Showing posts with label Supreme Court of India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supreme Court of India. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Supreme Court says Section 33 entitles reservation for employees with disabilities in promotion in Group A,B,C & D alike [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

Case Title: Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others

Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008

Date of Judgement: 30 June 2016

Subject: Reservation in Promotion for Disabled to Group A and B posts; Section 33 of The Persons with Disabilities Act 1995

Brief:

Dear Colleagues,

Please refer to my earlier posts dated 02 March 15 and  10 Oct 14, on the subject. 

In a historic judgment in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008 titled Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30 Jun 2016 has set aside / quashed the two below office memorandums issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, terming them as illegal and inconsistent with the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.:-
  •  OM No. 36035/16/91-Estt.(SCT) dated 18.02.1997  and 
  •  OM No. No.36035/3/2004-Estt. (RES) dated 29.12.2005 
In the instant case the petitioners, Rajeev Kumar Gupta and seven other persons with disabilities serving as engineers in Prasar Bharti made the grievance that the higher level posts in the engineering cadre were filled mostly by promotion. Although these posts were suitable for persons with disabilities, the Government was denying them 3% reservation in these posts, which amounted to defeating the intent and purpose of reservation provided for in the Persons with Disabilities (equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation) Act, 1995. At the heart of the problem were the DoPT instructions dated 18.2.97 and 29.12.2005, which prohibited reservation in promotion for disabled persons in Group A and B posts. 

Petitioners had argued that a large number of Groups A and B were filled only through promotion and because of the impugned DoPT memorandums, the benefit of reservation under Section 33 of the 1995 Act was denied with respect to those posts. Petitioners therefore lost out on a significant amount of opportunities at the upper end of the organizational hierarchy.

The government opposed concession to the disabled, contending that they have no right to demand reservation in promotion to identified Group A and Group B posts. It also cited the nine-judge bench ruling by the apex court in the Indra Sawhney (Mandal reservation) case, to maintain reservation should be confined to recruitment at the initial level, and not at the stage of promotions.

It may be pertinent to mention that in the Indra Sawhney case while dealing with caste based reservation issue, the Bench had held "Reservation in promotion is constitutionally impermissible as, once the advantaged and disadvantaged are made equal and are brought in one class or group then any further benefit extended for promotion on the inequality existing prior to be brought in the group would be treating equals unequally. It would not be eradicating the effects of past discrimination but perpetuating it."

But the bench dismissed the government’s arguments, noting that once the posts for the disabled have been identified under Section 32 of the Act, the purpose behind such identification cannot be frustrated by prescribing a mode of recruitment which results in denial of statutory reservation.

“It would be a device to defraud persons with disabilities of the statutory benefit. Once a post is identified, it means that a person with disability is fully capable of discharging the functions associated with the identified post. Once found to be so capable, reservation under Section 33 to an extent of not less than 3 per cent must follow. Once the post is identified, it must be reserved for PWD irrespective of the mode of recruitment adopted by the State for filling up of the said post,” it held.

The bench further said that Indra Sawhney’s case shall not impose a bar on reservation for the disabled, since the principle laid down in this case is applicable only when the State seeks to give preferential treatment in the matter of employment to the backward class.

“The basis for providing reservation for persons with disabilities is physical disability and not any of the criteria forbidden under Article 16(1) such as caste, religion etc. The objective behind the 1995 Act is to integrate those living with disabilities into the society and to ensure their economic progress… persons with disabilities are not and cannot be equated with backward classes contemplated under Article 16(4),” it said. Article 16 of the Constitution empowers the state to prescribe preferential treatment to certain classes in matters of public employment.

The judgement is historic and a major milestone in the fight for restoring the rights of persons with disabilities in India. 

The argument in this case were concluded on 17.03.2016  and the bench had reserved the judgement.

The case, represents success in a hard fought battle waged by persons with disabilities for equal opportunity and representation in the higher echelons of Government. Hitherto, disabled persons were likely to stagnate at the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, as their promotion to higher level posts was made difficult because of their physical disadvantage. 

Brief Background of related matters

It may be pertinent to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court  had on 08 Oct 2013 in the case titled Union of India vs. National Federation of the Blind delivered a land mark judgment directing the Govt, of India and State Governments to compute 3% reservation for persons with disabilities in all groups of posts against the total number of vacancies in the cadre strength. The Hon'ble Court also laid down that the computation had to be done in an identical manner in respect of all groups of posts. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its judgement dated 10 Dec 2013 in a case titled as MCD Vs. Manoj Kumar Gupta upheld a judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High court which declared that Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, provided for reservation in promotion for persons with disabilities in Groups A and B also.

But instead of implementing the judgement, the Govt. of India had been contesting the issue through various frivolous litigation which were nipped in the bud each time by the Hon'ble Court. 

Judgement Copy 

Download the Judgement dated 30 June 2016 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 521/2008 titled Rajeev Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Union of India and Others (PDF 326BKB) or read the judgement below:



Updates as on 04 Sep 2017 

The issue of whether persons with disabilities deserve reservation in promotions as well, apart from the reservation that exists in appointment, has been escalated by the Supreme Court to a five-judge bench since it requires interpretation by the Constitution bench.

On Monday (September 4, 2017) the bench of Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices AM Khanwilkar and DY Chandrachud heard deposition by Solicitor General Ranjit Kumar and counsels  requested a larger bench to hear the issue. The three judge bench headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice Dipak Misra agreed to refer the matter to a five-judge bench.

The question that has arisen in this case is whether persons, governed under “The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995”, can be given reservation in promotion. A view had been taken by this Court in Rajeev Kumar Gupta & Others vs Union of India & Others in the affirmative. The Solicitor General had pointed out that the prohibition against reservation in promotion laid down by the majority in Indra Sawhney vs Union of India and Others – (1992) case applies not only to Article 16(4) but also to 16 (1) of the Constitution of India and inference to the contrary is not justified. Persons with disabilities certainly require preferential treatment and such preferential treatment may also cover reservation in appointment but not reservation in promotion. Section 33 of the 1995 Act is required to be read and construed in that background. “We find merit in the contention that the matter needs to be considered by the larger bench,” he said.

