Temporary Disability Certificates Cannot Automatically Defeat Appointment: Central Administrative Tribunal on Disability Reservation

Court: Central Administrative Tribunal (Principal Bench, New Delhi)
Bench: Manish Garg (Member – Judicial) and Rajinder Kashyap (Member – Administrative)
Case No.: O.A. No. 666/2024
Case Title: Keshav v. Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 9 February 2026

Background

The case arose from a recruitment process conducted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi for the post of Junior Administrative Assistant reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities. The applicant, who had applied under the PwBD–Low Vision category, successfully cleared the recruitment examination and was provisionally selected for the post.

However, the authorities declined to issue the appointment letter on the ground that the disability certificate produced by the applicant described his disability as temporary and valid only up to a specified period, rather than as a permanent disability. The respondents argued that reservation under the PwBD category required a permanent disability certificate and therefore the applicant was not eligible to be appointed against the reserved post.

Challenging this decision, the applicant approached the Tribunal arguing that the rejection of his candidature was arbitrary and contrary to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. He contended that the disability certificate had been issued by a competent medical authority and clearly established the existence of benchmark disability exceeding the statutory threshold at the relevant time.

The dispute therefore raised an important question regarding the interpretation of disability certification requirements and whether administrative authorities could deny the benefit of reservation solely because a disability certificate described the disability as temporary.

Key Observations

The Bench emphasised that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 is a beneficial legislation intended to promote the inclusion of persons with disabilities in public employment. The Tribunal noted that the statute defines a person with benchmark disability primarily with reference to the extent of disability, rather than whether the disability is labelled permanent or temporary.

It was observed that the applicant possessed a disability certificate issued by a competent medical authority certifying 90% low vision disability, which clearly satisfied the statutory requirement of benchmark disability. The mere fact that the certificate was valid for a limited period did not negate the existence of disability during the relevant recruitment stage.

The Tribunal also noted that the definition of “person with disability” under the RPwD Act refers to long-term impairment that restricts participation in society. Administrative authorities must therefore avoid adopting an overly restrictive interpretation that defeats the beneficial purpose of the legislation.

Importantly, the Bench emphasised that denying appointment solely on the ground that a certificate is temporary would introduce unnecessary rigidity into the recruitment framework and undermine the objective of ensuring participation of persons with disabilities in public employment.

Directions Issued

• The Tribunal held that the rejection of the applicant’s candidature solely on the ground that his disability certificate was temporary was unsustainable.

• The respondents were directed to reconsider the applicant’s case for appointment under the PwBD category in accordance with the provisions of the RPwD Act.

• Authorities were instructed to ensure that disability certification issued by competent medical boards is assessed in a manner consistent with the objectives of disability rights legislation.

Commentary

The decision addresses an issue that frequently arises in disability-related recruitment disputes: the reliance by administrative authorities on technical interpretations of disability certification. While the RPwD Act establishes a statutory framework for identifying benchmark disability, inconsistencies in administrative practice often create barriers for candidates with disabilities.

Temporary disability certificates are sometimes issued where periodic reassessment of a medical condition is required. Treating such certificates as automatically disqualifying candidates from disability reservation would undermine the inclusive objectives of the legislation.

By emphasising that the existence of benchmark disability at the relevant time should be the primary consideration, the Tribunal reinforced the principle that disability rights legislation must be interpreted liberally in favour of inclusion.

More broadly, the decision highlights the need for recruitment authorities to apply disability reservation policies in a manner consistent with the rights-based approach embodied in the RPwD Act, ensuring that persons with disabilities are not excluded through overly technical administrative interpretations.

Read the judgement [PDF 8.7MB]

Disability Reservation Cannot Be Rendered Illusory: Patna High Court on Implementation of Quota in State Services

Court: Patna High Court
Bench: Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay
Case No.: CWJC 1373 of 2025
Case Title: Rajeev Ranjan & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 6 February 2026

 

Background

The petition before the Patna High Court arose from concerns regarding the implementation of reservation for persons with disabilities in recruitment to state government services in Bihar. The petitioner, a candidate with benchmark disability, challenged the recruitment process conducted by the State authorities on the ground that the disability reservation mandated under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 had not been properly implemented.

