Spouse Appointed Guardian of Comatose Husband: Delhi High Court Invokes Parens Patriae Jurisdiction Amid Legal Vacuum

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Sachin Datta
Case No.: W.P.(C) 16793/2025
Case Title: Professor Alka Acharya v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 31.12.2025

In a significant ruling addressing the continuing legal vacuum surrounding guardianship of persons in a comatose or vegetative state, the Delhi High Court appointed a wife as the legal guardian of her husband, who was rendered incapacitated following a severe intracranial haemorrhage.

Background

The petitioner, Professor Alka Acharya, approached the Court seeking appointment as the legal guardian of her husband, Mr. Salam Khan, who has been in a persistent vegetative state since February 2025. Following emergency neurosurgery and prolonged hospitalization, Mr. Khan remained unconscious, requiring continuous medical support including tracheostomy and assisted feeding.

With no statutory mechanism available for appointing a guardian in such situations, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under the doctrine of parens patriae to manage her husband’s medical care and financial affairs.

Medical and Administrative Findings

Pursuant to the Court’s directions:

• A Medical Board from Govind Ballabh Pant Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education and Research (GIPMER) examined Mr. Khan and confirmed:

  • Persistent vegetative state
  • 100% disability
  • Inability to take any decisions or perform daily activities

• The Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) conducted a detailed inquiry and verified:

  • The marital relationship and legal heirship
  • Absence of any dispute or conflict of interest
  • Financial stability and proper caregiving by the petitioner
  • Authenticity of disclosed movable and immovable assets

Importantly, the couple’s children also gave their no-objection to the appointment.

Key Legal Issue

The case once again highlighted a critical gap in Indian law: there is no clear statutory framework governing appointment of guardians for individuals in a comatose or vegetative state.

The Court relied on its earlier precedent in N.A. v. GNCTD and other High Court rulings, which recognize that:

• Neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 nor the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 adequately address such situations
• Constitutional Courts retain inherent powers under Article 226 to step in and protect such individuals
• The doctrine of parens patriae empowers courts to act in the best interests and welfare of incapacitated persons

Court’s Observations

The Court reiterated that:

• Persons in vegetative states fall outside conventional statutory categories such as “persons with disabilities” or “persons with mental illness” for the purpose of guardianship frameworks
• This creates a “clear statutory vacuum”, necessitating judicial intervention
• Courts must adopt a case-by-case approach, guided by medical evidence, family structure, and absence of conflict

Directions Issued

Allowing the petition, the Court:

1. Appointed Professor Alka Acharya as the legal guardian of her husband
2. Permitted her to manage and deal with both movable and immovable assets of Mr. Khan to meet his medical and living expenses
3. Granted her authority over: Medical decisions and caregiving; Financial management and daily expenditures; Operation of bank accounts, investments, and insurance

Significance

This judgment reinforces an evolving but crucial line of jurisprudence where High Courts step in to fill legislative gaps affecting some of the most vulnerable individuals. Key takeaways include:

• Recognition of legal vacuum: Existing disability and mental health laws do not cover guardianship for comatose persons
• Expanded role of constitutional courts: Courts continue to invoke parens patriae jurisdiction to ensure protection and dignity
• Preference for close relatives: Spouses and immediate family members are ordinarily preferred as guardians
• Need for legislative reform: The case underscores the urgent need for a structured statutory framework governing such situations

Comment

While the judgment provides immediate relief and practical clarity in individual cases, it also highlights a systemic issue. Despite progressive legislation like the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, certain categories of persons—especially those in prolonged unconscious states—remain outside formal legal protection mechanisms.

Until Parliament addresses this gap, courts will continue to play a vital, albeit ad hoc, role in safeguarding the rights, dignity, and welfare of such individuals.

Read the Judgement (PDF 599 KB)

Acquired Disability Not a Ground to Push Employees Out of Service: P&H High Court

Court: Punjab & Haryana High Court
Bench: Justice Sandeep Moudgil
Case No.: CWP-31286-2024
Case Title: Brij Bhushan v. State of Haryana & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 19 December 2025
Cases Referred: Kunal Singh v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 524; Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (2025)

In a significant reaffirmation of the rights of employees acquiring disability during service, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that denying service protection on account of disability strikes at the very foundation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The Court emphasised that such an approach not only violates statutory protections but also erodes human dignity.

