Friday, October 8, 2010

Bombay High Court steps in to ensure Barrier Free Environment for persons with disabilities

Dear Friends,

Many people think what they can do if the pedestrian infrastructure is inaccessible to the disabled or the public places including Government offices are on the second floor without any provision of accessibility or that the local transport facilities are inaccessible to the elderly and the disabled! So they keep suffering the discrimination in silence and often attribute the problems to their own physical inability to cope up in the inaccessible city!

Also given the busy life to make two ends meet, one seldom get in to actions seeking rights from government agencies that demand time, money and congregations of like minded people. But, few disabled people organisations have woken up and started resisting against the apathy of the civic agencies, government in smaller towns and cities. However, the common experience has been that a representation to the Disability Commissioner in States which are often additional charge offices of bureaucrats and many times literally defunct offices in the States not aware about what to do in such a case fails to evoke any sympathy or corrective measure. Also the representations to the civic agencies or the transport departments fail to invoke any one's attention for them it is a non issue  in semi urban and rural India.

This is despite the fact that the Persons with Disabilities Act was passed way back in 1995 and currently Expert committees and activists are mulling changes required in the existing legislation in light of UNCRPD. The Act of 1995 is strong enough to make the state government take positive action to ensure barrier free environment at least in public transport, public roads and pedestrian infrastructure, in schools, colleges & offices that regularly see and deal with persons with disabilities and the elderly!

However, in Nagpur, a disabled scientist petitioned the High Court through a lawyer who is herself disabled against the apathy of the government. The court finds  a reason and directs that the petitioners along with architects be allowed to inspect all government buildings. Court has given two weeks time for the government to respond. This brings to the fore that when the attempts with the administration and civic agencies fail, disability rights can very convincingly be achieved through our active and responsible Indian Judiciary  who have always stood with the marginalized.

So the lesson learnt is- If rights are not automatically coming, citizen should demand for them by all the means available to them and the doors of the courts should be knocked if every thing fails. I am hopeful that with the recent launch of a Central Scheme "Scheme for Implementation of PwD Act 1995 (SIDPA)" by Govt. of India, the states would take immediate steps to ensure that the environment is made accessible to all citizen including the elderly, children and the disabled.

For information of all, just two days back Government of India issued a press release inviting proposals from States for giving Central Assistance to the tune of Rs. 100 crore to provide barrier free environment in Govt. Buildings and to make Government Websites accessible to the Persons with Disabilities. (Read the PIB release here) based on their said SIPDA Scheme. Click here for various other schemes of Ministry of Social Justice

Good wishes for the petitioners at Nagpur!

regards
Subhash Chandra Vashishth

To read the coverage in detail click on the link  Move to make buildings disabled friendly


NAGPUR: The Nagpur bench of Bombay High Court on Wednesday directed the state government to allow free access to a team of petitioners and experts from Indian Institute of Architects (IIA) to all government buildings in the city to explore possibilities of making then friendly for the physically handicapped. 

The court's direction came on a plea filed by P N Andhare, a disabled scientist from the city, through his counsel Trupti Udeshi who is also physically handicapped. A division bench comprising justices Sharad Bobde and Mridula Bhatkar granted two weeks more to the government to file a reply on whether facilities for disabled could be constructed at Vasantrao Deshpande hall and social welfare department. 

The team will visit every government department and look for the facilities for disabled persons. It will also suggest how facilities like ramps could be erected there. The petitioner, who is 80% disabled, had filed the PIL through an NGO Indradhanu praying for compliance of Maharashtra government resolution of 2005 which mandated facilities for disabled. Secretary of Indradhanu Prakash Sohoni is another petitioner. 

According to the duo, local authorities including Nagpur Municipal Corporation (NMC) should make efforts to implement byelaws, guidelines and measures to ensure a barrier-free environment and non-discrimination in transport for the handicapped and senior citizens. Giving examples, Andhare and Sohoni pointed out that social welfare department was on second floor in Zilla Parishad building and there was no provision of lift. 

Moreover, in the renovated government buildings including Deshpande Hall, no efforts were made to incorporate ramp or railing to benefit the disabled. Pointing out several lacunae on the roads and footpaths, the petitioners claimed they were laid in such a way that it became difficult for both the disabled and the elderly to move while encroachments on all footpaths created obstacles in movement. 

They contended that despite Lokayukta's recommendations, the master transportation plan for the city had no provisions for disabled.

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

Surpreme Court of India | Govt. of India & Anr. Vs. Ravi Prakash Gupta | SLP (C) 14889 of 2009 | 07 July 2010

 Court: Supreme Court of India

Case No. & Title: SLP (C) 14889 of 2009, titled Govt of India  vs Ravi Prakash Gupta & Anr 

Bench: Altamas Kabir, Cyriac Joseph 

Date of Judgement:  07 July, 2010

                                                   REPORTABLE


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.14889 OF 2009


Govt. of India (through Secretary & Anr.)                           .. Petitioners

                           Vs.

Ravi Prakash Gupta & Anr.                                                    .. Respondents

 J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. The Government of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Personnel & Public Grievances, Department of Personnel and Training and through the Secretary, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, has filed this Special Leave Petition against the judgment and order dated 25th February, 2009, passed by the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.5429 of 2008, allowing the Writ Petition and setting aside the order dated 7th April, 2008, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in O.A. No.1397 of 2007, filed by the Respondent No.1 herein, and allowing the reliefs prayed for therein.

2. The Respondent No.1 is a visually handicapped person who suffers from 100% blindness. He appeared in the Civil Services Examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission in the year 2006. After clearing the preliminary examination, the Respondent No.1 appeared for the main examination in October, 2006 and was declared successful and was, thereafter, called for a personality test scheduled for 1st May, 2007. Pursuant to such interview, the names of 474 candidates who were selected were released on 14th May, 2007. In the said list, the name of one other visually impaired candidate also figured. The Respondent No.1 was at serial no.5 of the merit list prepared for visually handicapped candidates, who had been declared successful in the examination. According to the Respondent No.1, although there were more than 5 vacancies available in the visually handicapped category, only one post was offered under the said category and he was, therefore, not given appointment despite the vacancies available.

