Delhi HC - JNU should work out the 5% reservation mandate of the RPWD Act, so that every person with disability, who qualifies get admission. [Judgement Included]

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench:  Hon'ble The Chief Justice  and Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3817/2018
Case Title: National Federation of Blind Vs. Union of India
Date of Judgement: 12 Nov 2018

Cases refered:

• Sambhavana v. Union of India and Ors. W.P.(C) 3919/2014 decided on March 4, 2015;
• Students Federation of India and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. W.P(C) 3032/2017 decided on October 1, 2018 
• and the Supreme Court in the cases of Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (2017)14 SCC 1; Union of India and Ors. v. National Federation of Blind and Ors. 2013 10 SCC 772,

Background

The Delhi High Court examined an important issue concerning implementation of the mandatory 5% reservation for persons with disabilities in higher educational institutions under Section 32 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The petition was filed by the National Federation of the Blind challenging the admission policy adopted by Jawaharlal Nehru University for admission to M.Phil./Ph.D. and Ph.D. programmes for the academic session 2018–19.

The main grievance was that JNU had failed to provide the full 5% reservation mandated under the RPwD Act.

According to the petitioner, against a total intake of 723 seats, the University reserved only 32 seats for persons with disabilities instead of approximately 36 seats required under the law.

The petitioner argued that the shortfall arose because the University calculated reservation separately for each School and Centre rather than calculating reservation on the basis of the total seats across the University.

Under this system, departments with fewer than nine seats effectively provided no reservation for persons with disabilities at all. The petitioner contended that such compartmentalised calculation diluted the statutory guarantee under Section 32 of the RPwD Act.

The case also involved denial of admission to candidates with disabilities in courses where reservation was allegedly not implemented due to low departmental seat intake.

JNU defended its methodology by relying upon the reservation framework followed under the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 and its School-wise and Centre-wise reservation calculations.

Key Observations of the Court

The Delhi High Court examined whether disability reservation under Section 32 of the RPwD Act could be calculated separately for each School or Centre even if such calculation reduced the overall reservation below the mandatory 5%.

The Court recognised that Section 32 creates a binding obligation requiring higher educational institutions receiving government aid to reserve “not less than 5%” seats for persons with benchmark disabilities.

Importantly, the Bench observed that this statutory mandate cannot be diluted through administrative formulas or internal institutional calculation methods.

The Court noted that the methodology adopted by JNU resulted in departments with small seat intake effectively excluding persons with disabilities from reservation benefits. As a consequence, the actual reservation available across the University fell below the statutory minimum.

The Bench made it clear that disability reservation cannot be treated as a fragmented or discretionary exercise dependent on departmental seat distribution.

The Court also observed that the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 cannot be interpreted in a manner that defeats the mandate of the RPwD Act.

Another important aspect of the proceedings was the recognition that rigid departmental allocation systems can indirectly exclude students with disabilities from higher education despite formal reservation policies existing on paper.

During the hearing, JNU acknowledged the issue raised by the petitioner and agreed to grant admission to additional candidates with disabilities in compliance with the RPwD Act.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court effectively held that reservation for persons with disabilities must be implemented in a manner that fully ensures the mandatory 5% reservation under Section 32 of the RPwD Act.

The Court:

• Recognised that School-wise or Centre-wise reservation calculations resulting in reservation below 5% are inconsistent with the RPwD Act;
• Took on record JNU’s decision to grant admission to additional PwD candidates;
• Addressed grievances relating to denial of admission arising from departmental seat allocation structures; and
• Reinforced that institutions cannot reduce statutory disability reservation through administrative calculation mechanisms.

Commentary

The judgment in National Federation of the Blind v. Union of India & Ors. is a significant ruling on disability reservation in higher education because it directly addresses one of the most common methods used to dilute reservation for persons with disabilities.

Educational institutions often adopt programme-wise or departmental seat calculations which appear compliant on paper but substantially reduce the actual number of seats available to students with disabilities. The Delhi High Court recognised that such practices undermine both the purpose and the guarantee of the RPwD Act.

A key strength of the judgment is its emphasis that the requirement of “not less than 5%” reservation must be implemented in substance and not merely in form.