Background

The petitioner, a long-serving employee of Haryana Roadways, was initially appointed in 1986 and later promoted as a Painter. During his service, he suffered a brain haemorrhage and was assessed with 70% disability by a competent medical authority, rendering him unable to perform his original duties.

Invoking Section 20 of the RPwD Act, he sought retention in service on a supernumerary or suitable alternative post with full service benefits until superannuation. Despite a legal notice and earlier directions, the authorities rejected his claim on the ground that his disability was not “permanent” and further initiated disciplinary proceedings alleging unauthorised absence.

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court challenging both the rejection order and the charge-sheet.

Key Issues

• Whether an employee acquiring disability during service can be denied protection due to absence of a “permanent” disability certificate

• Scope and application of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016

• Legality of disciplinary action in the context of disability-related absence

Court’s Analysis

The Court rejected the State’s narrow interpretation of disability certification. It held that the petitioner clearly fell within the statutory definition of a “person with disability,” given the extent of functional limitations affecting his ability to work and perform daily activities.

Importantly, the Court noted that the disability certificate—valid up to 2029—covered the remaining period of the petitioner’s service, making the distinction between “temporary” and “permanent” disability irrelevant in the facts of the case.

Reiterating the mandate of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, the Court underscored that:

• An employee acquiring disability cannot be removed, reduced in rank, or denied promotion

• If unable to perform existing duties, the employee must be shifted to a suitable post

• Where no such post exists, the employee must be retained on a supernumerary post with full benefits

The Court also drew upon Supreme Court jurisprudence to reinforce that reasonable accommodation is not discretionary but a legal obligation flowing from constitutional principles of equality and dignity.

Observations on State as a Model Employer

In a strongly worded observation, the Court held that public authorities must act with sensitivity and responsibility when dealing with employees who acquire disabilities during service. It cautioned against bureaucratic rigidity and emphasised that institutional responses must prioritise inclusion over exclusion.

The judgment highlights that beneficial legislation like the RPwD Act must be interpreted purposively, ensuring that employees are not pushed out of service due to circumstances beyond their control.

Decision

Allowing the petition, the Court:

• Quashed the rejection order and the charge-sheet

• Directed the State to retain the petitioner on a supernumerary or suitable post

• Ensured continuity of service, full salary, and all consequential benefits

• Ordered payment of arrears with interest

• Directed that the period of absence due to disability be treated as duty

Commentary

This judgment is a crucial addition to the growing body of jurisprudence reinforcing employment security for persons who acquire disabilities during service. It decisively rejects technical objections—such as the nature of disability certification—that are often used to deny statutory protections.

The ruling aligns with earlier Supreme Court precedents and strengthens the principle that reasonable accommodation and service continuity are enforceable rights, not administrative concessions.

For disability rights practitioners, the judgment is particularly important in addressing a recurring issue: the misuse of procedural or certification-based grounds to dilute the protections under Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

At a broader level, the decision reiterates that the State’s role as a model employer must be measured not by formal compliance, but by its commitment to dignity, inclusion, and substantive equality.

Read the Judgement (PDF 140 KB)

HIV-Positive Persons Fall Within the Definition of Persons with Disabilities: A Landmark Ruling by Delhi HC

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench / Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3616/2021
Case Title: [Name withheld] v. Union of India & Ors. (BSF)
Date of Judgment: 16 December 2025
Relevant Statutes:

• Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016
• HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017

Brief

In a significant and precedent-setting judgment, the Delhi High Court has categorically held that an HIV-positive person can fall within the definition of a “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). This ruling marks what is arguably the first direct judicial equation of HIV-positive status with disability under the RPwD framework.

The case arose from the discharge of a Border Security Force (BSF) constable, who was removed from service in April 2019 after being diagnosed as HIV-positive. The constable had contracted HIV in 2017 and was undergoing antiretroviral therapy (ART). Despite treatment and recovery from associated ailments, including abdominal tuberculosis, he was issued a show-cause notice in November 2018 and subsequently discharged on the ground of being “physically unfit”. His departmental appeal was rejected in October 2020, compelling him to approach the Delhi High Court.

Key Findings of the Court

The Division Bench held that the petitioner’s discharge was unlawful under both the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017 and the RPwD Act, 2016.

1. HIV as a Disability under the RPwD Act
   The Court held that an HIV-positive employee suffering from a long-term physical impairment that hinders full and effective participation in society would fall within the ambit of “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act. Consequently, the statutory protections under Section 20 of the RPwD Act—particularly the prohibition on dispensing with the services of an employee who acquires a disability during service—were squarely attracted.

