Madras HC Reinforces Voting Rights and Electoral Accessibility for Disabled Persons in Vaishnavi Jayakumar's petition against ECI

Court: Madras High Court
Bench: Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan
Case No.: W.P. No. 34815 of 2025
Case Title: Vaishnavi Jayakumar v. The Election Commission of India & Ors.
Date of Order: 30 April 2026

Background

In an important case concerning disability rights and democratic participation, the Madras High Court considered issues relating to accessibility of polling stations, election-related information, and digital electoral systems for persons with disabilities.

The petition was filed by our friend and sector colleague Ms. Vaishnavi Jayakumar seeking systemic reforms to ensure that elections are conducted in a manner consistent with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”), the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, and the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021.

The petitioner sought directions to the Election Commission of India and other authorities to:

• designate only fully accessible polling stations with all “Assured Minimum Facilities”;
• ensure permanent compliance of polling infrastructure with universal accessibility standards;
• publish complete polling booth data, including geo-coordinates and available accessibility facilities;
• make electoral documents available in accessible formats such as HTML and ePUB; and
• introduce accessible and multi-modal CAPTCHA systems on government websites.

The petition highlighted continuing barriers faced by persons with disabilities during elections despite repeated statutory mandates, judicial pronouncements, and Election Commission guidelines.

A major grievance raised before the Court was the continuing reliance upon temporary arrangements such as makeshift ramps during elections instead of permanent barrier-free infrastructure at polling stations.

The petitioner also pointed out that election-related websites and digital information systems frequently remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities, thereby preventing equal and independent participation in the electoral process.

The matter therefore raised broader constitutional questions concerning accessible democracy and equal political participation for persons with disabilities.

Key Observations of the Court

The Bench recognised accessibility in the electoral process as an essential constitutional and democratic requirement rather than a mere administrative formality.

The Court acknowledged that the RPwD Act imposes a positive obligation upon the Election Commission and State authorities to ensure that polling stations, electoral processes, and election-related information are fully accessible to persons with disabilities.

Importantly, the Court recognised that meaningful exercise of voting rights cannot exist where physical, informational, and digital barriers continue to prevent persons with disabilities from independently exercising their franchise.

The Bench took note of submissions highlighting that many polling stations continue to lack permanent accessibility infrastructure despite repeated judicial and statutory directions.

The Court observed that temporary arrangements introduced only during elections do not satisfy the standards of universal accessibility, dignity, and equal participation recognised under disability rights jurisprudence.

A particularly significant aspect of the proceedings lies in the Court’s recognition that accessibility extends beyond physical infrastructure and includes digital accessibility and accessible dissemination of information.

The Bench acknowledged the importance of ensuring that election-related information published on official websites is made available in formats accessible to persons with visual and other disabilities, including accessible HTML and ePUB formats.

The Court also recognised that inaccessible CAPTCHA systems and inaccessible government websites effectively function as digital barriers excluding persons with disabilities from accessing crucial electoral information and services.

Importantly, the proceedings highlighted the constitutional obligation of public authorities to move beyond symbolic inclusion toward genuine accessibility grounded in universal design principles.

During the hearing, the Election Commission of India informed the Court that directions had already been issued to State authorities to ensure accessibility measures, including permanent ramps and other facilities at polling booths. It was further assured that deficiencies noticed during recent elections would be examined and appropriately addressed.

Accessibility and Democratic Participation

One of the most important aspects emerging from the proceedings is the Court’s recognition that voting rights of persons with disabilities cannot be meaningfully exercised in the absence of accessible infrastructure and accessible information systems.

The case foregrounds the principle that democracy itself becomes exclusionary when public institutions fail to accommodate disabled citizens.

The proceedings therefore reinforce that:

• accessibility is integral to electoral justice;
• political participation forms part of substantive equality; and
• the right to vote necessarily includes the right to independently and dignifiedly access the electoral process.

The matter also reflects the evolving judicial understanding that digital accessibility forms an inseparable component of constitutional accessibility obligations in contemporary governance systems.

Commentary

The proceedings in Vaishnavi Jayakumar v. Election Commission of India & Ors. represent an important development in India’s evolving disability rights jurisprudence relating to political participation and accessible democracy.

Historically, persons with disabilities have faced multiple barriers in exercising their voting rights, including inaccessible polling booths, lack of assistive infrastructure, inaccessible transportation, inaccessible election materials, and digital exclusion.

One of the most transformative aspects of the case lies in its insistence upon permanent accessibility infrastructure instead of temporary election-time arrangements. This distinction is significant because temporary measures often perpetuate dependency, uncertainty, and indignity for disabled voters.

The proceedings also broaden the understanding of accessibility by recognising the central importance of digital accessibility within modern democratic participation.