Monday, June 1, 2026

Supreme Court Issues Notice on PIL Seeking Stronger Enforcement of Disability Commission Orders

Court: Supreme Court of India
Case: Shashank Pandey v. Union of India
Case No.: W.P. (C) No. 715 of 2026
Date of Notice: 01 June 2026
Next Date of Hearing: 21 July 2026

On 1 June 2026, the Supreme Court of India has issued notice in a significant public interest litigation filed by disability rights advocate Shashank Pandey, raising concerns about the ineffective implementation of the grievance redressal mechanism under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). The matter is now listed for hearing on 21 July 2026.

The petition highlights a systemic problem familiar to many persons with disabilities across India: even after securing favourable recommendations from the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) or State Commissioners for Persons with Disabilities (SCPDs), implementation often remains elusive because authorities simply ignore the recommendations without consequences.

The Enforcement Gap

The RPwD Act establishes the offices of the CCPD and SCPDs as specialised statutory bodies entrusted with protecting and enforcing disability rights. Sections 76 and 81 of the Act require authorities to act on recommendations made by these commissions within three months. If an authority chooses not to comply, it must communicate reasons for such non-acceptance both to the concerned commission and to the aggrieved person.

According to data relied upon in the petition, however, this statutory framework is routinely disregarded.

The petition cites information furnished by the Union Government before the Supreme Court in an earlier case concerning compliance with CCPD recommendations. The data allegedly reveals that in a majority of cases authorities neither comply with recommendations nor furnish reasons for refusing to do so. For instance, in 2022, action taken reports were received in only 81 out of 250 cases, while reasons for non-acceptance were furnished in only 22 of the remaining cases. Similar trends were reported for 2023 and 2024.

The petitioner argues that only about 10–15% of cases involving non-compliance are accompanied by the statutorily mandated explanation, rendering the legislative safeguard largely ineffective.

Penalty Powers Rarely Used

One of the central concerns raised in the PIL is the near-total absence of enforcement through the penalty provisions contained in the RPwD Act.

Section 93 empowers disability commissions to impose fines on authorities that fail to furnish information, reports, or documents that they are legally required to provide. The petition contends that despite widespread failures to submit action taken reports or reasons for non-acceptance, there is no known instance where the CCPD has actually imposed penalties under this provision.

Similarly, Section 89 provides for penalties for contravention of provisions of the Act, yet the petition alleges that these powers remain largely unutilised.

According to the petitioner, this has resulted in a situation where successful complainants must approach High Courts or the Supreme Court merely to secure implementation of recommendations already issued by specialised disability commissions. The petition cites several examples where litigants had to seek constitutional remedies despite obtaining favourable findings from disability commissions.

Institutional Weakening of Disability Commissions

Beyond enforcement concerns, the PIL paints a troubling picture regarding the functioning and resourcing of disability commissions.

The petition notes that since 2019, the post of Chief Commissioner has not been occupied by a full-time appointee, with the position reportedly being handled as an additional charge by the Secretary, Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. The petitioner argues that this arrangement is inconsistent with the scheme of the RPwD Act and Rules, which contemplate an independent statutory office.

The petition further points out that only one of the two Additional Commissioner posts contemplated under Section 74(2) is presently filled, effectively reducing what should be a three-member leadership structure to a significantly weakened arrangement.

These vacancies, it is argued, contribute to delays in complaint adjudication despite the RPwD Rules envisaging disposal of complaints within three months.

Budgetary and Staffing Concerns

The PIL also raises concerns regarding financial and human resource allocation.

According to the petition, the CCPD's office received only ₹5.5 crore in budgetary allocation for 2025–26, substantially lower than allocations made to several other statutory commissions. For 2026–27, the allocation reportedly stands at ₹6.5 crore.

The petitioner argues that such limited resources affect the ability of disability commissions to discharge their statutory responsibilities effectively.

The petition further alleges that many State Commissions suffer from acute staffing shortages. Some reportedly lack even basic support personnel such as legal consultants, clerical staff, stenographers, and accountants necessary for efficient grievance redressal.

Digital Accessibility and Online Grievance Redressal

The PIL also highlights deficiencies in the digital infrastructure of disability commissions.

According to the petition, a large number of State Disability Commissions do not maintain functional websites. The petitioner further alleges that only four states presently provide a functioning online mechanism for registration of complaints, while most states and Union Territories either lack such systems altogether or operate dysfunctional portals.

For a rights enforcement framework intended to serve persons with disabilities across the country, the absence of accessible digital complaint mechanisms raises serious access-to-justice concerns.

Missing Advisory Committees

Another issue flagged in the PIL concerns the advisory committees mandated under Sections 74(8) and 79(7) of the RPwD Act.

The Act requires both the CCPD and SCPDs to be assisted by advisory committees comprising experts from the disability sector. However, the petitioner asserts that such committees are presently either non-existent or non-functional at both the central and state levels.

Reliefs Sought

The petitioner has requested the Supreme Court to:

  1. Frame guidelines ensuring effective and time-bound compliance with recommendations issued by disability commissions and ensure meaningful utilisation of penalty provisions under Sections 89 and 93 of the RPwD Act.
  2. Direct the Union Government to fill vacancies in the Office of the Chief Commissioner, including the vacant post of Additional Commissioner.
  3. Ensure constitution of advisory committees at both central and state levels.
  4. Order an independent audit of the offices of the CCPD and SCPDs to identify infrastructural, staffing and resource gaps and ensure their timely rectification.

Why This PIL Matters

The case raises a question that goes to the heart of disability rights enforcement in India: What value do statutory rights have if the institutions created to enforce them lack the authority, resources, or willingness to ensure compliance?