2. Non-Discrimination in Employment
   Drawing a clear parallel between the RPwD Act and the HIV Act, the Court reiterated that both statutes prohibit discrimination in matters of employment. Section 20(2) of the RPwD Act mandates reasonable accommodation, while Section 20(4) specifically bars termination of service on the ground of disability acquired during employment.

3. Violation of the HIV Act, 2017
   The Court relied heavily on Section 3 of the HIV Act, which imposes an absolute bar on terminating employment solely on the ground of HIV-positive status. The only exception—contained in Section 3(a)—requires a written assessment by an independent and qualified healthcare provider certifying that the employee is unfit to perform duties and poses a significant risk of transmission.

   The BSF, the Court noted, made no attempt whatsoever to comply with this mandatory requirement. In the absence of such an assessment, the presumption must be that the employee posed no significant risk and was fit for duty.

4. Reinstatement with Continuity of Service
   Setting aside both the discharge order (2019) and the appellate order (2020), the Court directed reinstatement of the petitioner with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, including pay fixation. However, back wages were expressly denied.

5. Reasonable Accommodation and Alternate Employment
   Importantly, the Court clarified that if the petitioner could not perform duties attached to the post of constable due to medical reasons, the BSF was duty-bound to provide reasonable accommodation. This includes offering alternate employment in an equivalent post, or if such a post is unavailable, placement in a supernumerary or equivalent position.

Broader Significance

This judgment is a watershed moment in Indian disability rights jurisprudence. For the first time, a constitutional court has explicitly recognised that HIV-positive persons may qualify as persons with disabilities under the RPwD Act, thereby extending to them the full spectrum of statutory protections relating to non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and security of tenure.

The ruling also reinforces the legislative intent of the HIV Act, 2017, which seeks to dismantle stigma-driven employment practices rooted in fear rather than medical evidence. Together, the two statutes are interpreted as complementary rights-based frameworks, not siloed protections.

For uniformed services and other government establishments, the decision sends a clear message: HIV status, by itself, cannot be a ground for termination. Any departure from this principle must strictly comply with statutory safeguards, medical evidence, and the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation.

From a disability rights perspective, the judgment deepens the understanding of “disability” as a lived, functional, and rights-oriented concept—rather than a narrow medical label—bringing Indian jurisprudence closer to the spirit of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Read the Judgement

Disability Benefits for Armed Forces Personnel Must Be Interpreted Liberally: Delhi High Court on Service Rights of Disabled Soldiers

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice C. Hari Shankar & Justice Om Prakash Shukla
Case No.: W.P.(C) 17070/2025
Case Title: Union of India v. Col. Surender Mohan
Date of Judgment: 11 November 2025
 
Background
 
The case arose from a writ petition filed by the Union of India challenging an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal which had granted disability pension to the respondent, a retired Army officer suffering from primary hypertension.
 
The respondent, Col. Surender Mohan, had earlier challenged the decision of the authorities denying him disability pension and related benefits on the ground that the disability was not attributable to or aggravated by military service.
 
The respondent argued that the medical condition had manifested while he was in active service and that the denial of disability benefits was inconsistent with the principles governing disability pension for armed forces personnel. He contended that service conditions in the armed forces are often physically demanding and stressful, and therefore the assessment of disability claims must take into account the unique circumstances under which such personnel perform their duties.
 
The Union of India defended the decision, relying on medical board findings that concluded the disability was not attributable to service conditions. The dispute therefore centred on the interpretation of the rules governing disability pension and the degree of deference courts should accord to medical board determinations.
 
Key Observations
 
The Delhi High Court emphasised that the framework governing disability benefits for armed forces personnel must be interpreted in a manner that recognises the special nature of military service. Soldiers are often required to operate under physically demanding and stressful conditions, and therefore the assessment of disability claims cannot be approached in an unduly restrictive manner.
 
The Court observed that while medical board findings play an important role in determining disability claims, such findings cannot be treated as conclusive where they fail to adequately consider the circumstances of military service. Judicial review remains available to ensure that disability claims are assessed in accordance with the principles of fairness and justice.
 
The Bench further noted that disability pension provisions are intended to provide financial security and dignity to personnel who suffer health complications during service. A narrow or technical interpretation of these provisions would defeat their underlying purpose.
 