3. Being aggrieved by the manner in which selections were made for appointment in the visually handicapped category, the Respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition, being Writ Petition (Civil) No.5338 of 2007, before the Delhi High Court. The same was subsequently withdrawn since it was the Central Administrative Tribunal only which had jurisdiction to entertain such matters at the first instance. The Respondent No.1, accordingly, withdrew the Writ Petition, with liberty to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal. Thereafter, he filed an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which was registered as O.A. No.1397 of 2007, staking his claim for appointment under the reservation of vacancies for disabled categories provided for under Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection, Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, hereinafter referred to as `the Disabilities Act, 1995'. The basic contention of the Respondent No.1 was tthat since the aforesaid Act came into force in 1996 providing a statutory mandate for reservation of 3% of the posts available for persons suffering from different kinds of disabilities enumerated in Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, such reservation ought to have been in force with effect from the date on which the Act came into force. According to the Respondent No.1, if the vacancies were to be considered from the year 1996, then instead of one vacancy being declared for the year in question, there should have been at least 7 vacancies from the reserved categories of disabilities which were interchangeable. It was, therefore, the case of the Respondent No.1 that having regard to the number of appointments made with regard to the disabled categories reserved under Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, since the Act came into force, there were at least 7 posts which could be filled up in the year 2006. However, in that year only one post from this category had been filled. It was, therefore, the case of the Respondent No.1 that being at serial no.5 of the list of successful candidates amongst the physically impaired candidates, there were sufficient number of vacancies in which he could have been appointed and that the authorities had acted contrary to the provisions of the above Act upon the faulty reasoning that the vacancies in the reserved posts could not be declared, without first identifying the same for the purposes of Sections 32 and 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995.

4. The case of the Respondent No.1 having been negated by the Tribunal, the Respondent No.1 as indicated hereinbefore, moved the High Court and the High Court, upon accepting the Respondent No.1's case, set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 7th April, 2008, and allowed the Respondent No.1's O.A. No.1397 of 2007 filed before the Tribunal. While allowing the said application, the High Court, upon observing that a clear vacancy was available to which the Respondent No.1 could be accommodated on the basis of his position in the merit list, issued a mandamus to the Respondent No.1 to offer him an appointment to one of the reserved posts by issuing an appropriate appointment letter, within six weeks from the date of the order. Certain consequential orders were also passed together with cost of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the Petitioner herein.

5. On behalf of the Government of India, which is the Petitioner herein, learned Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Indira Jaising, submitted that the submissions advanced on behalf of the Respondent No.1 which had been accepted by the High Court, were not tenable and that the Government of India had been actively involved in complying with the provisions of the Disabilities Act, 1995, after it came into force. The learned ASG contended that the Government of India had been making reservation for physically handicapped persons in Group `C' and `D' posts from 1977 and in order to consider the growing demand from the visually handicapped persons, a meeting for identification of jobs in various Ministries/Departments was scheduled in 1985 and 416 such posts were identified in Group `A' and `B' posts. In 1986, an Office Memorandum was issued by the Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT) providing for preference to be given to handicapped person for these posts. In 1988, another Office Memorandum was issued by the Government of India indicating that the identification done in the year 1986 would remain valid till the same was modified. After the Act came into force in 1996, a further Office Memorandum was issued, whereby reservation of physically handicapped persons in identified Group `A' and Group `B' posts/services was extended to posts which were to be filled up through direct recruitment. Learned ASG submitted that in 1999 the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment constituted an Expert Committee to identify/review posts in categories `A, `B', `C' and `D', in which recommendations were made for identification of posts for the visually handicapped persons. The report of the Expert Committee was accepted by the Ministry in 2001 and posts were duly identified for persons with disabilities. Learned ASG, however, made it clear that the 416 posts, which had been identified in 1985, did not include All India Services and that for the first time in 2005, the posts of the Indian Administrative Service were identified in compliance with the provisions of Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995 and pursuant to such identification, the posts were reserved and filled up. Ms. Jaising also submitted that reservation upto 3% of vacancies in the reserved posts were, accordingly, identified with effect from 2006 and the claim of the Respondent No.1 for appointment on the basis of the argument that the reservation should have taken effect from 1996 when the Act came into force, was liable to be rejected.

6. Appearing in-person, Mr. Ravi Prakash Gupta, the Respondent No.1 herein, strongly defended the impugned judgment of the High Court and urged that the Special Leave Petition filed by the Government of India was liable to be dismissed. Mr. Gupta submitted that the fact that he was completely blind was known to the Petitioners and their respective authorities from the very beginning, since he had annexed his blindness certificate with his original application in the proforma provided by the Union Public Service Commission (U.P.S.C.), which showed the percentage of his blindness as 100%. However, the main thrust of Mr. Gupta's submissions was that when the Disabilities Act, 1995, came into force in 1996, it was the duty of the concerned authorities to reserve 3% of the total vacancies available immediately thereafter. The plea of non-identification of posts prior to the year 2006 was only an attempt to justify the failure of the Petitioners to act in terms of the Disabilities Act, 1995. Mr. Gupta submitted that the High Court had negated such contention made on behalf of the Petitioners and rightly directed the Petitioners to calculate the number of vacancies in terms of Section 33 of the above Act from 1996 when the said Act came into force.

7. Mr. Gupta then submitted that in terms of the Department's OM No.3635/3/2004 dated 29th December, 2005, reservations have been earmarked and should have been made available from 1996 itself and in the event the vacancies could not be filled up owing to lack of candidates, the same could have been carried forward for two years after which the same could have been treated as lapsed. Mr. Gupta submitted that although the Petitioners were fully aware of the said Office Memorandum, they chose not to act on the basis thereof and as admitted on behalf of the Government of India, the IAS cadre was identified in 2006 for the purposes of Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995. In fact, the Act remained on paper as far as visually challenged candidates were concerned and only after the judgments of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ravi Kumar Arora and in the case of T.D. Dinakar were delivered, that the identification process was started. Mr. Gupta submitted that it would be pertinent to mention that the two above-mentioned candidates were appointed in the Civil Services without waiting for identification of their respective services on the orders of the High Court.

8. Mr. Gupta submitted that the plea of non- identification of posts in the IAS till the year 2006 could not absolve the petitioners of their statutory obligation to provide for reservation in terms of Section 33 of the aforesaid Act.

