Wednesday, April 22, 2020

Accident having occurred during leave and not attributable to government service - Claim for disability pension not sustainable (CCS(EOP) Rules, 1939)




HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

AFR
Reserved
In Chamber

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 1178 of 2019

Appellants :- Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi and 3 others
Respondent :- Raj Bahadur Singh s/o Veer Singh, r/o Murauli, P.O. Durgaganj, District Rampur
Counsel for Appellants :- Ashok Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- Divakar Rai Sharma

Hon'ble Biswanath Somadder,J.
Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.
(Per : Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)

1. The present special appeal seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 27.05.2019 passed in Writ-A No.53145 of 2004 (Raj Bahadur Singh Vs. Union of India and others) whereby the writ petition has been allowed and the orders passed by the respondent authorities in terms of which the claim of the petitioner for disability compensation under the Central Civil Services (Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 19391 stood rejected, have been set aside, and a direction has been issued to the respondents to compute the benefits payable to the petitioner under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939 and to pay the same within a stipulated time period as per terms of the order.

2. The Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, and the authorities of the Central Reserve Police Force, who were the respondents in the writ petition, are the appellants before us.

3. The principal grounds canvassed before us on behalf of the appellants is that the respondent-petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of disability compensation inasmuch as he was not 'homebound' when he met with the accident, as he had already reached home and the accident occurred when he was engaged in his personal work and as such there was no causal connection/ attributability between the disablement and government service, and the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge to Rule 3-A(1)(a) of the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, is erroneous and the judgment and order is legally unsustainable.

4. It has been pointed out that the respondent was sanctioned leave for 14th, 15th, and 16th December, 1998 with permission to avail 13th December, 1998, the same being a Sunday, and he had left the Unit, where he was posted, on 13th December, 1998 itself to reach his home town on the same day which is only at distance of 110 kilometers from the Unit he was posted, having a travelling time of about three hours, and in view of the same the accident having occurred on 14th December, 1998, the respondent petitioner could not in any manner be said to be 'homebound' at the relevant point of time.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner has supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge by submitting that the petitioner having met with an accident on 14th December, 1998 while he was on leave for a short period, the same would be considered to be on duty, and he would be entitled to get the disability benefit.

6. The facts of the case, which are reflected from the records before us, indicate that as per the case set up in the writ petition, the petitioner was on leave from 14th December, 1998 to 16th December, 1998, when he met with an accident, which occurred on 14th December, 1998 while he was going to his house by a scooter which was hit from the opposite side by a three-wheeler. The claim raised by him for disability pension under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939 was based on a contention that the leave being for very short period, he would be considered to be on duty and would be entitled for the disability pension.

7. The claim raised by the petitioner for disability pension under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, was rejected by the Commandant of the Battalion by means of an order dated 6th April, 1999, the operative portion of which reads as follows :-
‘‘1. चॅूकि बल संख्या-911182766 सिपाही राज बहादुर सिंह का एक्सीडेंट दिनांक 14/12/98 को लगभग 17 बजे दिनांक 14/12/98 से 16/12/98 तक 3 दिन के अवकाश दिनांक 13/12/98 की अनुमति सहित, के दौरान अपना निजी कार्य संपन्न करते समय अपने पैतृक गॉव में हुआ है, अतः उक्त दुर्घटना के परिणाम स्वरूप हुए नुकसान अथवा भविष्य में होने वाली किसी भी असक्तता के लिए उक्त कार्मिक केरिपुबल विभाग से किसी प्रकार के दावे/प्रतिपूर्ति का हकदार नहीं होगा तथा उक्त दुर्घटना सरकारी ड्यूटी पर न मानी जा कर कार्मिक के द्वारा निजी कार्य संपन्न करते समय निजी कार्य हेतु मानी जाये।2. कार्मिक के ईलाज की अवधि का समय समय पर कार्मिक के अवकाश की हकदारी के अनुसार नियमित कर दिया जाये।’’
8. Thereafter, the respondent-petitioner submitted a representation before the Deputy Inspector General, CRPF, Rampur raising a plea that the accident having occurred during the period of casual leave the same would be considered to be as a period on duty as per the relevant rules and accordingly the accident would be deemed to be while on government duty and accordingly he was entitled to disability pension. The claim sought to be raised by the respondent-petitioner was rejected by the Deputy Inspector General, CRPF by means of an order dated 5th April, 2004 stating therein that there was no provision under the relevant rules that the period spent on casual leave would be treated to be as that on duty and therefore the accident having occurred when the respondent-petitioner was on casual leave the same could not have been treated to be an accident while on duty.