The Court therefore emphasised that disability benefit rules must be interpreted liberally in favour of service personnel, particularly where the medical condition has manifested during active service.
 
Directions Issued
 
• The Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Union of India challenging the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal.
• The judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal granting disability pension to the respondent was affirmed.
• The authorities were directed to ensure compliance with the Tribunal’s order within the stipulated period.
 
Commentary
 
The judgment highlights the complex relationship between disability rights jurisprudence and the specialised framework governing the armed forces. While the military operates under a distinct legal regime, the fundamental principles of fairness and dignity continue to guide judicial interpretation of service-related benefits.
 
Disability pension disputes frequently arise from disagreements between medical board assessments and the experiences of service personnel. Courts have therefore played an important role in ensuring that such assessments are not applied in a rigid or mechanical manner that undermines the purpose of disability benefit schemes.
 
By emphasising the need for a liberal interpretation of disability pension provisions, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed the principle that service personnel who develop medical conditions during active duty should not be denied support through narrow technical reasoning.
 
The decision also reflects a broader judicial sensitivity toward the welfare of armed forces personnel who suffer disabilities during service. Ensuring that such individuals receive appropriate financial and institutional support is essential not only for their personal dignity but also for maintaining the integrity of the service system as a whole.

Read the Judgement [PDF 1.3 MB]

Supreme Court of India Urges Bar Council of India to Consider Reservation for Advocates with Disabilities in Elections

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan and Joymalya Bagchi
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1045 of 2025
Case Title: Amit Kumar Yadav v. Bar Council of India & Anr.
Date of Order: November 3, 2025

Brief

The Supreme Court has urged the Bar Council of India (BCI) to examine the issue of providing reservation for advocates with disabilities in Bar Councils and Bar Associations, emphasizing that the matter raises vital questions of policy and equality under the Constitution.

The Bench, comprising Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan and Joymalya Bagchi, was hearing a writ petition filed by Amit Kumar Yadav, a practicing advocate known for espousing the cause of persons with disabilities. The petitioner sought directions to the Bar Council of India and the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to reserve certain positions in their governing bodies for advocates with disabilities.

It was noted during the hearing that elections for the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh had already been notified, though nominations were yet to be filed. The Court, therefore, observed that it would be difficult at this stage to interfere with the ongoing electoral process or issue a positive mandamus directing such reservation.

However, while declining to intervene directly, the Court underscored the importance of inclusivity and representation in professional bodies. It stated that the issue deserved careful consideration within the framework of existing laws and the constitutional principles of equality.

“The reservation for persons with disability essentially being a policy matter, we dispose of this writ petition with a direction to the Bar Council of India to consider the cause espoused by the petitioner in light of the relevant legislative policies and statutes emanating from the constitutional principles of equality,”
— Order of the Supreme Court dated 3 November 2025.

The Court further clarified that all stakeholders are free to take an appropriate decision on the issue and that the petitioner is at liberty to approach the appropriate forum again, if necessary. All pending applications in the matter were also disposed of.

Significance and Perspective

This order, though brief, is an important development in the discourse around representation and inclusion of persons with disabilities in professional self-governing bodies. The Supreme Court’s direction places the onus on the Bar Council of India — the apex regulatory body of the legal profession — to introspect on the inclusivity of its governance structures.

At present, no Bar Council or Bar Association in India formally reserves seats for advocates with disabilities, despite statutory recognition of equality and non-discrimination under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15, and 16. The petitioner’s plea, therefore, opens a larger debate on how persons with disabilities can have a voice in decision-making spaces within the legal profession itself.

While several states have begun reserving or nominating persons with disabilities to local self-government bodies, such as municipal or ward-level committees, and women have reserved seats in state legislatures and Parliament, there remains an absence of similar affirmative mechanisms for persons with disabilities in elected professional or representative bodies.

Bar Councils and Bar Associations perform critical regulatory and welfare functions — from enrolment and discipline to welfare schemes and representation before authorities. Inclusion of persons with disabilities in their governing structures would not only enhance diversity but also ensure that policies and welfare measures are attuned to the lived realities of disabled advocates.

This case, therefore, marks an important judicial nudge toward recognizing representation as an essential dimension of equality. Whether or not the Bar Council of India takes proactive steps will determine if this moment becomes a turning point in building a more inclusive legal fraternity in India.