9. During the course of hearing, leave had been granted to one A.V. Prema Nath and one Mr. Rajesh Singh to intervene in the proceedings. The submissions made by the Respondent No.1 have been repeated and reiterated on behalf of the Intervenor No.1, Shri A.V. Prema Nath by A. Sumathi, learned Advocate. His written submissions are embellished with references to various decisions of this Court, including the decision in Francis Coralie Mullin vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors. [(1981) 1 SCC 608], regarding the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The main thrust of the submissions is with regard to the denial of rights to persons with disabilities under Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, which prevent them from enjoying their fundamental rights to equality and the right to live, by the State.

10. More detailed submissions were made by Mr. S.K. Rungta, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the Intervenor No.2, Mr. Rajesh Singh, and it was also sought to be pointed out that the said intervenor was himself a candidate from amongst the visually impaired candidates and had, in fact, been placed at serial no.3 in rank in the merit list for visually impaired candidates in the Central Services Examinations, 2006, whereas the Respondent No.1 had been placed at serial no.5. In other words, what was sought to be projected was that Shri Rajesh Singh had a better claim for appointment from amongst the visually impaired candidates over the Respondent No.1 and that if the vacancies in the reserved category were to be calculated from 1996 and even from 2001, when identification of posts in respect of Civil Services forming part of the IAS Cadre was sought to be effected and a notification to that effect was issued, the Respondent No.1 could not have been appointed.

11. It was further submitted that in the decision of this Court in The National Federation of Blind vs. Union Public Service Commission & Ors. [(1993) 2 SCC 411], the demand by blind candidates for being permitted to write the examination in Braille script, or with the help of a Scribe, for posts in the IAS was duly accepted for recruitment to the lowest posts in the service reserved for such persons. It was also held that blind and partially blind persons were eligible for appointment in Government posts. It was submitted that the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners that the notification in respect of the services in respect of the Group `A' and `B' services in the IAS in 2005 was not a fresh exercise, but only an attempt to consolidate and strengthen the identification already available and that such an exercise could at best be said to be enabling and supplementary action for the smooth implementation of the statutory provisions containing the scheme of reservation for persons with disabilities, could not be taken as an excuse to postpone the benefit which had already accrued to candidates falling within 3% of the vacancies indicated in Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995. It was also urged that after the issuance of OM dated 29th December, 2005 and OM dated 26th April, 2006, there was hardly any room for the Government of India to deny the benefit of reservation to persons with disabilities, including the blind, in Civil Services encompassing the IAS from the year 1996 itself. Furthermore, since the Act itself did not make any distinction between Group `A' and Group `B' services and Group `C' and Group `D' services, it was not available to the Government of India to contend that since identification had been done only for Group `C' and Group `D' services, prior to the year 2005, reservation in respect of Group `A' and `B' services, which include the IAS, for which identification was commenced in 2005, would only be available thereafter.

12. On behalf of the Intervenor No.2, it was submitted that the Special Leave Petition was liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.

13. We have examined the matter with great care having regard to the nature of the issues involved in relation to the intention of the legislature to provide for integration of persons with disabilities into the social main stream and to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development and programmes and services and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities and for their education, training, employment and rehabilitation amongst other responsibilities. We have considered the matter from the said angle to ensure that the object of the Disabilities Act, 1995, which is to give effect to the proclamation on the full participation and equality of the people with disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region, is fulfilled.

14. That the Respondent No.1 is eligible for appointment in the Civil Services after having been declared successful and having been placed at serial no.5 in the disabled category of visually impaired candidates, cannot be denied. The only question which is relevant for our purpose is whether on account of the failure of the Petitioners to identify posts for persons falling within the ambit of Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, the Respondent No.1 should be deprived of the benefit of his selection purportedly on the ground that there were no available vacancies in the said category. The other question which is connected with the first question and which also requires our consideration is whether the reservation provided for in Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, was dependent on identification of posts suitable for appointment in such categories, as has been sought to be contended on behalf of the Government of India in the instant case.

15. Although, the Delhi High Court has dealt with the aforesaid questions, we wish to add a few observations of our own in regard to the objects which the legislature intended to achieve by enacting the aforesaid Act. The submission made on behalf of the Union of India regarding the implementation of the provisions of Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, only after identification of posts suitable for such appointment, under Section 32 thereof, runs counter to the legislative intent with which the Act was enacted. To accept such a submission would amount to accepting a situation where the provisions of Section 33 of the aforesaid Act could be kept deferred indefinitely by bureaucratic inaction. Such a stand taken by the petitioners before the High Court was rightly rejected. Accordingly, the submission made on behalf of the Union of India that identification of Grade `A' and `B' posts in the I.A.S. was undertaken after the year 2005 is not of much substance. As has been pointed out by the High Court, neither Section 32 nor Section 33 of the aforesaid Act makes any distinction with regard to Grade `A', `B', `C' and `D' posts. They only speak of identification and reservation of posts for people with disabilities, though the proviso to Section 33 does empower the appropriate Government to exempt any establishment from the provisions of the said Section, having regard to the type of work carried on in any department or establishment. No such exemption has been pleaded or brought to our notice on behalf of the petitioners.

16. It is only logical that, as provided in Section 32 of the aforesaid Act, posts have to be identified for reservation for the purposes of Section 33, but such identification was meant to be simultaneously undertaken with the coming into operation of the Act, to give effect to the provisions of Section 33. The legislature never intended the provisions of Section 32 of the Act to be used as a tool to deny the benefits of Section 33 to these categories of disabled persons indicated therein. Such a submission strikes at the foundation of the provisions relating to the duty cast upon the appropriate Government to make appointments in every establishment (emphasis added). For the sake of reference, Sections 32 and 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, are reproduced hereinbelow :

"32.Identification of posts which can be reserved for persons with disabilities.- Appropriate Governments shall -

(a) Identify posts, in the establishments, which can be reserved for the persons with disability;

(b) At periodical intervals not exceeding three years, review the list of posts identified and up-date the list taking into consideration the developments in technology.

33.Reservation of posts.- Every appropriate Government shall appoint in every establishment such percentage of vacancies not less than three per cent for persons or class of persons with disability of which one per cent each shall be reserved for persons suffering from-

(i) blindness or low vision;

(ii) hearing impairment;

(iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy,

in the posts identified  for each disability:

Provided, that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any department or establishment by notification subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section."