In contemporary electoral systems, citizens increasingly depend upon online platforms for voter information, polling station details, candidate information, and election procedures. Inaccessible websites and inaccessible CAPTCHA systems therefore operate as structural barriers to democratic participation.

Another important aspect of the case is its emphasis on universal accessibility standards under the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021. By invoking these standards, the petition reinforces that accessibility is a measurable and enforceable legal obligation rather than a discretionary administrative choice.

The matter further contributes to the growing recognition that disability rights are inseparable from democratic rights and citizenship rights.

Importantly, the proceedings reaffirm that inclusion cannot be reduced to token compliance. Accessibility obligations under the RPwD Act require proactive institutional transformation grounded in dignity, autonomy, and equal participation.

At a broader constitutional level, the case reinforces that electoral participation for persons with disabilities must not depend upon charity, assistance, or temporary accommodations, but upon enforceable rights ensuring independent and equal participation within the democratic process.

The proceedings therefore represent a significant step toward strengthening the constitutional vision of an inclusive democracy where accessibility is treated not as an exception, but as an essential prerequisite for equal citizenship and meaningful participation in public life.

Read the Judgement

Court of CCPD Directs Canara Bank to Transfer Visually Impaired Employee to Accessible Branch, Reimburse Withheld Salary, and Conduct Accessibility Audit

Court: Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities
Case Nos.: CCPD/13498/1024/2022 and CCPD/16130/1022/25
Complainant: Shri Ravinder Jadhav
Respondents: Canara Bank
Date of Order: 23 April 2026

Summary: Accessibility Is Not a Workplace Perk—It Is a Constitutional Requirement

In a significant order reinforcing the rights of employees with disabilities, the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) has directed Canara Bank to transfer a visually impaired employee to an accessible branch, reimburse salary and allowances withheld during the period he was unable to join an inaccessible posting, and undertake a formal accessibility audit of its facilities through auditors empanelled by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities.

The order, passed by Chief Commissioner Shri S. Govindaraj, reiterates that accessibility and reasonable accommodation are indispensable components of the constitutional guarantee of equality in public employment and cannot be treated as discretionary concessions.

Background: From Systemic Accessibility Concerns to an Individual Employment Dispute

The proceedings arose out of two connected complaints filed by Shri Ravinder Jadhav, a person with 71% benchmark disability employed with Canara Bank. In the first complaint, he raised several issues affecting employees with disabilities, including inaccessible HRMS systems, delays in providing JAWS screen-reading software, irregularities in payment of Special Conveyance Allowance, absence of effective grievance redress mechanisms, and accessibility concerns within the Bank's infrastructure.

During the proceedings, the CCPD repeatedly emphasised the need for accessible digital systems, assistive technology, automated allowance payments, grievance redressal mechanisms and an Equal Opportunity Policy. The Bank informed the Court that it had revised its allowance policy, initiated procurement of JAWS software and designated a Grievance Redressal Officer. However, the matter did not end there.

In 2025, Shri Jadhav approached the CCPD again after being transferred from Canara Bank's Faridabad Sector-9 Branch to the Sanjay Colony Branch. He contended that the new branch was inaccessible and unsafe for a visually impaired employee because access required negotiating a hazardous route involving an open drain and a narrow crossing. He further alleged that when he could not safely report to the branch, his salary and allowances were stopped.

The Bank defended the transfer as a routine administrative rotation after completion of tenure and argued that the branch was accessible and well connected. It also justified withholding salary on the ground that the employee had not reported for duty.

Photographic Evidence Revealed Serious Accessibility Hazards

A critical aspect of the case was the photographic evidence submitted by the complainant.

After examining the photographs, the CCPD recorded that the entrance route to the branch was not merely inconvenient but posed a serious safety risk for a person with visual impairment. The Court noted that the route involved an open drainage canal covered by an uneven and precarious grate, creating a hazardous and inconsistent walking surface. It observed that such conditions could endanger even non-disabled persons and constituted a structural barrier for a visually impaired employee.

The Court consequently concluded that the branch failed to provide a barrier-free environment and that the employee's inability to access the workplace was directly attributable to the inaccessible conditions.

Strong Reliance on Accessibility Jurisprudence

The order is notable for drawing upon recent constitutional developments in accessibility law.

The CCPD referred to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, where accessibility was recognised as an integral component of the rights to dignity, life and freedom of movement under Article 21 of the Constitution. The order also highlighted the Supreme Court's distinction between accessibility and reasonable accommodation, explaining that accessibility addresses systemic barriers while reasonable accommodation addresses individual needs.

The Court further relied upon State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma, where the Supreme Court recognised accessibility and connectivity as essential facets of the right to life.

Importantly, the CCPD also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, which recognised the right to unobstructed and accessible pathways as a fundamental right and mandated compliance with accessibility standards for pedestrian infrastructure.