The RPwD Act established a specialised grievance redressal mechanism precisely to provide persons with disabilities a faster and more accessible alternative to conventional court litigation. If recommendations issued after inquiry can be routinely ignored without consequence, the effectiveness of that mechanism becomes seriously undermined.

The outcome of this PIL may therefore have implications extending far beyond the offices of the CCPD and SCPDs. It could determine whether disability commissions function merely as recommendatory bodies or evolve into robust institutions capable of securing meaningful compliance with disability rights obligations across the country.

With notice now issued and the matter scheduled for hearing on 21 July 2026, the Supreme Court's consideration of these issues will be closely watched by the disability rights community.


Friday, January 30, 2026

Menstrual Dignity is a Fundamental Right: Supreme Court on MHM in Schools

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1000 of 2022
Case Title: Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors. [PDF 786 KB]
Date of Judgment: 30 January 2026

Background

The petition, filed by Dr. Jaya Thakur, brought to the fore a persistent but under-acknowledged barrier to girls’ education — the absence of menstrual hygiene management (MHM) facilities in schools. The petitioner pointed out that lack of access to sanitary products, private functional toilets, water, and safe disposal mechanisms was leading to absenteeism and, in many cases, girls quietly dropping out of school.

The plea invited the Court to view menstrual health not merely as a matter of policy preference but as a question of constitutional rights.

Key Observations

The Supreme Court located menstrual health squarely within the guarantees of life, dignity, equality, privacy and education. The Bench emphasised that dignity must be experienced in everyday conditions and not remain a constitutional slogan. For menstruating students, the absence of facilities often translates into stigma, embarrassment, and exclusion.

The Court recognised that “period poverty” directly undermines equal access to education. Compelling a girl to miss school or manage menstruation in unsafe ways was held to be a violation of bodily autonomy and privacy. The judgment also noted that autonomy is meaningful only when supported by enabling conditions — functional toilets, water, menstrual products, and hygienic disposal.

Importantly, the Court acknowledged the social dimension of menstruation. It underlined the need to sensitise male teachers and students to normalise conversations around menstruation and prevent harassment or intrusive questioning.

Directions Issued

Through a continuing mandamus, the Court directed States and Union Territories to:

  • Provide functional, gender-segregated toilets in all schools, government and private, in both rural and urban areas.

  • Ensure toilets are hygienic, have water supply, and safeguard privacy.

  • Make oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins available free of cost, preferably through vending machines located within toilet premises.

  • Set up designated MHM corners with emergency supplies such as spare uniforms, innerwear and disposal bags.

  • Install safe and environmentally compliant disposal systems, including covered bins or incinerators.

  • Educate and sensitise male staff and students about menstruation.

The Court also linked compliance to the Right to Education Act. Government schools failing to meet Section 19 norms may invite accountability, while private schools risk de-recognition for non-compliance.

Commentary

This judgment is significant for reframing menstrual health from a welfare measure to a rights-based entitlement. By rooting MHM in Articles 14 and 21, the Court has made the issue justiciable and enforceable.

For the disability rights community, the ruling carries an added layer of importance. The Court’s insistence on privacy, functional infrastructure, and barrier-free access implicitly includes girls with disabilities, who often face compounded exclusion. Accessible toilets, water availability, and dignified spaces are not optional extras but constitutional necessities.

The decision also signals a broader judicial trend: recognising that exclusion in education often happens through design failures and social silence rather than formal denial. Addressing menstruation with candour and constitutional seriousness is a step toward substantive equality in schools. In effect, the Court has said what many girls already knew from lived experience — education cannot be equal if dignity is conditional.

While the judgment speaks in the language of all menstruating students, its implications are particularly profound for girls with disabilities — a group whose experiences around menstruation are rarely centred in policy or law. For many girls with disabilities, menstruation is not only a matter of hygiene but also of accessibility, support, and autonomy.

Girls with locomotor disabilities often encounter toilets that are technically “separate” but not usable — narrow doors, high thresholds, inaccessible taps, or disposal units placed beyond reach. For girls with visual disabilities, poorly designed facilities without tactile cues or consistent layouts can make independent menstrual management difficult. Girls with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities frequently face over-medicalisation, stigma, or denial of information about their own bodies. In some instances, families and institutions resort to restrictive practices out of fear or lack of support systems.

Against this backdrop, the Court’s insistence on dignity, privacy, and enabling conditions becomes highly relevant. When the Bench states that autonomy can only be exercised where infrastructure and resources exist, it indirectly affirms what disability rights advocates have long argued — that bodily autonomy is inseparable from accessible environments.

The reference to barrier-free access under the RTE norms is particularly important. If implemented in its true spirit, this could mean toilets that are accessible, safe, and usable for girls with diverse disabilities. MHM corners, if thoughtfully designed, could include accessible storage, clear signage, and support materials in multiple formats. Sensitisation of teachers and students can also reduce the infantilisation and silence that many girls with disabilities face around menstruation.

This ruling therefore opens a door. It allows future advocacy to explicitly demand disability-inclusive menstrual health frameworks within schools. The judgment may not detail these dimensions, but its rights-based reasoning readily accommodates them.

Menstrual dignity, for girls with disabilities, is not a peripheral concern. It sits at the intersection of education, health, accessibility, and gender justice. The real test now lies in whether implementation will recognise this intersectionality. If it does, the judgment could quietly become a turning point for some of the most marginalised students in the school system.

Read the judgement 



Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Substantive Equality over Technicalities- SC Grants Relief to Woman with Benchmark Disability saying Reasonable Accommodation is a Fundamental Right [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026
Case Title: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors.  [PDF 289 KB]
Date of Judgment: 13 January 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 53

Cases Referred: Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India (2024 INSC 775); Anmol v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 387); Om Rathod v. DGHS (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130); Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592); Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC; Avni Prakash v. NTA; Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625; Jane Kaushik v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257)

Brief 

In a significant judgment reinforcing the centrality of reasonable accommodation and substantive equality in public employment, the Supreme Court in Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited held that technicalities such as expiry of a recruitment panel cannot defeat the fundamental and statutory rights of persons with disabilities (PwDs). The Court directed Coal India Limited (CIL) to appoint the appellant, a woman with benchmark disability, by creating a supernumerary post and ensuring a suitable, accessible desk job with assistive infrastructure. 