Citation:
Amit Kumar Yadav v. Bar Council of India & Anr., W.P.(C) No. 1045 of 2025, Order dated 03.11.2025, Supreme Court of India.

Download Order: View PDF in Amit Kumar Yadav Vs. Bar Council of India

Brain vs. Eye: Delhi HC Rules Ocular Sight Not Required for Legal Roles under RPwD Act in Mudit Gupta v. Airport Authority of India case

 

Blindness Reservation & Sight Function Case

Court: High Court of Delhi

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Case No.: W.P.(C) 938/2025 & CM APPL. 4579/2025 (Connected with W.P.(C) 61/2025 & W.P.(C) 68/2025)

Case Title: Mudit Gupta v. Airport Authority of India and Anr. (Along with Amit Kumar & Ors v. Airport Authority of India and Deepak Arora & Anr v. Airport Authority of India)

Date of Judgment: October 16, 2025

Citation: 2025:DHC:9207-DB

Cases Referred: Government of India v. Ravi Prakash Gupta (2010) 7 SCC 626; Union of India v. National Federation of the Blind (2013) 10 SCC 772; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370; National Federation of the Blind v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan MANU/DE/7042/2023; In re. Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481; Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission (2011) 1 SCC 150; Ravi Kumar v. Department of Space 316 (2025) DLT 531; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Rathod Anil v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8114; Satyendra Kumar v. UOI 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9529; Pragati Kesharwani v. Union of India 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7924; Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission MANU/SC/0633/2025; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services MANU/SC/1172/2024; Dr (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar (2019) 20 SCC 17;  Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC 576.

Summary & Brief Background

The Airport Authority of India (AAI) issued Advertisement 03/2023 inviting applications for multiple executive-level vacancies, which legally allocated reserved slots under "Category A" for candidates who are blind or experience low vision. The petitioner, Mudit Gupta, who is completely blind, applied for the post of Junior Executive (Law), passed the competitive Computer Based Test (CBT), and was provisionally selected. However, during the document verification stage, AAI withheld his selection to determine whether he satisfied the functional requirements of "Reading & Writing" and "Seeing" stipulated in the advertisement table.

AAI subjected him to a medical examination layout at VMMC & Safdarjung Hospital, which certified that he could not clinically perform functions by "seeing". Invoking Note 8 of the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPWD) Notification dated January 4, 2021, AAI cancelled his candidature on the grounds of functional unsuitability. Identical cancellations occurred for Amit Kumar (aspiring to Junior Executive - Common Cadre) and Deepak Arora (aspiring to Junior Executive - Finance). The aggrieved petitioners filed a batch of writ petitions seeking to quash the cancellations and challenge the constitutional validity of Note 8.

Core Arguments & Institutional Contradiction

a) The Clinical Ocular Defense: AAI maintained that every administrative post carries essential functional demands. They argued that since "seeing" was explicitly recorded as a foundational requirement, and a specialized medical board certified that the blind candidates could not physically see, the organization was fully justified in disqualifying them. AAI further contended that because the petitioners participated in the selection process with full knowledge of these functional filters, they were legally estopped from challenging the conditions after failing to receive a final appointment.

b) The Structural Reservation Contradiction: The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocate S.K. Rungta (who is himself blind), exposed a major systemic contradiction. They pointed out that the statutory Expert Committee, acting under Section 33 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act), had already reviewed these positions and explicitly identified them as suitable for blind individuals. Therefore, the statutory body had already determined that the functional duties of the office could be successfully handled by a blind officer. To deploy a cold medical exam to exclude a candidate based on the exact impairment for which the slot was reserved creates an absurd, self-defeating layout that nullifies legislative reservations. Strikingly, the Union of India itself supported the petitioners, noting that AAI had entirely misconstrued Note 8 to convert it into a tool of medical exclusion.

Key Issues Addressed

1. Whether an appointing establishment can legally utilize a clinical or medical examination to override statutory identification and disqualify a candidate based on a disability for which the post was explicitly reserved.
2. How the functional requirement of "seeing" must be interpreted within the protective, rights-based regime of the RPwD Act, 2016.
3. Whether the principle of estoppel strips a disabled candidate of their locus to contest discriminatory misconstructions of recruitment guidelines if they participated in the selection process.

