Bipolar Disorder Without Benchmark Disability Not Enough to Invoke Transfer Protection: says Delhi High Court

Court: High Court of Delhi
Bench: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Amit Mahajan
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3022/2026
Case Title: Ms. Shalu Pruthi v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr.
Date of Judgment: 25.03.2026

In a decision that sits at the intersection of service law and disability rights, the Delhi High Court has declined to interfere with the transfer of a Kendriya Vidyalaya teacher who invoked Bipolar Affective Disorder as a ground for retention at a preferred station.

The Court upheld the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, finding no infirmity in the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan’s (KVS) decision to transfer the petitioner from Delhi to Babugarh Cantt. in the Agra region.

Background and Facts

The petitioner, a Primary Teacher appointed in 2009, had been serving in Delhi for over a decade. Her transfer traces back to the 2022 rationalisation exercise within KVS, which later became the subject matter of litigation culminating in proceedings before the Supreme Court.

Pursuant to directions issued therein, teachers were invited to indicate preferred stations. The petitioner opted for Faridabad, Ghaziabad, and Noida. However, owing to non-availability of vacancies, she was posted to Babugarh Cantt., approximately 90 km from her first preference.

Challenging this, she relied primarily on her long-standing diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder, contending that:

• she required continuous psychiatric care,
• family support was essential for stability, and
• the authorities failed to extend reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Tribunal’s View

The Tribunal had rejected her plea, holding that her case did not fall within the “Medical Disability Ground” (MDG) category under the KVS Transfer Policy dated 30.06.2023.

This policy recognises limited categories, including specified illnesses and “any other disease with more than 50% mental disability.”

High Court’s Findings

The High Court’s reasoning proceeds along three distinct lines:

1. Transfer is an Incident of Service

Reiterating settled service jurisprudence, the Court emphasised that:

• an employee cannot claim posting at a particular place as a matter of right,
• judicial review in transfer matters is narrow, confined to mala fides or statutory violation.

The Court relied on established precedents such as S.L. Abbas, S.C. Saxena, and Shilpi Bose, which consistently hold that administrative discretion in transfers must be respected unless clearly arbitrary.

2. Absence of Benchmark Disability Was Decisive

The core issue turned on whether the petitioner could bring herself within the protective framework of either:

• the KVS transfer policy, or
• the disability law regime.

The Court noted that while medical documents showed ongoing treatment, there was no certification indicating benchmark disability (i.e., the statutory threshold of 40% or more under the RPwD Act, and 50% mental disability under the policy).

This evidentiary gap proved fatal. The Court accepted the employer’s view that without such certification, the case could not be treated under the MDG category.

3. Reasonable Accommodation Cannot Be Claimed in the Abstract

The petitioner relied on Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India and Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan, both of which strongly affirm the principle of reasonable accommodation. 

However, the Court distinguished these precedents on facts.

Case Analysis: The “Benchmark” Barrier—Why the Delhi HC’s Ruling on Bipolar Disorder Fails the Mental Health Test

In a decision that highlights the cold friction between administrative policy and the fluid reality of mental health, the Delhi High Court upheld the transfer of a teacher struggling with Bipolar Affective Disorder. While this judgment aligns with rigid service law, it leaves a glaring void in the progressive interpretation of disability rights.

For the disability rights community, this isn't just about a transfer—it’s about the "quantification of suffering" and the invisible walls built by bureaucratic benchmarks. 

The Outcome: A "Mechanical" Dismissal

The Petitioner, Shalu Pruthi, has served as a Primary Teacher with the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) since February 2009. Having served in Delhi for over 12 years, she was caught in a rationalization exercise and transferred from Delhi to Babugarh Cantt., roughly 90 km from her preferred stations.

She challenged the move, citing a decade-long battle with Bipolar Affective Disorder that requires consistent psychiatric care and essential family support for stability. She argued that the authorities failed to provide reasonable accommodation as mandated by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

The High Court dismissed the petition, leaning on two primary pillars:

• Transfer as an Incident of Service: An employee cannot claim a specific posting as a right, especially in a cadre with All India transfer liability.

• The Certification Gap: The KVS Transfer Policy (2023) recognizes medical grounds only for "specified illnesses" or "any other disease with more than 50% mental disability".

