and passed the folloiwng order:

"(i) the respondents are to pay all the cumulative dues such as salary, allowances, etc. which were payable to the petitioner under his service conditions within a period of three month from today;

(ii) the salary and allowances payable to the petitioner shall be released from this month and regularize his service conditions by way of recalling all the earlier orders passed by TSECL treating his absence from duty as unauthorized absence. Those unauthorized absence period, according to the TSECL, shall be regularized and that would not have any bearing to the service of the petitioner;

 

(iii) if it is found that the petitioner is eligible to perform his duty, then, he may be permitted to undertake such duties. Further, if the petitioner is found to be unfit to perform the nature of duties, which he was performing before being disabled, then, he should be assigned/adjusted with such suitable duties which he would be able to discharge;

(iv) if the petitioner is found incapable of performing any kind of duties, then, the respondents are under obligation and shall pay all service benefits including the promotion to the petitioner by creating a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation;

(v) the respondents shall utilize capacity of the petitioner by providing and environment around him and ensure reasonable accommodation by way of making appropriate modifications and adjustments in the spirit of the discussions and observations made here-inabove;

(vi) the petitioner shall appear before the constituted Medical Board of the State Government within 7 (seven) days from today. The Medical Board shall examine and issue necessary certificate mentioning the extent of his disability in consonance with the RPwD Act; and

(vii) it is not advisable to send the petitioner to the Medical Board time and again."

What is missed in this judgement.

The judgement though extends relief to the petitioner, it  adopts some very poor legal reasoning for the relief provided.

Firstly, the judgement fails to appropriately explain the “reasonable accommodation” & its relation to the employment rules. In fact there was no reference needed to be made with reasonable accommodation since the law is clear on the protections available under the Act to a person acquirng disability while in service. It ensures that such a person will not be discriminated against merely because of the disabilty acquired and his job, post and related benefits would be protected even when the person is unable to perform any functions. 

Secondly, it presents that the barriers faced by disabled persons arise from their medical condition of disability, rather than the disabling environment around them which mmay be inform of inaccessible built environment, discriminatory employment policies and practices.

Thus the thought processs and the reasoning given in the judgemement doesn't gel with the overal scheme of the RPWD Act and jurisprudence developed through various case laws since 1996.

 

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Supreme Court of India- Degree of disability no ground to deny reasonable accommodation [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud; Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice Sanjiv Khanna

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1882 of 2021 

Case Title: Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission & Others.

Date of Judgement: 11 February 2021  

Cited as:  2021 SCC OnLine SC 84

Cases refered/quoted: 

• Jeeja Ghosh vs. Union of India (2016)  7 SCC 761; 
• V Surendra Mohan vs. State of Tamil Nadu;  
• Rajive Raturi v. Union of India and Ors., 2017 ; 
• Disabled Rights Group and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 397.

Case Brief:

On February 11, 2021, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission (Vikash Kumar) held that that an individual with Writer’s Cramp or dysgraphia which is neither an identified disability in the Act nor has been certified as benchmark disability, is entitled to a scribe in India’s Civil Services’ Examination (CSE). 

The judgement is a significant step towards ensuring inclusivity for persons with disabilities as it emphatically affirms their position as rights bearers. It represents a move from a medical model of disability wherein disability is viewed as an affliction to a human rights model in consonance with the mandate of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCPRD).

This judgement proposes reasonable accommodation and non-discrimination as the fulcrum of contemporary disability jurisprudence. The judgement goes on to valorise the social model of disability and rejects the medical model of disability.

Case details:

In a landmark 62-page judgment, the Supreme Court of India has said that the principle of reasonable accommodation, spelt out in the 2016 Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, captures the positive obligation of the State and private parties to provide additional support to persons with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective participation in society. 

The Court further said that “…Cases such as the present offer us an opportunity to make a meaningful contribution in the project of creating the RPwD generation in India… A generation of disabled people in India which regards as its birthright access to the full panoply of constitutional entitlements, robust statutory rights geared to meet their unique needs and conducive societal conditions needed for them to flourish and to truly become co-equal participants in all facets of life.”