The ruling also reinforces that disability reservation is not a matter of administrative convenience. Universities cannot rely on internal departmental structures or technical formulas to reduce opportunities available to persons with disabilities.

Importantly, the judgment situates disability reservation within the broader constitutional framework of equality, dignity and inclusion. Reservation under the RPwD Act is not simply a welfare measure but an enforceable right intended to address historical exclusion from educational spaces.

The case additionally highlights a continuing implementation gap in higher education institutions where statutory reservation exists formally but is weakened in practice through restrictive admission systems and fragmented seat allocation methods.

Overall, the decision remains an important precedent affirming that the full 5% disability reservation mandated under the RPwD Act must be meaningfully implemented and cannot be diluted through administrative practices.

Read the judgement below:

LPG dealership not a poverty alleviation scheme so as to come under Section 37 of The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, opines Bangalore HC

Poverty alleviation is for consumers- says Karnataka High Court, rejecting plea that questioned oil companies reserving only 3 per cent of LPG dealerships for people with physical challenges.

The High Court has refused a plea by an organisation working for the welfare of physically challenged persons to reserve five per cent of LPG dealerships to such people. The HC said that it cannot apply Section 37 of The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 as the LPG dealership given by State-owned oil companies are not government welfare schemes where this rule needs to be applied.

Karnataka Rajya Vikalchetanara Rakshana Samiti approached the HC against Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum and the Union Government challenging a notification by these companies that wanted to select 238 LPG distributors.

As per the RPD Act, the reservation for physically challenged persons is five per cent. But the notification had reserved only 6 distributorships for the physically challenged instead of 11, it was argued. This was less than 3 per cent.

The HC however said that the distributorship is not a welfare measure. It said, “In the overall comprehension of the matter, we are satisfied that even if the award of LPG distributorships, essentially a matter of commercial contract, is a welfare measure and leads to manifold empowerment and all-round development of society, it cannot be termed as a notified scheme for poverty alleviation and development.”

The court also said that poverty alleviation in LPG is directed at consumers and not distributors. So, reservation for distributors under the Act was not possible. It said, “Needless to reiterate that the availability of LPG to the persons below poverty line may be correlated with the poverty alleviation, but that relates to the consumers and not to the distributors.”

The division bench of Chief Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Justice S Sunil Dutt Yadav refused to consider the distributorship licencing as a poverty alleviation scheme. It said, “The award of LPG distributorships is taken up essentially by the three State-owned oil companies and is not any notified scheme of the appropriate Government or local authorities, which could be classified as a poverty alleviation and development scheme.”

Noting that three per cent of the distribution agencies are already reserved for physically challenged persons, the HC said, “The provision for reservation by the respondent Oil Companies, who are the agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, prima facie indicates their attention to the requirements of the persons belonging to different classes and categories. However, for that matter, we find no reason to issue a mandamus to provide for extra reservation for persons with disabilities by operating Section 37” of The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

However, the HC said that claims of other concessions in application fee and financial assistance can be sought by making appropriate representation to the concerned authorities.

Supreme Court: MCI Expert Committee's opinion cannot be allowed to override a statutory provision mandating medical institutions to provide 5% reservation to persons with disabilities.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Justice Arun Mishra and Hon'ble Justice Indira Banerjee

Case No: WRIT PETITION (C) No. 669 OF 2018

Case title: Purswani Ashutosh (Minor) Through Dr. Kamlesh Virumal Purswani Vs Union of India & Ors

Date of Judgement: 28 Aug 2018

Brief:

The Petitioner, who appeared for the NEET UG Examination for the 2018-19 session was denied benefit of reservation for persons with disabilities, despite having low vision impairment and being eligible for 5% reservation for specific benchmark disability under the RPwD Act, 2016 and MCI's Medical Education Regulation 4(3). 

An MCI expert committee determined that individuals with a visual impairment below 40% would not be admitted to the MBBS course.  Aggrieved by this he approached the Court.

The question which arises in this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is, whether a person with benchmark disability of low vision, within the meaning of Section 2(r), read with Clause 1B of the Schedule, of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 can be denied the benefit of reservation for admission to the MBBS Medical Course.