Deep Dive: Diverging from the Supreme Court

The Petitioner relied on two landmark Supreme Court rulings to argue for a sensitive, humane approach:

• Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India (2023): This case established that the Doctrine of Reasonable Accommodation is a fundamental component of equality. It mandates that the State adopt a sensitive approach to ensure administrative actions do not unfairly penalize employees for conditions beyond their control.
• Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan (2022): This ruling emphasized that disability rights must be interpreted in a purposive and rights-based manner, moving away from rigid or formalistic approaches.

Despite these powerful precedents, the High Court held that their application presupposes a "demonstrated legal entitlement". Because Pruthi’s medical records did not explicitly quantify her condition as 50% or more, the Court found no "benchmark disability" and refused to interfere.

Critique: Ignoring the Invisible Reality

This judgment exposes a harsh reality for those with mental health conditions: the quantification of suffering. By sticking strictly to the policy's percentages, the Court has signaled that "reasonable accommodation" has a high entry barrier—one that is fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation.

1. The Stigma of Certification

The Court noted an "evidentiary gap" because the petitioner lacked a formal certificate. However, this ignores the severe stigma attached to mental illness. Many users are reluctant to seek "Benchmark Disability" certificates due to the social "labeling" that follows. Furthermore, there is a chronic shortage of professionals to assess mental illness, and the process often requires repeated, exhausting hospital visits.

2. The 40% vs. 50% Inconsistency

The RPwD Act recognizes "benchmark disability" at 40%. Yet, the KVS policy demands a 50% threshold for mental disability. The Court did not question this discrepancy or consider how a more restrictive internal policy might dilute the spirit of national disability law.

3. A Missed Opportunity for Writ Jurisdiction

Under its writ jurisdiction (Article 226), the Court had the power to order an independent medical assessment to determine the degree of disability. Instead of bridging this evidentiary gap, the Court chose a mechanical approach, rejecting the petition on technical grounds alone.

The Bottom Line: Need-Based, Not Score-Based

Reasonable Accommodation is defined as the necessary and appropriate modifications to ensure persons with disabilities can exercise their rights equally with others. By its very nature, it is need-specific, not just percentage-specific.

Bipolar Disorder can be debilitating and requires environmental stability long before it hits a "50% disability" score on a bureaucratic chart. This ruling highlights the urgent need for more nuanced policy frameworks—so that the promise of reasonable accommodation does not remain narrowly confined to those with the "right" paperwork.

Read the judgement (PDF 578 KB)

Reliance on Outdated Disability Classification Cannot Defeat Right to Employment: Supreme Court Directs Appointment of Candidates with SLD and Mental Illness

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No(s). of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 43728/2025
Case Title: Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 12 March 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 232

In a significant ruling reinforcing the evolving framework of disability rights in public employment, the Supreme Court of India has held that candidates with benchmark disabilities such as Specific Learning Disability (SLD) and mental illness cannot be denied appointment on the basis of outdated identification lists of posts.

The judgment arose from a challenge to the denial of appointment to candidates who had successfully cleared the Combined Graduate Level Examination, 2018 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission for the post of Auditor in the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

Background

The dispute traces back to the recruitment process initiated in 2018. Candidates, including the appellant Sudhanshu Kardam and another candidate, Shri Amit Yadav, had qualified through all stages of the examination and were recommended for appointment under the Persons with Disabilities category.

However, their candidature was rejected by the CAG on the ground that the post of Auditor had not been identified as suitable for persons with mental illness or Specific Learning Disability, relying on the 2013 identification list.

Aggrieved, the candidates relied upon the Gazette Notification dated 4 January 2021 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which updated and expanded the list of identified posts to include these categories of disabilities.

Key Findings of the Court

The Supreme Court took note of the 2021 notification, which superseded the earlier 2013 list and expressly identified Group ‘C’ posts such as Assistant (Audit) and Auditor-II as suitable for persons with benchmark disabilities including mental illness and SLD.

Relying on the affidavit filed by the CAG, the Court recorded that there was no longer any legal or administrative barrier to accommodating the candidates in suitable posts.

Importantly, the Court rejected the continued reliance on outdated classification systems, implicitly affirming that administrative inertia cannot override statutory rights under the RPwD Act.

Directions Issued

The Court issued the following operative directions:

• The Staff Selection Commission was directed to forward the dossiers of the candidates to the CAG within two weeks.

• Upon receipt, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India must consider them for appointment to suitable Group ‘C’ posts.

• If the originally advertised vacancies from 2018 had already been filled, the authorities were directed to create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates.

• The appointments would take effect from the date of joining.