The case concerned a person with a chronic neurological condition resulting in Writer’s Cramp, or extreme difficulty in writing. He was denied a scribe for the Civil Services Exam by the UPSC, on the ground that he did not come within the definition of person with benchmark disability (40% or more of a specified disability).  The Court, in rejecting this stand, held that the petitioner was a person with disability and that provision of scribe to him came within the scope of reasonable accommodation.  The Court said ” … the accommodation which the law mandates is ‘reasonable’ because it has to be tailored to the requirements of each condition of disability. The expectations which every disabled person has are unique to the nature of the disability and the character of the impediments which are encountered as its consequence…”

In a detailed analysis of Indian and International disability law, the Court said that disability is a long-term condition which due to barriers in the environment hinders full and effective participation in society. Reasonable accommodation implies looking at the specific disabling condition and providing amenities in accordance. Examples: Blind persons need screen reading software to work on the computer, hearing impaired need sign language interpreters. Reasonable accommodation extends to all persons with disabilities, not just those with benchmark disabilities.

The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) argued that as per the CSE Rules 2018 a scribe could only be provided to blind candidates and candidates with locomotor disability and cerebral palsy which resulted in an impairment of function by at least 40%. The Supreme Court observed that the UPSC’s response was contrary to the reply filed by the nodal ministry in India for implementing the provisions of the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). The law had been enacted after India became a party to the UNCRPD in 2007.

The reply of the ministry recognised that there may be certain medical conditions not identified as disability per se but which have a detrimental impact on the writing capability of a person. Therefore, the onus was on the examining body, in consultation with India’s health ministry, to consider such cases for grant of scribe, extra time or other facilities, on production of a medical certificate. 

In this context, the Supreme Court noted that a ‘person with disability’ under the RPwD Act includes individuals with a ‘long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with various barriers, hinders full and effective participation in society equally with others’. The RPwD separately defines persons with ‘benchmark disability’ as those who are certified to have not less than 40% of the disabilities specified in the Schedule of the RPwD Act.

The Supreme Court opined that the higher threshold of benchmark disability could not be imposed to deny equal access to persons with disabilities contrary to the ethos of non-discrimination enshrined in the fundamental rights chapter of the Indian Constitution. 

The judgement clarified that the scheme of the RPwD Act imposed a benchmark disability as a precondition only for access to specific entitlements such as affirmative action as under Sections 32 and 34 of Chapter VI. In other words, the absence of benchmark disability could not be used to deny other forms of reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities. 

The bench relied upon the landmark precedent of Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India wherein it was held that equality is not only limited to preventing discrimination but also embraces a wide ambit of positive rights including reasonable accommodation. The principle of reasonable accommodation, the Court observed in Vikash Kumar, is a facet of substantive equality set out in General Comment 6 of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The Court also held that the denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes disability-based discrimination under Section 3 of the RPwD Act. The object of the provision is to ensure that persons with disabilities can overcome insidious barriers of exclusion without the imposition of a disproportionate burden. In this context, the state has an obligation to develop an appropriate environment guaranteeing equality of opportunity to persons with disabilities. Reasonable accommodation, such as the facility of a scribe, is therefore an enabling instrument for securing substantive equality.

Further, the state had raised a concern that the provision of a scribe could offer an undue advantage to persons with disabilities. In response, the Court pointed to  the absence of empirical data to hold that this argument of misuse was unsubstantiated. The unfounded suspicion, the Court also remarked, in fact perpetuated the stereotype that persons with disabilities have to resort to state largesse due to their inability to compete on a level-playing field.

Finally, the Court emphasised that it expected the government to consult persons with disabilities in a bid to democratise policy making. It remains to be seen whether such an endeavour results in lasting impact.

Read the judgement embedded below in Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1882 of 2021 titled as Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission & Others. 

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Supreme Court- FTII should make reasonable accommodation in their curriculum for candidates with colour blindness in all courses.

Court: Supreme Court of India 

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Hon'ble Mr. Justice MM Sunresh.

Case No: Civil Appeal No. 7719 of 2021

Case Title: Ashutosh Kumar Vs. The Film and Television  Institute of India & Anr. 

Date of Judgement: 12 April 2022

Brief:

Films and Television Institute of India - Majority view of the Committee appointed by SC accepted - Individuals with color blindness should be permitted to enroll for ALL courses offered by FTII. There should be no bar to admissions to the FTII for colorblind individuals - FTII should make reasonable accommodation in their curriculum for candidates with color blindness, in all courses where there is a bar to the admission of colorblind individuals. (Para 26-35)

A Supreme Court bench directed the Film and Television Institute of India(FTII) to allow color blind candidates to take admission in all its courses. Court further mooted a proposal to make subjects that may not inclusive for such students to be made optional.