Equality in Employment Includes Accessible Workplaces

One of the most significant observations in the order concerns the relationship between accessibility and equal opportunity in employment.

The CCPD observed that Article 16(1) guarantees equal opportunity in public employment and that this guarantee must be meaningful for persons with disabilities. The Court emphasised that accessibility and reasonable accommodation are not ancillary benefits but structural prerequisites for equality. Where an employer fails to remove barriers, the opportunity offered to an employee with disability becomes illusory rather than real.

The order makes an important conceptual shift by recognising that a workplace cannot be viewed merely as the office premises. Instead, the workplace must be understood as an integrated environment that includes safe and accessible access to the workplace itself.

Salary Cannot Be Withheld When Inaccessibility Prevents Attendance

The CCPD found that withholding salary and allowances from the complainant during the period he was unable to access the branch was punitive and amounted to a denial of livelihood. Since the inability to attend work arose directly from inaccessible conditions, the consequences could not be visited upon the employee.

Accordingly, the Court advised the Bank to:

• Post the complainant to an accessible branch as close to his native place as possible, subject to administrative constraints; and
• Reimburse all salary and allowances withheld during the period he could not access the branch.

Accessibility Audit Ordered

Going beyond the individual grievance, the CCPD recommended that Canara Bank undertake a formal accessibility audit through auditors empanelled by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities.

The audit is to cover not only the branch premises but also the route used for accessing the workplace. The Bank has been directed to prepare an Action Taken Report and submit compliance within ninety days. The order warns that failure to comply may invite proceedings under Sections 77, 89 and 93 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Why This Order Matters

This order is important because it expands the understanding of workplace accessibility beyond ramps, lifts and office interiors. It recognises that an employee cannot meaningfully exercise the right to work if the path leading to the workplace itself is unsafe or inaccessible.

The CCPD's reasoning aligns closely with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that views accessibility as a fundamental right rather than a welfare measure. It also reinforces a principle that disability rights advocates have long emphasised: equal opportunity in employment requires more than merely appointing persons with disabilities. Employers must ensure that employees can safely reach, enter, navigate and perform their work with dignity and independence.

For banks, public sector undertakings and government establishments across India, the message is clear. Accessibility audits cannot remain limited to buildings. They must extend to digital systems, assistive technologies, administrative policies, grievance mechanisms and the broader ecosystem through which employees with disabilities access their workplace.

The order is another reminder that accessibility is not a matter of charity or convenience. It is a legal obligation flowing directly from the Constitution, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and the evolving jurisprudence of equality and dignity.

While the Bank was a respondent in this case we also find that municipal bodies, ULBs also continue to ignore accessibility compliance on streets, roads and allow encroachments or leave drains open without a raised boundary or protection, they also issue permission to build structures and issue occupancy certificate with no mechanism to ensure accessibility. The accessibility having been declared a fundamental right, its time we also held the municipal agencies accountable for their lethargy and lack of action.

Read the Court order in Shri Ravinder Jadhav V. Canara Bank

Disabled Employee Shifted to New Cadre cannot Claim Past Seniority: Bombay High Court Clarifies Scope of Section 47

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench
Bench: Justice M. W. Chandwani
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 6535 of 2024
Case Title: Rameshwar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 26 March 2026

In a significant ruling on the scope of service protections available to employees acquiring disability during service, the Bombay High Court has held that a disabled employee shifted to another post or cadre cannot claim seniority in the new cadre based on past service in the previous post. The bench ruled that while the law mandates the protection of pay and service benefits for those who acquire a disability during service, it does not grant them a "carried-forward" seniority that disrupts the existing hierarchy of their new cadre.

The Court clarified that while Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 safeguards continuity of employment, pay, and service benefits, it does not extend to disturbing the existing seniority structure of the cadre into which such an employee is absorbed.

Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Lab Technician in 2002. After acquiring low vision in 2010, he sought reassignment to a suitable post. Pursuant to earlier court directions, he was absorbed in 2016 as an Extension Officer (Panchayat) with the same pay scale and service benefits.

At the time of absorption, he was placed at the bottom of the seniority list in the new cadre. Several years later, when a seniority list for promotion was published excluding his name, the petitioner challenged this placement, arguing that his past service since 2002 should be counted for determining seniority and eligibility for promotion.

Key Legal Issue

Whether a government employee who acquires disability during service and is shifted to another cadre under Section 47 can claim seniority in the new cadre based on past service in the previous post.

Court’s Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 47 of the 1995 Act and emphasized that the provision operates in two distinct spheres:

1. Protection against discharge or reduction in rank:
   An employee acquiring disability cannot be removed or demoted and must be accommodated in a suitable post with the same pay scale and service benefits.