17. While it cannot be denied that unless posts are identified for the purposes of Section 33 of the aforesaid Act, no appointments from the reserved categories contained therein can be made, and that to such extent the provisions of Section 33 are dependent on Section 32 of the Act, as submitted by the learned ASG, but the extent of such dependence would be for the purpose of making appointments and not for the purpose of making reservation. In other words, reservation under Section 33 of the Act is not dependent on identification, as urged on behalf of the Union of India, though a duty has been cast upon the appropriate Government to make appointments in the number of posts reserved for the three categories mentioned in Section 33 of the Act in respect of persons suffering from the disabilities spelt out therein. In fact, a situation has also been noticed where on account of non-availability of candidates some of the reserved posts could remain vacant in a given year. For meeting such eventualities, provision was made to carry forward such vacancies for two years after which they would lapse. Since in the instant case such a situation did not arise and posts were not reserved under Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, the question of carrying forward of vacancies or lapse thereof, does not arise.

18. The various decisions cited by A. Sumathi, learned Advocate for the first intervenor, Shri A.V. Prema Nath, are not of assistance in the facts of this case, which depends on its own facts and interpretation of Sections 32 and 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995.

19. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court impugned in the Special Leave Petition which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. All interim orders are vacated. The petitioners are given eight weeks' time from today to give effect to the directions of the High Court.

20. The petitioners shall pay the cost of these proceedings to the respondent No.1 assessed at Rs.20,000/-, within four weeks from date.


................................................J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR) 

................................................J.

(CYRIAC JOSEPH) 

New Delhi Dated:7th July, 2010.

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Avoid frivolous lawsuits, ministries advised | iGovernment.in

Dear Friends,

Many ministries are notorious for filing lawsuits, Review Petitions and Appeals despite the Courts ordering as per the provisions of extant legislations, rules and bye-laws. I have pretty curious experience with one Union Ministry of Railways which defies all rules, laws and policies of the Government of India on employing persons with disabilities! They still consider the persons with disabilities as threat and employing them may lead to security issues. And they claim that being a railway responsible for the safety of passengers, they can not risk the life of passengers by employing persons with disabilities! Though there are no studies or scientific evidence to attribute any of the accidents in the Railways till date to the cause of Disability.

I call it a mind set. And we have seen it for over few years now that Railways has been at loggerheads with the Ministry of Social Justice literally pressuring the MSJE with reminder after reminder to consider their request for exempting all posts of railways from the purview of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act 1995 which is due for a sea-change in light of the new committee set up to suggest a New Legislation which is more right based.  The ministry of Social Justice has categorically refused for any such exemption however, that doesn't deter the Ministry of Railways.

I am wondering what would the Railways do when they would be confronted with the new disability law, which most of disability rights activists and supporters believe will usher a new era of rights based regime and ensure true inclusion of every personal experiencing disabilities of any kind.

I have few cases which I wanted to discuss, but for the lack of time, like that of one All India Confederation of the Blind is contesting against Railways seeking filling up of backlog of reserved vacanices in all cadres A,B,C and D and the one matter of Mr. Jayanta Khamari - a physically disabled civil engineer who has been serving in CPWD for past decade without any question on his ability, not finding welcome in Railway despite clearing the Engineering Services Exam on his own merit! The matter is still being contested by the Railways through a SLP before the Supreme Court of India despite loosing the matter in the court of Chief Commissioner of Persons with Disabilities & before the Double Bench of Orissa High Court. Even their review petition was dismissed by the Ld High Court, Orissa as being devoid of any merit.

But the Ministry has the audacity to waste public money in frivolous litigation with impunity. Is Govt. of India monitoring how much their ministries wasting by just fighting against each other in the court of laws?

Any RTI will reveal, as to how many cases, writ petitions, PILs are being contested by Railways in different high courts in India merely on implementation of the Persons with Disabilities Act!

I do hope that this is an early reminder and Ministries do take note of these issues of alarming proportions.

regards
SC Vashishth
Advocate-Disability Rights

Avoid frivolous lawsuits, ministries advised iGovernment.in

Thursday, April 1, 2010

Private Organisations not bound by Disability Act: Says Supreme Court

Dear Friends,

This post is with respect to a recent judgement by Hon'ble Supreme Court in  Civil Appeal No. 1886/2007 titled Dalco Engineering Private Ltd. Vs. Shree Satish Prabhakar Padhye and Ors with another Civil Appeal No. 1858/2007 titled Fancy Rehabilitation Trust and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors.

The employee Mr. Padhye acquired hearing impairment during the period of service and was terminated by the employer. Employee got a favourable suggestion from Disability Commissioner Pune for his re-instatement under Section 47 of Disabilty Act which says:

“47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.—(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service:

Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.


(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability:


Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”

The word "Establishment" has been defined by Section 2( k)( i) of the Persons with Disability (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act 1995 defines the word "Establishment as :-

"Establishment" means a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a local authority or a Government company as defined in section 617 of 'the Companies Act, 1956 and includes Departments of a Government;

On a simple reading of the definition of the word "establishment", it is clear that any organisation established under a central, provincial or state act will be an establishment. Thus any organisation registered and established under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act or the Indian Trust Act or The Companies Act should ordinarily get covered under this.

However over insistence here on the Government share/ownership or control indicates that the intention of creators of this statute was to only include organisations which are largely government or local authorities created under central or state statutes or has a government stake of 51% (read section 617 of Companies Act which has been specifically referred to indicate that this has to be read in exclusion of the Companies Act). Also the heading of Section 47 of Disability Act is "Non-discrimination in Government Employment" which clarifies the intention of the legislature that it did not wanted to include private companies under the word "establishment".

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has indicated that similar phrase in the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act meant "government companies".  The reason put forward by the Court is "A ‘company’ is not ‘established’ under the Companies Act. An incorporated company does not ‘owe’ its existence to the Companies Act. An incorporated company is formed by the act of any seven or more persons (or two or more persons for a private company) associated for any lawful purpose subscribing their names to a Memorandum of Association and by complying with the requirements of the Companies Act in respect of registration. Therefore, a ‘company’ is incorporated and registered under the Companies Act and not established under the Companies Act.

It further clarifies that inclusion of only a specific category of companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (Govt. Companies registered under Section  617) within the definition of ‘establishment’ necessarily and impliedly excludes all other types of companies registered under the Companies Act, 1956, from the definition of ‘establishment’.