In December 2021, Ashutosh Kumar, a 35-year-old man approached the Supreme Court after being barred by the institute because he is color blind. The institute had put forth the logic that he may not be able to pass in certain subjects.

then directed the creation of a panel of experts comprising 

The top court had, instead of taking a call itself on whether colour blindness would be an aspect which would be an impediment in going through the course, it formed a committee of experts consisting of  an ophthalmologist, a film director, a film editor, a script supervisor, a head of the department from FTII, and a lawyer to analyze whether students with color blindness can be allowed to pursue a course in FTII,  to look into the issue and to facilitate a more comprehensive exercise by the Committee to opine on the aspect of colour blindness qua all the courses for which it is perceived as a disqualification. The court framed the two issues on which the opinion of the members was sought as under: 

“i. Whether the course curriculum provided for diploma in Editing can be successfully completed by the appellant who suffers from color blindness? 

Committee’s recommendations: The appellant Mr. Ashutosh Kumar who has Red and Green color vision deficiency and has color perception of CP4, as per the AIIMS Medical Board report, will have difficulty in completing the existing course curriculum of the diploma in Film and Editing course offered by the FTII. This is more particularly due to a twenty-minute ‘color grading module’ which is part of the Film Editing curriculum. However, the color grading module has no relevance to either the film editing course or to the film editor’s professional role (Mr. K. Rajasekaran, HoD Editing, FTII, does not agree that the color grading module is irrelevant to the film editing course). 

ii. To facilitate a more comprehensive exercise, the role of the committee would be to opine on the aspect of color blindness qua all the courses for which it is perceived as a disqualification.”

Committee’s recommendation: It is the opinion of the committee that :

i. It is recommended that individuals with color blindness should be permitted to enroll for ALL courses offered by FTII. There should be no bar to admissions to the FTII for colorblind individuals. Any limitation can be overcome by an assistant in educational and professional life.

ii. FTII should make reasonable accommodation in their curriculum for candidates with color blindness, in all courses where there is a bar to the admission of colorblind individuals. For example, by providing elective/optional modules in the curriculum for those core credits which may require intensive color appreciation or in any other way. 

iii. The color grading module in the existing Diploma in Film Editing Course curriculum, should either be excluded or made elective, thereby lifting the bar of admissions for individuals with color blindness.” 

Court analyzed the report filed by the panel of experts, all of whom except one had recommended that FTII should admit students with color blindness as stressing that “filmmaking is a collaborative art and shortfalls can be addressed by having assistance while making the film.”

In particular, the committee expressed that individuals with colour blindness should be permitted to enroll for all courses offered by the FTII with the following reasoning:-

(a) Film and television creations are collaborative art forms. Restricting entry of colour blind candidates to film courses may sacrifice creative talent and stultify the development of the art. Inclusivity enriches this creative art form by introducing variety, any limitation can be overcome by assistance in the educational and professional life. 

(b) It is not the role of FTII to decide for candidates their future prospects as a film/television professional. If learning limitation of the candidate can be overcome by making reasonable accommodation or with the help of an assistant, the candidate should be eligible for admission to courses offered by FTII. 

(c) Film editing is the art, technique and practice of assembling shots into a coherent sequence and the job of an Editor is not simply to mechanically put piece of a film together, cut off film slates or edit dialogue scenes. The Film Editor must creatively work with the layers of images, story, dialogue, music, pacing as well as the actors performances to effectively “reimagine” and even re-write the film to craft a cohesive whole.

Court while agreeing with their view noted that “We find ourselves with majority view of committee. Same to be adopted by FTII in its curriculum. It does not impede on their freedom but gives them a broader canvas in pioneering effort.”

Court further noted that FTII as a premier institute can put reasonable accommodation like other global institutes from whom the panel of experts sought an opinion.

it was subitted that applicant was not permitted to take up the course despite having completed six months of the course. He submitted that though he is willing to waive the first six months and start afresh again he should not have to go through the admission process again after a medical officer had cleared his eye examination.