Significance

This ruling is important for several reasons:

1. Dynamic Interpretation of Disability Rights:
   The judgment underscores that identification of posts must reflect current statutory frameworks, particularly the expanded categories introduced under the RPwD Act, 2016.

2. Primacy of Updated Notifications:
   Authorities cannot rely on obsolete identification lists when a subsequent statutory notification has redefined suitability criteria.

3. Substantive Equality in Employment:
   By directing the creation of supernumerary posts, the Court ensured that procedural delays or administrative decisions do not deprive persons with disabilities of their rightful employment opportunities.

4. Recognition of Invisible Disabilities:
   The decision affirms the inclusion of less visible disabilities such as mental illness and Specific Learning Disability within mainstream public employment.

Commentary

The judgment is a clear message that the promise of reservation and inclusion under the RPwD Act cannot be diluted by outdated bureaucratic practices. It aligns with a rights-based approach where identification of posts is not a static exercise but one that must evolve with law and policy.

For disability rights jurisprudence, this decision strengthens the principle that eligibility once recognized by law must translate into actual access to employment, and that the State carries a positive obligation to remove institutional barriers—even if that requires creation of additional posts.

Read the Judgement (PDF 204 KB)

SC Strikes Down Arbitrary Disability Percentage Ceiling for Public Employment: Reaffirms Reasonable Accommodation under RPwD Act in Prabhu Kumar [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 868 of 2024
Case Title: Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others
Date of Judgment: 11 March 2026

In a judgment with far-reaching implications for disability-inclusive public employment in India, the Supreme Court of India has held that the State cannot impose arbitrary upper limits on disability percentages for reservation in public employment unless such restrictions are backed by objective functional assessment and the principles of reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

The judgment is a major reaffirmation of substantive equality and the doctrine of reasonable accommodation, and decisively rejects the long-standing administrative practice of mechanically excluding persons with higher disability percentages from employment opportunities.

Background of the Case

The appellant, Prabhu Kumar, a practising advocate with 90% permanent locomotor disability due to left shoulder disarticulation, had applied for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) in Himachal Pradesh pursuant to a 2018 recruitment advertisement.

The recruitment notification reserved two posts for persons with disabilities but imposed a condition that eligible candidates must have disability between 40% and 60% in one arm or one leg.

Despite successfully clearing the written examination and interview, and even topping among candidates selected under the disability category, the appellant was denied appointment solely because his disability exceeded the prescribed 60% ceiling.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed his challenge, following the earlier decision in V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

RPwD Act Creates a “Floor”, Not a “Ceiling”

The Supreme Court examined Sections 2(r) and 33 of the RPwD Act, 2016 and held that the law only prescribes a minimum threshold of 40% disability for benchmark disability status and does not permit the State to impose arbitrary upper limits.

In one of the most significant observations of the judgment, the Court held:

“The RPwD Act, 2016 defines the ‘floor’ for reservation eligibility but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary ‘ceiling’ that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they are otherwise capable of performing the functional requirements of the role through reasonable accommodation.”

The Court further observed that by fixing a 60% cap, the State had effectively rewritten the statutory definition of benchmark disability in a manner contrary to the object of the RPwD Act.

Reasonable Accommodation Is Central to Disability Rights

The Bench relied heavily upon the transformative ruling in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, which had questioned and weakened the earlier precedent in V. Surendra Mohan.

Reproducing extensive portions from Vikash Kumar, the Court reiterated that disability jurisprudence in India must be rooted in reasonable accommodation and not in stereotypical assumptions about capability.

The judgment quoted with approval the observation that:

“Reasonable accommodation is not a matter of charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of our Constitution.”

The Court emphasised that the relevant question is not whether accommodating a person with disability may create “avoidable complications”, but whether providing accommodation imposes a disproportionate or undue burden.

Disability Percentage Cannot Determine Capability

Rejecting the assumption that a higher disability percentage automatically implies inability to perform professional duties, the Court made a strong statement on functional competence:

“The percentage of disability, by itself, cannot be treated as determinative of a candidate’s capability or suitability for public employment.”

The Bench noted that the appellant had already demonstrated his competence by practising law successfully for nearly a decade and by securing the highest rank among disability category candidates.

Importantly, the Court held that suitability must be assessed through actual functional evaluation rather than abstract medical percentages.

Supreme Court Questions the Rationality of the 60% Ceiling

The Court expressed strong disapproval of the State’s inability to justify the 60% disability cap.