Observations & Findings of the Court

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court partly allowed the writ petitions, providing a landmark ruling on inclusive equality and the biological nature of human perception:

• The Cognitive Nature of Sight (Brain vs. Eye): In an extraordinary neuro-legal analysis, the Court dismantled the narrow definition of sight, differentiating between biological ocular functions and real conceptual perception:

"The eye is a sense organ. It processes no power of cognition or discernment. It merely fulfils the function of recording of an image which is before it... The recorded image is then transmitted, through electrical signals, to the brain, via the optic nerve. The function of interpreting and understanding the image that was recorded on the retina is performed by the brain. The power of cognition, discernment and understanding, therefore, vests in the brain, not in the eye. Expressed otherwise, the function of sight, which we otherwise attribute to the eye, is in fact largely performed by the brain." The Court held that if a blind professional is capable of understanding, processing, and navigating legal or financial records through digital assistive frameworks, they legally fulfil the functional attribute of "seeing".

• Repudiation of the Medicalized Model: Drawing heavily from the Apex Court's ruling in In re. Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court observed that assessing a candidate’s functional capacity through clinical metrics completely violates the social model of disability:

"...the principle of reasonable accommodation is a concept that not only relates to affording equal opportunity to the persons with disabilities but also it goes further as to ensuring the dignity of the individual by driving home the message that the assessment of a person's suitability, capacity and capability is not to be tested and measured by medical or clinical assessment of the same but must be assessed after providing reasonable accommodation and an enabling atmosphere."

• The Mandate for Reasonable Accommodation: The Court emphasized that both the DEPWD working remarks and Note 1 explicitly demand that suitability must be evaluated alongside assistive technologies, digital reading software, and customized adaptations. Dismissing a candidate without providing these accommodations is an act of indirect discrimination that forces substantive inequality.
• No Estoppel Against Sacrosanct Rights: Invoking Dr (Major) Meeta Sahai, the Court firmly threw out AAI’s estoppel defense, ruling that participating in a process means accepting standard procedure, not condoning structural illegality:

"In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it... There can be no estoppel against enforcement of such rights. They are sacrosanct, and part of our constitutional ethos."

• Note 8 Upheld under Rights-Based Parameters: The Court refused to strike down Note 8 of the DEPWD Notification, clarifying that when properly read, it simply tasks establishments with verifying certificates and assessing candidate requirements in an enabling framework, rather than acting as a gateway for medical exclusion.

Directions Issued

To enforce structural compliance and secure integration, the High Court issued the following mandatory directions:

• The administrative rejections quashing the candidatures of Mudit Gupta, Amit Kumar, and Deepak Arora were set aside.
• The respondents are directed to conduct a comprehensive non-medical, rights-based re-assessment of the petitioners' functional capabilities within two weeks from the date of the judgment.
• This assessment layout must strictly utilize assistive devices, specialized software, and an enabling atmosphere as mandated by current disability jurisprudence.
• Petitioners who are evaluated as suitable must be extended formal letters of appointment within four weeks of the re-assessment.
• Upon selection, the petitioners will receive notional appointments matching their original batchmates, carrying full continuity of service and all associated seniority benefits, except back wages.

Legal Disclaimer: The summaries provided on this platform are for informational and academic purposes, aimed at increasing awareness of disability legislation and rights across Indian jurisprudence.

Read the Judgement in Mudit Gupta Vs. AAI dt 16 Oct 2025

Variance of High Magnitude in Disability Percentage : Delhi HC Orders Composite Medical Board for PwBD Candidate in Shubham Agarwal v. UOI

Civil Services - Disability Quota- Formation of Independent Expert Medical Board in case of conflicting opinions 

Court: High Court of Delhi

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Madhu Jain

Case No.: W.P.(C) 13162/2025 & CM APPL. 53924/2025

Case Title: Shubham Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors

Date of Decision: October 6, 2025

Citation: 2025:DHC:8847-DB

Cases Referred: Department of Personnel and Training v. Kore Nihal Pramod (Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 17995/2025).

Summary & Brief Background

The petitioner participated in the Civil Services Examination 2024 under the Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD) category, claiming a permanent hearing impairment exceeding the 40% benchmark. He successfully cleared the examination, securing an All India Rank of 1001. On May 27, 2025, he underwent an initial mandatory medical examination at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), where a medical report dated May 30, 2025, declared him unfit for appointment after measuring his disability at a mere 1%.