A counter argument to this would be that while IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act are punitive in nature and should be interpreted in restrictive and strict sense, the Disability Act is a benevolent, socio-economic and empowering legislation and must be interpreted in a way which favours the marginalized section of the society.

However, now a decision of the learned judges of the Supreme Court is out here clarifying the meaning of word establishment, removing the clouds of doubt on the existing legislation and leaving no room for its benevolent interpretation in future. Therefore, it would be worthwhile now that the disability activists address this issue in the New Law that is being suggested and be categorical that the provisions of the disability act would apply to all establishment including those private initiatives which are registered under any of the Central or State statutes like companies, trusts, societies and cooperatives etc.

This has larger force of argument because when a labour legislation related to PF, Minimum Wage etc. is applicable to private employers with a certain number of employees then why can't disability legislation be applicable - for the objective of both legislations is to empower the weak, vulnerable and marginalized members of our society?

On second thought, it comes to my mind as to why the exploitation of an employee with disability by an employer could not be taken up through labour legislations read in conjunction with disability Act and why alone under Section 47 of the Disability Act? The last line of the judgement - "This will not come in the way of employee of any private company, who has been terminated on the ground of disability, seeking or enforcing any right available under any other statute, in accordance with the law." -  gives a hint that it could have perhaps been better fought under labour legislations. 

Here is the news report on the issue from the Mail Today.

regards

SC Vashishth
Advocate-Disability Rights
09811125521


SC says disability Act not binding on private firms

(To read from source in (PDF 2 MB

Mail Today, 01st April 2010

THE SUPREME Court on Wednesday held that a law enacted in 1995, to prevent exploitation of the disabled by their employers, could not be enforced on the private sector.

A three- judge bench, comprising justices R. V. Raveendran, R. M. Lodha and C. K. Prasad, said the Persons with Disabilities ( Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, did not cast any obligation on private companies and schools.

The bench rejected a contention that the Act covered all companies incorporated under the Companies Act.

A private company had approached the apex court, against a high court order holding that the disabilities commissioner had jurisdiction over any company incorporated under the Companies Act. The high court had said it could direct the company to reinstate an employee who was dismissed on account of disability.

The second appeal was filed by a trust — on behalf of the employee — which had approached the apex court after the high court refused to pass any such direction to the company and admitted that the first judgment was incorrect.

Opposing the company’s appeal, the dismissed employee pointed out that section 2( k)( i) of the disability Act brought “ a corporation established by or under a central, provincial, or state Act” within its ambit.


But the apex court said a similar phrase in the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act meant government companies.

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Supreme Court | Dalco Engineering Pvt. Ltd vs Satish Prabhakar Padhye & Ors | 31 March 2010

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: R.V. Raveendran, R.M. Lodha, C.K. Prasad

Case No. : Civil Appeal No. 1886 OF 2007

Case Title: Dalco Engineering Pvt. Ltd vs Satish Prabhakar Padhye & Ors

Date of Judgement: 31 March, 2010

Author: R V Raveendran

Acts Involved: The Persons with Disabilities Act 1995;  


---------------

                                                                         Reportable

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.1886 OF 2007

Dalco Engineering Private Ltd.                        ... Appellant

        Vs.

Shree Satish Prabhakar Padhye & Ors.                  ... Respondents


                                    WITH


                   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1858 OF 2007

Fancy Rehabilitation Trust & Anr.                     ... Appellant

Vs.

Union of India & Ors.                                 ... Respondents

                             JUDGMENT

R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J.

Facts in CA No.1886/2007 :

The appellant is a private limited company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The respondent - S.P. Padhye - (also referred to as `the employee') was employed as a Telephone Operator by the appellant for more than two decades. The respondent's service was terminated by the appellant with effect from 31.12.2000 on the ground that he had become deaf (85% reduction in ability to hear). The respondent complained to the Disability Commissioner, Pune, in regard to such termination, alleging that he was fit, able and normal when he joined service of the appellant and as he acquired the hearing impairment during the period of service, he should have been continued in employment in some suitable post. The Disability Commissioner made an order dated 12.10.2001 suggesting to the employer to undertake a social responsibility, by re- employing the respondent to discharge any other work. The suggestion was not accepted by the employer.

2. According to the respondent, the Commissioner, instead of making a mere suggestion, ought to have issued a direction to the employer, in exercise of jurisdiction under section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (`the Act', for short). He therefore filed a writ petition seeking the following reliefs (i) quashing of the order dated 12.10.2001; and (ii) a direction to implement the provisions of the Disabilities Act by directing the employer to reinstate him in service in a suitable post, with retrospective effect from 1.1.2001, in the same pay-scale and service benefits. The High Court allowed the said writ petition by judgment dated 23.12.2005, and directed the employer to reinstate the respondent and shift him to a suitable post with the same pay-scale and service benefits and with full back-wages. The High Court held that the appellant, though a private limited company, was an "establishment" as defined under section 2(k) of the Act and consequently section 47 of the Act enjoined it not to dispense with the services of its employee who acquired a disability.

Facts in CA No.1858/2007 :

3. The first Appellant is a Public Trust (for short the `Trust') working for the benefit of the physically and mentally challenged persons, took up a house-keeping contract from the third respondent Company on 24.7.2000. The appellant employed several physically handicapped persons for executing the said contract. The third respondent terminated the appellant's contract on 18.7.2006. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed a complaint dated 22.7.2006 with the Disability Commissioner, Pune followed by a writ petition in the High Court for quashing the notice terminating the contract. The appellant also sought a direction for rehabilitation of the persons with disabilities who were employed by it for executing the said house-keeping contract, under the provisions of the Act. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by judgment dated 19.9.2006 dismissed the writ petition holding that the third respondent was not an "establishment" within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act and, consequently, the provisions of the Act did not apply and that the Disability Commissioner had no jurisdiction to issue any direction to the third respondent. It also held that the earlier decision in S.P. Padhye (which is the subject matter of the first case) was per incuriam as it ignored two binding decisions of this court - the Constitution Bench decision in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 (1) SCC 421] and the decision in S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi [1981 (3) SCC 431]. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal. Questions for decision

4) The employee relies on section 47 which provides that no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service. Section 47 of the Act is extracted below :-

"47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.--(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service:

Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section."