The court said that the argument of MCI that Section 32 is not attracted since it only provides for reservation to higher educational institutions and not to technical institutions imparting technical education, appears to be fallacious since higher educational institution is a generic term which would include institutions imparting all kinds of higher education, including technical education, whereas technical institution is a specific term for those institutions which only impart technical education.

The court, rejecting the opinion of the committee, held that its opinion cannot be allowed to override a statutory provision (Medical Regulations) mandating medical institutions to provide 5% reservation to persons with disabilities. It held that the RPwD Act, 2016 as well as Medical Regulations by MCI was binding on the institution and thus no expert committee's opinion could be given primacy over the same. Thus, it held that the petitioner cannot be denied admission if he qualifies as per his merit in the category of persons with disabilities.

Judgement:

Hearing-Impaired Candidates Cannot Be Excluded from MBBS Admissions: Delhi HC

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Siddharth Mridul
Case No.: W.P.(C) 7820/2018
Case Title: Tina Sharma (Minor) Through Her Father Bhagwati Prasad Sharma v. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 31 July 2018

Background

The present writ petition before the Delhi High Court raised important questions concerning the rights of hearing-impaired candidates seeking admission to MBBS courses under the reservation framework created by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”).

The petition was filed on behalf of Tina Sharma, a hearing-impaired student aspiring to pursue medical education under the category of persons with benchmark disabilities.

The petitioner had successfully completed her Class XII examination conducted by the CBSE and had also appeared in the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET-UG) 2018 for admission to medical colleges.

The NEET information bulletin specifically provided that 5% of seats in medical institutions would be reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities in accordance with the RPwD Act.

The petitioner fell within the statutory definition of “person with benchmark disability” under Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act. Hearing impairment was recognised under the statute as a specified disability where an individual suffers hearing loss of 70 decibels or more in speech frequencies in both ears.

However, the controversy arose because the Expert Committee constituted by the Medical Council of India (“MCI”) had recommended exclusionary standards concerning hearing-impaired candidates seeking admission to MBBS courses.

The case therefore raised a broader constitutional issue — whether candidates with hearing disabilities could be denied access to medical education despite statutory guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, and inclusive education under the RPwD Act.

Key Observations of the Court

Justice Siddharth Mridul adopted a purposive and rights-oriented interpretation of the RPwD Act while examining the issue.

At the outset, the Court recognised the RPwD Act as a transformative legislation intended to mainstream persons with disabilities within educational institutions and professional spaces.

The Court emphasised that the statute embodies the principles of:

• equality of opportunity;
• respect for inherent dignity;
• individual autonomy;
• freedom of choice;
• non-discrimination; and
• full and effective participation in society.

The Bench observed that persons with benchmark disabilities possess enforceable statutory and constitutional rights to access educational institutions recognised or funded by the Government.

Importantly, the Court clarified that the RPwD Act is not merely a welfare-oriented concessionary framework but a rights-based legislation intended to secure substantive equality and dismantle systemic barriers faced by persons with disabilities.

A particularly important aspect of the order lies in the Court’s recognition that exclusionary educational standards affecting disabled candidates must be subjected to strict scrutiny and cannot be justified on the basis of stereotypical assumptions regarding capability or competence.

The Court underscored that the RPwD Act had been enacted in consonance with constitutional guarantees as well as Directive Principles of State Policy and was intended to ensure equal participation of persons with disabilities within higher education.

The Bench further recognised that the legislation reflects India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which obligates States to ensure accessibility, inclusion, and equal opportunity for persons with disabilities across all sectors, including education.

Importantly, the Court acknowledged the larger social importance of enabling persons with disabilities to enter professional domains that have historically remained inaccessible because of institutional prejudice, inflexible eligibility standards, and medically deterministic assumptions.

The order implicitly rejected the assumption that disability necessarily equates to incapacity and recognised that persons with disabilities possess equal aspirations, dignity, and entitlement to participate in professional education systems.

Interpretation of the RPwD Act

One of the most significant aspects of the order is the Court’s interpretation of the RPwD Act as a progressive social legislation intended to promote inclusion rather than perpetuate exclusion.

The Court recognised that:

• benchmark disability status creates enforceable legal rights;
• educational inclusion forms part of substantive equality; and
• institutional policies must conform to constitutional morality and disability rights jurisprudence.