9. Aggrieved against the aforesaid two orders, the respondent-petitioner preferred another representation before the Director General of Police, CRPF, Lucknow, reiterating his contention that the accident having occurred during a period when he was on casual leave the same would be treated to be as a period spent on duty. The representation of the petitioner was turned down by the Director General, CRPF, by assigning the reason that there was no provision under the rules to treat the period of casual leave as that on duty and therefore the respondent petitioner could not claim entitlement to disability pension.

10. The stand taken by the respondents (appellants herein) with regard to the claim set up by the petitioner, as reflected from the averments made in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, is being extracted below :-


"3(a). That while the petitioner was working as Constable/General Duty at 62 Bn. C.R.P.F. C/o. 56 APO. He has sanctioned three days Casual Leave i.e. for 14th, 15th and 16th December, 1998 with the permission to avail 13th December, 1998, being Sunday.
3(b). That on 14th December, 1998 when he was on leave, he met under an accident with three wheeler at his home town at Hardoi while he was doing his own work and he sustained the fracture injury in his right leg due to said accident.x x x x x5. That in reply to the contents of paragraph no. 3 of the writ petition, it is submitted that on 14th December, 1998 at his home town while the petitioner was on sanctioned leave the accident took place in which he receive the injury in his right leg. However, on 6.4.1999 an order has been passed that as per Rule petitioner is not entitled for disability benefits."
11. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, the provisions with regard to disability pension under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, may be adverted to.

12. The relevant extracts from the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, are as follows :-

"3. For the purpose of these rules unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,(1) 'accident' means,(i) a sudden and unavoidable mishap; or(ii) a mishap due to an act of devotion to duty in an emergency arising otherwise than by violence out of and in the course of service;(2) 'date of injury' means,(i) in the case of accident or violence, the actual date on which the injury is suffered or such date, not being later than the date of the report of the Medical Board, as the President may fix; and(ii) in the case of disease, the date on which the Medical Board reports or such earlier date as may be fixed by the President with due regard to the opinion of the Medical Board;3-A. Disablement/Death.--(1)(a) Disablement shall be accepted as due to Government service, provided that it is certified that it is due to wound, injury or disease which,(i) is attributable to Government service, or(ii)existed before or arose during Government service and has been and remains aggravated thereby.(b) Death shall be accepted as due to Government service provided it is certified that it was due to or hastened by,(i) a wound, injury or disease which was attributable to Government service, or(ii) the aggravation by Government service of a wound, injury or disease which existed before or arose during Government service.(2) There shall be a causal connection between,(a) disablement and Government service; and(b)death and Government service, for attributability or aggravation to be conceded. Guidelines in this regard are given in the Appendix which shall be treated as part and parcel of these Rules."
13. We may also refer to the 'Guidelines for conceding attributability of disablement or death to government service', referable to Rule 3-A(2), appended to the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939.

14. In particular, we may refer to clause 4(b) and 4(c) of the aforesaid guidelines, which are as follows :-

"4(b) A person subject to the disciplinary code of the Central Armed Police Battalions, is 'on duty',(i) When performing an official task or a task, failure to do which would constitute an offence, triable under the disciplinary code, applicable to him.(ii) When moving from one place of duty to another place of duty irrespective of the method of movement.(iii) During the period of participation in recreation, organized or permitted by service authorities, and during the period of travelling in a body or singly under organized arrangements.(iv) When proceeding from his duty station to his leave station on returning to duty from his leave station at public expenses, that is, on Railway warrant, on cash TA (irrespective of whether Railway warrant/cash TA is admitted for the whole journey or for a portion only), in Government transport or when road mileage is paid for the journey.(v) When journeying by a reasonable route from one's official residence to and back from the appointed place of duty irrespective of the mode of conveyance, whether private or provided by the Government.(c) An accident which occurs when a man is not strictly 'on duty' as defined above, may also be attributable to service, provided that it involved risk which was definitely enhanced in kind or degree by the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of his service and that the same was not a risk common to human existence in modern conditions in India. Thus, for example,where a person is killed or injured by someone by reason of his belonging to an Armed Police Battalion (and in the course of his duty in such service, he had incurred wrath of such person) he shall be deemed to be 'on duty' at the relevant time.This benefit will be given more liberally to the claimant in cases occurring on 'active service' as defined in the relevant Acts/Rules (e.g., those applicable to BSF/CRPF, etc., Personnel)."
15. It may be noted that the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, are applicable to all Central Government servants paid from Civil Estimates other than those to whom the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, applied, whether their appointments are permanent or temporary on a scale of pay or fixed pay or piece-work rate.