The term "establishment" employed in section 47 is defined in section 2(k) of the Act as follows :

"2. Definitions.--In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, --

xxxxx

(k) "establishment" means a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a local authority or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes Departments of a Government;"

5. The question is, having regard to the definition of the word `establishment' of section 2(k) of the Act, whether the requirement relating to non-discrimination of employees acquiring a disability during the course of service, embodied in Section 47, is to be complied with only by authorities falling within the definition of State (as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution), or even by private employers. This leads us to the following two questions:-

(i) Whether a company incorporated under the Companies Act (other than a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956) is an "establishment" as defined in section 2(k) of the Act ?

(ii) Whether the respondent in the first case and the appellant in the second case are entitled to claim any relief with reference to section 47 of the Act ?


Re: Question (i)

6. Let us examine the meaning of the crucial word `establishment' used in sub-section (1) of section 47 of the Act. The definition of the word `establishment' in section 2(k), when analyzed, shows that it is an exhaustive definition, and covers the following categories of employers:

(i) a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial, or State Act;

(ii) an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government;

(iii) a local authority;

(iv) a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956; and

(v)  Departments of a Government.

It is not in dispute that the employers in these two cases are companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 which do not fall under categories (ii) to (v) specified in Section 2(k) of the Act.

7. The employee contends that a company incorporated under the Companies Act is a Corporation falling under the first category enumerated in section 2(k), that is `Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act', on the following reasoning : that a corporation refers to a company; that Companies Act is a Central Act; and that therefore a company incorporated and registered under the Companies Act is a Corporation established under a Central Act. He contends that the use of the words "by or under" is crucial. According to him, `a corporation established by an Act' would refer to a corporation brought into existence by an Act; and a `corporation established under an Act' would refer to a company incorporated under the Companies Act. On the other hand, the employer contends that the term `Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act' refers to a statutory Corporation which is brought into existence by a statute, or under a statute and does not include a company which is registered under the Companies Act. It is submitted that Companies Act merely facilitates and lays down the procedure for incorporation of a company which, when incorporated, will be governed by the provisions of the said Act and therefore, a company registered under the Companies Act, is not a corporation established under an Act.

8. The words "a Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act" is a standard term used in several enactments to denote a statutory corporation established or brought into existence by or under statute. For example, it is used in sub-clause (b) of Clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC' for short) and Section 2(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (`PC Act' for short). Both these statutes provide that a person in the service of a `Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act' is a public servant. The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 defines `public property' as meaning any property owned by, or in the possession of, or under the control of (i) the Central Government (ii) any state government; or (iii) any local authority; or (iv) any corporation established by, or under, a Central, Provincial or State Act; or (v) any company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956; or (vi) any institution, concern or undertaking which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in that behalf provided that the Central Government shall not specify any institution, concern or undertaking under that sub- clause unless such institution, concern or undertaking is financed wholly or substantially by funds provided directly or indirectly by the Central Government or by one or more State Governments, or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments. Thus the term is always used to denote certain categories of authorities which are `State' as contrasted from non-statutory companies which do not fall under the ambit of `State'.

9. The meaning of the term came up for consideration in S. S. Dhanoa vs. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors. - 1981 (3) SCC 431 with reference to section 21 of IPC. This Court held:

"Clause Twelfth does not use the words "body corporate", and the question is whether the expression "corporation" contained therein, taken in collocation of the words "established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act" would bring within its sweep a cooperative society. Indubitably, the Cooperative Store Limited is not a corporation established by a Central or State Act. The crux of the matter is whether the word 'under' occurring in Clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code makes a difference. Does the mere act of incorporation of a body or society under a Central or a State Act make it a corporation within the meaning of Clause Twelfth of Section 21. In our opinion, the expression 'corporation' must, in the context, mean a corporation created by the Legislature and not a body or society brought into existence by an act of a group of individuals. A cooperative society is, therefore, not a corporation established by or under an Act of the Central or State Legislature.

A corporation is an artificial being created by law having a legal entity entirely separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it with the capacity of continuous existence and succession, notwithstanding changes in its membership. ........ The term 'corporation' is, therefore, wide enough to include private corporations. But, in the context of Clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, the expression 'corporation' must be given a narrow legal connotation.

Corporation, in its widest sense, may mean any association of individuals entitled to act as an individual. But that certainly is not the sense in which it is used here. Corporation established by or under an Act of Legislature can only mean a body corporate which owes its existence, and not merely its corporate status, to the Act. For example, a Municipality, a Zilla Parishad or a Gram Panchayat owes its existence and status to an Act of Legislature. On the other hand, an association of persons constituting themselves into a Company under the Companies Act or a Society under the Societies Registration Act owes its existence not to the Act of Legislature but to acts of parties though, it may owe its status as a body corporate to an Act of Legislature.

There is a distinction between a corporation established by or under an Act and a body incorporated under an Act. The distinction was brought out by this Court in Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Ors - (1975) 1 SCC 421. It was observed :

A company incorporated under the Companies Act is not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

There is thus a well-marked distinction between a body created by a statute and a body which, after coming into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of a statute."

(emphasis supplied) In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain - 1976 (2) SCC 58, this Court explained the position further:

"In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainhead of its powers. The question in such case to be asked is, if there is no statute, would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body."

[emphasis supplied]

10. A `company' is not `established' under the Companies Act. An incorporated company does not `owe' its existence to the Companies Act.

An incorporated company is formed by the act of any seven or more persons (or two or more persons for a private company) associated for any lawful purpose subscribing their names to a Memorandum of Association and by complying with the requirements of the Companies Act in respect of registration. Therefore, a `company' is incorporated and registered under the Companies Act and not established under the Companies Act. Per contra, the Companies Act itself establishes the National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, and those two statutory authorities owe their existence to the Companies Act.