The Bench treated the RPwD Act as a transformative legal framework intended to shift Indian disability jurisprudence away from paternalistic and medicalised approaches toward a human-rights-based model centred upon dignity, participation, autonomy, and equal opportunity.

The Court thereby reaffirmed that professional educational institutions cannot adopt exclusionary standards inconsistent with statutory guarantees under the RPwD Act.

Commentary

The decision in Tina Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. represents an important judicial affirmation of inclusive professional education and disability rights in India.

One of the most significant contributions of the ruling lies in its recognition that disability rights are integral to constitutional equality and cannot be treated merely as welfare concerns.

Historically, persons with disabilities — especially candidates with sensory disabilities such as hearing impairment — have faced structural barriers in accessing professional education due to rigid eligibility standards and stereotypical assumptions regarding competence.

The present case reflects the judiciary’s growing recognition that exclusion from educational institutions often arises not because of disability itself, but because of inaccessible institutional structures and discriminatory policies.

A transformative aspect of the Court’s reasoning is its movement away from the traditional medical model of disability toward a rights-based approach. Instead of reducing disabled individuals to impairment percentages or medical conditions, the judgment recognised persons with disabilities as rights-bearing individuals entitled to dignity, autonomy, and equal participation.

The ruling also strengthens the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Formal equality merely permits disabled candidates to compete; substantive equality requires active dismantling of institutional barriers that prevent meaningful participation.

Another important aspect of the decision is the Court’s insistence that statutory protections under the RPwD Act must receive liberal and purposive interpretation consistent with constitutional values.

The judgment additionally contributes to the evolving disability rights jurisprudence in India recognising accessibility and educational inclusion as indispensable components of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Importantly, the case carries wider implications for representation of persons with disabilities within medicine and allied professions. Professional spaces have historically remained inaccessible because of infrastructural barriers, rigid institutional norms, and assumptions regarding bodily ability. Judicial interventions such as the present one challenge these exclusionary structures and promote democratisation of access to professional education.

At a broader constitutional level, the decision reinforces the vision of an inclusive society where educational and professional opportunities are not conditioned upon conformity with narrow notions of bodily normalcy.

The order therefore stands as an important reaffirmation that disability rights jurisprudence in India must continue evolving in favour of dignity, inclusion, autonomy, and substantive equality rather than exclusion rooted in stereotypes or restrictive institutional assumptions.

Read the Judgement

Delhi HC Says Reservation Without Academic Support Defeats Disability Rights, Directs IIT Delhi to Re-admit and Coach Student with Disability Expelled for Failing [Judgement Included]

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Rekha Palli
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1158/2018
Case Title: Manif Alam v. Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 16 February 2018

In a landmark judgment on inclusive education and the rights of students with disabilities in higher educational institutions, the Delhi High Court held that premier institutions such as Indian Institute of Technology Delhi cannot limit disability inclusion merely to reservation at the stage of admission and thereafter expel students with disabilities without providing adequate academic support, coaching, guidance, and reasonable opportunity to improve performance.

The Court set aside the expulsion of a student with locomotor disability from IIT Delhi after his first semester and directed the Institute to re-admit him and provide additional academic support if required.

Background of the Case

The petitioner, Mr. Manif Alam, a student with 50% locomotor disability, had secured admission to the M.Sc. Mathematics programme at Indian Institute of Technology Delhi under the Persons with Disabilities category for the academic year 2017–18 through the Joint Admission Test for M.Sc. Mathematics.

After completing the first semester examinations, the petitioner secured an SGPA of 2.75 against the minimum required SGPA of 4.00. Consequently, IIT Delhi declared him failed and struck his name off the rolls of the Institute with immediate effect.

The petitioner challenged the decision before the High Court, seeking reinstatement and permission to continue his studies.

Petitioner’s Grievance: Lack of Institutional Support

The petitioner contended that he had faced considerable difficulty in coping with the academic environment because his prior education had been primarily in Hindi-medium institutions and the lectures at IIT Delhi were delivered exclusively in English. He also highlighted his economically disadvantaged background and the absence of institutional support mechanisms for students with disabilities.

Importantly, he argued that despite the mandate of disability rights laws, IIT Delhi had failed to establish mechanisms such as an Equal Opportunity Cell or any specialised support structure for students with disabilities.