Background

Coal India Limited had issued a recruitment notification in 2019 for Management Trainees. Sujata Bora applied under the visually disabled category, qualified for interview, and was later called for document verification and an Initial Medical Examination (IME) in 2021. She was declared medically unfit on the ground of visual disability coupled with residual partial hemiparesis.

Challenging this, she approached the Calcutta High Court. The Single Judge quashed the IME result and held that CIL could not deny appointment in the multiple disabilities category, but limited relief by directing consideration in the subsequent recruitment cycle since the earlier process had concluded. The Division Bench, however, set aside even this relief, primarily on the ground that the panel had expired.

Before the Supreme Court, detailed medical assessment was ordered through an AIIMS medical board. The final report assessed her disability at 57%, above the 40% benchmark threshold, making her eligible under the RPwD Act. The Court also interacted with the appellant and noted her determination and capability. 

Key Directions

The Supreme Court:

  • Set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court.
  • Held that the appellant had been wrongly denied employment through no fault of her own.
  • Directed creation of a supernumerary post for her appointment.
  • Requested that she be given a suitable desk job, with a separate computer and keyboard consistent with universal design under the RPwD Act.
  • Requested posting at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam.
  • Exercised powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. 

Reasonable Accommodation as a “Gateway Right”

One of the most important contributions of this judgment is its strong articulation of reasonable accommodation. The Court reaffirmed that:

  • Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right.
  • It is a gateway right enabling PwDs to enjoy all other rights.
  • Denial of reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination and undermines substantive equality.

The Court rejected a narrow view of accommodation limited to devices or physical aids, instead endorsing a broad, purposive interpretation aligned with dignity, autonomy, and participation.

Intersectionality: Gender and Disability

The Court expressly recognised intersectional discrimination, noting that the appellant was a single woman with disability striving to overcome compounded barriers. It held that equality analysis cannot be unidimensional where multiple axes of disadvantage operate together. This acknowledgment strengthens the evolving Indian jurisprudence on intersectionality in disability rights.

Directive Principles and the Right to Work

Linking disability rights with constitutional philosophy, the Court invoked Articles 14, 21, 39(a), and 41, reiterating that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are “two wheels of a chariot.” The right to livelihood and work was treated as integral to a meaningful life.

Corporate Responsibility and Disability

Notably, the judgment situates disability inclusion within Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and ESG frameworks, referencing UN Guiding Principles and ILO materials. It emphasises that disability rights are human rights and must be addressed from a non-discrimination perspective, not merely as diversity optics. 

Significance

This ruling is a landmark for several reasons:

  • Panel expiry cannot defeat disability rights where injustice is evident.
  • Reasonable accommodation is firmly embedded as a fundamental right.
  • Supernumerary posts are validated as a remedy in appropriate cases.
  • Intersectionality receives explicit judicial recognition.
  • Public sector employers are reminded that exclusion at the threshold, without exploring accommodations, is unlawful.

The Court’s opening line—“Lack of physical sight does not equate to a lack of vision”—aptly captures the spirit of the decision. The judgment sends a clear message: disability rights are not charity, nor mere policy preferences; they are enforceable legal and constitutional guarantees.

Read the Judgement


Friday, September 12, 2025

Why Are Disabled Persons Who Make Open Category Cut-Off Not Treated as General Candidates? Supreme Court Asks Centre

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta
Case Title:  Reena Banerjee and Another vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others (I.A. No(s). 130117 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No(s). 11938 of 2016  with
Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 116/1998 
Date of Judgment: September 12, 2025
Law:  Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (Section 34)

Case Summary

On September 12, 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment reinforcing disability rights under the constitutional framework and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPWD Act). The Court intervened on two distinct but connected issues:

  1. Upward Movement in Merit Lists for Persons with Disabilities (PWD)
    The Court expressed grave concern over the systemic denial of upward movement in the merit list for PWD candidates in public employment and education recruitment. Despite scoring above the general (unreserved) category cut-off, PWD candidates are treated only as reserved category candidates. This practice leads to lower-scoring PWD candidates occupying reserved seats, which the Court rightly described as "hostile discrimination." The Court directed the Central Government to explain by October 14, 2025, the steps taken to ensure that meritorious candidates are not denied upward movement and that the same principle applies to promotions as well.

  2. Project Ability Empowerment: Nationwide Monitoring of Care Institutions
    The Court initiated a comprehensive, independent, nationwide monitoring framework named Project Ability Empowerment. This follows decades of systemic neglect in state-run and private institutions housing persons with cognitive disabilities. The goal is to ensure effective implementation of the RPWD Act, safeguard constitutional rights, and shift away from institutionalisation toward community-based, inclusive models of care.

Key Directions and Distinct Aspects of the Judgment

1. Resident Profiling, Care and Rehabilitation

  • Individualized profiling of every resident, including age, gender, disability profile, medical history, education level, vocational skills, and psychosocial needs.
  • Creation of Individual Care Plans aligned with best practices to facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.
  • Assessment of healthcare access, periodic review of psychiatric prescriptions, and establishment of multidisciplinary care teams.

2. Accessibility, Infrastructure, and Education

  • In-depth audits of physical accessibility aligned with the Harmonised Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility.
  • Evaluation of accessible transport, assistive technologies, and communication formats.
  • Assessment of access to education for children and vocational training for adults, including institutional support for the National Institute of Open Schooling.

3. Rights, Protection, and Compliance

  • Examination of grievance redressal mechanisms, institutional policies, and participatory governance structures.
  • Review of use of restraints and behaviour management policies.
  • Monitoring compliance with the RPWD Act and the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, including appointment of protection officers and institution registration.