16. The CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, provide for the grant of award in the form of monthly pension or lump sum compensation in certain circumstances, including a case, where a government servant is boarded out of government service on account of his disablement due to wound, injury or disease and the disablement is accepted as due to government service, the government servant would be granted disability pension. This disability pension would be in addition to invalid pension/gratuity, if admissible under CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.

17. As we have already noticed the appellants/respondent have taken a specific stand that the respondent-petitioner had been sanctioned three days' casual leave for 14th, 15th, and 16th December, 1998 with a permission to avail 13th December, 1998 being a Sunday, and during the period when he was on leave on 14th December, 1998, he met with an accident at his home town while on his own work and there would be no entitlement to disability benefit to a person in a case where disability had occurred other than on government duty and accordingly orders were passed by the authorities rejecting his claim. It was also stated that there was no provision in terms of which a period of casual leave is to be treated as a period on duty, as claimed by the petitioner.

18. The stand taken by the respondents/appellants in their counter affidavit has been taken note of by the learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal in the following manner :-
"A Counter Affidavit has been filed by respondents admitting that petitioner was working as Constable (General Duty) at 62 Battalion, CRPF, C/o 56 APO. He was sanctioned three days casual leave, i.e., 14th, 15th and 16th December, 1998 with the permission to avail 13th December 1998 being Sunday. On 14.12.1998 while riding a Scooter and going to his hometown at Hardoi, petitioner met an accident with a three-wheeler causing fracture in his right leg."

19. Similarly, the order dated 6th April, 1999 passed by the Commandant, CRPF, rejecting the claim of the respondent petitioner for disability pension has been taken note of in the judgment under appeal, as follows :-


"Whenever a person is granted leave, it cannot be said that as soon as he is relieved at the place of posting or moves towards his hometown, process of journey would not be attributable to Government service inasmuch this journey is also being undertaken by the employee concerned which is directly attributable to his service inasmuch as a part of service conditions, he was posted at a place other than his hometown. Therefore, till the incumbent reaches his hometown on official leave, in my view, the entire process of journey will be part of official duty being attributable to Government service and has casual connection to such service."

20. The judgment under appeal proceeds on the premise that the claim of the petitioner had been rejected for the reason that the petitioner had met with an accident while proceeding on leave and that the accident occurred on 14th December, 1998 while the petitioner was on his way to his home town. It is on the basis of this presumption that the learned Single Judge proceeded to formulate the issue in dispute and also to record his view in the following manner :-
"7. In the present case, petitioner met an accident when he was granted leave and going to his Hometown from the place of his posting. "Whether an employee when returns to Home from his Office or place of posting, if meets and accident, can it be said to have occurred during the course of employment and in the present case can it be said that it has connection with Government duty" is the moot question to be answered."8. In my view, it cannot be said that returning to Hometown from place of posting has no direct connection with the Government duty inasmuch, leave when granted to a Government servant is part of service condition and when Government servant is returning to his house from the place of posting, it is an incident of service having direct connection with the Government duty otherwise there would not have been any occasion for the Government Servant to undertake journey to return to his Hometown.9. When an Government Servant is granted leave and he proceeds from his place of Posting to his residence, can it be said that as soon as he leaves the place of postings, he ceased to be a Government Servant and there is no connection with Government duty at all is also an issue which has to be examined in the light of spirit of Rules with which Rules, 1939 have been framed.
10. The aforesaid Rules are for the welfare of employees who sustain injuries, disease etc. during course of duty or when they are doing something which has any connection with the Government Duty."

21. On a plain reading of the pleadings in the writ petition, as are evident from the records, it is seen that the issue which was formulated by the writ court did not at all arise in the facts of the case.

22. In the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, the appellants/respondents nowhere took a stand that the accident occurred on 14th December, 1998 while the petitioner was going to his home town and that his claim for disability pension was turned down for that reason. The order dated 6th April, 1999 passed by the Commandant, CRPF, rejecting the claim of the petitioner for disability pension, is also not for the reason that the accident occurred when the petitioner was proceeding on leave as has been noted in the judgment under appeal.

23. It is also not the stand of the writ petitioner in the writ petition, or at any stage when he raised his claim for disability pension before the authorities, that the accident occurred on 14th December, 1998 while he was proceeding on leave or was on way to his home town. On the contrary, the admitted case of the petitioner was that the accident occurred while he was on leave and the basis of the claim set up by him was that the leave being for a very short period he would be considered to be on duty and would be entitled for disability pension on the basis thereof.

24. It thus emerges from the admitted stand of the parties that the petitioner had been sanctioned three days' casual leave for 14th, 15th and 16th December, 1998 with permission to avail 13th December, 1998, being a Sunday, and it was on 14th December, 1998 during the period when the petitioner was on leave that the accident occurred. The claim set up by the petitioner was based on the ground that the leave being for a short period, the petitioner ought to have been considered to be on duty when the accident occurred.