The petitioner further argued that once admission had been granted under the disability reservation quota using relaxed eligibility criteria, the institution had a corresponding obligation to provide reasonable academic support and accommodation rather than mechanically applying the same performance standards applicable to general category students.

IIT Delhi’s Defence

IIT Delhi defended its action by relying upon its academic regulations and the Course of Study brochure, which prescribed a minimum SGPA requirement of 4.0 for continuation in the programme. The Institute argued that the petitioner was aware of these rules at the time of admission and that courts should not interfere in academic matters governed by institutional autonomy.

The Institute also contended that students were free to seek help from faculty members, counsellors, or peers and that the requirement of establishing an Equal Opportunity Cell applied only to institutions under the purview of the University Grants Commission and not to IITs, which function as autonomous statutory institutions.

Significantly, however, the Union Government authorities, including the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, supported the petitioner’s case.

Core Issue Before the Court

Justice Rekha Palli reframed the controversy in broader constitutional and disability rights terms. The Court observed that the case was not merely about enforcement of academic rules but about whether a student admitted through disability reservation could be expelled after the very first semester without meaningful support mechanisms.

The Court framed the central issue in the following words:

“whether a student like the petitioner who is able to join a premier Institute like IIT Delhi only because of the 5% reservation provided for ‘Persons with Disability’ can be expelled from the Institute after the very first semester on account of his inability to meet the criteria fixed for general students…”

Reliance on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

The Court extensively relied upon Section 16 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which imposes duties upon educational institutions to ensure inclusive education, provide reasonable accommodation, necessary support, and monitor the participation and progress of students with disabilities.

The Court highlighted in particular that institutions are statutorily obligated to:

• provide necessary support to maximise academic and social development; and
• monitor progress and completion of education for every student with disability.

Justice Rekha Palli made a powerful observation:

“A mere reservation at the time of entry into the Institute, would become meaningless if the Institutes like IIT Delhi don’t do their bit and extend a helping hand to such students.”

The Court strongly criticised IIT Delhi’s stand that it was not obliged to create disability support structures merely because UGC regulations did not formally apply to it. The Court observed:

“an autonomous premier Institute like the respondent no.1 ought to have been more sensitive towards the needs of the persons with disabilities…”

Supreme Court Precedent on Additional Academic Support

The Court also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Avinash Singh Baghri v. Registrar, IIT Delhi, where the Supreme Court had emphasised that educational institutions must provide additional coaching and support to disadvantaged students so that they are brought at par with general category students.

Applying the same principle to students with disabilities, the High Court held that institutions cannot defeat the objectives of disability rights legislation by mechanically enforcing academic regulations without providing support and accommodation.

Violation of Principles of Natural Justice

Apart from disability rights violations, the Court also found fault with the automatic expulsion of the petitioner without issuing any show cause notice or granting him an opportunity to explain his circumstances.

The Court held:

“The automatic and compulsory expulsion of a student from the Institute, upon his failure to achieve the prescribed grade, without even giving him any opportunity to even give an explanation… would definitely be a violation of principles of natural justice.”

The Court further observed that while academic institutions enjoy autonomy, such autonomy cannot extend to denying disadvantaged students a fair opportunity to improve performance.

Directions Issued by the Court

Allowing the writ petition, the Court set aside the order dated 09 January 2018 and directed IIT Delhi to immediately re-admit the petitioner and provide extra coaching and guidance if required.

Significance of the Judgment

This judgment is one of the earliest and most significant judicial pronouncements interpreting the obligations of higher educational institutions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 in the context of inclusive education.

The ruling makes it abundantly clear that reservation alone does not satisfy the mandate of inclusion. Educational institutions — especially premier publicly funded institutions — must actively create enabling environments through academic support, reasonable accommodation, mentoring, counselling, and monitoring mechanisms.

The judgment also recognises that students admitted under disability reservation may require transitional academic support owing to structural disadvantages, language barriers, inaccessible pedagogy, or unequal educational backgrounds. Denial of such support, coupled with rigid application of academic regulations, would defeat the very object of disability rights legislation.

Equally important is the Court’s reaffirmation that institutional autonomy cannot override statutory obligations under disability rights laws or principles of natural justice.

Read the final judgement dated 16.02.2018