4. Staffing, Resources, and Accountability

  • Analysis of staffing strength, qualifications, training, and remuneration.
  • Review of institutional record-keeping, transparency mechanisms, and responsiveness to Right to Information (RTI) applications.

5. Documentation and Welfare Access

  • Recommendations for maintaining an online presence of institutions with an institutional dashboard containing essential functioning information.
  • Facilitation of Aadhaar enrollment for every resident to ensure access to welfare schemes.

6. Reservation under Section 34 of the RPWD Act

  • Strong emphasis on a positive and purposive interpretation of the reservation provisions.
  • Recognition that disability is not homogeneous, requiring nuanced application of affirmative action.
  • Mandate that meritorious PWD candidates should benefit from upward movement, leaving reserved seats for those with greater structural disadvantage.

Implications

This judgment marks a watershed moment in disability rights jurisprudence in India. It firmly rejects outdated medical and charitable paradigms of disability in favour of a rights-based, inclusive constitutional vision. The Court highlighted that reasonable accommodation is not charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The involvement of eight National Law Universities, regionalised across India, introduces a systematic, independent monitoring mechanism. The report due in March 2026 will present a data-driven, actionable pathway toward systemic reforms, including transition from institutional care to community living.

By addressing both affirmative action in public recruitment and the quality of institutional care, the Supreme Court affirmed that the true and substantive benefit of disability reservations and welfare must reach the most marginalized.

Read the judgement dated 12 Sep 2025 here




For further detailed updates on disability rights and authoritative case summaries, visit disabilityrightsindia.com.


Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Supreme Court of India Upholds the Right to Accessible Footpaths as a Fundamental Right under Article 21

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice AS Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Case Number: IA No. 50798 OF 2025 in W.P.(Civil) No.  295/2012
Case Title: S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India & Ors
Date of Order: 14 May 2025

Cases Referred: 

  • Olga Tellis & Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors  (1985) 3 SCC 545
  • Bombay HC in High Court on its own Motion vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 21221
  • Karnataka HC in the case of D.S. Ramachandra Reddy vs. The Commissioner of Police, Bangalore & Ors  2021 SCC OnLine Kar 12223

Brief:

In a historic development for pedestrian safety and disability rights in India, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the right to unobstructed and disabled-friendly footpaths is a fundamental right protected under Article 21 of the Constitution — the right to life and personal liberty. This judgment, rooted in constitutional guarantees and grounded in empathy for the lived realities of persons with disabilities (PwDs), marks a significant leap forward in the recognition of accessible urban infrastructure as a legal and human right.

The Background

The Supreme Court was hearing a public interest matter that raised critical concerns about the lack of proper footpaths, rampant encroachments, and the resulting safety hazards to pedestrians — especially those with disabilities. The Court acknowledged the urgent and widespread nature of the problem, noting that without accessible and continuous footpaths, pedestrians are effectively forced onto the streets, putting their lives at constant risk.

Key Observations and Findings

The Bench, comprising Justice AS Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, made a series of pointed observations that reflect both the legal urgency and the human costs of inaccessibility:

  • "Right to have unobstructed and disabled-friendly footpaths is guaranteed under Article 21," the Court unequivocally stated.
  • The safety of pedestrians is not a luxury, but a constitutional obligation of the state.
  • The absence of accessible footpaths disproportionately affects persons with disabilities, older persons, and others who rely on mobility aids.

Supreme Court's Directions

The Court issued a set of sweeping directions to ensure nationwide compliance and structural reforms:

  1. Mandatory Accessibility: Footpaths must be designed and maintained to be accessible and usable by persons with disabilities.

  2. Encroachment Removal: All encroachments from footpaths must be removed without exception.

  3. Universal Footway Standards: Every public road must have proper, inclusive footpaths or walkways.

  4. Policy Mandate: All States and Union Territories must evolve and implement policies for the construction, maintenance, and protection of accessible footpaths.

  5. Compliance Timeline:

    • States and UTs must frame guidelines in line with those issued by the Bombay High Court in High Court on its Own Motion v. State of Maharashtra and DS Ramchandra Reddy v. Commissioner of Police.
    • The Union of India is directed to place on record existing or new national guidelines within two months.
    • The matter is scheduled for further hearing on 1st August 2025, to review compliance.

Relevance of the Bombay High Court Model

The Supreme Court emphasized that States should refer to the Bombay High Court’s earlier directions, which already set a progressive precedent on footpath design, accessibility, and encroachment-free pedestrian zones. This reinforces the principle that access to infrastructure must be inclusive by design, not adjusted retroactively.

A Constitutional and Human Rights Milestone

This judgment is not merely about footpaths. It is a profound reiteration that urban design and infrastructure planning are constitutional issues. For persons with disabilities, accessible pedestrian infrastructure is not an amenity; it is a prerequisite for dignity, autonomy, and inclusion.

The Supreme Court’s order stands as a powerful reminder that accessibility is not optional — it is a mandated right under the Indian Constitution. The judgment sets the stage for a nationwide shift in how cities and towns approach pedestrian infrastructure to ensure accessible and dignified mobility for all people with disabilities.

Next Steps for Advocates and Stakeholders

  • Monitor Compliance: Civil society organizations, disability rights groups, and urban planners must actively engage with State governments to ensure meaningful implementation.
  • Participate in Policy Making: Stakeholders must demand participation in the framing of guidelines to reflect diverse accessibility needs.
  • Use as Precedent: This order provides strong judicial backing to challenge inaccessible infrastructure in any city or district.

Taking note of standards laid down by the Indian Roads Congress and other authorities, the Court directed: All State Governments and Union Territories shall frame guidelines in line with the High Court directions and file compliance reports within two months. The Union of India shall also place on record the policy/guidelines issued for protecting the rights of pedestrians within two months. 

As we approach the next hearing on 01 August 2025, this judgment offers a foundation to push for inclusive, safe, and equitable urban mobility — not just as a policy goal, but as a constitutional promise.