The Bench observed:

“We are at a loss to comprehend as to what could have been the rationale behind fixing this upper limit of disability…”

It further noted that the duties of an Assistant District Attorney primarily involve legal reasoning, advocacy, teaching, and advisory functions where locomotor disability in the arm could not reasonably be treated as an impediment.

The Supreme Court also highlighted that even the High Court had recorded serious doubts regarding the basis on which the State had fixed the disability ceiling and had found no evidence of consultation with experts or objective assessment.

Constitutional Equality and Substantive Inclusion

The Court held that the State’s action violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as well as the mandate of the RPwD Act.

The judgment is significant because it shifts the focus from medicalised exclusion to substantive equality and individualised assessment.

It reiterates that persons with disabilities cannot be denied opportunities merely because administrative authorities rely upon preconceived assumptions or arbitrary numerical restrictions unsupported by scientific or functional analysis.

Relief Granted

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed the State of Himachal Pradesh to appoint the appellant as Assistant District Attorney within two weeks.

The Court further directed that:

• the appointment would relate back to 19 September 2019 with all notional benefits;
• if the vacancy was unavailable, a supernumerary post must be created;
• the State must pay costs of ₹5 lakh to the appellant for the prolonged injustice suffered by him.

Commentary

This ruling is likely to become a foundational precedent in disability employment jurisprudence in India.

Across India, recruitment advertisements and institutional policies frequently prescribe rigid medical or disability-percentage restrictions without undertaking any evidence-based assessment of actual job requirements or possibilities of reasonable accommodation. This judgment makes it clear that such exclusions cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.

The decision also strengthens the evolving judicial trend seen in cases such as Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, Anmol v. Union of India, and Kabir Pahariya v. National Medical Commission, where the Supreme Court has consistently moved away from stereotype-based exclusion and towards individualised, evidence-based assessment of capabilities.

Most importantly, the judgment recognises that accessibility and reasonable accommodation are not concessions but enforceable constitutional entitlements essential to achieving genuine equality for persons with disabilities in public life.

Read the judgement in Prabhu Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh

Accessibility in Residential Complexes is a Fundamental Right: Allahabad High Court

Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Bench: Justice Siddharth Nandan and Justice Atul Sreedharan
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5663 of 2026
Case Title: M/s SCC Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Others
Date of Judgment: 26 February 2026

In a progressive ruling, the Allahabad High Court has reaffirmed that the right to accessibility is not limited to public infrastructure, but extends equally to residential complexes involving community living. This judgment strengthens the jurisprudence around disability rights by clearly situating accessibility within the framework of Article 21 (right to life and dignity) and Article 14 (equality) of the Constitution.

The Court emphasized that residential buildings with shared amenities—such as lifts, parking, pavements, playgrounds, community centres, and gyms—must be designed and maintained in a manner that ensures unhindered access for persons with disabilities (PwDs).

Background of the Case

The case arose from a dispute involving a homebuyer with 90% locomotor disability, who had been allotted a designated parking space in a residential project in Ghaziabad. Years later, the builder unilaterally divided the allotted parking space into two, allocating part of it to another buyer.

This alteration significantly affected the complainant’s ability to access the lift conveniently from the parking area, thereby undermining her independence and mobility within the residential complex.

Following a complaint, the authorities conducted a site inspection and found that the modification indeed created barriers. The State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities ruled in favour of the complainant. The builder challenged this decision before the High Court.

Key Findings of the Court

1. Accessibility as a Fundamental Right in Residential Spaces

The Court relied on established precedent, including State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma, to reiterate that accessibility is a fundamental right under Article 21. Importantly, it clarified that:

Accessibility is not confined to public spaces—it extends to “community living” environments, including private residential complexes.

This marks a crucial expansion in the interpretation of accessibility obligations in India.

2. Community Living Must Be Barrier-Free

Recognising the nature of modern urban housing, the Court held that common facilities in residential buildings must be fully accessible, including:

• Parking spaces

• Lifts

• Pathways and pavements

• Playgrounds

• Community centres

• Gymnasiums

Any obstruction or redesign that hampers access to these facilities—especially from critical points like parking to lifts—would amount to a violation of fundamental rights.

3. Builder’s Action Violated Accessibility Rights

The Court found that splitting the originally allotted parking space:

• Was done without the consent of the allottee

• Resulted in practical barriers to accessing the lift

• Could not be justified, especially given the complainant’s high support needs

The Court upheld the findings of the Commissioner and refused to interfere, noting that the proceedings were fair and based on admitted facts and inspection reports.