11. Where the definition of `establishment' uses the term `a corporation established by or under an Act', the emphasis should be on the word `established' in addition to the words `by or under'. The word `established' refers to coming into existence by virtue of an enactment. It does not refer to a company, which, when it comes into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. But then, what is the difference between `established by a central Act' and `established under a central Act'? The difference is best explained by some illustrations. A corporation is established by an Act, where the Act itself establishes the corporation. For example, Section 3 of State Bank of India Act, 1955 provides that a Bank to be called the State Bank of India shall be constituted to carry on the business of banking. Section 3 of Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 provides that with effect from such date as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint, there shall be established a corporation called the Life Insurance Corporation of India. State Bank of India and Life Insurance Corporation of India are two examples of corporations established by "a Central Act". We may next refer to the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 which provides for establishment of various Financial Corporations under that Act. Section 3 of that Act relates to establishment of State Financial Corporations and provides that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette establish a Financial Corporation for the State under such name as may be specified in the notification and such Financial Corporation shall be a body corporate by the name notified. Thus, a State Financial Corporation is established under a central Act. Therefore, when the words "by and under an Act" are preceded by the words "established", it is clear that the reference is to a corporation established, that it is brought into existence, by an Act or under an Act. In short, the term refers to a statutory corporation as contrasted from a non-statutory corporation incorporated or registered under the Companies Act.

12. There is indication in the definition of `establishment' itself, which clearly establishes that all companies incorporated under the Companies Act are not establishments. The enumeration of establishments in the definition of `establishment' specifically includes "a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956". This shows that the legislature, took pains to include in the definition of `establishment' only one category of companies incorporated under the Companies Act, that is the `Government Companies' as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act. If, as contended by the employee, all Companies incorporated under the Companies Act are to be considered as `establishments' for the purposes of Section 2(k), the definition would have simply and clearly stated that `a company incorporated or registered under the Companies Act, 1956' which would have included a Government company defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The inclusion of only a specific category of companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 within the definition of `establishment' necessarily and impliedly excludes all other types of companies registered under the Companies Act, 1956, from the definition of `establishment'. It is clear that the legislative intent was to apply section 47 of the Act only to such establishments as were specifically defined as `establishment' under section 2(k) of the Act and not to other establishments. The legislative intent was to define `establishment' so as to be synonymous with the definition of `State' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Private employers, whether individuals, partnerships, proprietary concerns or companies (other than Government companies) are clearly excluded from the `establishments' to which section 47 of the Act will apply.

13. There is yet another indication in section 47, that private employers are excluded. The caption/ marginal note of section 47 describes the purport of the section as non-discrimination in Government employment. The word `government' is used in the caption, broadly to refer to `State' as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. If the intention of the legislature was to prevent discrimination of persons with disabilities in any kind of employment, the marginal note would have simply described the provision as `non-discrimination in employment' and sub-section (1) of section 47 would have simply used the word `any employer' instead of using the word `establishment' and then taking care to define the word `establishment'. The non-use of the words `any employer', and `any employment' and specific use of the words `Government employment' and `establishment' (as defined), demonstrates the clear legislative intent to apply the provisions of Section 47 only to employment under the State and not to employment under others. While the marginal note may not control the meaning of the body of the section, it usually gives a safe indication of the purport of the section to the extent possible. Be that as it may.

14. The learned counsel for the employee submitted that the decision in Dhanoa was rendered with reference to a penal statute; and that words or terms in such statutes are used in a restrictive and strict sense. He contended that definition of words and terms in a penal statute will not provide a safe guide to interpret the same words employed in socio-economic legislations. He further contended that the terms used in a socio-economic statute like Disabilities Act, providing for full participation and equality, for people with disabilities and to remove any discrimination against them vis-`-vis non- disabled persons, should be interpreted liberally. He submitted that any interpretation of the term `a corporation established by or under a central, provincial or state Act' with reference to the Penal Code should not therefore be imported for understanding the meaning of that term when used in the Act. He referred to and relied upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act which states that India as a signatory to the Proclamation on the Full Participation and Equality of the People with Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region, enacted the Statute to provide for the following :

(i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities;

(ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities;

(iii) to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of development benefits, vis-`-vis non-disabled persons;

(iv) to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities;

(v) to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and

(vi) to make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream."

He submitted that keeping the said objects in view, the term `establishment' should be extended to all corporations incorporated under the Companies Act 1956, irrespective of whether they are in the public sector or private sector.

14.1) He also relied upon the following principle of contextual interpretation enunciated by this Court in Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., - 1987 (1) SCC 424:

"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say is the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place."

14.2) He next relied upon the principle that words in a social welfare legislation should receive liberal and broad interpretation, stated by this Court in Workman of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation - 1985 (4) SCC 71 :

"The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognized and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the `colour', the `content' and the `context' of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds - 1971 (3) All ER 237). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (1981) 1 SCR 789, we had occasion to say, Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of "bread and butter" statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions."

14.3) He next relied upon the following observations in Kunal Singh v. Union of India - 2003 (4) SCC 524, where this Court, referring to the very section under consideration, observed thus :

"Section 47 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during the service. In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service."

15. We agree that the socio-economic legislations should be interpreted liberally. It is also true that Courts should adopt different yardsticks and measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes, as compared to penal statutes, and taxing statutes. But a caveat. The courts cannot obviously expand the application of a provision in a socio-economic legislation by judicial interpretation, to levels unintended by the legislature, or in a manner which militates against the provisions of the statute itself or against any constitutional limitations. In this case, there is a clear indication in the statute, that the benefit is intended to be restricted to a particular class of employees, that is employees of enumerated establishments (which fall within the scope of `state' under Article 12). Express limitations placed by the socio-economic statute can not be ignored, so as to include in its application, those who are clearly excluded by such statute itself. We should not lose sight of the fact that the words "corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act" is a term used in several enactments, intended to convey a standard meaning. It is not a term which has any special significance or meaning in the context of the Disabilities Act or any other socio-economic legislations. It is a term used in various enactments, to refer to statutory corporations as contrasted from non-statutory companies. Any interpretation of the said term, to include private sector, will not only amount to overruling the clear enunciation in Dhanoa which has held the field for nearly three decades, but more importantly lead to the erasure of the distinction maintained in the Constitution between statutory corporations which are `state' and non-statutory bodies and corporations, for purposes of enforcement of fundamental rights. The interpretation put forth by the employee would make employees of all companies, public servants, amenable to punishment under the provisions of Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act; and would also result in all non-statutory companies and private sector companies being included in the definition of `State' thereby requiring them to comply with the requirements of non- discrimination, equality in employment, reservations etc.

16. The appellant next contended that the scheme of the Act, does not confine its applicability to government or statutory corporations. Reference is invited to some provisions of the Act to contend that obligations/duties/ responsibilities are fixed with reference to persons with disabilities, on establishments other than those falling under section 2(k) of the Act. It was submitted that section 39 casts an obligation on all educational institutions, to reserve not less than three percent of the seats for persons with disabilities. In fact, it is not so. Though, the marginal note of section 29 uses the words `all educational institutions' with reference to reservation of seats for persons with disabilities, the section makes it clear that only government educational institutions and educational institutions receiving aid from the government shall reserve not less than three percent seats for persons with disabilities. It is well recognized that an aided private school would be included within the definition of `State' in regard to its acts and functions as an instrumentality of the State. Therefore, care is taken to apply the provisions of the Act to only educational institutions belonging to the government or receiving aid from the government and not to unaided private educational institutions. Further, section 39 of the Act, does not use the word `establishment'. Reference is next made to the section 44 which requires non-discrimination in transport. This section requires establishments in the transport sector to take special measures (within the limits of their economic capacity) to permit easy access to persons with disabilities. The employee contends that this would mean that all establishments whether statutory corporations falling under the definition of section 2(k) of the Act or non- statuary corporations, or even individuals operating in the transport sector should comply with section 44 of the Act. We do not propose to consider whether Section 44 applies to non-statutory corporations in the transport sector, as that issue does not arise in this case. Further the use of the words "within the limits of their economic capacity" makes it virtually directory. Be that as it may.

Re : Question (ii)

17. As the appellant in CA No. 1886/2007 and the third respondent in CA No. 1858/2007, are not establishments, within the meaning of that expression in Section 2(k) of the Act, section 47 of the Act will not apply. In so far the CA No. 1858 of 2007, there is an additional factor. Third respondent therein was not the employer of any persons with disability. Therefore, in that case, the entire question is academic. In neither of the cases, any relief can be granted under section 47 of the Act.

18. Therefore CA No. 1886 of 2007 is allowed and CA No. 1858 of 2007 is dismissed resulting in the dismissal of the respective writ petitions. This will not come in the way of employee of any private company, who has been terminated on the ground of disability, seeking or enforcing any right available under any other statute, in accordance with the law.


_____________________J.    (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

 _____________________J.   (R. M. LODHA)

  _____________________J.  (C. K. PRASAD)

                                                         

New Delhi.                                     

March 31, 2010.                                         

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

Delhi High Court issues notices to DU colleges on non implementation of PWD Act.

Notices to colleges for not adhering to disability quota



New Delhi: The Delhi High Court recently issued notices to eight colleges run by the central government for not implementing the disability quota for teachers despite directions.


A division bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Ajit Bharihoke asked the colleges to file their reply by April 16 and state why their orders were not complied with.

Bharti College and Lady Harding Medical College are two of the eight colleges that have not complied with the order.

Colin Gonsalves, counsel for NGO Sambhavana Trust, said, "There are only 39 colleges in Delhi University (DU) that have complied fully with the disability quota, 12 colleges have partially complied and 31 colleges have not complied at all."

The court was hearing a public interest petition seeking an implementation of the law on quota for disabled candidates for teaching posts.

Sambhavana Trust, a registered society of disabled persons, had alleged that the varsity and its colleges had not implemented the law even 15 years after the Parliament passed it and six years after the court's direction in this regard.

It was also submitted that the university, after enactment of the law, had passed a resolution in 1996 to provide three percent reservation for the disabled, out of which two percent was to be given to the visibly handicapped and one percent to orthopaedically handicapped. IANS (This is miquoted in the media, the correct version as 1.5% to the Visually Impaired and 1.5% to the Orthopaedically Impaired candidates)

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Discharged on request with undertaking- will not seek pension- illegal, arbitrary & bad in law

 Dear friends,

Here is a fit case that has come to light which reinforces that the principals of natural justice can't be overruled with illegal undertakings got signed from the outgoing employees. Disregarding the earlier rejection of the petition by lower court and also refusal from Punjab and Haryana High court, the Chandigarh bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) decided the disability pension case in favour of the retired subedar, a day before i.e. on 09th March 2010.

The Subedar was discharged on his own request and the employer got an undertaking signed from him that he would not claim any pension. The court held it absoutely illegal, arbitrary and bad in law. Though the matter took a long time but finally some justice seems to be coming through.

This matter also indicates that specific courts can do much better job in rendering justice than a regular or general court. The same holds true for matters relating to disability- where our experience confirms that the Court of Chief Commissioner-Disabilities constituted under the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 has done far better job while CAT and High Court went on against the petitioners in similar matters.

regards
SC Vashishth, Advocate-Disability Rights

To read from source click here:  VRS no ground for rejecting pension, says defence tribunal

The Chandigarh bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) decided a disability pension case in favour of a retired subedar on Tuesday. The case had earlier been rejected by a lower court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court on the grounds that the army personnel had given an undertaking at the time of voluntary retirement stating he would not claim disability pension.

Citing the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mahavir Singh Narwal versus Union of India of 2005 in support of this case, the Chandigarh bench of AFT, comprising Justice Ghanshyam Prasad and Lieutenant General (retired) Justice N S Brar, decided that the lower court was neither legal nor justified and had wrongly rejected the suit of the petitioner.

The bench decided that the petitioner, former subedar Rohtash Singh, resident of Umrawal village, district Bhiwani, was entitled to get disability pension from the date of his discharge plus the arrears of three years prior to filing of the suit with eight per cent annual interest. It was stated that the rejection of Singh’s claim for grant of disability pension on the grounds that he was discharged from service at his own request and gave an undertaking that he would not claim any pension was absolutely illegal, arbitrary and bad in law.

Rohtash Singh joined the Regiment of Artillery on May 25, 1967. He had a head injury after he met with a serious accident on September 26, 1989.

The medical board proceedings conducted by the Military Hospital in Ambala Cantonment awarded him 30 per cent disability and he was discharged on September 1, 1992.

He approached the appropriate authority for the grant of disability pension, which was rejected by the Artillery Record, Nasik, on January 12, 1994, on the plea that he was discharged at his own request and hence not entitled for disability pension. He also filed an appeal against the rejection of his appeal which was also rejected by the competent authority on July 22, 1994.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court relegated the matter to the civil court on August 12, 2005. The civil court also rejected Singh’s appeal on the grounds that he was discharged from service at his own request on extreme compassionate grounds as per the Army Headquarters and he has approached the court after the lapse of nine years of rejection of his appeal.