Read the Order dated  14 May 2025 above.

Thursday, May 1, 2025

Supreme Court issues directions to make the process of Digital KYC accessible for persons With disabilities, declares it an integral part of fundamental right under Article 21

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan 
Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 289/2024 & W.P.(C) No. 49/2025
Case Title: Pragya Prasun v. Union of India & Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgement: 30 April 2025

Published on: May 1, 2025
By: Disability Rights India Team

Background

The proceedings before the Supreme Court arose from writ petitions filed by persons with disabilities highlighting accessibility barriers in the digital KYC and e-KYC verification processes used by several financial institutions, telecommunications providers and other service platforms. The petitioners argued that the design and functioning of these digital verification systems prevented persons with visual impairments and facial disfigurements from independently completing identity verification procedures.

According to the petitioners, many digital KYC mechanisms relied on technological requirements such as capturing live photographs, facial recognition and other verification steps that were not compatible with the needs of persons using assistive technologies. These systems often required actions such as blinking or visually aligning documents, which created significant barriers for persons with blindness or severe eye injuries.

The petitioners contended that such barriers effectively excluded persons with disabilities from accessing essential services including banking facilities, telecommunications connections and other digital governance platforms. They argued that this failure violated the obligations imposed on public authorities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which requires government institutions and regulated entities to ensure accessibility in information and communication technologies.

In a historic and far-reaching judgment delivered on April 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of India declared that the right to digital access is an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. This precedent-setting decision is a major milestone in the struggle for disability rights in India, specifically addressing the systemic digital exclusion faced by persons with disabilities (PwDs), especially those with visual impairments and facial disfigurements.

The judgment was delivered in two writ petitions:
Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 289/2024 and Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 49/2025  —filed by advocates and disability rights activists seeking digital accessibility in the e-KYC process for individuals with blindness and acid attack survivors.

Key Directions Issued by the Court

A two-judge bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan issued 20 binding directions that mark a significant overhaul of the digital architecture for service delivery, with inclusivity and accessibility at the center.

Here are some of the landmark directives:

Digital KYC Must Be Inclusive

  • The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) must issue new guidelines that incorporate alternative methods to verify "liveness" or live photographs, moving beyond the default “blinking of eyes” method.
  • Entities must now accept thumb impressions as valid authentication for visually impaired users during the e-KYC process.

Right to Reasonable Accommodation

  • All reporting entities (REs), whether public or private, are directed to adhere to accessibility standards, appoint digital accessibility nodal officers, and undergo periodic audits by certified professionals.
  • All apps, websites, and platforms must involve persons with visual impairments in user acceptance testing for any new digital service.

Mandatory Accessibility for Government and Private Services

  • All government websites and digital services must comply with Section 46 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016, which mandates both electronic and print media be accessible.
  • WCAG 2.1 and Guidelines for Indian Government Websites (GIGW) are now mandatory for all government platforms.

Communication and Service Delivery

  • Public services must provide information in alternative formats—including Braille, easy-to-read formats, and audio-described content.
  • Helplines, grievance redressal mechanisms, and human review of rejected KYC applications must be set up for PwDs.

Sensitization and Training

  • Disability awareness and inclusion modules must be part of training for employees of all regulated entities.
  • RBI is directed to monitor implementation and regularly conduct public awareness campaigns about inclusive KYC processes.

A Game-Changer for Digital Equality

This judgment unequivocally affirms that access to digital services is no longer a privilege—but a constitutional right, especially for persons with disabilities who have been persistently side-lined in India’s digital revolution. The Court has not only addressed the how (mechanisms and guidelines) but also the why—the deep need to treat persons with disabilities as equal citizens entitled to dignity, convenience, and autonomy.

This move will have far-reaching consequences across all sectors—from banking and governance to education and healthcare. It is a wake-up call to both government and private entities that accessibility is not an afterthought—it is a non-negotiable obligation under the law.

Next Steps and Accountability

As disability rights advocates, it is now essential to monitor the implementation of these directions and hold entities accountable. Civil society must collaborate with regulators, tech developers, and service providers to translate these orders into practice on the ground.

The judgment reinforces the principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and aligns with the Accessible India Campaign. It is now up to us—activists, organizations, and allies—to ensure that these rights are not just declared but delivered.

Download/Read the judgement 

Thursday, April 3, 2025

All Disabilities Must Get Equal Treatment: Supreme Court Strikes Down Discriminatory Retirement Policy

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan

Case Title: Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr. 

Case No.: Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).1091-1092/2023

Date of Judgement: 03 April 2025

Brief

In a landmark judgment reinforcing the principle of equality for persons with disabilities, the Supreme Court has ruled that prescribing different retirement ages based on the type of disability amounts to unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that all benchmark disabilities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) constitute a single homogenous class for the purposes of service-related benefits—and must be treated equally.

Case Background:

The case arose when Kashmiri Lal Sharma, an electrician with 60% locomotor disability, was compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board. However, under an Office Memorandum (OM) dated March 29, 2013, employees with visual impairments were permitted to serve up to 60 years of age. Aggrieved by this differential treatment, the appellant challenged the policy as arbitrary and discriminatory, invoking both the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and the RPwD Act, 2016.

After unsuccessful representations before the State Administrative Tribunal and the Himachal Pradesh High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Ruling:

A Bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan ruled in the appellant’s favour. The Court struck down the impugned policy, declaring that prescribing different retirement ages solely based on the nature of disability lacks any rational basis and violates Article 14.

“There is no intelligible differentia to justify extending the retirement age benefit to only one category of benchmark disability while denying it to others. Such discrimination is arbitrary,” the Court observed.

The Court emphasized that all benchmark disabilities listed under the 1995 and 2016 disability laws must receive uniform service benefits, including retirement age.

Reference to Precedent:

The Bench relied on its earlier approval of the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014), which also upheld the principle of parity in service benefits across all recognized disability categories.