4. Mandatory Compliance Under the RPwD Act, 2016

Referring to Section 44 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the Court reiterated that:

• No building plan can be approved unless it complies with accessibility standards

• No completion certificate can be issued without such compliance

The Court underscored that accessibility must be ensured both at the planning stage and at the completion stage of construction.

Directions Issued by the Court

The High Court issued broader systemic directions to improve accessibility in residential developments:

• Development Authorities in Uttar Pradesh must frame and incorporate guidelines ensuring accessibility in housing projects

• Building plans for community living must include:

  • Dedicated accessible parking spaces

  • Barrier-free access to lifts and other common facilities

• The State must ensure strict enforcement of accessibility norms at:

  • The stage of granting building permission

  • The stage of issuing completion certificates

Significance of the Judgment

This decision is particularly important for several reasons:

a. Expanding the Scope of Accessibility Law

The ruling firmly establishes that private residential developments are not outside the ambit of accessibility obligations, especially where shared infrastructure is involved.

b. Strengthening Everyday Rights

By focusing on something as routine as parking-to-lift access, the Court highlights how accessibility is central to independent living and dignity, not merely a technical compliance issue.

c. Reinforcing Accountability of Builders and Authorities

The judgment sends a clear message that post-allotment alterations affecting accessibility will not be tolerated, and that authorities must actively ensure compliance.

d. Aligning with International Obligations

The Court’s reasoning aligns with India’s commitments under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), particularly the principle of accessibility as a precondition for inclusion.

Commentary

This judgment is a welcome and necessary development in Indian disability jurisprudence. It bridges a long-standing gap between legal standards and lived realities, particularly in urban housing.

While accessibility norms often exist on paper, their enforcement in residential contexts has been weak. By recognizing accessibility in community living as a fundamental right, the Court has elevated the issue beyond mere regulatory compliance to a matter of constitutional importance.

Going forward, this ruling can serve as a strong precedent to challenge inaccessible housing designs, retrofitted barriers, and exclusionary urban planning practices across India.

This case is a reminder that accessibility is not an optional add-on—it is integral to equality, dignity, and the right to live independently.

Read the judgement here (PDF 424 KB)

Disability Pension Claims Must Not Be Rejected on Technical Grounds: Delhi High Court on Rights of Disabled Air Force Personnel

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
Case No.: W.P.(C) 2718/2026
Case Title: Union of India & Ors. v. HFO Murali Dhar Yadav
Date of Judgment: 26 February 2026

 

 Background

 The dispute before the Delhi High Court arose from an appeal filed by the Union of India challenging an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal granting disability pension to a former member of the Indian Air Force. The respondent, HFO Murali Dhar Yadav, had developed a medical condition during the course of his service and sought disability pension under the applicable service rules.

 

The claim, however, was rejected by the authorities on the basis of a medical board opinion that concluded the disability was not attributable to or aggravated by military service. The respondent approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, which examined the circumstances of the case and held that the denial of disability pension was not justified.

 

Aggrieved by this decision, the Union of India filed an appeal before the Delhi High Court, arguing that the Tribunal had incorrectly interfered with the medical board’s findings. The case therefore required the Court to examine the scope of judicial review over medical board determinations in disability pension matters.

 

Key Observations

 

The Delhi High Court emphasised that while medical board opinions are an important component of the disability pension framework, such findings cannot be treated as immune from judicial scrutiny. Courts retain the authority to examine whether disability claims have been evaluated fairly and in accordance with the governing legal principles.

 

The Court observed that disability pension schemes are intended to provide financial protection and dignity to service personnel who develop medical conditions during their service. As such, these provisions must be interpreted in a manner that advances their welfare-oriented objectives rather than undermining them through technical interpretations.

 

The Bench also noted that armed forces personnel often operate under strenuous and hazardous conditions that may contribute to the development or aggravation of medical conditions. In such circumstances, a narrow approach to attributability may unjustly deprive individuals of the benefits intended for their protection.

 

The Court therefore reaffirmed that disability pension provisions must be applied with due regard to the realities of military service and the broader principles of fairness that guide service jurisprudence.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Union of India.

• The order of the Armed Forces Tribunal granting disability pension to the respondent was upheld.

• Authorities were directed to release the disability pension and all consequential benefits to the respondent in accordance with the Tribunal’s order.

 

Commentary

 

The decision reflects the judiciary’s continued engagement with disputes concerning disability pension for members of the armed forces. Such cases frequently involve complex interactions between medical assessments, service rules and the broader objectives of welfare legislation.