 

According to the petitioner, although certain posts were formally earmarked for persons with disabilities, the manner in which the recruitment process was conducted effectively prevented candidates from benefiting from the reservation policy. In particular, the petitioner argued that the State had failed to properly identify posts suitable for persons with disabilities and had not ensured that the statutory quota was meaningfully implemented.

 

The State authorities contended that the recruitment process had been conducted in accordance with existing service rules and administrative procedures. They argued that the reservation policy had been applied within the framework of the recruitment rules governing the relevant service.

 

The dispute therefore raised an important question regarding whether the mere formal existence of a disability quota satisfies the requirements of the RPwD Act, or whether authorities must take proactive steps to ensure that the reservation framework operates effectively in practice.

Key Observations

The Patna High Court emphasised that the reservation framework established under the RPwD Act is intended to ensure meaningful participation of persons with disabilities in public employment. Simply declaring a certain percentage of posts as reserved for persons with disabilities does not fulfil the statutory obligation if the recruitment process is designed in a manner that prevents those posts from being filled.

 

Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay observed that the identification of suitable posts is a critical component of the disability reservation framework. Public authorities must undertake a careful assessment of the functions attached to each post and determine whether appropriate accommodations can enable persons with disabilities to perform those functions effectively.

 

The Court also noted that the RPwD Act represents a shift from a welfare-oriented approach toward a rights-based framework grounded in equality and inclusion. State authorities are therefore under a positive obligation to ensure that recruitment systems are structured in a way that enables the participation of persons with disabilities.

Importantly, the Court cautioned that failure to properly implement disability reservation policies could render the statutory guarantee meaningless and defeat the objectives of the legislation.

Directions Issued

• The Court directed the State authorities to review the implementation of disability reservation in the recruitment process in question.
• The authorities were instructed to ensure that posts reserved for persons with disabilities are properly identified and filled in accordance with the provisions of the RPwD Act.
• The State was directed to take appropriate steps to ensure that recruitment procedures facilitate the effective participation of candidates with disabilities.

 

Commentary

The judgment highlights a recurring challenge in the implementation of disability reservation policies in India: the gap between formal reservation provisions and their practical enforcement. While the RPwD Act mandates reservation in public employment, the effectiveness of this framework depends heavily on the manner in which recruitment processes are designed and administered.

One of the most significant obstacles faced by candidates with disabilities is the failure of authorities to properly identify posts suitable for persons with disabilities. Without such identification, reserved posts may remain vacant or may be effectively inaccessible due to the structure of recruitment procedures.

 

By emphasising that disability reservation must translate into real employment opportunities rather than symbolic compliance, the Patna High Court reaffirmed the transformative objectives of the RPwD Act. The decision underscores that equality for persons with disabilities requires active institutional commitment rather than passive adherence to statutory quotas.

More broadly, the ruling contributes to the evolving jurisprudence on disability rights by highlighting the importance of systemic implementation. The effectiveness of disability legislation ultimately depends not only on the text of the law but also on the willingness of public authorities to design inclusive administrative processes that remove barriers to participation.

Read the judgement [PDF 249 KB]

Inclusive Medical Education Requires Accommodation: Delhi High Court on Rights of Disabled Students

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Prathiba M. Singh
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1712/2025
Case Title: Sahil Arsh v. National Medical Commission & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 4 February 2026

 

Background

 

The petition before the Delhi High Court was filed by a medical student with a disability who challenged certain regulatory restrictions imposed by the National Medical Commission (NMC) that limited the ability of persons with disabilities to pursue medical education. The petitioner contended that the eligibility criteria and institutional practices adopted by medical authorities did not adequately account for the needs of students with disabilities.

 

According to the petitioner, despite the statutory protections provided under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several medical institutions continued to apply rigid eligibility requirements that effectively excluded candidates with disabilities from pursuing medical education or completing their training on equal terms. The petitioner argued that such practices were inconsistent with the principle of reasonable accommodation mandated by the RPwD Act.

 

The matter therefore raised an important question regarding the obligations of regulatory bodies governing professional education. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether professional standards could be interpreted in a manner that excluded persons with disabilities or whether institutions must adapt their systems to ensure inclusive participation.