25. The precedents which have been referred to in the judgment under appeal, are mostly in respect of matters relating to the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, and the interpretation of the expression 'in the course of employment' which term as per the settled legal position has been held to connote not only actual work but also any other engagement, natural and incidental thereto.

26. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law and in particular that the expression 'in the course of employment' would stand reasonably extended both as regards work-hours and work-place by applying the doctrine of notional extension as to time and place. The narrow interpretation that an accident would be said to have arisen 'out of and in the course of employment' only if the workman sustained injuries at the place of his employment, would be totally out of sync with the present times where modern management methods and developments have made it wholly unnecessary to consider a workman on duty only when he reaches his place of work or starts working and the principle of notional extension of the employers' premises has been adopted in the context of claims relating to workmen compensation. It is in this context of notional extension of the employers' premises that in a case where an employee dies while going to join his duty or while coming back from duty, would be deemed to be 'in the course of his employment'.

27. As we have already noticed, in the facts of the present case, the accident having admittedly occurred while the petitioner was already availing leave and was neither in the process of undertaking a journey home from duty or going back to duty the issue with regard to notional extension of the employers' premises would not arise in the present case.

28. The question which was therefore posed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition does not arise in the facts of the case at hand since it was not the case of the petitioner that the accident occurred while he was undertaking a journey back home from his place of work and for the said reason the accident could not be said to have occurred 'in the course of employment'.

29. The law with regard to applicability of the doctrine of precedents is well settled. It has been consistently held that a judgment is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. In order to fully understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision, it is always necessary to see what were the facts of the case in which the decision was given and what was the point decided.

30. In the case of The State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors.2 referring to the observations made by Earl of Halsbury LC in Quinn Vs. Leathem3, it was stated thus :-

"12. ...A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495."Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."
31. A similar view was taken in Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchandra and others4, and after referring to the decisions in London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. Vs. Horton5, Home Office Vs. Dorcet Yacht Co.6 and Herrington Vs. British Railways Board7, it was stated that observations of Court must be read in the context in which they appear and that one additional or different fact may make a world of difference :-

"15. ...Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. 
Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Pock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: 
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judges." 
16. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.(1970 (2) All ER 294), Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed. 
"One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 
17. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 
18. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."x x x"Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."

32. The precedents which have been referred to in the judgment under appeal being on a point of law which does not arise in the facts and situation of the present case reliance placed on the said decisions to arrive at a conclusion on a question which was not at issue is therefore misplaced and the judgment of the writ court cannot be sustained for the said reason.

33. We may now refer to the provisions of the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939 to advert to the question as to whether the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of disability pension in terms of the provisions contained therein.

34. The grant of disability pension under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939 is admissible in a case where government servant is boarded out of government service on account of his disablement due to wound, injury or disease. In terms of Rule 3-A(1)(a), disablement shall be accepted as due to government service, provided it is certified that it was due to wound, injury or disease which is attributable to government service, or existed before or arose during government service and has been and remains aggravated thereby. Further, sub-rule (2) of Rule 3-A provides that there has to be a causal connection between disablement and Government service for attributability to be conceded.


35. The guidelines for conceding attributability of disablement of government service, in the context of persons subject to the disciplinary code of the Central Armed Police Battalions (CAPB), have included the case of an accident which occurs while proceeding from duty station to leave station and on returning to duty from leave station at public expense. An accident which occurs when a person is not strictly 'on duty' as defined under clause 4(b), may also be attributable to service, provided it involved risk which was definitely enhanced in kind or degree by the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of his service and that the same was not a risk common to human existence in modern conditions.

36. In the case at hand, the accident having occurred on a day when the petitioner was availing leave, howsoever liberally we may attempt to construe the provisions under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, the petitioner would not by any stretch be held to be 'on duty' leading to a causal connection between disablement and government service for attributability to be conceded in any manner.

37. As per the petitioner's case also there is no assertion that the accident occurred while he was on his journey back home from his duty station, and the sole basis of the claim being founded on the stand that the leave being for a short period the petitioner may be considered 'on duty', the accident can in no manner be held to be attributable to Government service as per the provisions of the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, so as to sustain a claim for disability pension in terms thereof.

38. The judgment under appeal whereby directions have been issued to compute benefits payable to the petitioner in terms of the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, and to make payment of the same, therefore, cannot be sustained. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside.

39. The special appeal is allowed.

40. The writ petition stands dismissed.

Order Date :- 22.04.2020
Pratima


(Biswanath Somadder,J.)

(Dr.Y.K.Srivastava,J.)


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