 

While medical boards play a central role in determining disability claims, courts have repeatedly emphasised that their findings cannot be treated as final when they fail to adequately consider the circumstances of service personnel. Judicial oversight therefore serves as an important safeguard against decisions that may inadvertently deny legitimate entitlements.

 

By upholding the Tribunal’s decision in favour of the respondent, the Delhi High Court reinforced the principle that disability pension schemes must be interpreted in a manner that protects the welfare of service personnel. Technical objections or narrow interpretations should not be permitted to defeat the purpose of provisions designed to support individuals who suffer health complications during service.

 

More broadly, the judgment contributes to the evolving body of jurisprudence that recognises the need for a balanced approach in disability pension disputes—one that respects medical expertise while ensuring that the rights and dignity of service personnel remain at the centre of the decision-making process.

Read the Judgement [PDF 554 KB]

Delhi High Court Reinforces Accessibility Obligations in Higher Education: University of Delhi Directed to Ensure Inclusive Infrastructure at Campus Law Centre

Court: Delhi High Court

Bench: Justice Jasmeet Singh

Case No.: W.P.(C) 5390/2022

Case Title: Jayant Singh Raghav v. University of Delhi & Ors.

Date of Order : 25 February 2026

Background

In an important order concerning accessibility and inclusive higher education, the Delhi High Court issued directions to improve accessibility measures at the Campus Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi.

The petition was filed by Jayant Singh Raghav, then a student of the Campus Law Centre, seeking implementation of accessibility standards and reasonable accommodation for students with disabilities, particularly in view of the Open Book Examinations scheduled from April 2022.

The case raised wider concerns regarding the continued barriers faced by students with disabilities in accessing educational spaces, infrastructure, digital platforms and examination systems within universities.

The petitioner sought directions relating to:

• Provision of assistive devices and accommodations based on individual needs;
• Compliance with accessibility standards for buildings and infrastructure;
• Adherence to the “Guidelines for Indian Government Websites and Apps” issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology;
• Compliance with the “Harmonised Guidelines and Space Standards for Barrier-Free Built Environment for Persons with Disabilities and Elderly Persons”;
• Digital accessibility measures;
• Accessible examination-related infrastructure; and
• Institutional monitoring mechanisms for ensuring long-term accessibility compliance.

The petition therefore went beyond an individual grievance and sought systemic enforcement of accessibility obligations across educational institutions.

Recognising the significance of the issues raised, the Court appointed Kamal Gupta as Amicus Curiae. During the proceedings, inspections were conducted and technical recommendations were provided, including by Centre for Accessibility in Built Environment (CABE) Foundation.

Accessibility Measures Undertaken

During the pendency of the proceedings, several accessibility improvements were carried out within the Campus Law Centre premises, including:

• Construction of cement concrete accessible parking space;
• Installation of a new entrance gate with tactile pathways for visually impaired students;
• Accessible toilets with tactile accessibility features, handrails and grab bars;
• Accessible drinking water facilities connected through tactile pathways;
• Renovation of corridors using tactile tiles and Kota stone flooring to improve safe navigation;
• Tactile pathways leading to the auditorium and Law Centre-I building;
• Wooden ramps inside the Moot Court Room;
• Non-slippery ramps and additional accessibility measures within Law Centre-I.

The Court also took note of the University’s submission that a new building for the Campus Law Centre was proposed to be constructed and that the existing infrastructure may eventually be redeveloped.

Key Observations of the Court

The Delhi High Court recognised that accessibility in educational institutions is not merely an infrastructural issue but an essential component of equality, dignity and meaningful participation for persons with disabilities.

A particularly significant aspect of the order is the Court’s emphasis that accessibility must be integrated at the planning and design stage itself, rather than being treated as a post-construction adjustment.

The Court directed the University to consult the petitioner and the learned Amicus Curiae while planning and designing the new building so that the accessibility requirements of students with disabilities are fully incorporated into the proposed infrastructure.

The order also implicitly recognised the principles of universal design under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 by requiring accessibility considerations to become part of institutional planning from inception.

Importantly, the Court further directed that until the proposed infrastructure becomes operational, all accessibility facilities already installed must remain fully functional and accessible to students with disabilities.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court issued the following directions while disposing of the petition:

• The University must consider the suggestions of the petitioner and the Amicus Curiae while planning and constructing the new Campus Law Centre building.
• The proposed infrastructure must comply with accessibility requirements for persons with disabilities.
• Existing accessibility measures must remain functional and accessible until the new infrastructure is developed.
• The status report submitted by the Amicus Curiae regarding inspections and accessibility compliance was taken on record.