 

Key Observations

 

The Delhi High Court emphasised that professional education, including medical education, must be governed by the principles of equality, accessibility and reasonable accommodation recognised under the RPwD Act. The Court observed that regulatory bodies cannot frame or enforce rules that have the effect of systematically excluding persons with disabilities from professional courses.

 

Justice Prathiba M. Singh noted that the purpose of disability legislation is to ensure that educational institutions adopt inclusive practices that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively. This includes not only physical accessibility but also modifications in academic procedures, evaluation systems and institutional support mechanisms.

 

The Court further observed that professional competence should not be assessed through rigid assumptions about disability. Instead, institutions must examine whether reasonable accommodations and assistive technologies can enable students with disabilities to perform the essential functions required in the profession.

 

Importantly, the Court emphasised that regulatory frameworks governing medical education must be interpreted in a manner that advances the objective of inclusion rather than reinforcing outdated perceptions about the capabilities of persons with disabilities.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Court directed the National Medical Commission to reconsider the petitioner’s case in light of the principles of reasonable accommodation under the RPwD Act.

• Authorities were instructed to ensure that regulatory guidelines governing medical education are consistent with the statutory rights of persons with disabilities.

• The Court emphasised that institutions must adopt inclusive policies that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively in professional education.

 

Commentary

 

The judgment represents an important development in the evolving discourse on disability rights in professional education. Historically, certain professions—including medicine—have been governed by rigid eligibility criteria that often excluded persons with disabilities based on assumptions about their abilities.

 

However, contemporary disability rights law recognises that such exclusion frequently reflects institutional barriers rather than inherent limitations. Advances in assistive technologies, adaptive learning systems and inclusive teaching methods have significantly expanded the possibilities for persons with disabilities to participate in professional fields.

 

By emphasising the obligation of regulatory bodies to incorporate reasonable accommodation into professional education frameworks, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed the transformative vision underlying the RPwD Act. The statute seeks not merely to remove formal barriers but to reshape institutional practices so that diversity becomes a normal and expected feature of educational environments.

 

The decision also signals a broader shift in judicial thinking. Rather than treating disability as a ground for exclusion from demanding professions, courts increasingly recognise that institutions must adapt their structures to accommodate diverse forms of participation. In doing so, the judgment contributes to the development of a more inclusive model of professional education in India.

Read the judgement [PDF 560KB]

Menstrual Dignity is a Fundamental Right: Supreme Court on MHM in Schools

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1000 of 2022
Case Title: Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors. [PDF 786 KB]
Date of Judgment: 30 January 2026

Background

The petition, filed by Dr. Jaya Thakur, brought to the fore a persistent but under-acknowledged barrier to girls’ education — the absence of menstrual hygiene management (MHM) facilities in schools. The petitioner pointed out that lack of access to sanitary products, private functional toilets, water, and safe disposal mechanisms was leading to absenteeism and, in many cases, girls quietly dropping out of school.

The plea invited the Court to view menstrual health not merely as a matter of policy preference but as a question of constitutional rights.

Key Observations

The Supreme Court located menstrual health squarely within the guarantees of life, dignity, equality, privacy and education. The Bench emphasised that dignity must be experienced in everyday conditions and not remain a constitutional slogan. For menstruating students, the absence of facilities often translates into stigma, embarrassment, and exclusion.

The Court recognised that “period poverty” directly undermines equal access to education. Compelling a girl to miss school or manage menstruation in unsafe ways was held to be a violation of bodily autonomy and privacy. The judgment also noted that autonomy is meaningful only when supported by enabling conditions — functional toilets, water, menstrual products, and hygienic disposal.

Importantly, the Court acknowledged the social dimension of menstruation. It underlined the need to sensitise male teachers and students to normalise conversations around menstruation and prevent harassment or intrusive questioning.

Directions Issued

Through a continuing mandamus, the Court directed States and Union Territories to:

• Provide functional, gender-segregated toilets in all schools, government and private, in both rural and urban areas.

• Ensure toilets are hygienic, have water supply, and safeguard privacy.

• Make oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins available free of cost, preferably through vending machines located within toilet premises.

• Set up designated MHM corners with emergency supplies such as spare uniforms, innerwear and disposal bags.

• Install safe and environmentally compliant disposal systems, including covered bins or incinerators.

• Educate and sensitise male staff and students about menstruation.

The Court also linked compliance to the Right to Education Act. Government schools failing to meet Section 19 norms may invite accountability, while private schools risk de-recognition for non-compliance.

Commentary

This judgment is significant for reframing menstrual health from a welfare measure to a rights-based entitlement. By rooting MHM in Articles 14 and 21, the Court has made the issue justiciable and enforceable.

For the disability rights community, the ruling carries an added layer of importance. The Court’s insistence on privacy, functional infrastructure, and barrier-free access implicitly includes girls with disabilities, who often face compounded exclusion. Accessible toilets, water availability, and dignified spaces are not optional extras but constitutional necessities.

The decision also signals a broader judicial trend: recognising that exclusion in education often happens through design failures and social silence rather than formal denial. Addressing menstruation with candour and constitutional seriousness is a step toward substantive equality in schools. In effect, the Court has said what many girls already knew from lived experience — education cannot be equal if dignity is conditional.

While the judgment speaks in the language of all menstruating students, its implications are particularly profound for girls with disabilities — a group whose experiences around menstruation are rarely centred in policy or law. For many girls with disabilities, menstruation is not only a matter of hygiene but also of accessibility, support, and autonomy.

Girls with locomotor disabilities often encounter toilets that are technically “separate” but not usable — narrow doors, high thresholds, inaccessible taps, or disposal units placed beyond reach. For girls with visual disabilities, poorly designed facilities without tactile cues or consistent layouts can make independent menstrual management difficult. Girls with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities frequently face over-medicalisation, stigma, or denial of information about their own bodies. In some instances, families and institutions resort to restrictive practices out of fear or lack of support systems.

Against this backdrop, the Court’s insistence on dignity, privacy, and enabling conditions becomes highly relevant. When the Bench states that autonomy can only be exercised where infrastructure and resources exist, it indirectly affirms what disability rights advocates have long argued — that bodily autonomy is inseparable from accessible environments.

The reference to barrier-free access under the RTE norms is particularly important. If implemented in its true spirit, this could mean toilets that are accessible, safe, and usable for girls with diverse disabilities. MHM corners, if thoughtfully designed, could include accessible storage, clear signage, and support materials in multiple formats. Sensitisation of teachers and students can also reduce the infantilisation and silence that many girls with disabilities face around menstruation.

This ruling therefore opens a door. It allows future advocacy to explicitly demand disability-inclusive menstrual health frameworks within schools. The judgment may not detail these dimensions, but its rights-based reasoning readily accommodates them.

Menstrual dignity, for girls with disabilities, is not a peripheral concern. It sits at the intersection of education, health, accessibility, and gender justice. The real test now lies in whether implementation will recognise this intersectionality. If it does, the judgment could quietly become a turning point for some of the most marginalised students in the school system.

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Substantive Equality over Technicalities- SC Grants Relief to Woman with Benchmark Disability saying Reasonable Accommodation is a Fundamental Right [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026

Case Title: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors.  [PDF 289 KB]

Date of Judgment: 13 January 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 53

Cases Referred: Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India (2024 INSC 775); Anmol v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 387); Om Rathod v. DGHS (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130); Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592); Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC; Avni Prakash v. NTA; Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625; Jane Kaushik v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257)

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Brief 

In a significant judgment reinforcing the centrality of reasonable accommodation and substantive equality in public employment, the Supreme Court in Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited held that technicalities such as expiry of a recruitment panel cannot defeat the fundamental and statutory rights of persons with disabilities (PwDs). The Court directed Coal India Limited (CIL) to appoint the appellant, a woman with benchmark disability, by creating a supernumerary post and ensuring a suitable, accessible desk job with assistive infrastructure. 

Background

Coal India Limited had issued a recruitment notification in 2019 for Management Trainees. Sujata Bora applied under the visually disabled category, qualified for interview, and was later called for document verification and an Initial Medical Examination (IME) in 2021. She was declared medically unfit on the ground of visual disability coupled with residual partial hemiparesis.

Challenging this, she approached the Calcutta High Court. The Single Judge quashed the IME result and held that CIL could not deny appointment in the multiple disabilities category, but limited relief by directing consideration in the subsequent recruitment cycle since the earlier process had concluded. The Division Bench, however, set aside even this relief, primarily on the ground that the panel had expired.

Before the Supreme Court, detailed medical assessment was ordered through an AIIMS medical board. The final report assessed her disability at 57%, above the 40% benchmark threshold, making her eligible under the RPwD Act. The Court also interacted with the appellant and noted her determination and capability. 

Key Directions

The Supreme Court:

• Set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court.

• Held that the appellant had been wrongly denied employment through no fault of her own.

• Directed creation of a supernumerary post for her appointment.

• Requested that she be given a suitable desk job, with a separate computer and keyboard consistent with universal design under the RPwD Act.

• Requested posting at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam.

• Exercised powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. 

Reasonable Accommodation as a “Gateway Right”

One of the most important contributions of this judgment is its strong articulation of reasonable accommodation. The Court reaffirmed that:

• Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right.

• It is a gateway right enabling PwDs to enjoy all other rights.

• Denial of reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination and undermines substantive equality.

The Court rejected a narrow view of accommodation limited to devices or physical aids, instead endorsing a broad, purposive interpretation aligned with dignity, autonomy, and participation.

Intersectionality: Gender and Disability

The Court expressly recognised intersectional discrimination, noting that the appellant was a single woman with disability striving to overcome compounded barriers. It held that equality analysis cannot be unidimensional where multiple axes of disadvantage operate together. This acknowledgment strengthens the evolving Indian jurisprudence on intersectionality in disability rights.

Directive Principles and the Right to Work

Linking disability rights with constitutional philosophy, the Court invoked Articles 14, 21, 39(a), and 41, reiterating that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are “two wheels of a chariot.” The right to livelihood and work was treated as integral to a meaningful life.

Corporate Responsibility and Disability

Notably, the judgment situates disability inclusion within Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and ESG frameworks, referencing UN Guiding Principles and ILO materials. It emphasises that disability rights are human rights and must be addressed from a non-discrimination perspective, not merely as diversity optics. 

Significance

This ruling is a landmark for several reasons:

1. Panel expiry cannot defeat disability rights where injustice is evident.

2. Reasonable accommodation is firmly embedded as a fundamental right.

3. Supernumerary posts are validated as a remedy in appropriate cases.

4. Intersectionality receives explicit judicial recognition.

5. Public sector employers are reminded that exclusion at the threshold, without exploring accommodations, is unlawful.

The Court’s opening line—“Lack of physical sight does not equate to a lack of vision”—aptly captures the spirit of the decision. The judgment sends a clear message: disability rights are not charity, nor mere policy preferences; they are enforceable legal and constitutional guarantees.

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Disability Rights Extend to Public Sector Employment: Supreme Court on Reasonable Accommodation for Workers with Disabilities

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026
Case Title: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd. & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 13 January 2026

 

Background

 

The case arose from a dispute concerning the employment rights of a worker who had acquired a disability during the course of her service with Coal India Limited, a public sector undertaking. The petitioner contended that after acquiring a disability, she was denied meaningful reasonable accommodation in the workplace and faced administrative actions that effectively undermined her continued employment.

 

She argued that the actions of the employer violated the statutory protections provided under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, particularly the obligation of employers to provide reasonable accommodation and to ensure that employees who acquire disabilities are not discriminated against.

 

The matter eventually reached the Supreme Court, where the central question was whether public sector employers could evade their obligations under the RPwD Act by relying on rigid service rules that failed to account for the needs of employees who acquire disabilities during service.

Key Observations

 

The Supreme Court emphasised that the RPwD Act represents a shift from a welfare-based understanding of disability to a rights-based legal framework grounded in dignity and equality. Public authorities and government-controlled entities are therefore under a positive obligation to ensure that persons with disabilities are able to participate in employment on equal terms.

 

The Court observed that employees who acquire disabilities during service are particularly vulnerable, as they may suddenly find themselves excluded from the very institutions they have served for years. In such circumstances, the law requires employers to explore reasonable accommodation measures rather than resorting to administrative actions that result in exclusion.

 

The Bench reiterated that the RPwD Act explicitly prohibits discrimination against employees with disabilities and mandates the creation of inclusive workplaces. Employers must therefore interpret service rules in a manner that promotes participation rather than exclusion.

 

The Court also noted that public sector undertakings, as instrumentalities of the State, are bound by constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity. Administrative decisions affecting employees with disabilities must therefore be consistent with both statutory protections and constitutional principles.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Supreme Court held that the employer was required to comply with the obligations imposed under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

• The authorities were directed to reconsider the petitioner’s employment status in light of the statutory requirement to provide reasonable accommodation.

• The Court emphasised that public sector employers must adopt measures that enable continued employment of persons who acquire disabilities during service.

• Relevant authorities were directed to ensure that future administrative decisions are consistent with the principles laid down in the RPwD Act.

Commentary

 

The judgment highlights the growing recognition within Indian constitutional jurisprudence that employment rights form a critical component of disability inclusion. For many individuals, employment is not merely a source of income but also a foundation for dignity, independence and social participation.

 

Employees who acquire disabilities during service often face a sudden erosion of these rights. Without strong legal protections, they may find themselves marginalised within the workplace or pushed out of employment altogether. The RPwD Act seeks to address this problem by imposing clear obligations on employers to provide reasonable accommodation and to prevent discrimination.

 

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case reinforces the transformative nature of the statute. By insisting that employers interpret service rules in a manner consistent with disability rights, the Court underscored that inclusion requires institutional adaptation rather than mere formal compliance with existing regulations.

The broader significance of the decision lies in its recognition that disability rights cannot remain confined to theoretical guarantees. For persons with disabilities to participate fully in public life, workplaces must be designed and administered in ways that anticipate diversity and remove barriers to participation. The ruling therefore strengthens the evolving framework of disability rights law in India by reaffirming that equality in employment requires proactive institutional reform.

Read the judgement: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd. & Ors. [PDF 289KB]

Disability Is Not Incredibility: Court Applies Supreme Court’s Disability Jurisprudence

Court: Sessions Court, Mumbai
Presiding Judge: Ms. Surekha A. Sinha, Sessions Judge
Case No.: (Not reported)
Case Title: State of Maharashtra v. [Name Withheld]
Date of Judgment: Early January 2026
Cases Referred:

Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Supreme Court, Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2021, 2021 INSC 272 (testimony of disabled witness; intersectionality)

Brief:

In a significant judgment reinforcing the rights of survivors with disabilities, the Sessions Court in Mumbai convicted a 35-year-old salon worker for the abduction and rape of a woman with moderate intellectual disability in 2019. The accused was sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, and additionally received one year’s imprisonment under Section 92(b) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016 (for assaulting or using force against a person with disability), with sentences to run concurrently.

The survivor’s testimony — central to the prosecution case — was accepted by the court despite challenges regarding her cognitive functioning. Medical evidence established that although physically adult, she had a social/mental age of approximately seven years with an IQ of 36. Upon returning home after going missing on April 29, 2019, she tearfully narrated how the accused lured her, threatened her with a knife, gagged her, and sexually assaulted her, attempting to wash away evidence afterwards.

During trial, the special public prosecutor examined 14 witnesses. Forensic reports were inconclusive, attributed to the post-assault washing. However, medical experts testified to trauma consistent with sexual assault. The defence sought to discredit the testimony on grounds of hearsay and minor inconsistencies. The court rejected these arguments, describing the survivor as a “sterling witness” and placing reliance on Supreme Court guidance on the legal treatment of testimony by persons with disabilities.

Importantly, the court referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, where the apex court held that the testimony of a witness with disability cannot be considered weak or inferior merely because of the disability, emphasising that credibility must be assessed on merit and that disability should not attract prejudice in judicial evaluation. The Supreme Court also recognised the importance of accounting for intersectionality — how overlapping identities (e.g., gender, caste, disability) may compound vulnerability — and called for judicial sensitivity and reasonable accommodations in recording and appreciating such testimony.

In the Patan Jamal Vali case, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for the rape of a blind Scheduled Caste woman, affirming that her testimony deserved equal evidentiary value when it otherwise inspired confidence, and underscored that courts should not stereotype persons with disabilities as inherently weak or incapable of giving reliable evidence.

Anchoring its reasoning in this precedent, the Sessions Court emphasised that minor discrepancies in testimony are neither fatal nor unusual in cases involving survivors with cognitive impairments, and that rigid demands for corroboration should not impede justice where the overall narrative is credible and probable. This aligns with the principle that the judicial process must accommodate diverse ways in which persons with disabilities perceive, communicate, and testify.

The judgment is notable for its integration of disability rights jurisprudence into mainstream criminal adjudication, affirming that persons with disabilities possess full legal personhood and that their testimonies — where consistent and credible — merit equal weight. It also reinforces the RPwD Act’s role not only as a protective statute but as an instrument imposing substantive penal consequences where crimes target persons on account of their disability. This case thus contributes to the evolving landscape of disability-sensitive adjudication in India. 

HIV-Positive Persons Fall Within the Definition of Persons with Disabilities: A Landmark Ruling by Delhi HC

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench / Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3616/2021
Case Title: [Name withheld] v. Union of India & Ors. (BSF)
Date of Judgment: 16 December 2025
Relevant Statutes:

• Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016
• HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017

Brief

In a significant and precedent-setting judgment, the Delhi High Court has categorically held that an HIV-positive person can fall within the definition of a “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). This ruling marks what is arguably the first direct judicial equation of HIV-positive status with disability under the RPwD framework.

The case arose from the discharge of a Border Security Force (BSF) constable, who was removed from service in April 2019 after being diagnosed as HIV-positive. The constable had contracted HIV in 2017 and was undergoing antiretroviral therapy (ART). Despite treatment and recovery from associated ailments, including abdominal tuberculosis, he was issued a show-cause notice in November 2018 and subsequently discharged on the ground of being “physically unfit”. His departmental appeal was rejected in October 2020, compelling him to approach the Delhi High Court.

Key Findings of the Court

The Division Bench held that the petitioner’s discharge was unlawful under both the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017 and the RPwD Act, 2016.

1. HIV as a Disability under the RPwD Act
   The Court held that an HIV-positive employee suffering from a long-term physical impairment that hinders full and effective participation in society would fall within the ambit of “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act. Consequently, the statutory protections under Section 20 of the RPwD Act—particularly the prohibition on dispensing with the services of an employee who acquires a disability during service—were squarely attracted.

2. Non-Discrimination in Employment
   Drawing a clear parallel between the RPwD Act and the HIV Act, the Court reiterated that both statutes prohibit discrimination in matters of employment. Section 20(2) of the RPwD Act mandates reasonable accommodation, while Section 20(4) specifically bars termination of service on the ground of disability acquired during employment.

3. Violation of the HIV Act, 2017
   The Court relied heavily on Section 3 of the HIV Act, which imposes an absolute bar on terminating employment solely on the ground of HIV-positive status. The only exception—contained in Section 3(a)—requires a written assessment by an independent and qualified healthcare provider certifying that the employee is unfit to perform duties and poses a significant risk of transmission.

   The BSF, the Court noted, made no attempt whatsoever to comply with this mandatory requirement. In the absence of such an assessment, the presumption must be that the employee posed no significant risk and was fit for duty.

4. Reinstatement with Continuity of Service
   Setting aside both the discharge order (2019) and the appellate order (2020), the Court directed reinstatement of the petitioner with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, including pay fixation. However, back wages were expressly denied.

5. Reasonable Accommodation and Alternate Employment
   Importantly, the Court clarified that if the petitioner could not perform duties attached to the post of constable due to medical reasons, the BSF was duty-bound to provide reasonable accommodation. This includes offering alternate employment in an equivalent post, or if such a post is unavailable, placement in a supernumerary or equivalent position.

Broader Significance

This judgment is a watershed moment in Indian disability rights jurisprudence. For the first time, a constitutional court has explicitly recognised that HIV-positive persons may qualify as persons with disabilities under the RPwD Act, thereby extending to them the full spectrum of statutory protections relating to non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and security of tenure.

The ruling also reinforces the legislative intent of the HIV Act, 2017, which seeks to dismantle stigma-driven employment practices rooted in fear rather than medical evidence. Together, the two statutes are interpreted as complementary rights-based frameworks, not siloed protections.

For uniformed services and other government establishments, the decision sends a clear message: HIV status, by itself, cannot be a ground for termination. Any departure from this principle must strictly comply with statutory safeguards, medical evidence, and the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation.

From a disability rights perspective, the judgment deepens the understanding of “disability” as a lived, functional, and rights-oriented concept—rather than a narrow medical label—bringing Indian jurisprudence closer to the spirit of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Read the Judgement