Relief Granted:

While the State had later withdrawn the 2013 OM on November 4, 2019, the Court held that the appellant had a legitimate expectation to continue in service until that withdrawal. As a result, the Court ruled:

“The appellant shall be entitled to the benefit of continuance in service until 04.11.2019. He is also entitled to full wages from 01.10.2018 to 04.11.2019, along with all consequential benefits impacting his pension.”

The Court thus partly allowed the appeal and set aside the Himachal Pradesh High Court’s decision dated 28.07.2021, which had earlier upheld the retirement.

Significance:

This judgment is a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory mandate of non-discrimination in employment policies affecting persons with disabilities. It sends a strong message that disability-based classifications in service benefits must meet the test of reasonableness and equality.

The decision underscores the spirit of the RPwD Act, which aims to ensure equal opportunity, protection of rights, and full participation of persons with disabilities in all spheres of life—including public employment.

Read the Judgement

Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr. 

Monday, March 3, 2025

Supreme Court Upholds Equal Access to Judicial Services for Persons with Disabilities [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan

Case Title:  Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, Vs. The Registrar General , The High Court of Madhya Pradesh  (Suo-Motu)

Case No.: SMW(C) No. 2/2024  (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2 of 2024

Date of Judgement: 03 March 2025

Brief: 

In a landmark judgment delivered on March 3, 2025, the Supreme Court of India reaffirmed the rights of persons with disabilities (PWDs) by holding that no candidate can be denied consideration for judicial service recruitment solely due to their disability. The ruling strikes down discriminatory provisions and upholds the principles of equality and affirmative action enshrined in the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

A Victory for Inclusive Judiciary

The judgment is a significant milestone in the journey toward an inclusive and equitable judicial system. The Supreme Court explicitly held that persons with disabilities must not face discrimination while seeking employment in the judiciary and that the state is responsible for ensuring an inclusive framework. The Court emphasized that any indirect discrimination—such as unreasonable cutoffs or procedural barriers—must be removed to uphold substantive equality.

By striking down a provision in the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Rules that barred visually impaired and low vision candidates from judicial service, the Court has sent a strong message against systemic exclusion. The ruling makes it clear that visually impaired candidates are fully eligible to participate in the selection process for judicial positions.

Key Highlights of the Judgment

  • The Supreme Court invalidated Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Services Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Services) Rules, 1994, which disqualified visually impaired candidates.

  • Rule 7, which imposed additional requirements such as a three-year practice period or a minimum of 70% aggregate marks, was also struck down to the extent that it discriminated against PWD candidates.

  • The Court held that reasonable accommodations must be provided to PWD candidates during the recruitment process, in line with the RPwD Act, 2016.

  • The judgment extends relief to PWD candidates in Rajasthan who were denied a separate cutoff in the Rajasthan Judicial Service preliminary exams, ensuring they will be considered in future recruitments.

Background of the Case

The case originated when the mother of a visually impaired candidate wrote to then-Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud about the exclusion of her son from the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination. Taking cognizance of the matter, the Supreme Court converted the letter into a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court subsequently issued notices to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the Union of India.

The issue gained prominence after the Civil Judge Class-II examination in 2022 failed to provide reservation slots for visually impaired candidates, contradicting the provisions of the RPwD Act. Interim measures were taken by the Court to ensure participation of visually impaired aspirants, but their selection was made subject to the final outcome of the case.

A Step Forward for Disability Rights

The judgment underscores a rights-based approach to disability inclusion in the judiciary. It affirms that disability is not a limitation but a social barrier that must be addressed through reasonable accommodations and affirmative action. The Court recognized that once recruited, judicial officers with disabilities must be provided the necessary training and support to discharge their duties effectively.

The ruling aligns with Section 34 of the RPwD Act, which mandates reservation for PWDs in government jobs, including judicial positions. Senior Advocate Gaurav Agarwal, acting as Amicus Curiae, argued that the Madhya Pradesh Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, already provide for a 6% reservation in state services, further reinforcing the need for compliance with disability rights legislation.

Implications for the Future 

The Supreme Court’s verdict sets a crucial precedent for other states and institutions in India. It reaffirms that arbitrary barriers preventing PWDs from equal participation in public service must be dismantled. Moreover, it highlights the judiciary’s commitment to ensuring substantive equality for persons with disabilities.

For aspiring judges with disabilities, this ruling is a ray of hope. It not only paves the way for their rightful inclusion in the legal profession but also strengthens the foundation of a truly representative and diverse judiciary.

This judgment is a reminder that the fight for disability rights is far from over, but each legal victory brings us closer to a more inclusive society.

Judgement

Read the Judgement below:

Friday, February 21, 2025

Beyond “Both Hands Intact”: Supreme Court Rejects Ableist Approach to Medical Education in Anmol Vs UOI

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. V. Viswanathan 
Case No. : Civil Appeal No. 14333 of 2024
Case Title:  Anmol v. Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgement: 21 February 2025

Overview:

The Supreme Court has once again affirmed that disability cannot be treated as a proxy for professional incompetence. In Anmol v. Union of India, the Court held that medical aspirants with disabilities must be assessed on functional competence, with reasonable accommodation and assistive technology, rather than through rigid assumptions about their bodies.

Background

Anmol, an aspiring medical student, had secured rank 2462 in the PwD category in NEET-UG 2024 and had a 58% multiple disability comprising locomotor and speech and language disabilities. Despite meeting the eligibility threshold for the PwD quota, a Disability Assessment Board declared him ineligible for the MBBS course.

The principal barrier was the regulatory requirement that candidates with locomotor disabilities should have “both hands intact, with intact sensations, sufficient strength and range of motion.”

The Supreme Court found this approach legally unsustainable.

From impairment to functional competence

The Court emphasised that a disability assessment cannot end with the percentage of disability. Drawing upon its recent decisions in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, it reiterated that a candidate must be assessed to determine whether they can actually pursue the particular course, including with reasonable accommodation and assistive technology.