The Court also formally appreciated the assistance rendered by the Amicus Curiae during the proceedings.

Commentary

The decision in Jayant Singh Raghav v. University of Delhi & Ors. is an important addition to India’s evolving disability rights jurisprudence on accessibility and inclusive education.

One of the most significant features of the case is its recognition that accessibility extends beyond ramps and physical mobility. The proceedings addressed multiple dimensions of inclusion, including digital accessibility, assistive technology, examination accommodations, tactile infrastructure, accessible pathways and institutional compliance mechanisms.

The order is also important because it moves the discourse beyond retrofitting and temporary fixes. By directing consultation with accessibility experts and stakeholders during the planning stage of the new building, the Court reinforced that accessibility must be built into institutional infrastructure from the very beginning.

Equally significant is the participatory nature of the proceedings. The case demonstrates that persons with disabilities are not passive beneficiaries of welfare measures, but active stakeholders whose lived experiences are essential in shaping accessibility standards and institutional policies.

At the same time, the litigation highlights the continuing implementation gap within educational institutions despite clear statutory obligations under the RPwD Act and existing accessibility guidelines. The fact that students are still compelled to approach constitutional courts for basic accessibility measures reflects the persistent disconnect between legal guarantees and institutional practice.

Nevertheless, the order strongly reinforces that accessibility is not a matter of administrative convenience or institutional discretion. It is a legally enforceable right linked to equality, dignity and equal participation in education.

Read the Order [PDF 28 KB]

Disability Pension Cannot Be Restricted by Limitation: Supreme Court on Arrears for Disabled Veterans

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe
Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 6820–6824 of 2018
Case Title: Union of India v. SGT Girish Kumar & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 12 February 2026

Background

 

The appeals before the Supreme Court arose from a series of decisions delivered by the Armed Forces Tribunal concerning the payment of disability pension to former members of the armed forces. In several cases, the Tribunal had recognised the entitlement of disabled veterans to receive disability pension but restricted the payment of arrears to three years prior to the filing of the claim, relying on principles of limitation.

 

A number of ex-servicemen challenged this approach, arguing that disability pension is not a discretionary benefit but a statutory entitlement arising from injuries sustained during military service. They contended that restricting arrears undermined the purpose of the disability pension framework, particularly because many disabled veterans face serious health and financial challenges that delay their ability to initiate legal proceedings.

 

The Union of India defended the Tribunal’s approach, arguing that limitation principles were necessary to prevent stale claims and administrative uncertainty. The Supreme Court was therefore required to determine whether arrears of disability pension could be restricted through the mechanical application of limitation principles.

 

Key Observations

 

The Supreme Court emphasised that disability pension cannot be viewed as a matter of governmental charity or discretionary largesse. Instead, it forms part of the compensation structure attached to military service and is intended to recognise the sacrifices made by soldiers who acquire disabilities while serving the nation.

 

The Court observed that disability pension constitutes deferred compensation for injuries sustained in the course of service. As such, it is not merely a welfare benefit but a legal entitlement flowing from the terms of service and the broader constitutional commitment to dignity and social justice.

 

The Bench also recognised the practical realities faced by disabled veterans. Many former servicemen struggle with long-term medical conditions, financial hardship and bureaucratic hurdles when attempting to access their entitlements. Applying strict limitation rules in such circumstances could effectively deny them the benefits intended by the disability pension scheme.

 

Importantly, the Court clarified that disability pension is a recurring right, and each denial of pension gives rise to a continuing cause of action. As a result, restricting arrears solely on the basis of limitation principles would defeat the purpose of the pension framework.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Supreme Court held that arrears of disability pension cannot automatically be restricted to three years prior to the filing of a claim.

• The Court upheld the entitlement of the respondents to receive disability pension arrears from the date on which the entitlement arose.

• Appeals filed by the Union of India challenging the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal were dismissed.

• Authorities were directed to process similar disability pension claims in accordance with the principles clarified in the judgment.

 

Commentary

 

The judgment represents a significant development in the jurisprudence governing disability pension for members of the armed forces. By recognising disability pension as deferred compensation rather than governmental largesse, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the State bears a continuing obligation toward soldiers who acquire disabilities while serving the nation.