2. Protection against denial of promotion solely on the ground of disability:
   Promotion cannot be denied merely due to disability, but this does not override other eligibility conditions.

The Court made a crucial distinction between:

• Reduction in rank (which is prohibited), and
• Reduction in seniority (which pertains to inter se placement within a cadre and affects promotional prospects).

It held that maintaining pay and service benefits does not automatically entail carry-forward of seniority into a different cadre.

Seniority vs. Protection Under Disability Law

The Court observed that allowing a transferred employee to retain seniority from a previous cadre would:

• Disrupt the settled seniority of existing employees in the new cadre,
• Lead to inequity and potential discrimination against those already serving in that cadre, and
• Go beyond the legislative intent of Section 47.

It emphasized that the law aims to protect the disabled employee without prejudicing the rights of others.

“…in the process of shifting a disabled employee… seniority of the employees who are already in that cadre… cannot be disturbed.”

Findings on Facts

On the facts of the case, the Court noted:

• The petitioner himself sought transfer to the new post.
• He accepted the condition of being placed at the bottom of the seniority list at the time of appointment.
• He raised the issue of seniority only after several years, when promotion opportunities arose.
• He did not meet the minimum qualifying service requirement (7 years) in the new cadre at the relevant time.
• His non-promotion was not on account of disability, but due to lack of eligibility and seniority.

Distinguishing Precedents

The petitioner had cited following two cases to support his case to argue that Section 47 is mandatory.:

1. Kunal Singh vs. Union of India (2003) 

The Difference: In Kunal Singh, the employer actually discharged (fired) the employee after he acquired a disability.

The Court's View: The Bombay High Court noted that the issue in Kunal Singh was the termination of service without applying Section 47 protections. In Rameshwar’s case, the Zilla Parishad did not try to fire him or reduce his rank; they actually absorbed him into a new post as requested.

2. The Sahib Singh Case (Punjab and Haryana High Court)

The petitioner also relied on Sahib Singh Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd., where a court allowed an employee shifted to a new post to keep his original seniority.

The Bombay HC's Critique: Justice Chandwani observed that the Sahib Singh ruling relied on Kunal Singh, but in his view, it misconstrued that Supreme Court decision.

Binding Precedent: Most importantly, the Bombay High Court pointed to its own Division Bench decision in Shyamkumar Vs. Union of India (2023). This ruling states that denial of promotion doesn't violate the Act if the employee doesn't meet the recruitment rules of the new cadre. As a "Nagpur Bench" decision, Shyamkumar is legally binding on this court, whereas the Punjab and Haryana ruling is not.

Conclusion

Dismissing the writ petition, the Court held that:

• Past service in a previous post cannot be counted for determining seniority in a new cadre after transfer or absorption under Section 47.
• The statutory protection ensures continuity of employment and benefits, but does not confer a right to retrospective seniority in a different cadre.
• Promotion claims must be assessed based on applicable service rules and eligibility criteria, not merely on disability status.

Significance

This judgment provides important clarity on the limits of protection under disability law in public employment. While reinforcing that employees acquiring disability must be protected from loss of employment and pay, the Court has balanced this with the rights of other employees by preserving the integrity of cadre-based seniority systems.

For disability rights advocates, this judgment underscores the importance of the "same pay scale and service benefits" mandate while acknowledging the administrative realities of cadre-based seniority. It confirms that while the law provides a safety net to prevent a disabled worker from losing their livelihood or status, it does not allow for a "leapfrog" over colleagues who have spent years building seniority in a specific department. Thus it underscores that disability rights in employment are protective, not preferential, and must operate within the broader framework of service jurisprudence. 

However, the Punjab and Haryana High  court Judgement in Sahib Singh vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., still stands which highlighted a critical legal stance that employees cannot be penalized with loss of seniority or benefits merely due to a change in, or adaptation of, their job roles because of acquired disability.  We believe, this analysis can be used against employees acquiring disabilities 

Read the Judgement here (PDF 115 KB)

Bipolar Disorder Without Benchmark Disability Not Enough to Invoke Transfer Protection: says Delhi High Court

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Amit Mahajan
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3022/2026
Case Title: Ms. Shalu Pruthi v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr.
Date of Judgment: 25.03.2026

In a decision that sits at the intersection of service law and disability rights, the Delhi High Court has declined to interfere with the transfer of a Kendriya Vidyalaya teacher who invoked Bipolar Affective Disorder as a ground for retention at a preferred station.

The Court upheld the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, finding no infirmity in the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan’s (KVS) decision to transfer the petitioner from Delhi to Babugarh Cantt. in the Agra region.

Background and Facts

The petitioner, a Primary Teacher appointed in 2009, had been serving in Delhi for over a decade. Her transfer traces back to the 2022 rationalisation exercise within KVS, which later became the subject matter of litigation culminating in proceedings before the Supreme Court.

