Supreme Court Questions TET Requirement for Special Educators in Bihar: Where Is It Prescribed in the Recruitment Rules?

Court:               Supreme Court of India

Bench:               Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu

Case Title:        Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

Case No.:          W.P.(C) No. 132/2016

Order Dated:    28 July 2026

Issue:                 Whether TET can be insisted upon as an additional

                           qualification for appointment of Special Educators in Bihar

Introduction

Please refer to our earlier post dated 28 October 2021 titled Supreme Court Calls for Systemic Reform in Recruitment of Special Teachers for Children with Disabilities in the above matter.

The Supreme Court, while hearing the continuing proceedings in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., has questioned the legal basis for requiring Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) qualification for appointment as Special Educators in Bihar. The Court is examining whether TET was actually prescribed in the applicable recruitment rules before it was introduced as an eligibility condition.

The Issue Before the Supreme Court

Can a State require a Special Educator to possess a Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) qualification when the applicable recruitment rules do not clearly prescribe TET for the post?

This question has acquired considerable importance in the continuing proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the availability and appointment of Special Educators for children with disabilities.

The proceedings arise against the backdrop of a larger concern: children with disabilities cannot receive meaningful inclusive education unless schools have an adequate number of appropriately qualified Special Educators.

The Court's order dated 28 July 2026 does not finally decide whether TET is mandatory for Special Educators. Instead, it raises an important preliminary question—what is the legal source of the TET requirement in Bihar?

Background

The Supreme Court has been monitoring issues concerning the appointment and availability of Special Educators in different States.

In the Bihar recruitment process, the question arose whether candidates possessing the requisite qualification recognised by the Rehabilitation Council of India (RCI) could nevertheless be excluded because they did not possess TET qualification.

The figures placed before the Court demonstrate the practical consequences.

Out of 7,279 sanctioned posts, 816 posts were stated to be reserved for contractual teachers. Following verification of documents relating to 788 candidates, only 139 candidates were found to possess both RCI and TET qualifications.

The remaining 649 candidates did not possess TET qualification and, consequently, were not recommended for appointment.

This led to a fundamental question: if these candidates possessed the professional qualification prescribed for Special Educators under the RCI framework, could the State nevertheless exclude them on the basis of TET?

The petitioners also relied upon the position taken by the RCI that TET is not an RCI-mandated qualification for Special Educators.

The controversy, therefore, is not merely about one additional examination. It concerns the relationship between:

• professional qualification and registration under the RCI framework;
• general teacher eligibility requirements;
• State-specific recruitment rules; and
• the urgent need for Special Educators in schools serving children with disabilities.

What Did the Supreme Court Ask?

During the hearing, the Bench closely examined the language of the Bihar recruitment rules. Justice Dipankar Datta questioned the basis for treating the relevant TET provision as applicable to Special Educators.

The Court's questioning essentially went to the heart of the matter:

Where, in the applicable recruitment rules, is TET prescribed as a mandatory qualification for Special Educators?

The Bench also examined whether the rule relied upon by the State was actually a provision concerning general school teachers and, if so, whether it could automatically be extended to Special Educators.

This distinction is important. A Special Educator is not simply a general teacher with an additional disability-related role. Special Educators undergo specialised professional education and are regulated within the RCI framework.

Consequently, if the State wishes to impose an additional qualification upon this specialised professional category, there must be a clear legal and regulatory basis for doing so.

RCI Qualification and TET: Two Different Questions

The proceedings also bring into focus an important distinction between professional qualification and eligibility for a particular government recruitment process.

RCI recognition and registration are concerned with professional competence and regulation in rehabilitation and special education.

TET, on the other hand, is a teacher-eligibility mechanism generally associated with school-teaching appointments.

The existence of one qualification does not necessarily answer the question whether another qualification may be prescribed.

At the same time, the fact that TET is not an RCI qualification does not, by itself, mean that a State can never prescribe TET as an additional recruitment requirement.

The crucial question is therefore:

Was TET validly prescribed for the particular post under the applicable recruitment rules?

That is the question the Supreme Court has asked the State of Bihar to address.

Why the Recruitment Rules Matter

Eligibility conditions in public employment cannot ordinarily rest merely upon administrative practice or an assumption that a qualification applicable to one category of employees automatically applies to another.

The recruitment rules governing the post are therefore critical.

The Supreme Court has directed the Bihar Government to clarify whether the relevant rules were amended before the recruitment advertisement was issued so as to make TET mandatory.

This temporal question is also significant.

If a qualification was not prescribed in the governing rules when the recruitment process was initiated, the State would have to explain the legal basis for subsequently treating it as an eligibility condition.

The Court has, therefore, adopted a cautious approach: rather than immediately deciding the validity of the TET requirement, it has asked the State to establish the precise statutory and regulatory foundation of its position.

649 Candidates & Human Consequence of an Eligibility Rule

The numbers placed before the Court illustrate why this is more than a technical recruitment dispute.

Of the 788 candidates whose documents were verified:

• 139 reportedly possessed both RCI and TET qualifications.
• 649 reportedly possessed the relevant RCI qualification but lacked TET and were therefore not recommended.

In other words, a large majority of the candidates considered in this exercise were potentially excluded because of the additional TET requirement.

The consequence extends beyond the candidates themselves. Every unfilled Special Educator position has a potential impact on children with disabilities who depend upon specialised educational support.

A recruitment rule that excludes otherwise professionally qualified Special Educators may therefore have implications for the implementation of the right to education and the right to inclusive education.

Does the Supreme Court Say TET Is Not Required?

No—not yet.