 

The decision is particularly important in light of the structural barriers that disabled veterans frequently encounter. Administrative complexity, delays in medical certification, and the challenges of navigating bureaucratic systems often prevent former servicemen from pursuing their claims promptly. A rigid application of limitation rules in such circumstances would effectively penalise individuals for the very disabilities that gave rise to their entitlements.

 

From a broader disability rights perspective, the judgment also reflects a growing judicial recognition that legal frameworks must account for the lived realities of persons with disabilities. Courts are increasingly willing to interpret procedural rules in a manner that advances substantive equality rather than perpetuating structural disadvantage.

 

By clarifying that disability pension is a continuing entitlement that cannot be curtailed through mechanical limitation rules, the Supreme Court has strengthened the legal protection available to disabled veterans and reinforced the constitutional commitment to dignity, fairness and social justice.

Read the judgement: Union of India v. SGT Girish Kumar & Ors. dated 12 Feb 2026 [PDF 258 KB]

Temporary Disability Certificates Cannot Automatically Defeat Appointment: Central Administrative Tribunal on Disability Reservation

Court: Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench, New Delhi)
Bench: Manish Garg (Member – Judicial) and Rajinder Kashyap (Member – Administrative)
Case No.: O.A. No. 666/2024
Case Title: Keshav v. Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 9 February 2026

Background

The case arose from a recruitment process conducted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi for the post of Junior Administrative Assistant reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities. The applicant, who had applied under the PwBD–Low Vision category, successfully cleared the recruitment examination and was provisionally selected for the post.

However, the authorities declined to issue the appointment letter on the ground that the disability certificate produced by the applicant described his disability as temporary and valid only up to a specified period, rather than as a permanent disability. The respondents argued that reservation under the PwBD category required a permanent disability certificate and therefore the applicant was not eligible to be appointed against the reserved post.

Challenging this decision, the applicant approached the Tribunal arguing that the rejection of his candidature was arbitrary and contrary to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. He contended that the disability certificate had been issued by a competent medical authority and clearly established the existence of benchmark disability exceeding the statutory threshold at the relevant time.

The dispute therefore raised an important question regarding the interpretation of disability certification requirements and whether administrative authorities could deny the benefit of reservation solely because a disability certificate described the disability as temporary.

Key Observations

The Bench emphasised that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 is a beneficial legislation intended to promote the inclusion of persons with disabilities in public employment. The Tribunal noted that the statute defines a person with benchmark disability primarily with reference to the extent of disability, rather than whether the disability is labelled permanent or temporary.

It was observed that the applicant possessed a disability certificate issued by a competent medical authority certifying 90% low vision disability, which clearly satisfied the statutory requirement of benchmark disability. The mere fact that the certificate was valid for a limited period did not negate the existence of disability during the relevant recruitment stage.

The Tribunal also noted that the definition of “person with disability” under the RPwD Act refers to long-term impairment that restricts participation in society. Administrative authorities must therefore avoid adopting an overly restrictive interpretation that defeats the beneficial purpose of the legislation.

Importantly, the Bench emphasised that denying appointment solely on the ground that a certificate is temporary would introduce unnecessary rigidity into the recruitment framework and undermine the objective of ensuring participation of persons with disabilities in public employment.

Directions Issued

• The Tribunal held that the rejection of the applicant’s candidature solely on the ground that his disability certificate was temporary was unsustainable.

• The respondents were directed to reconsider the applicant’s case for appointment under the PwBD category in accordance with the provisions of the RPwD Act.

• Authorities were instructed to ensure that disability certification issued by competent medical boards is assessed in a manner consistent with the objectives of disability rights legislation.

Commentary

The decision addresses an issue that frequently arises in disability-related recruitment disputes: the reliance by administrative authorities on technical interpretations of disability certification. While the RPwD Act establishes a statutory framework for identifying benchmark disability, inconsistencies in administrative practice often create barriers for candidates with disabilities.

Temporary disability certificates are sometimes issued where periodic reassessment of a medical condition is required. Treating such certificates as automatically disqualifying candidates from disability reservation would undermine the inclusive objectives of the legislation.

By emphasising that the existence of benchmark disability at the relevant time should be the primary consideration, the Tribunal reinforced the principle that disability rights legislation must be interpreted liberally in favour of inclusion.

More broadly, the decision highlights the need for recruitment authorities to apply disability reservation policies in a manner consistent with the rights-based approach embodied in the RPwD Act, ensuring that persons with disabilities are not excluded through overly technical administrative interpretations.

Read the judgement [PDF 8.7MB]