Pursuant to directions issued therein, teachers were invited to indicate preferred stations. The petitioner opted for Faridabad, Ghaziabad, and Noida. However, owing to non-availability of vacancies, she was posted to Babugarh Cantt., approximately 90 km from her first preference.

Challenging this, she relied primarily on her long-standing diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder, contending that:

• she required continuous psychiatric care,
• family support was essential for stability, and
• the authorities failed to extend reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Tribunal’s View

The Tribunal had rejected her plea, holding that her case did not fall within the “Medical Disability Ground” (MDG) category under the KVS Transfer Policy dated 30.06.2023.

This policy recognises limited categories, including specified illnesses and “any other disease with more than 50% mental disability.”

High Court’s Findings

The High Court’s reasoning proceeds along three distinct lines:

1. Transfer is an Incident of Service

Reiterating settled service jurisprudence, the Court emphasised that:

• an employee cannot claim posting at a particular place as a matter of right,
• judicial review in transfer matters is narrow, confined to mala fides or statutory violation.

The Court relied on established precedents such as S.L. Abbas, S.C. Saxena, and Shilpi Bose, which consistently hold that administrative discretion in transfers must be respected unless clearly arbitrary.

2. Absence of Benchmark Disability Was Decisive

The core issue turned on whether the petitioner could bring herself within the protective framework of either:

• the KVS transfer policy, or
• the disability law regime.

The Court noted that while medical documents showed ongoing treatment, there was no certification indicating benchmark disability (i.e., the statutory threshold of 40% or more under the RPwD Act, and 50% mental disability under the policy).

This evidentiary gap proved fatal. The Court accepted the employer’s view that without such certification, the case could not be treated under the MDG category.

3. Reasonable Accommodation Cannot Be Claimed in the Abstract

The petitioner relied on Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India and Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan, both of which strongly affirm the principle of reasonable accommodation. 

However, the Court distinguished these precedents on facts.

Case Analysis: The “Benchmark” Barrier—Why the Delhi HC’s Ruling on Bipolar Disorder Fails the Mental Health Test

In a decision that highlights the cold friction between administrative policy and the fluid reality of mental health, the Delhi High Court upheld the transfer of a teacher struggling with Bipolar Affective Disorder. While this judgment aligns with rigid service law, it leaves a glaring void in the progressive interpretation of disability rights.

For the disability rights community, this isn't just about a transfer—it’s about the "quantification of suffering" and the invisible walls built by bureaucratic benchmarks. 

The Outcome: A "Mechanical" Dismissal

The Petitioner, Shalu Pruthi, has served as a Primary Teacher with the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) since February 2009. Having served in Delhi for over 12 years, she was caught in a rationalization exercise and transferred from Delhi to Babugarh Cantt., roughly 90 km from her preferred stations.

She challenged the move, citing a decade-long battle with Bipolar Affective Disorder that requires consistent psychiatric care and essential family support for stability. She argued that the authorities failed to provide reasonable accommodation as mandated by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

The High Court dismissed the petition, leaning on two primary pillars:

• Transfer as an Incident of Service: An employee cannot claim a specific posting as a right, especially in a cadre with All India transfer liability.

• The Certification Gap: The KVS Transfer Policy (2023) recognizes medical grounds only for "specified illnesses" or "any other disease with more than 50% mental disability".

Deep Dive: Diverging from the Supreme Court

The Petitioner relied on two landmark Supreme Court rulings to argue for a sensitive, humane approach:

• Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India (2023): This case established that the Doctrine of Reasonable Accommodation is a fundamental component of equality. It mandates that the State adopt a sensitive approach to ensure administrative actions do not unfairly penalize employees for conditions beyond their control.
• Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan (2022): This ruling emphasized that disability rights must be interpreted in a purposive and rights-based manner, moving away from rigid or formalistic approaches.

Despite these powerful precedents, the High Court held that their application presupposes a "demonstrated legal entitlement". Because Pruthi’s medical records did not explicitly quantify her condition as 50% or more, the Court found no "benchmark disability" and refused to interfere.

Critique: Ignoring the Invisible Reality

This judgment exposes a harsh reality for those with mental health conditions: the quantification of suffering. By sticking strictly to the policy's percentages, the Court has signaled that "reasonable accommodation" has a high entry barrier—one that is fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation.

1. The Stigma of Certification

The Court noted an "evidentiary gap" because the petitioner lacked a formal certificate. However, this ignores the severe stigma attached to mental illness. Many users are reluctant to seek "Benchmark Disability" certificates due to the social "labeling" that follows. Furthermore, there is a chronic shortage of professionals to assess mental illness, and the process often requires repeated, exhausting hospital visits.

2. The 40% vs. 50% Inconsistency

The RPwD Act recognizes "benchmark disability" at 40%. Yet, the KVS policy demands a 50% threshold for mental disability. The Court did not question this discrepancy or consider how a more restrictive internal policy might dilute the spirit of national disability law.

3. A Missed Opportunity for Writ Jurisdiction

Under its writ jurisdiction (Article 226), the Court had the power to order an independent medical assessment to determine the degree of disability. Instead of bridging this evidentiary gap, the Court chose a mechanical approach, rejecting the petition on technical grounds alone.

The Bottom Line: Need-Based, Not Score-Based

Reasonable Accommodation is defined as the necessary and appropriate modifications to ensure persons with disabilities can exercise their rights equally with others. By its very nature, it is need-specific, not just percentage-specific.

Bipolar Disorder can be debilitating and requires environmental stability long before it hits a "50% disability" score on a bureaucratic chart. This ruling highlights the urgent need for more nuanced policy frameworks—so that the promise of reasonable accommodation does not remain narrowly confined to those with the "right" paperwork.

Read the judgement (PDF 578 KB)

Reliance on Outdated Disability Classification Cannot Defeat Right to Employment: Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Candidates with SLD and Mental Illness

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No(s). of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 43728/2025
Case Title: Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 12 March 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 232

In a significant ruling reinforcing the evolving framework of disability rights in public employment, the Supreme Court of India has held that candidates with benchmark disabilities such as Specific Learning Disability (SLD) and mental illness cannot be denied appointment on the basis of outdated identification lists of posts.

The judgment arose from a challenge to the denial of appointment to candidates who had successfully cleared the Combined Graduate Level Examination, 2018 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission for the post of Auditor in the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

Background

The dispute traces back to the recruitment process initiated in 2018. Candidates, including the appellant Sudhanshu Kardam and another candidate, Shri Amit Yadav, had qualified through all stages of the examination and were recommended for appointment under the Persons with Disabilities category.

However, their candidature was rejected by the CAG on the ground that the post of Auditor had not been identified as suitable for persons with mental illness or Specific Learning Disability, relying on the 2013 identification list.

Aggrieved, the candidates relied upon the Gazette Notification dated 4 January 2021 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which updated and expanded the list of identified posts to include these categories of disabilities.

Key Findings of the Court

The Supreme Court took note of the 2021 notification, which superseded the earlier 2013 list and expressly identified Group ‘C’ posts such as Assistant (Audit) and Auditor-II as suitable for persons with benchmark disabilities including mental illness and SLD.

Relying on the affidavit filed by the CAG, the Court recorded that there was no longer any legal or administrative barrier to accommodating the candidates in suitable posts.

Importantly, the Court rejected the continued reliance on outdated classification systems, implicitly affirming that administrative inertia cannot override statutory rights under the RPwD Act.

Directions Issued

The Court issued the following operative directions:

• The Staff Selection Commission was directed to forward the dossiers of the candidates to the CAG within two weeks.

• Upon receipt, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India must consider them for appointment to suitable Group ‘C’ posts.

• If the originally advertised vacancies from 2018 had already been filled, the authorities were directed to create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates.

• The appointments would take effect from the date of joining.

Significance

This ruling is important for several reasons:

1. Dynamic Interpretation of Disability Rights:
   The judgment underscores that identification of posts must reflect current statutory frameworks, particularly the expanded categories introduced under the RPwD Act, 2016.

2. Primacy of Updated Notifications:
   Authorities cannot rely on obsolete identification lists when a subsequent statutory notification has redefined suitability criteria.

3. Substantive Equality in Employment:
   By directing the creation of supernumerary posts, the Court ensured that procedural delays or administrative decisions do not deprive persons with disabilities of their rightful employment opportunities.

4. Recognition of Invisible Disabilities:
   The decision affirms the inclusion of less visible disabilities such as mental illness and Specific Learning Disability within mainstream public employment.

Commentary

The judgment is a clear message that the promise of reservation and inclusion under the RPwD Act cannot be diluted by outdated bureaucratic practices. It aligns with a rights-based approach where identification of posts is not a static exercise but one that must evolve with law and policy.

For disability rights jurisprudence, this decision strengthens the principle that eligibility once recognized by law must translate into actual access to employment, and that the State carries a positive obligation to remove institutional barriers—even if that requires creation of additional posts.

Read the Judgement (PDF 204 KB)

SC Strikes Down Arbitrary Disability Percentage Ceiling for Public Employment: Reaffirms Reasonable Accommodation under RPwD Act in Prabhu Kumar [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 868 of 2024
Case Title: Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others
Date of Judgment: 11 March 2026

In a judgment with far-reaching implications for disability-inclusive public employment in India, the Supreme Court of India has held that the State cannot impose arbitrary upper limits on disability percentages for reservation in public employment unless such restrictions are backed by objective functional assessment and the principles of reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

The judgment is a major reaffirmation of substantive equality and the doctrine of reasonable accommodation, and decisively rejects the long-standing administrative practice of mechanically excluding persons with higher disability percentages from employment opportunities.

Background of the Case

The appellant, Prabhu Kumar, a practising advocate with 90% permanent locomotor disability due to left shoulder disarticulation, had applied for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) in Himachal Pradesh pursuant to a 2018 recruitment advertisement.

The recruitment notification reserved two posts for persons with disabilities but imposed a condition that eligible candidates must have disability between 40% and 60% in one arm or one leg.

Despite successfully clearing the written examination and interview, and even topping among candidates selected under the disability category, the appellant was denied appointment solely because his disability exceeded the prescribed 60% ceiling.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed his challenge, following the earlier decision in V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

RPwD Act Creates a “Floor”, Not a “Ceiling”

The Supreme Court examined Sections 2(r) and 33 of the RPwD Act, 2016 and held that the law only prescribes a minimum threshold of 40% disability for benchmark disability status and does not permit the State to impose arbitrary upper limits.

In one of the most significant observations of the judgment, the Court held:

“The RPwD Act, 2016 defines the ‘floor’ for reservation eligibility but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary ‘ceiling’ that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they are otherwise capable of performing the functional requirements of the role through reasonable accommodation.”

The Court further observed that by fixing a 60% cap, the State had effectively rewritten the statutory definition of benchmark disability in a manner contrary to the object of the RPwD Act.

Reasonable Accommodation Is Central to Disability Rights

The Bench relied heavily upon the transformative ruling in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, which had questioned and weakened the earlier precedent in V. Surendra Mohan.

Reproducing extensive portions from Vikash Kumar, the Court reiterated that disability jurisprudence in India must be rooted in reasonable accommodation and not in stereotypical assumptions about capability.

The judgment quoted with approval the observation that:

“Reasonable accommodation is not a matter of charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of our Constitution.”

The Court emphasised that the relevant question is not whether accommodating a person with disability may create “avoidable complications”, but whether providing accommodation imposes a disproportionate or undue burden.

Disability Percentage Cannot Determine Capability

Rejecting the assumption that a higher disability percentage automatically implies inability to perform professional duties, the Court made a strong statement on functional competence:

“The percentage of disability, by itself, cannot be treated as determinative of a candidate’s capability or suitability for public employment.”

The Bench noted that the appellant had already demonstrated his competence by practising law successfully for nearly a decade and by securing the highest rank among disability category candidates.

Importantly, the Court held that suitability must be assessed through actual functional evaluation rather than abstract medical percentages.

Supreme Court Questions the Rationality of the 60% Ceiling

The Court expressed strong disapproval of the State’s inability to justify the 60% disability cap.

The Bench observed:

“We are at a loss to comprehend as to what could have been the rationale behind fixing this upper limit of disability…”

It further noted that the duties of an Assistant District Attorney primarily involve legal reasoning, advocacy, teaching, and advisory functions where locomotor disability in the arm could not reasonably be treated as an impediment.

The Supreme Court also highlighted that even the High Court had recorded serious doubts regarding the basis on which the State had fixed the disability ceiling and had found no evidence of consultation with experts or objective assessment.

Constitutional Equality and Substantive Inclusion

The Court held that the State’s action violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as well as the mandate of the RPwD Act.

The judgment is significant because it shifts the focus from medicalised exclusion to substantive equality and individualised assessment.

It reiterates that persons with disabilities cannot be denied opportunities merely because administrative authorities rely upon preconceived assumptions or arbitrary numerical restrictions unsupported by scientific or functional analysis.

Relief Granted

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed the State of Himachal Pradesh to appoint the appellant as Assistant District Attorney within two weeks.

The Court further directed that:

• the appointment would relate back to 19 September 2019 with all notional benefits;
• if the vacancy was unavailable, a supernumerary post must be created;
• the State must pay costs of ₹5 lakh to the appellant for the prolonged injustice suffered by him.

Commentary

This ruling is likely to become a foundational precedent in disability employment jurisprudence in India.

Across India, recruitment advertisements and institutional policies frequently prescribe rigid medical or disability-percentage restrictions without undertaking any evidence-based assessment of actual job requirements or possibilities of reasonable accommodation. This judgment makes it clear that such exclusions cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.

The decision also strengthens the evolving judicial trend seen in cases such as Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, Anmol v. Union of India, and Kabir Pahariya v. National Medical Commission, where the Supreme Court has consistently moved away from stereotype-based exclusion and towards individualised, evidence-based assessment of capabilities.

Most importantly, the judgment recognises that accessibility and reasonable accommodation are not concessions but enforceable constitutional entitlements essential to achieving genuine equality for persons with disabilities in public life.

Read the judgement in Prabhu Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh

Accessibility in Residential Complexes is a Fundamental Right: Allahabad High Court

Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Bench: Justice Siddharth Nandan and Justice Atul Sreedharan
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5663 of 2026
Case Title: M/s SCC Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Others
Date of Judgment: 26 February 2026

In a progressive ruling, the Allahabad High Court has reaffirmed that the right to accessibility is not limited to public infrastructure, but extends equally to residential complexes involving community living. This judgment strengthens the jurisprudence around disability rights by clearly situating accessibility within the framework of Article 21 (right to life and dignity) and Article 14 (equality) of the Constitution.

The Court emphasized that residential buildings with shared amenities—such as lifts, parking, pavements, playgrounds, community centres, and gyms—must be designed and maintained in a manner that ensures unhindered access for persons with disabilities (PwDs).

Background of the Case

The case arose from a dispute involving a homebuyer with 90% locomotor disability, who had been allotted a designated parking space in a residential project in Ghaziabad. Years later, the builder unilaterally divided the allotted parking space into two, allocating part of it to another buyer.

This alteration significantly affected the complainant’s ability to access the lift conveniently from the parking area, thereby undermining her independence and mobility within the residential complex.

Following a complaint, the authorities conducted a site inspection and found that the modification indeed created barriers. The State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities ruled in favour of the complainant. The builder challenged this decision before the High Court.

Key Findings of the Court

1. Accessibility as a Fundamental Right in Residential Spaces

The Court relied on established precedent, including State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma, to reiterate that accessibility is a fundamental right under Article 21. Importantly, it clarified that:

Accessibility is not confined to public spaces—it extends to “community living” environments, including private residential complexes.

This marks a crucial expansion in the interpretation of accessibility obligations in India.

2. Community Living Must Be Barrier-Free

Recognising the nature of modern urban housing, the Court held that common facilities in residential buildings must be fully accessible, including:

• Parking spaces

• Lifts

• Pathways and pavements

• Playgrounds

• Community centres

• Gymnasiums

Any obstruction or redesign that hampers access to these facilities—especially from critical points like parking to lifts—would amount to a violation of fundamental rights.

3. Builder’s Action Violated Accessibility Rights

The Court found that splitting the originally allotted parking space:

• Was done without the consent of the allottee

• Resulted in practical barriers to accessing the lift

• Could not be justified, especially given the complainant’s high support needs

The Court upheld the findings of the Commissioner and refused to interfere, noting that the proceedings were fair and based on admitted facts and inspection reports.

4. Mandatory Compliance Under the RPwD Act, 2016

Referring to Section 44 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Court reiterated that:

• No building plan can be approved unless it complies with accessibility standards

• No completion certificate can be issued without such compliance

The Court underscored that accessibility must be ensured both at the planning stage and at the completion stage of construction.

Directions Issued by the Court

The High Court issued broader systemic directions to improve accessibility in residential developments:

• Development Authorities in Uttar Pradesh must frame and incorporate guidelines ensuring accessibility in housing projects

• Building plans for community living must include:

  • Dedicated accessible parking spaces

  • Barrier-free access to lifts and other common facilities

• The State must ensure strict enforcement of accessibility norms at:

  • The stage of granting building permission

  • The stage of issuing completion certificates

Significance of the Judgment

This decision is particularly important for several reasons:

a. Expanding the Scope of Accessibility Law

The ruling firmly establishes that private residential developments are not outside the ambit of accessibility obligations, especially where shared infrastructure is involved.

b. Strengthening Everyday Rights

By focusing on something as routine as parking-to-lift access, the Court highlights how accessibility is central to independent living and dignity, not merely a technical compliance issue.

c. Reinforcing Accountability of Builders and Authorities

The judgment sends a clear message that post-allotment alterations affecting accessibility will not be tolerated, and that authorities must actively ensure compliance.

d. Aligning with International Obligations

The Court’s reasoning aligns with India’s commitments under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), particularly the principle of accessibility as a precondition for inclusion.

Commentary

This judgment is a welcome and necessary development in Indian disability jurisprudence. It bridges a long-standing gap between legal standards and lived realities, particularly in urban housing.

While accessibility norms often exist on paper, their enforcement in residential contexts has been weak. By recognizing accessibility in community living as a fundamental right, the Court has elevated the issue beyond mere regulatory compliance to a matter of constitutional importance.

Going forward, this ruling can serve as a strong precedent to challenge inaccessible housing designs, retrofitted barriers, and exclusionary urban planning practices across India.

This case is a reminder that accessibility is not an optional add-on—it is integral to equality, dignity, and the right to live independently.

Read the judgement here (PDF 424 KB)