Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Supreme Court of India | Civil Appeal No. 213 of 2013 | State of Punjab Vs. Jagjit Singh & Ors | Dated 26 Oct 2016

Equal Pay for Equal Work: Supreme Court Rejects Artificial Distinctions Between Temporary and Regular Employees

Supreme Court of India | Civil Appeal No. 213 of 2013 and connected matters | Judgment dated 26 October 2016

Appellants:       State of Punjab & Ors.   
Respondents:    Jagjit Singh & Ors.
Bench:              Hon'ble Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar
                          Hon'ble Justice S.A. Bobde)
Order Date:       26 October 2016
Status :              Reportable

Introduction

Can a government employee be paid substantially less merely because they are engaged as a daily-wage, casual, ad hoc or contractual worker, even though they perform the same duties and carry the same responsibilities as a regular employee?

In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Jagjit Singh & Ors., the Supreme Court answered this question firmly: a temporary employee performing the same work, with the same duties and responsibilities as a regular employee, cannot be denied the minimum of the regular pay-scale merely because of the temporary nature of the appointment. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

The judgment, delivered by a Bench comprising Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar and Justice S.A. Bobde, is an important exposition of the constitutional principle of “equal pay for equal work”, particularly in the context of temporary employment.

The Issue Before the Court

The appeals arose from conflicting decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court concerning the entitlement of daily-wage and other temporary employees to the minimum of the regular pay-scale.

The employees included persons working as Pump Operators, Fitters, Helpers, Drivers, Plumbers, Chowkidars and others. The central question was whether temporary employees performing the same duties as regular employees against corresponding posts were entitled to the minimum of the regular pay-scale. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

The Full Bench of the High Court had carved out limited exceptions under which temporary employees could receive the minimum of the regular pay-scale—for example, where they had been selected through a fair process against sanctioned posts, or where they had worked continuously for ten years. The Supreme Court found that this approach improperly mixed up the question of regularisation with the distinct question of pay parity. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

What Does “Equal Pay for Equal Work” Mean?

The Supreme Court undertook an extensive review of its earlier decisions and distilled the principles governing equal pay for equal work.

Importantly, the Court clarified that designation alone is not decisive. What matters is the substance of the work.

Among the factors relevant for determining parity are:

  • the nature and quality of duties;
  • the responsibilities attached to the posts;
  • the level of responsibility and reliability;
  • the volume of work;
  • the qualifications prescribed;
  • the hierarchy of the posts;
  • the nature of recruitment; and
  • whether the duties are qualitatively and functionally comparable. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

The onus of establishing parity lies on the person claiming equal pay. At the same time, the Court made clear that employees cannot be denied parity merely because they are working in a different department if their duties and responsibilities are otherwise identical. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

Thus, “equal pay for equal work” is not a mechanical or mathematical formula. The comparison must be substantive and based on the actual nature of work.

Temporary Status Cannot Become a Reason for Lower Wages

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is its treatment of temporary workers.

The Court reviewed several earlier cases where temporary employees had been granted parity with regular employees. It noted that the principle had already been applied to employees described variously as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad hoc and contractual employees. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

The Court rejected the proposition that temporary employees could automatically be denied pay parity merely because they had not been appointed through the same process as regular employees.

The critical consideration is whether the employee is actually performing the same duties and responsibilities and possesses the qualifications required for the corresponding post.

Regularisation and Pay Parity Are Different Questions

The judgment draws an important distinction between two concepts which are often conflated:

Regularisation of employment and pay parity for work actually performed.

An employee may not have a right to be regularised simply because they have worked for a long period. But that does not automatically mean that the employer can pay them less for performing the same work as a regular employee.

The Supreme Court specifically found that the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had mixed the law relating to regularisation with the law relating to equal pay. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

This distinction is particularly important in public employment, where temporary or contractual arrangements may continue for years.

The Constitutional Foundation

The Court traced the principle of equal pay for equal work to the Constitution, particularly the values embodied in Articles 14, 16 and 39(d).

The judgment also relied upon the Court's earlier decision in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, where equal pay for equal work was recognised as a constitutional principle flowing from the equality provisions.

The Court emphasised that the principle is not simply an administrative policy. It constitutes law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

The Court also referred to Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognises fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value. India ratified the Covenant in 1979. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

Dignity of Labour

The judgment goes beyond technical questions of pay fixation.

The Supreme Court observed that creating artificial distinctions to deny the fruits of labour undermines human dignity. Where one person performs the same work as another but is compelled to accept a substantially lower wage, the Court viewed such inequality as potentially exploitative and coercive.

The Court linked fair remuneration with the dignity and self-worth of the worker and recognised that a person may accept lower wages not voluntarily, but because economic circumstances leave little real choice. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

This makes the judgment particularly significant from a human rights perspective: remuneration is not merely a matter of service rules but can also implicate equality, dignity and freedom from exploitation.

What Did the Supreme Court Ultimately Hold?

The Court set aside the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and affirmed the entitlement of the concerned temporary employees to the minimum of the pay-scale applicable to regular employees holding the same post, though the Court clarified the treatment of allowances. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

In the particular batch before it, the factual position was decisive. The State itself acknowledged that:

  • the temporary employees were working against posts also available in the regular establishment;
  • temporary employees and regular employees were being assigned the same duties from time to time;
  • the temporary employees possessed the qualifications prescribed for regular appointment; and
  • there was no other applicable principle that would disentitle them to parity.

The Court therefore held that the principle of equal pay for equal work applied to them. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

Consequently, the Court held:

Temporary employees performing the same work as regular employees are entitled to wages at the minimum of the regular pay-scale applicable to the corresponding post. SC Judgement-213of2013-EqualPay…

Why Does the Judgment Matter?

Jagjit Singh is an important reminder that employment status cannot, by itself, determine the value of labour.

The judgment does not say that every temporary employee is automatically entitled to the pay-scale of a regular employee. The employee must establish the requisite parity in duties, responsibilities, qualifications and other relevant factors.

But once such parity is established, the employer cannot create an artificial distinction merely by labelling one employee “temporary” and another “regular”.

For workers in the public sector, therefore, the judgment provides an important constitutional safeguard against unequal remuneration for substantially identical work.

A Disability Rights Perspective

Although the judgment does not concern disability rights or a claim under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, its reasoning has wider relevance to equality in employment.

For persons with disabilities, employment discrimination can sometimes operate through apparently neutral classifications—such as the nature of appointment, category of engagement, contractual status or job classification. Jagjit Singh reinforces the broader constitutional proposition that formal labels cannot substitute for an examination of the actual work, responsibilities and circumstances of the employee.

However, this should not be read as creating a disability-specific rule from Jagjit Singh. Its direct holding concerns pay parity between temporary and regular employees performing comparable work.

Conclusion

State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh strengthens the constitutional commitment to equal pay for equal work by rejecting artificial distinctions that result in workers being paid less despite performing the same duties and carrying the same responsibilities.

The judgment is ultimately about more than salary. It is about equality, dignity of labour and protection against exploitation.

Where the work is genuinely equal, the Court's message is clear: the temporary label cannot become a licence to pay less.

Read the Judgement in Civil Appeal No. 213 of 2013



Thursday, October 20, 2016

US Supreme Court to hear ground breaking case involving what is "appropriate education" for students with Autism in public schools

Dear Colleagues,

The origins of this potentially lank mark case stretch back to 2010 when the parents of a child with autism in Douglas County of USA had to withdraw their child from "Summit View Elementary" -  a public school  after the child (now 17) began to exhibit severe behavioral issues, including banging his head, dropping to the floor, disrobing and running away from school. The parents having been convinced the school wasn’t doing enough to help their son with autism progress academically, pulled the child out of Summit View and enrolled him in Firefly Autism, a Denver school that specializes in working with autistic children.

The parents have argued in the petition they submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court late last year that the intent of the IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) was to provide a meaningful education to disabled students, not simply a “just-above-trivial” benefit. They noted that federal judges from several circuits across the country have issued conflicting rulings over the years on what is the "appropriate standard" to be used to assess the proper level of educational benefit a disabled student should get. The petition of the parents argues that this case presents an ideal vehicle for this Court to resolve the circuit split and provide lower courts with guidance in applying the IDEA.

It is pertinent to note that the U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t spoken on the issue since the 1982 Board of Education Versus Rowley ruling, when it affirmed that IDEA guaranteed disabled students access to the public school classroom but didn’t address the quality of that education.

Even in India, we have been facing this issue of what is 'appropriate education' for children with disabilities, particularly those with intellectual and developmental disabilities. While the government schools in India are woefully ill-equipped in absence of trained educators, lack of teaching learning material in the schools given the large number of students. The situation is equally grim in the private schools as well who charge a considerable amount in the name of tuition fee and other counts, however, have made the education of disabled children an affair to be managed by Shadow Teachers (paid by parents). In the name of inclusion, children do remain in the school but there is hardly an effort to include them in the classroom or the learning outcomes. Children with disabilities are also not included in play or extra-curricular activities. This is surely not inclusion. This is a clear violation of the spirit of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act 1995 and in particular Section 30 of the Act.

Entire world will be watching this case with great curiosity as to what Supreme Court of USA decides. But one thing is sure, Supreme Court had made up its mind to speak its mind on the issue and likely to grant Certiorari to the parents. This case is truly about equal opportunity for the special needs children that the law requires. And this is likely to help realize inclusive education as enshrined in the IDEA.

Brief about IDEA 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a four-part (A-D) piece of American legislation that ensures students with a disability are provided with Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) that is tailored to their individual needs. IDEA was previously known as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA) from 1975 to 1990. In 1990, the United States Congress reauthorized EHA and changed the title to IDEA (Public Law No. 94-142). Overall, the goal of IDEA is to provide children with disabilities the same opportunity for education as those students who do not have a disability.

IDEA is composed of four parts, the main two being part A and part B.[1] Part A covers the general provisions of the law, Part B covers assistance for education of all children with disabilities, Part C covers infants and toddlers with disabilities which includes children from birth to age three, and Part D is the national support programs administered at the federal level. Each part of the law has remained largely the same since the original enactment in 1975.

In practice, IDEA is composed of six main elements that illuminate its main points. These six elements are: Individualized Education Program (IEP), Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), Least Restrictive Environment (LRE), Appropriate Evaluation, Parent and Teacher Participation, and Procedural Safeguards. To go along with those six main elements there are also a few other important components that tie into IDEA: Confidentiality of Information, Transition Services, and Discipline. Throughout the years of IDEA being reauthorized these components have become key concepts when learning about IDEA.

Here is the coverage in Denver on the issue

U.S. Supreme Court will hear Douglas County student with disabilities case
Origins of potentially landmark case stretch back to 2010

The U.S. Supreme Court announced Thursday that it will hear a potentially groundbreaking case brought by a Douglas County couple who claim that their autistic son was not provided an adequate education in the public school system as required by federal law.

The high court’s ruling on the case, which likely wouldn’t come down until next year, could have substantial implications for students with disabilities across the country in terms of the standard school districts will be required to meet when providing instruction and services. At issue is whether schools must provide an education equal to other students.

The family, whose last name is not used in court documents, told The Denver Post on Thursday that they were “shell-shocked and giddy” about the decision by the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to their case, which has dragged on for half a dozen years.

“It’s about equal opportunity for special-needs kids that the law requires,” said Joe F., father of Endrew F., whose name anchors the Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District case file. “If we can change any families’ lives, that’s our goal.”

The district released a statement on the high court’s decision late Thursday.

“It would be inappropriate to discuss the specifics of the case while it is still being litigated, but the Court’s decision today is not a decision on the merits, and we look forward to addressing the issues before the Court,” district spokeswoman Paula Hans said.

The roots of the case go back to 2010, when the Highlands Ranch couple pulled Endrew, now 17, out of Summit View Elementary after he began to exhibit severe behavioral issues, including banging his head, dropping to the floor, disrobing and running away from school. Convinced the school wasn’t doing enough to help their son progress academically, the couple pulled him out of Summit View and enrolled him in Firefly Autism, a Denver school that specializes in working with autistic children.
“If he was able to show up to school and say ‘good morning,’ that was good enough for them,” Joe F. said of the Douglas County School District. “They weren’t moving his education forward.”

The family has asked that their last name not be used.

The parents, who said their son has made progress in his learning since attending Firefly, asked the district to reimburse them for the tuition they paid for Endrew’s private schooling. They claimed that the Douglas County School District did not do enough to provide their son with a “free appropriate public education” as required by the 1975 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

But an administrative law judge, a federal judge and the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals backed the district, claiming in separate rulings that the federal statute only requires that schools provide students with “some educational benefit,” a standard they determined Douglas County had met with Endrew.

The family argued in the petition they submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court late last year that the intent of the IDEA was to provide a meaningful education to disabled students, not simply a “just-above-trivial” benefit. They noted that federal judges from several circuits across the country have issued conflicting rulings over the years on what is the appropriate standard to be used to assess the proper level of educational benefit a disabled student should get.

“This case presents an ideal vehicle for this Court to resolve the circuit split and provide lower courts with guidance in applying the IDEA,” their petition argued.

The U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t spoken on the issue since the 1982 Board of Education v. Rowley ruling, when it affirmed that IDEA guaranteed disabled students access to the public school classroom but didn’t address the quality of that education.

The family received a boost last month when the Office of the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to take up the case. It said that the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had set the bar — a standard of “merely … more than de minimis” educational benefit — too low.

“No parent or educator in America would say that a child has received an ‘appropriate’ or a ‘specially suitable’ or ‘proper’ education ‘in the circumstances’ when all the child has received are benefits that are barely more than trivial,” the solicitor general’s office wrote.

But Kathleen Sullivan, chief counsel for the Colorado Association of School Boards, said it would be better for Congress to clarify its statutes than for the court to impose an order. A uniform standard handed down by the Supreme Court would prove “disruptive” to what is today an individually tailored analysis and decision between educators, parents and students, she said.

“The disruption is in shoving aside more than 30 years of case law that we have in helping us understand what the IDEA means for students,” Sullivan said. “I think we would see a wave of litigation to define and apply that new standard.”

The district, in a brief it filed earlier this month urging the Supreme Court not to take up the case, argued that in passing the IDEA, Congress guaranteed access to public education for students with disabilities but did not specify what the level of that education should be.

“Thus, for over 30 years, this Court has held that if a State provides a program ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,’ then it ‘has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more,’ ” the brief argued.

But Jack Robinson, an attorney for Endrew F.’s family, said one of the IDEA’s stated goals is readying a student with disabilities for the workforce or independent living, something that can’t be achieved with a minimal education offering.

“There has to be a more heightened and robust standard than a little more than nothing,” Robinson said. “This case has the potential of recognizing that children with disabilities have a right to a substantive education.”

Source : Denverpost 

Note: This post is also reproduced on " Subhash Vashishth's Blog"

Disabled Soldiers & Politics of their Disability Pension

Dear Colleagues,

Here is a wonderful article by  Maj Navdeep Singh, a veteran and a fellow lawyer at Punjab and Haryana High Court. In this connection, you may also refer to  my earlier post dt. 26 Feb 2014 "DESW works against Ex-Servicemen disabled during service are worst hit".

Questions of compensation

India has the distinction of exhibiting disdain towards the cause of disabled soldiers

India is quite a paradox. There is excessive chest-thumping for our men and women in uniform on the one hand and pride in laying constant siege to the benefits and legal rights of those very personnel whom we superficially cheer while on parades on the other.

And bearing the brunt of this all are our disabled soldiers. The deleterious effect the stress and strain of military service has on a soldier’s health is a universally recognised phenomenon. In fact, most nations go out of the way to make the lives of their troops more comfortable — as seen in rising payouts for their loss of health. However, India has the distinction of exhibiting utter disdain towards the cause of disabled soldiers. At a very rudimentary level, for example, one has defence services accountants asking how ailments such as heart disease, neurosis, backache, seizures — common in civilians too — can be affected or aggravated by military service.

The service-disability connection

It is not difficult to discern that a highly unsettled and regimented life, away from family most of the year, and at times under the shadow of the gun, the inability to cope with domestic commitments, and a lack of community living, sexual fulfilment and physical proximity, curtailed freedoms and rights, can all lead to an aggravation of common medical conditions. The life of military personnel or even paramilitary troopers who are on duty almost 24 hours a day and who require permission to use even a washroom or visit a market after signing multiple registers, cannot be compared with civilians who live with their families and have fixed and reasonable working hours in a week.

Disability rules in India and other democracies are balanced and work on the presumption of a military service-disability connection. But the army of accountants and financial wizards often rejects such disability claims leading to numerous instances of judicial intervention. When disability benefits are awarded by courts and tribunals, there is more shock in store. The Ministry of Defence appeals against the claims of disabled, at times over amounts as little as a few hundred rupees. Between 2012-2013, 90 per cent of all appeals filed in the Supreme Court by the Ministry of Defence were against disabled soldiers. The efforts of the Defence Minister to control the litigation malaise are being met with strong resistance from the official-legal ecosystem which thrives on the miseries of disabled soldiers.

Paring pension rates
A recent example was the recommendation made in the Seventh Central Pay Commission to slash disability pension rates. The observation was that as there was an increase in the percentage of disabled officers in the defence services vis-à-vis the lower ranks, benefits needed to be slashed from the “percentage of pay system” to a “slab system” which would be more equitable for ranks other than officers. The recommendation was that from the current formula of “30% of pay for 100% disability”, the disability element should now be granted at the fixed rate of Rs. 27,000, Rs.17,000 and Rs.12,000 for Commissioned Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks respectively for 100 per cent disability, and proportionately reduced for lesser disability. Surprisingly, no such corresponding “equitable” change was recommended for civilian disability pensioners, including those from the Central Armed Police Forces, who continue to receive benefits on the basis of “percentage of pay”.

Statistically, there is a higher probability of officers incurring disability than jawans since the latter start retiring in their 30s after about 15-plus years of service. Officers retire in their 50s after a service period spanning 30 years or more. It shocks one that those who are maimed and infirm have to bear insults when instead there should be concern about the rise in stress and strain and a deteriorating health profile among defence personnel.

The recommendation was made suo motu based on data by the Defence Accounts Department to the commission and without being authenticated by the defence services. No opportunity was granted to discuss the issue. The accounting jugglery is even more jarring since the slab system would result in a better payout only to those rare cases where those in the lower ranks are medically boarded out at the start of their careers, while it results in a loss to all jawans who are released on completion of regular service terms. In the higher ranks, the difference is more glaring. A Lieutenant General who is 100 per cent disabled and drawing a disability element of Rs.52,560 as of December 31, 2015, would now get Rs.27,000 on January 1, 2016. His civilian counterpart, on a par earlier, would now get Rs.67,500. While the pay commission has handsomely increased all pensions, which includes civil disability, it has slashed those for military disability; in some instances by more than half. The fact that vested interests have twisted the issue on social media citing ‘government sources’ makes this even more unfortunate.

What is the use of all the pomp and show at military displays or basking in the glory of our military achievements if we cannot take care of our disabled soldiers? They may form a minuscule percentage, but they certainly deserve much better.

About Major Navdeep Singh - Major Singh is a veteran and an advocate at the Punjab and Haryana High Court. He was the founding President of the Armed Forces Tribunal Bar Association, Chandigarh., and is Member of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War at Brussels

Source: The Hindu