This is an important qualification while reporting the order.

The Supreme Court's 28 July 2026 order is interlocutory. It does not finally hold that TET is not required for Special Educators.

Nor does the order establish a universal rule that every RCI-qualified Special Educator must necessarily be appointed without TET.

Rather, the Court is examining whether Bihar had a lawful basis for imposing TET as an additional qualification in the particular recruitment process.

The Court has accordingly sought an affidavit from the State addressing whether the relevant recruitment rules had been amended before the advertisement was issued.

The distinction is important because the larger proceedings have also considered the possibility of States prescribing TET as an additional qualification. The legal question is therefore not simply whether TET is “good” or “bad” for Special Educators, but whether and how it can lawfully be prescribed.

A Larger Question: Should Special Educators Have a Specialised TET?

The proceedings nevertheless raise a legitimate policy question.

If TET is considered necessary for Special Educators, should the test itself be designed around the competencies required of Special Educators?

A general TET is intended to assess competencies associated with teaching.

Special Education requires additional and distinct professional competencies, including understanding of:

• disability-specific educational needs;
• individualised education and support planning;
• assistive technology;
• alternative and augmentative communication;
• reasonable accommodation;
• universal design for learning;
• accessible teaching-learning materials;
• behavioural and psychosocial support;
• communication with families and caregivers; and
• inclusive classroom practices.

The question, therefore, is not whether quality standards should be maintained. They unquestionably should.

The question is whether a general teacher-eligibility test is the appropriate instrument for assessing the professional competence of a Special Educator.

If an additional national eligibility examination is considered necessary, there is a strong case for ensuring that it is appropriately designed around the actual professional competencies required in special and inclusive education.

Implications Under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

The issue also needs to be viewed against the statutory framework of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

Section 16 of the Act requires educational institutions to provide inclusive education to children with disabilities and take specified measures to ensure their participation and access to education.

Section 17 further requires governments and local authorities to take measures for facilitating inclusive education.

These statutory obligations cannot be implemented merely by declaring that education is inclusive.

There must be trained human resources to make inclusion work.

Special Educators play a critical role in this ecosystem. Their availability is particularly important for children who require specialised educational interventions, accommodations, communication support, assistive technologies or individualised educational strategies.

Consequently, recruitment policies affecting the availability of Special Educators must also be examined in the context of the State's obligation to ensure meaningful access to inclusive education.

The Supreme Court's Approach: Qualification Must Have a Legal Foundation

One of the most important aspects of the present proceedings is the Court's insistence on identifying the legal source of an eligibility requirement.

It is entirely legitimate for the State to prescribe appropriate qualifications for public employment.

But an eligibility condition must have a legal foundation.

A qualification prescribed for general teachers cannot necessarily be presumed to apply to every specialised category of teaching professionals.

This is particularly relevant where the specialised category is separately regulated through a statutory professional framework.

The Supreme Court's questioning therefore reinforces a basic principle of public recruitment:

Eligibility conditions must flow from the applicable rules and cannot simply be assumed.

What Happens Next?

The Supreme Court has directed the Government of Bihar to file an affidavit clarifying the position concerning RCI registration and TET qualification, including whether the applicable recruitment rules were amended before the recruitment advertisement.

The matter was listed for further consideration on 4 August 2026, along with matters concerning Special Educator appointments in Delhi, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh.

The Court also did not impose a rigid four-week deadline for appointment letters, noting the practical consideration of the frequency of meetings of the State Cabinet.

The ultimate determination could therefore have implications extending beyond Bihar.

Why This Matters

The case sits at the intersection of professional regulation, public employment and the right to inclusive education.

For Special Educators, the outcome may determine whether RCI qualifications are sufficient for particular government appointments or whether States may additionally insist upon TET.

For governments, the case highlights the importance of ensuring that recruitment advertisements faithfully reflect the governing statutory and regulatory framework.

For children with disabilities, however, there is an even more fundamental concern.

A right to inclusive education is meaningful only when the education system has the human resources necessary to deliver it.

If recruitment requirements unnecessarily narrow the pool of professionally qualified Special Educators, vacancies may remain unfilled. Conversely, if additional qualifications are genuinely necessary to ensure quality teaching, they must be appropriately designed and legally prescribed.

The objective should be neither dilution of professional standards nor unnecessary exclusion of qualified professionals.

It should be quality, specialised and accessible education for every child with disability.

What the Supreme Court May Ultimately Clarify

The continuing proceedings have the potential to provide important clarity on several questions:

1. Is TET universally applicable to Special Educators, or does its applicability depend upon the recruitment rules governing a particular post?
2. Can a State impose TET as an additional qualification where the applicable recruitment rules prescribe RCI qualifications but do not expressly prescribe TET?
3. What is the relationship between RCI professional qualifications and State teacher-recruitment qualifications?
4. Can a qualification introduced through an advertisement be sustained if it was not prescribed in the governing rules at the relevant time?
5. If TET is considered necessary for Special Educators, should there be a specialised test reflecting the competencies of special and inclusive education?

The answers could influence Special Educator recruitment policies across several States.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's order dated 28 July 2026 should therefore be understood as an important judicial inquiry, rather than a final ruling on the necessity of TET for Special Educators.

Its significance lies in the Court's insistence that the State identify the legal basis for an eligibility condition that has resulted in hundreds of RCI-qualified candidates being excluded from consideration.

At the same time, the proceedings raise a broader question about how India regulates and recruits the professionals who make inclusive education possible.

The objective should be to ensure that every child with disability has access to adequately trained, professionally competent and sufficient numbers of Special Educators.

The Supreme Court's eventual decision may help strike that balance—between maintaining professional standards, respecting specialised qualifications and ensuring that recruitment rules do not themselves become a barrier to fulfilling the promise of inclusive education.

For now, the key takeaway is simple: TET cannot be treated as mandatory for Special Educators merely by assumption. Its applicability must be traceable to the governing legal and recruitment framework.

Read the Order

Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 132/2016, order dated 28 July 2026, 

Disclaimer: This article discusses an interlocutory order and should not be read as a final determination by the Supreme Court that TET is either universally mandatory or universally unnecessary for Special Educators. The question remains under consideration in the continuing proceedings.

Hostel Accommodation is Part of Inclusive Education: Delhi High Court Upholds Rights of Visually Impaired JNU Student

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice C. Hari Shankar
Case No.: W.P.(C) 75/2024
Case Title: Sanjeev Kumar Mishra v. Jawaharlal Nehru University & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 26 February 2024

Background

In an important judgment concerning accessibility and inclusive education, the Delhi High Court held that hostel accommodation for students with disabilities cannot be treated merely as a discretionary facility and forms an integral part of ensuring equal access to higher education under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”).

The petitioner, Sanjeev Kumar Mishra, a student with 100% visual disability, approached the Court seeking hostel accommodation from Jawaharlal Nehru University during his M.A. Sociology programme.

The petitioner had earlier pursued multiple academic programmes within the University. Initially admitted in 2017 to a five-year B.A.-M.A. programme in German, he had been provided hostel accommodation during the course. Thereafter, he enrolled in another Master’s programme in Political Science with specialisation in International Studies and continued to reside in university accommodation, including a room in Sabarmati Hostel designated for students with disabilities.

However, after securing admission to a third programme — M.A. Sociology — the petitioner was denied hostel accommodation despite repeated requests.

Aggrieved by the denial, the petitioner approached the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities alleging violation of Section 16 of the RPwD Act, which mandates inclusive education and non-discrimination against students with disabilities.

The University resisted the claim by relying upon provisions of the JNU Hostel Manual. According to the University, students pursuing a second Master’s degree were not entitled to hostel accommodation under the prevailing rules and priority criteria.

JNU also attempted to rely upon allegations concerning the petitioner’s conduct and previous disputes with hostel authorities. However, these allegations bore no connection with the legal issue regarding accessibility and entitlement under disability rights law.

The legal question

The case therefore raised a broader and significant question — whether residential accommodation for students with disabilities is merely an administrative privilege or an essential component of accessible and inclusive higher education.

Key Observations of the Court

The bench delivered a significant ruling affirming that accessibility within higher education extends beyond classroom participation and includes residential and institutional support systems necessary for meaningful educational access.

At the outset, the Court rejected the University’s attempt to rely upon allegations regarding the petitioner’s conduct. The Bench observed that such allegations were wholly irrelevant to the issue of entitlement under disability rights law. The Court clarified that if disciplinary proceedings were warranted, the University remained free to proceed in accordance with law, but such allegations could not justify denial of statutory rights guaranteed under the RPwD Act.

A particularly important aspect of the judgment lies in the Court’s recognition that hostel accommodation for a visually impaired student directly impacts accessibility, mobility, participation, and safety within the educational environment.

The Court examined Section 16 of the RPwD Act and emphasised that educational institutions are under a statutory obligation to ensure inclusive education for students with disabilities. Importantly, the Court adopted a purposive and rights-based interpretation of the provision rather than a narrow administrative approach.

The judgment recognised that denial of hostel accommodation to a student with 100% visual disability could substantially impair the student’s ability to effectively pursue higher education. Residential accommodation within the university campus facilitates access to academic resources, mobility support, peer interaction, and participation in campus life.

The Court also examined the relationship between institutional regulations and statutory disability rights obligations. It held that internal hostel policies cannot be interpreted or enforced in a manner that defeats the objectives of the RPwD Act.

Importantly, the Bench recognised that substantive equality may require differential accommodation and affirmative institutional support. Applying hostel rules mechanically without considering the impact upon disabled students would amount to formal equality devoid of fairness and inclusion.

The Court thereby reaffirmed that disability rights law imposes positive obligations upon educational institutions requiring active institutional adaptation rather than passive non-discrimination.

The judgment also acknowledged the importance of dignity and equal participation, recognising that exclusion from hostel accommodation may lead to isolation, logistical hardship, and reduced participation in university life for students with disabilities.

Directions Issued

The Delhi High Court granted relief in favour of the petitioner and directed Jawaharlal Nehru University to provide hostel accommodation to him.

The Court effectively held that:

• Hostel accommodation for students with disabilities cannot be denied through rigid or mechanical application of hostel eligibility criteria.
• Institutional rules must yield where necessary to fulfil obligations under the RPwD Act.
• Inclusive education under Section 16 of the RPwD Act includes ancillary and supportive facilities necessary for meaningful participation in higher education.
• Students with disabilities are entitled to reasonable accommodation and equal participation within university environments.

The judgment thereby reinforced that educational inclusion extends beyond admission to classrooms and encompasses the broader ecosystem necessary for participation, accessibility, and dignity.

Commentary

The decision in Sanjeev Kumar Mishra v. Jawaharlal Nehru University & Ors. is an important contribution to disability rights jurisprudence because it expands the understanding of inclusive education from a purely academic concept to a holistic institutional obligation encompassing residential accessibility and campus integration.

One of the most significant aspects of the ruling is its recognition that barriers within higher education are not confined to classrooms alone. For students with disabilities — particularly students with visual impairments — access to residential accommodation within campus premises may fundamentally determine their ability to participate in educational life on equal terms.

The judgment meaningfully advances the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Formal equality would simply apply hostel rules identically to all students irrespective of disability. The Court instead recognised that identical treatment in unequal circumstances can itself produce discrimination.

Another important aspect of the ruling is its affirmation that internal institutional regulations cannot override statutory rights under the RPwD Act. Universities frequently rely upon administrative rules, hostel manuals, or infrastructural limitations to deny accommodations to disabled students. The present judgment correctly places disability rights obligations above rigid administrative formalism.

The Court’s reasoning also aligns with evolving international disability jurisprudence under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which conceptualises accessibility and inclusion as encompassing the entire educational environment rather than mere admission into educational institutions.

Importantly, the judgment rejects attempts to indirectly stigmatise disabled students through unrelated allegations or administrative objections. By refusing to allow the petitioner’s alleged conduct to influence adjudication of accessibility rights, the Court reaffirmed that disability rights cannot be made contingent upon institutional convenience.

The ruling also highlights broader structural shortcomings within Indian universities, where hostel accessibility, mobility support, assistive technologies, and inclusive campus infrastructure continue to remain inadequately addressed despite statutory obligations.

At a broader constitutional level, the judgment reinforces that education under the RPwD Act must be understood as a participatory and dignitarian right. Inclusion requires not merely permitting disabled students to enrol in universities, but ensuring that they can genuinely live, study, interact, and participate within institutional spaces on equal terms with others.

The decision therefore stands as an important precedent affirming that accessibility in higher education necessarily includes residential inclusion, institutional accommodation, and removal of barriers that impede full and effective participation of students with disabilities within university life.

Read the judgement

Supreme Court Calls for Systemic Reform in Recruitment of Special Teachers for Children with Disabilities

Court: Supreme Court of India

Coram: Hon’ble Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari, and C.T. Ravikumar
Case Title: Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Others v. Union of India & Others
Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No.: 876 of 2017

Date of Judgment: 28 October 2021

Brief Background

This public interest petition was filed in a representative capacity, raising a crucial concern: the continued engagement of B.Ed. (Special Education) and D.Ed. (Special Education) trained teachers on a contractual basis by state authorities, particularly in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, despite their statutory recognition as qualified rehabilitation professionals.

The petitioners contended that this practice undermined both the rights of the teachers and the educational needs of Children with Special Needs (CwSN). They called for regular appointments of special educators in line with the recommended pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) of 1:5, arguing that thousands of positions remain unfilled across the country despite the legal mandates.

Key Developments and Observations

The Supreme Court, during the course of hearing, considered several legal provisions, schemes, and factual reports:

1. Previous Court Directors and Amicus Report 

• The Court had previously directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to survey the population of CwSN and submit progress on recruitment of special educators.
• An Amicus Curiae was appointed to assess the situation on the ground. His report highlighted serious deficiencies in teacher availability, infrastructure, and educational quality across schools for the visually impaired, hearing impaired, and intellectually and physically disabled children.

2. Legal and Policy Framework Considered 

The Court undertook a comprehensive review of the legislative and policy landscape for inclusive education:

• Rehabilitation Council of India Act, 1992 (RCI Act): Mandates that only RCI-registered professionals with recognized qualifications can function as special educators. Any violation is a punishable offence.
• Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act): Provides for inclusive education (Sections 16 & 17), free education for children with benchmark disabilities (Section 31), and duties of institutions to cater to diverse needs.
• Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act): While it recognizes children with disabilities (Section 2(ee)), its Schedule of norms and standards does not specify PTR for CwSN, which creates a policy gap.
• Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and IEDSS Schemes: These schemes push for inclusion and recognize special educator-to-student ratios, particularly 1:5 under the Inclusive Education of the Disabled at Secondary Stage (IEDSS).

Supreme Court’s Key Findings and Directions

The Apex Court emphasized that the existing laws and schemes, taken together, create a binding obligation on governments to recruit qualified special educators. The lack of clarity in RTE norms was found to be a regulatory shortcoming needing urgent correction.

Major Directions Issued:

1. Central Government to amend the Schedule of the RTE Act, 2009, under Section 20, to include specific pupil-teacher ratios for CwSN, ensuring uniform standards across the country.

2. In the interim, until the amendment is notified, existing ratios in other enactments and schemes, particularly the 1:5 ratio under IEDSS, must be followed.

3. Only qualified, recognized, and RCI-registered rehabilitation professionals should be appointed as special educators. Ad-hoc arrangements and dilution of standards cannot be allowed.

4. The Court took note of communications from the Rehabilitation Council of India (RCI) and CBSE, both highlighting the need for proper qualifications and adherence to inclusive education norms.

5. The Court strongly reminded authorities of their duty to ensure compliance with inclusive education mandates under the RPwD Act and the UNCRPD, to which India is a signatory.

Significance of the Judgment

This judgment is a milestone in advancing the cause of inclusive education in India. It clarifies the legal status of special educators as rehabilitation professionals, mandates strict adherence to disability-specific PTRs, and calls for coherence between education laws and disability rights frameworks.

Importantly, the Supreme Court relied upon and cited the 2019 order of the Mr. TD Dhariyal, the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, NCT of Delhi in the case of Ms. Reshma Parveen vs. Director Education & Others , which had recommended two Special Educators per school in Delhi and had detailed disability-specific teacher-pupil ratios. This reflects the growing judicial recognition of the persuasive value of administrative orders under the RPwD Act.

Conclusion

Through this judgment, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that inclusive education is not a charity, but a legal right of children with disabilities, and that trained special educators are not expendable stopgaps, but integral professionals essential to realizing this right.

The verdict sets a strong precedent for systemic reform, and should serve as a wake-up call for education departments across the country to align their policies with the rights-based framework enshrined in Indian law.

Read the judgement 

Allahabad High Court issues notice to waive fees of students with disabilities as online classes not accessible

Parents of a child with autism have filed a petition before the Allahabad High Court against the school asking for fees in spite of the student not attending online classes during lockdown. The court issued a notice asking all CBSE affiliated schools to waive-off fee for children for benchmark disabilities in terms of  RPWD Act, 2016.

For many students with disabilities, the lockdown resulting from the COVID19 pandemic has definitely been difficult. Students with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) are clueless on how to pursue their education through online classes which are not easy for many of them. 

In the instant case, the child with autism is studying in class third at Amit International School in Lucknow. He has been unable to attend online classes due to his developmental disability. He is also undergoing therapies for the same. He has not attended most of his ongoing online classes as he finds them difficult to follow. But since last March, his school authorities have been regularly sending messages to his parents asking them to deposit the school fee at the earliest.

As per the petition filed before the court, there are thousands of children with different disabilities across Lucknow. Many are unable to attend online classes due to their disabling conditions. Demanding fees from such children is an act that must be punishable. Moreover, this system does not provide inclusive education either for students with disabilities.

The matter was heard by the bench of Justice Pankaj Kumar Jaiswal & Justice Saurabh Lavania through video-conferencing. The bench was pleased to issue Notices to the school authorities through e-mail, WhatsApp and messages.

This notice from the high court comes as a big relief to the parents. The schools have not been providing inclusive education nor have sufficient trained teachers. Many parents have formed or joined many support groups for helping each other and sharing of information etc.

Sad reality
This is a sad reality for all stakeholders that despite the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016 and Right to Education Act (RTE) making provisions for free and compulsory education to students with disabilities from 6 to 18 years of age, most of these parents end up bearing so many expenses and receive no quality education for their children. They have to pay for the child’s therapies & related medical conditions. Apart from the exorbitant school fee being forced upon them, there are expenses of transporting children by school buses. On top of it, many schools insist the parents to hire shadow teachers at their own cost as a pre-condition to allow admission to a child with disability. This is double whammy for parents of intellectually and developmentally disabled (IDD) children. 

Way ahead
The education sector, particularly private schools need to wake up to make appropriate adaptations in the syllabus and teaching methodologies to be more sensitive and inclusive towards the needs of students with disabilities. The notice of the court is the first step is right direction. However, we hope that parents get relief even after the impact of COVID19 lockdown the something positive comes out of this litigation in larger interest of similarly placed parents & students with IDD.

Watch this space for more updates or follow the blog.

Towards Inclusive Education in Delhi: A Landmark Order on Special Educators in Schools by SCPD Delhi in Reshma Parveen Vs. Director of Education NCT of Delhi & Ors.

Court: State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, Delhi
Presided by: Sh. T. D. Dhariyal
Case No. : Case No. 824/1014/2019/04/9072-84
Case Title: Ms. Reshma Parveen vs. Director of Education, NCT of Delhi & Others
Date of Judgement/Order: 31.12.2019

Brief Introduction

In a significant stride toward inclusive education, the Court of the State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, Delhi, issued a detailed and progressive order on December 31, 2019, in the matter of Ms. Reshma Parveen vs. Director of Education, NCT of Delhi & Others (Case No. 824/1014/2019/04/9072-84). This case highlights the systemic gaps in the recruitment of Special Educators (SETs) in Delhi’s schools and underlines the urgent need to provide equitable education to children with disabilities as mandated by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.

Notably, this order was subsequently referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Others v. Union of India & Others [W.P. (C) No. 876 of 2017, decided on 28 October 2021], while addressing the critical issue of recruitment and deployment of Special Educators across India. The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari, and C.T. Ravikumar relied on the findings and directions of the State Commissioner’s order to strengthen the national discourse on inclusive education.

Background of the Case
Ms. Reshma Parveen, a CTET-qualified Special Educator with a 58% locomotor disability and RCI registration, brought to the Court’s attention a critical implementation failure: despite a 2009 Delhi High Court direction requiring two Special Educators per school, most of Delhi’s 5700 government schools still do not have even one.

Her demands included:

• Permanent recruitment of at least two Special Educators (Primary) in each school.
• Immediate deployment of contractual or guest Special Educators as a stop-gap.
• Proper employment opportunities for trained Special Educators.
• Quality education access for children with disabilities.

Key Submissions from Respondents

Various agencies presented fragmented and incomplete responses:

• North DMC: Claimed recruitment was the South DMC's responsibility. 700 posts had been forwarded to DSSSB.
• Delhi Cantonment Board: Had only contractual Special Educators—none permanent.
• NDMC: Trained 38 teachers, but had no regular Special Education cadre.
• EDMC: Operating with 92 SETs across 354 schools, with cluster-model plans due to shortfall.
• Directorate of Education: No sanctioned posts at primary level, though 2048 SET posts exist at higher levels. SETs often deployed for cross-disability roles without RCI-sanctioned training.
• RCI: Objected to DoE's practice of deploying unqualified teachers across disability types, citing violation of Section 13 of the RCI Act.
• NCTE: Failed to respond to key questions regarding qualification and eligibility frameworks.

Expert Opinions and Key Observations

Recognizing the complexity and lack of a standard formula for teacher deployment, the Commissioner convened consultations with education and disability experts. Highlights include:

• No clear norm exists on the required number of SETs per school.
• Disability-specific teacher-pupil ratios were recommended:
• 1:8 for VI, HI, Cerebral Palsy
• 1:5 for ID, ASD, SLD
• 1:2 for Deafblind and multiple disabilities
• While the cluster model was viewed as a temporary fix, it was unanimously emphasized that RCI-approved qualifications (D.Ed. for primary, B.Ed. for higher levels) must be maintained.
• The system must treat SETs at par with general teachers, with the ability to teach all students.

Directions & Recommendations by the Court

The Commissioner, invoking powers under Section 75 of the RPwD Act, issued wide-ranging, time-bound directives:

1. Creation of two SET posts per school, with specialization across all RCI-recognized disabilities.
2. Deployment strategy based on disability-wise student data and appropriate teacher-student ratios.
3. Conversion of general teaching posts into SET posts where feasible.
4. Establishment of resource centers in schools or clusters (within 2–3 km radius).
5. Reform of recruitment rules and service conditions to enable SETs to teach children with and without disabilities.
6. Curriculum reform:

• NCTE to integrate compulsory modules on sign language, Braille, and inclusive pedagogy in B.Ed./D.Ed.
• NCERT to provide online training on the Swayam platform.

7. Mandatory training for in-service teachers on disability inclusion.
8. Ministry of Education to issue model guidelines on inclusive education for replication nationwide.

On RCI’s concern, the Commissioner clarified that RCI registration is not required for every teacher, but orientation and training in inclusive practices is essential for all.

Reference in Supreme Court Judgment

The Supreme Court of India, while deciding Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & Others v. Union of India & Others (W.P. (C) No. 876 of 2017), explicitly referred to this 2019 order of the State Commissioner. The Apex Court recognized its evidentiary and policy value in demonstrating the gaps and practical measures needed to ensure educational rights of children with disabilities under Article 21A of the Constitution and the RPwD Act. The reference in a constitutional bench decision highlights the legal relevance and persuasive authority of orders passed by State Commissioners under Section 75 of the Act.

Conclusion and Impact

This comprehensive and well-reasoned order is a landmark in administrative jurisprudence on inclusive education. It not only addresses the staffing gaps in schools but also provides a blueprint for systemic reform in teacher training, resource allocation, and policy coordination across departments.

The State Commissioner’s reliance on multi-stakeholder consultation—from experts to implementing agencies—and the insistence on a rights-based, data-driven, and disability-specific strategy reflects the spirit of the RPwD Act and India's commitment under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD).

As the order awaits compliance reports from authorities, it becomes an essential resource for disability rights advocates, policy makers, and educators seeking to ensure every child with a disability in Delhi—and across India—gets the education they are entitled to.

Read the Order 

Delhi HC Says Reservation Without Academic Support Defeats Disability Rights, Directs IIT Delhi to Re-admit and Coach Student with Disability Expelled for Failing [Judgement Included]

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Rekha Palli
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1158/2018
Case Title: Manif Alam v. Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 16 February 2018

In a landmark judgment on inclusive education and the rights of students with disabilities in higher educational institutions, the Delhi High Court held that premier institutions such as Indian Institute of Technology Delhi cannot limit disability inclusion merely to reservation at the stage of admission and thereafter expel students with disabilities without providing adequate academic support, coaching, guidance, and reasonable opportunity to improve performance.

The Court set aside the expulsion of a student with locomotor disability from IIT Delhi after his first semester and directed the Institute to re-admit him and provide additional academic support if required.

Background of the Case

The petitioner, Mr. Manif Alam, a student with 50% locomotor disability, had secured admission to the M.Sc. Mathematics programme at Indian Institute of Technology Delhi under the Persons with Disabilities category for the academic year 2017–18 through the Joint Admission Test for M.Sc. Mathematics.

After completing the first semester examinations, the petitioner secured an SGPA of 2.75 against the minimum required SGPA of 4.00. Consequently, IIT Delhi declared him failed and struck his name off the rolls of the Institute with immediate effect.

The petitioner challenged the decision before the High Court, seeking reinstatement and permission to continue his studies.

Petitioner’s Grievance: Lack of Institutional Support

The petitioner contended that he had faced considerable difficulty in coping with the academic environment because his prior education had been primarily in Hindi-medium institutions and the lectures at IIT Delhi were delivered exclusively in English. He also highlighted his economically disadvantaged background and the absence of institutional support mechanisms for students with disabilities.

Importantly, he argued that despite the mandate of disability rights laws, IIT Delhi had failed to establish mechanisms such as an Equal Opportunity Cell or any specialised support structure for students with disabilities.

The petitioner further argued that once admission had been granted under the disability reservation quota using relaxed eligibility criteria, the institution had a corresponding obligation to provide reasonable academic support and accommodation rather than mechanically applying the same performance standards applicable to general category students.

IIT Delhi’s Defence

IIT Delhi defended its action by relying upon its academic regulations and the Course of Study brochure, which prescribed a minimum SGPA requirement of 4.0 for continuation in the programme. The Institute argued that the petitioner was aware of these rules at the time of admission and that courts should not interfere in academic matters governed by institutional autonomy.

The Institute also contended that students were free to seek help from faculty members, counsellors, or peers and that the requirement of establishing an Equal Opportunity Cell applied only to institutions under the purview of the University Grants Commission and not to IITs, which function as autonomous statutory institutions.

Significantly, however, the Union Government authorities, including the office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, supported the petitioner’s case.

Core Issue Before the Court

Justice Rekha Palli reframed the controversy in broader constitutional and disability rights terms. The Court observed that the case was not merely about enforcement of academic rules but about whether a student admitted through disability reservation could be expelled after the very first semester without meaningful support mechanisms.

The Court framed the central issue in the following words:

“whether a student like the petitioner who is able to join a premier Institute like IIT Delhi only because of the 5% reservation provided for ‘Persons with Disability’ can be expelled from the Institute after the very first semester on account of his inability to meet the criteria fixed for general students…”

Reliance on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

The Court extensively relied upon Section 16 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which imposes duties upon educational institutions to ensure inclusive education, provide reasonable accommodation, necessary support, and monitor the participation and progress of students with disabilities.

The Court highlighted in particular that institutions are statutorily obligated to:

• provide necessary support to maximise academic and social development; and
• monitor progress and completion of education for every student with disability.

Justice Rekha Palli made a powerful observation:

“A mere reservation at the time of entry into the Institute, would become meaningless if the Institutes like IIT Delhi don’t do their bit and extend a helping hand to such students.”

The Court strongly criticised IIT Delhi’s stand that it was not obliged to create disability support structures merely because UGC regulations did not formally apply to it. The Court observed:

“an autonomous premier Institute like the respondent no.1 ought to have been more sensitive towards the needs of the persons with disabilities…”

Supreme Court Precedent on Additional Academic Support

The Court also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Avinash Singh Baghri v. Registrar, IIT Delhi, where the Supreme Court had emphasised that educational institutions must provide additional coaching and support to disadvantaged students so that they are brought at par with general category students.

Applying the same principle to students with disabilities, the High Court held that institutions cannot defeat the objectives of disability rights legislation by mechanically enforcing academic regulations without providing support and accommodation.

Violation of Principles of Natural Justice

Apart from disability rights violations, the Court also found fault with the automatic expulsion of the petitioner without issuing any show cause notice or granting him an opportunity to explain his circumstances.

The Court held:

“The automatic and compulsory expulsion of a student from the Institute, upon his failure to achieve the prescribed grade, without even giving him any opportunity to even give an explanation… would definitely be a violation of principles of natural justice.”

The Court further observed that while academic institutions enjoy autonomy, such autonomy cannot extend to denying disadvantaged students a fair opportunity to improve performance.

Directions Issued by the Court

Allowing the writ petition, the Court set aside the order dated 09 January 2018 and directed IIT Delhi to immediately re-admit the petitioner and provide extra coaching and guidance if required.

Significance of the Judgment

This judgment is one of the earliest and most significant judicial pronouncements interpreting the obligations of higher educational institutions under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 in the context of inclusive education.

The ruling makes it abundantly clear that reservation alone does not satisfy the mandate of inclusion. Educational institutions — especially premier publicly funded institutions — must actively create enabling environments through academic support, reasonable accommodation, mentoring, counselling, and monitoring mechanisms.

The judgment also recognises that students admitted under disability reservation may require transitional academic support owing to structural disadvantages, language barriers, inaccessible pedagogy, or unequal educational backgrounds. Denial of such support, coupled with rigid application of academic regulations, would defeat the very object of disability rights legislation.

Equally important is the Court’s reaffirmation that institutional autonomy cannot override statutory obligations under disability rights laws or principles of natural justice.

Read the final judgement dated 16.02.2018

US Supreme Court to hear ground breaking case involving what is "appropriate education" for students with Autism in public schools

Dear Colleagues,

The origins of this potentially lank mark case stretch back to 2010 when the parents of a child with autism in Douglas County of USA had to withdraw their child from "Summit View Elementary" -  a public school  after the child (now 17) began to exhibit severe behavioral issues, including banging his head, dropping to the floor, disrobing and running away from school. The parents having been convinced the school wasn’t doing enough to help their son with autism progress academically, pulled the child out of Summit View and enrolled him in Firefly Autism, a Denver school that specializes in working with autistic children.

The parents have argued in the petition they submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court late last year that the intent of the IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) was to provide a meaningful education to disabled students, not simply a “just-above-trivial” benefit. They noted that federal judges from several circuits across the country have issued conflicting rulings over the years on what is the "appropriate standard" to be used to assess the proper level of educational benefit a disabled student should get. The petition of the parents argues that this case presents an ideal vehicle for this Court to resolve the circuit split and provide lower courts with guidance in applying the IDEA.

It is pertinent to note that the U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t spoken on the issue since the 1982 Board of Education Versus Rowley ruling, when it affirmed that IDEA guaranteed disabled students access to the public school classroom but didn’t address the quality of that education.

Even in India, we have been facing this issue of what is 'appropriate education' for children with disabilities, particularly those with intellectual and developmental disabilities. While the government schools in India are woefully ill-equipped in absence of trained educators, lack of teaching learning material in the schools given the large number of students. The situation is equally grim in the private schools as well who charge a considerable amount in the name of tuition fee and other counts, however, have made the education of disabled children an affair to be managed by Shadow Teachers (paid by parents). In the name of inclusion, children do remain in the school but there is hardly an effort to include them in the classroom or the learning outcomes. Children with disabilities are also not included in play or extra-curricular activities. This is surely not inclusion. This is a clear violation of the spirit of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act 1995 and in particular Section 30 of the Act.

Entire world will be watching this case with great curiosity as to what Supreme Court of USA decides. But one thing is sure, Supreme Court had made up its mind to speak its mind on the issue and likely to grant Certiorari to the parents. This case is truly about equal opportunity for the special needs children that the law requires. And this is likely to help realize inclusive education as enshrined in the IDEA.

Brief about IDEA 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a four-part (A-D) piece of American legislation that ensures students with a disability are provided with Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) that is tailored to their individual needs. IDEA was previously known as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA) from 1975 to 1990. In 1990, the United States Congress reauthorized EHA and changed the title to IDEA (Public Law No. 94-142). Overall, the goal of IDEA is to provide children with disabilities the same opportunity for education as those students who do not have a disability.

IDEA is composed of four parts, the main two being part A and part B.[1] Part A covers the general provisions of the law, Part B covers assistance for education of all children with disabilities, Part C covers infants and toddlers with disabilities which includes children from birth to age three, and Part D is the national support programs administered at the federal level. Each part of the law has remained largely the same since the original enactment in 1975.

In practice, IDEA is composed of six main elements that illuminate its main points. These six elements are: Individualized Education Program (IEP), Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), Least Restrictive Environment (LRE), Appropriate Evaluation, Parent and Teacher Participation, and Procedural Safeguards. To go along with those six main elements there are also a few other important components that tie into IDEA: Confidentiality of Information, Transition Services, and Discipline. Throughout the years of IDEA being reauthorized these components have become key concepts when learning about IDEA.

Here is the coverage in Denver on the issue

U.S. Supreme Court will hear Douglas County student with disabilities case

Origins of potentially landmark case stretch back to 2010

The U.S. Supreme Court announced Thursday that it will hear a potentially groundbreaking case brought by a Douglas County couple who claim that their autistic son was not provided an adequate education in the public school system as required by federal law.

The high court’s ruling on the case, which likely wouldn’t come down until next year, could have substantial implications for students with disabilities across the country in terms of the standard school districts will be required to meet when providing instruction and services. At issue is whether schools must provide an education equal to other students.

The family, whose last name is not used in court documents, told The Denver Post on Thursday that they were “shell-shocked and giddy” about the decision by the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to their case, which has dragged on for half a dozen years.

“It’s about equal opportunity for special-needs kids that the law requires,” said Joe F., father of Endrew F., whose name anchors the Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District case file. “If we can change any families’ lives, that’s our goal.”

The district released a statement on the high court’s decision late Thursday.

“It would be inappropriate to discuss the specifics of the case while it is still being litigated, but the Court’s decision today is not a decision on the merits, and we look forward to addressing the issues before the Court,” district spokeswoman Paula Hans said.

The roots of the case go back to 2010, when the Highlands Ranch couple pulled Endrew, now 17, out of Summit View Elementary after he began to exhibit severe behavioral issues, including banging his head, dropping to the floor, disrobing and running away from school. Convinced the school wasn’t doing enough to help their son progress academically, the couple pulled him out of Summit View and enrolled him in Firefly Autism, a Denver school that specializes in working with autistic children.

“If he was able to show up to school and say ‘good morning,’ that was good enough for them,” Joe F. said of the Douglas County School District. “They weren’t moving his education forward.”

The family has asked that their last name not be used.

The parents, who said their son has made progress in his learning since attending Firefly, asked the district to reimburse them for the tuition they paid for Endrew’s private schooling. They claimed that the Douglas County School District did not do enough to provide their son with a “free appropriate public education” as required by the 1975 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

But an administrative law judge, a federal judge and the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals backed the district, claiming in separate rulings that the federal statute only requires that schools provide students with “some educational benefit,” a standard they determined Douglas County had met with Endrew.

The family argued in the petition they submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court late last year that the intent of the IDEA was to provide a meaningful education to disabled students, not simply a “just-above-trivial” benefit. They noted that federal judges from several circuits across the country have issued conflicting rulings over the years on what is the appropriate standard to be used to assess the proper level of educational benefit a disabled student should get.

“This case presents an ideal vehicle for this Court to resolve the circuit split and provide lower courts with guidance in applying the IDEA,” their petition argued.

The U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t spoken on the issue since the 1982 Board of Education v. Rowley ruling, when it affirmed that IDEA guaranteed disabled students access to the public school classroom but didn’t address the quality of that education.

The family received a boost last month when the Office of the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to take up the case. It said that the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had set the bar — a standard of “merely … more than de minimis” educational benefit — too low.

“No parent or educator in America would say that a child has received an ‘appropriate’ or a ‘specially suitable’ or ‘proper’ education ‘in the circumstances’ when all the child has received are benefits that are barely more than trivial,” the solicitor general’s office wrote.

But Kathleen Sullivan, chief counsel for the Colorado Association of School Boards, said it would be better for Congress to clarify its statutes than for the court to impose an order. A uniform standard handed down by the Supreme Court would prove “disruptive” to what is today an individually tailored analysis and decision between educators, parents and students, she said.

“The disruption is in shoving aside more than 30 years of case law that we have in helping us understand what the IDEA means for students,” Sullivan said. “I think we would see a wave of litigation to define and apply that new standard.”

The district, in a brief it filed earlier this month urging the Supreme Court not to take up the case, argued that in passing the IDEA, Congress guaranteed access to public education for students with disabilities but did not specify what the level of that education should be.

“Thus, for over 30 years, this Court has held that if a State provides a program ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,’ then it ‘has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more,’ ” the brief argued.

But Jack Robinson, an attorney for Endrew F.’s family, said one of the IDEA’s stated goals is readying a student with disabilities for the workforce or independent living, something that can’t be achieved with a minimal education offering.

“There has to be a more heightened and robust standard than a little more than nothing,” Robinson said. “This case has the potential of recognizing that children with disabilities have a right to a substantive education.”

Source : Denverpost 

Note: This post is also reproduced on " Subhash Vashishth's Blog"