Furthermore, counsel for the FTII submitted that it would be a difficult task to modify the entire course as the field is of technical nature and in some courses visually impaired are specifically limited from being able to pursue it.

Court on hearing the submission granted two weeks time for the institute to file its reply on this aspect and adjourned the matter to May 10. Sussequently the FTTI agreed to keep an additiona seat and grant admission to the petitioner in the session starting in March 2023 as prayed.

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Supreme Court | Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal Vs. Union of India | Civil Appeal No. 6924 of 2021 | 17 Dec 2021

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J. Surya Kant, J. and Vikram Nath, J.
Case title : Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal Vs. Union of India
Case No.: Civil Appeal No.6924 of 2021
Authored by: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud
Date of Judgement: 17 December 2021

Brief

In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court of India has reinforced the rights of employees with mental health conditions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act), setting aside disciplinary proceedings against a CRPF officer who had developed Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder and Major Depression during service.

The appellant, recruited to the CRPF in 2001, began suffering from psychosocial disabilities in 2009. In 2010, while posted in Ajmer, he faced complaints of unauthorized absence, use of unparliamentary language, and threats—events that occurred when his mental health was deteriorating. Despite being diagnosed with a 40–70% permanent disability and declared unfit for duty in 2016, he faced multiple disciplinary inquiries.

The legal dispute involved the interplay between the earlier Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016 (RPwD Act, 2016), alongside government notifications exempting CRPF "combatant personnel" from certain protections.

The appellant was a Central Reserve Police Force personnel who started facing obsessive-compulsive disorder and clinical depression. A complaint was registered against the appellant by his superior Deputy Inspector General of Police stating that his mental state is not sound and he might be a threat to himself and others. Pursuant to the complaint, an enquiry was initiated against the appellant and he was suspended from service. The Supreme Court,  concluded that persons with mental health disorders have a right against workplace discrimination and are entitled to reasonable accommodation.

Examples of reasonable accommodation for persons with a mental disability might include quiet office space, changes in supervisory methods, and permission to work from home. The Supreme Court held that Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act advances the guarantee of reasonable accommodation to persons with mental disabilities.

The Government establishment has a positive obligation to shift an employee who acquired a disability during service to a suitable post with the same pay scale and service benefits. The provision further states that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, they may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post becomes available or when they attain the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

Key Findings of the Supreme Court

1. RPwD Act Applies – The Court held that the 2016 Act, not the 1995 Act, governed the case.

2. Exemption Notifications Inapplicable – The 2002 exemption for CRPF under Section 47 of the 1995 Act did not carry forward, and the 2021 RPwD Act notification did not apply, as the appellant’s rights crystallized in 2020.

3. Broader Anti-Discrimination Mandate – Section 20 of the RPwD Act has a wider scope than Section 47 of the 1995 Act; rights against discrimination are inherent in the statute and informed by Article 5 of the UN CRPD.

4. Mental Health as Disability – The Court recognized mental health disorders as disabilities under the RPwD Act, moving away from outdated, stigmatizing approaches.

5. Misconduct & Disability – Where conduct is influenced by mental disability, disciplinary action may amount to indirect discrimination, even if disability is not the sole cause.

6. Reasonable Accommodation Required – Under Section 20(4), employers must explore reassignment to an equivalent post with preserved pay and benefits, factoring in safety considerations.

7. International Influence – The Court drew on the UN CRPD and ILO Code of Practice to reinforce a rights-based approach.

Judgment Outcome

• Disciplinary proceedings quashed from the first inquiry stage.
• Directed reassignment of the appellant to a suitable post with equivalent pay, benefits, and service conditions, ensuring no role involving firearms or hazardous duties if unsuitable.
• Affirmed that psychosocial disabilities require proactive workplace accommodation, not punitive action.

Commentary

This decision marks a historic shift in Indian disability jurisprudence, particularly for employees with mental health conditions. The Supreme Court not only clarified that protections under the RPwD Act apply to acquired disabilities in service but also addressed the unique ways in which mental disabilities can intersect with workplace discipline.

By recognising indirect discrimination—where facially neutral policies disproportionately disadvantage persons with disabilities—the Court aligned Indian law with international human rights standards.

The ruling sends a strong message to government and security forces: disability rights extend beyond physical impairments and include psychosocial disabilities, with an obligation to provide reasonable accommodation rather than resort to termination or punishment.

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