The Court was particularly critical of an approach under which Disability Assessment Boards become, in its words, “monotonous automations” that look at quantified disability and reject a candidate. Boards must instead examine whether the disability will actually prevent the candidate from pursuing the course.

This distinction is crucial. Functional competency focuses on the outcome that must be achieved, rather than insisting that every candidate achieve it in the same physical manner.

Reasonable accommodation is central—not an afterthought

The judgment reiterates the broad meaning of reasonable accommodation under Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act, 2016.

Accommodation is not limited to providing an assistive device. It may require modifications and adjustments that enable a person with disability to participate equally. The Court stressed that accommodation must be responsive to the individual needs of the person, and that there can be no “one size fits all” approach.

In Anmol's case, a separate assessment by Dr. Satendra Singh examined his actual functional abilities and considered possible clinical accommodations and assistive technologies. The assessment included simulated testing of several medical procedures, including suturing, handling syringes, making incisions, CPR and catheterisation.

The assessment concluded that Anmol could pursue the MBBS course with appropriate accommodations and assistive technology. The Supreme Court accepted this assessment.

“Both hands intact” has no place in disability-inclusive regulation

The Court expressly rejected the requirement of having “both hands intact”, holding that it failed to provide for individual functional assessment and was inconsistent with Article 41 of the Constitution, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the RPwD Act.

The Court stated:

“A prescription such as ‘both hands intact’ reeks of ableism and has no place in a statutory regulation.”

This is perhaps the most significant aspect of the judgment. A professional standard cannot simply reproduce the physical characteristics of the non-disabled majority and treat them as prerequisites for competence.

Expert opinion must also comply with the law

The Court clarified that it was not substituting its medical opinion for that of the experts. Courts are not medical boards. However, courts have both the jurisdiction and duty to ensure that the assessment process complies with constitutional and statutory requirements.

A negative assessment must therefore be reasoned, transparent and based on functional assessment. In the present case, the five-member AIIMS report did not adequately explain how Anmol had failed the functional assessment or why accommodation could not address the identified limitations.

The larger principle

The judgment reinforces a growing line of Supreme Court decisions moving disability law away from presumed incapacity towards functional ability, reasonable accommodation and substantive equality.

The correct question is not:

“Does this person have the physical characteristics traditionally associated with a doctor?”

It is:

“What are the essential competencies of the profession, can this person acquire and demonstrate them, and what reasonable accommodations may be required to enable equal participation?”

That shift is important not only for medical education, but for professional education and employment more broadly.

The Supreme Court ultimately confirmed Anmol's admission to Government Medical College, Sirohi, Rajasthan, and directed that the status of the revised NMC guidelines be placed before the Court.

Anmol therefore adds another important proposition to Indian disability jurisprudence: disability is not incompetence, and an assessment that does not meaningfully consider function, accommodation and assistive technology risks converting a professional eligibility test into a test of conformity with an able-bodied norm.

Read the judgement in Anmol Vs. UOI dated 21 Feb 2025


Tuesday, November 12, 2024

Supreme Court Mandates Enforcement of additional guidelines along with the UOI's Airport Guidelines for Dignified Assistance to Persons with Disabilities

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala  and Justice Pankaj Mithal

Case No. W.P.(C) No. 121/2024

Case title: Arushi Singh vs. Union of India  

Date of Judgement: 12 November 2024

Brief Summary

On November 12, 2024 the Supreme Court disposed off a writ petition filed by Arushi Singh, a person with a benchmark disability, addressing an incident of alleged humiliation at Kolkata Airport. Singh reported being asked by security personnel to stand up from her wheelchair during security screening, a situation that left her feeling disrespected and violated. The Court affirmed that the guidelines proposed by the Union Government for treating persons with disabilities with dignity at airports would now be mandatory, also extending to elderly and injured passengers requiring wheelchair assistance.

Incident Leading to the Petition  

Arushi Singh, a graduate of the National Law Institute University, Bhopal, and LL.M. holder from the National University of Singapore, recounted her experience on January 31, 2024. She alleged that she waited for approximately 20 minutes without assistance outside the airport and was subsequently asked to stand during security screening three times, despite her repeated explanations of her disability. The insensitivity allegedly displayed by Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel prompted Singh to file the petition, seeking effective enforcement of relevant regulations, including the Rights of Persons with Disability Act, 2016, and the Accessibility Standards and Guidelines for Civil Aviation 2022.  

Supreme Court Observations and UOI's Suggestions  

A bench comprising former Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice J.B. Pardiwala had noted during earlier hearings that the issues raised required action by the Union of India. During the proceedings, a joint statement was presented, outlining several suggestions for ensuring dignified treatment of specially-abled individuals at airports:  

1. Mobile Application for Wheelchair Availability: Real-time updates on wheelchair availability at designated airport points for easy access by users.  

2. Mechanized Wheelchairs: Availability of mechanized wheelchairs for passengers traveling solo or in cases of delayed assistance.  

3. Boarding Pass Coding:  Incorporation of an alphabet code indicating the type of disability and a color scale denoting the severity of the condition.  

4. Integration of Unique Disability Identity Database:  Streamlining the ticket booking process by linking the database, enabling instant access to verified disability information for better assistance.  

5. Specialized Kiosks for Boarding Passes: Contactless kiosks equipped with voice recognition and response technology to aid persons with disabilities.  

6. Regular Sensitization Training for Airport Staff: Comprehensive and periodic training for airport staff, emphasizing understanding various disabilities and compassionate assistance.  

Court’s Directives  

The Court agreed with the petitioner’s counsel, Abiha Zaidi, that these suggestions should be treated as mandatory guidelines. The bench further emphasized that these measures should not be limited to wheelchair users but also include elderly and injured passengers requiring assistance. Importantly, it clarified that physical assistance already being provided at airports would not be withdrawn under these guidelines.  

Concluding the matter, the bench remarked:  

"We dispose of the Writ Petition in the aforesaid terms laying more stress on sensitizing the staff at the airport to be more compassionate towards the specially abled passengers." 

Read the judgement