Aggrieved by this assessment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the statutory Appellate Disability Medical Board constituted at the Army Hospital (Research & Referral), Delhi. The Appellate Board subjected him to an exhaustive clinical examination between July 3, 2025, and July 11, 2025, ultimately determining that he suffered from a 67.84% hearing disability.

Instead of acting upon the Appellate Board's findings, the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) issued an email directive on August 5, 2025, ordering the petitioner to report to Smt. Sucheta Kriplani Hospital (SSKH), Lady Hardinge Medical College, for a third medical evaluation. The petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, under O.A. No. 3093/2025 to challenge the validity of this additional check. On August 21, 2025, the Tribunal directed the petitioner to comply with the third medical review, while provisionally permitting him to join the training program in the interim. Seeking relief from the directive forcing a third medical test, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court.

Core Arguments & Institutional Contradiction

• The Finality of Appellate Checks: The petitioner contended that under the established Civil Services Examination Rules, the assessment rendered by the statutory Appellate Disability Medical Board is final and binding. He argued that the state cannot systematically override the definitive findings of specialized appellate boards to demand endless cycles of examination based on administrative whims. Furthermore, the petitioner distinguished his case from the Supreme Court precedent in Kore Nihal Pramod, explaining that the Apex Court had ordered a neutral panel only because of a direct contradiction where an appellate board had declared a candidate unfit but a subsequent High Court-ordered evaluation declared them fit.

• The Variance of High Magnitude: The respondents defended the third test order by exposing a massive contradiction between the two state-run medical evaluations. They highlighted that the initial AIIMS board recorded a negligible 1% impairment layout, while the Army Hospital (R&R) panel calculated a severe 67.84% hearing disability. The state argued that this massive mathematical variance rendered a clarifying, independent third assessment essential to make a final recruitment decision.

Key Issues Addressed

• Whether an appointing authority can legally subject a PwBD candidate to a third medical examination when there is a massive conflict between the initial medical board and the statutory appellate board.
• What legal weight and finality must be ascribed to an Appellate Disability Medical Board's report when its findings conflict extensively with initial assessments.

Observations & Findings of the Court

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition, moulding the relief to balance the structural rules of recruitment with fair medical verification:

• The Reality of a Significant Disparity: The Court recognized that while an Appellate Medical Board's findings are structurally designed to act as final and non-challengeable under standard conditions, the specific numerical indices in this case revealed a stark institutional anomaly.

• Validation of the Magnitude: The Bench observed that the conflict did not represent a routine, minor variation in medical interpretation, but rather a structural contradiction of exceptional proportions:

  "It is not a matter of just difference in medical opinion, but a difference of opinion of a high magnitude."

• Contextualizing Prior Assessments: The Court noted that earlier medical certificates submitted by the petitioner had independently pegged his permanent hearing disability at 40% and 44%. This made the initial AIIMS finding of 1% and the subsequent appellate finding of 67.84% highly inconsistent, justifying an independent tie-breaker review layout.

• The Balanced Apex Court Model Adopted: Rather than permitting the DoPT to unilaterally select a single local hospital for the third evaluation, the High Court invoked the equitable process mapped out by the Supreme Court in Kore Nihal Pramod. The Bench held that the evaluation must be performed by a jointly constituted, high-level composite independent board to ensure strict transparency.

Directions Issued

To resolve the impasse and eliminate institutional biases, the High Court issued the following time-bound operational directions:

• The petitioner’s third medical evaluation layout was modified. The Court ordered the constitution of a fresh, specialized three-member Expert Medical Board specifically tracking hearing disabilities.

• The Board will consist of three independent experts: one doctor nominated by the Director of AIIMS, one nominated by the Director General of the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS), and one nominated by the Chief of the Army Research and Referral Hospital, New Delhi.

• To preserve absolute neutrality, the Court directed that the respective medical chiefs must not nominate any individual doctors who have previously examined the petitioner in the earlier rounds.

• The respective institutions are requested to formally constitute the specialized board within two weeks, and the Board must deliver its final binding opinion regarding eligibility within one week of conducting the examination.

• Clarification on Training Guidelines: The Bench noted the petitioner's complaint that the state had failed to comply with CAT’s interim order allowing him to join the training program. The High Court clarified that its own ad-interim order passed on August 28, 2025, had strictly stayed only the third medical test directive, meaning the remaining parts of the Tribunal's training guidelines remained fully operational and subject to active enforcement before the CAT.

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Read the Judgement in Shubham Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors