Disability Is Not Incredibility: Court Applies Supreme Court’s Disability Jurisprudence

Court: Sessions Court, Mumbai
Presiding Judge: Ms. Surekha A. Sinha, Sessions Judge
Case No.: (Not reported)
Case Title: State of Maharashtra v. [Name Withheld]
Date of Judgment: Early January 2026
Cases Referred:

Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Supreme Court, Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2021, 2021 INSC 272 (testimony of disabled witness; intersectionality)

Brief:

In a significant judgment reinforcing the rights of survivors with disabilities, the Sessions Court in Mumbai convicted a 35-year-old salon worker for the abduction and rape of a woman with moderate intellectual disability in 2019. The accused was sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, and additionally received one year’s imprisonment under Section 92(b) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016 (for assaulting or using force against a person with disability), with sentences to run concurrently.

The survivor’s testimony — central to the prosecution case — was accepted by the court despite challenges regarding her cognitive functioning. Medical evidence established that although physically adult, she had a social/mental age of approximately seven years with an IQ of 36. Upon returning home after going missing on April 29, 2019, she tearfully narrated how the accused lured her, threatened her with a knife, gagged her, and sexually assaulted her, attempting to wash away evidence afterwards.

During trial, the special public prosecutor examined 14 witnesses. Forensic reports were inconclusive, attributed to the post-assault washing. However, medical experts testified to trauma consistent with sexual assault. The defence sought to discredit the testimony on grounds of hearsay and minor inconsistencies. The court rejected these arguments, describing the survivor as a “sterling witness” and placing reliance on Supreme Court guidance on the legal treatment of testimony by persons with disabilities.

Importantly, the court referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, where the apex court held that the testimony of a witness with disability cannot be considered weak or inferior merely because of the disability, emphasising that credibility must be assessed on merit and that disability should not attract prejudice in judicial evaluation. The Supreme Court also recognised the importance of accounting for intersectionality — how overlapping identities (e.g., gender, caste, disability) may compound vulnerability — and called for judicial sensitivity and reasonable accommodations in recording and appreciating such testimony.

In the Patan Jamal Vali case, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for the rape of a blind Scheduled Caste woman, affirming that her testimony deserved equal evidentiary value when it otherwise inspired confidence, and underscored that courts should not stereotype persons with disabilities as inherently weak or incapable of giving reliable evidence.

Anchoring its reasoning in this precedent, the Sessions Court emphasised that minor discrepancies in testimony are neither fatal nor unusual in cases involving survivors with cognitive impairments, and that rigid demands for corroboration should not impede justice where the overall narrative is credible and probable. This aligns with the principle that the judicial process must accommodate diverse ways in which persons with disabilities perceive, communicate, and testify.

The judgment is notable for its integration of disability rights jurisprudence into mainstream criminal adjudication, affirming that persons with disabilities possess full legal personhood and that their testimonies — where consistent and credible — merit equal weight. It also reinforces the RPwD Act’s role not only as a protective statute but as an instrument imposing substantive penal consequences where crimes target persons on account of their disability. This case thus contributes to the evolving landscape of disability-sensitive adjudication in India. 

Court rules severely disabled woman wasn't raped because she didn't 'bite, kick or scratch' her assailant

This outrageous judgement from Connecticut State Supreme Court is only going to encourage crimes against disabled women! This indicates the prejudices, negative attitudes, lack of awareness about the disabling conditions that many of us live with in the community, especially among certain sections of the judiciary!

Court Rules Severely Disabled Woman Wasn't Raped Because She Didn't 'Bite, Kick or Scratch' Her Assailant

October 3, 2012    

In a 4-3 ruling Tuesday afternoon, the Connecticut State Supreme Court  overturned the sexual assault conviction of a man who had sex with a woman who “has severe cerebral palsy, has the intellectual functional equivalent of a 3-year-old and cannot verbally communicate.” The Court held that, because Connecticut statutes define physical incapacity for the purpose of sexual assault as “unconscious or for any other reason. . . physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act,” the defendant could not be convicted if there was any chance that the victim could have communicated her lack of consent. Since the victim in this case was capable of “biting, kicking, scratching, screeching, groaning or gesturing,” the Court  ruled that that victim could have communicated lack of consent despite her serious mental deficiencies:

When we consider this evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and in a manner that is consistent with the state’s theory of guilt at trial, we, like the Appellate Court, ‘are not persuaded that the state produced any credible evidence that the [victim] was either unconscious or so uncommunicative that she was physically incapable of manifesting to the defendant her lack of consent to sexual intercourse at the time of the alleged sexual assault.’

According to the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network (RAINN), lack of physical resistance  is not evidence of consent , as “many victims make the good judgment that physical resistance would cause the attacker to become more violent.” RAINN also notes that lack of consent is implicit “if you were under the statutory age of consent, or if you had a mental defect” as the victim did in this case.

Anna Doroghazi, director of public policy and communication at Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services,  worried that the Court’s interpretation of the law ignored these concerns: “By implying that the victim in this case should have bitten or kicked her assailant, this ruling effectively holds people with disabilities to a higher standard than the rest of the population when it comes to proving lack of consent in sexual assault cases. Failing to bite an assailant is not the same thing as consenting to sexual activity.” An amicus brief filed by the Connecticut advocates for disabled persons  argued that this higher standard “discourag[ed] the prosecution of crimes against persons with disabilities” even though “persons with a disability had an age-adjusted rate of rape or sexual assault that was more than twice the rate for persons without a disability.”

Source: www.alternet.org