Universal Accessibility Gets Judicial Backing: Karnataka High Court Issues Comprehensive SOP, Declares Accessibility a Fundamental Right

Court: High Court of Karnataka
Bench: Justice Suraj Govindaraj
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 11351 of 2020
Case Title: PSBB Learning Leadership Academy v. Mrs. Barnali Rout & Others
Date of Judgment: 1 June 2026

Introduction

In a judgment that may significantly influence the future of accessibility jurisprudence in India, the Karnataka High Court has issued a comprehensive Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Universal Accessibility covering government institutions, private establishments, educational institutions, transport infrastructure, public spaces, housing developments, and digital platforms.

The judgment arose from a dispute involving a teacher who acquired a severe locomotor disability while attempting to save a student from a potentially fatal incident. However, the Court transformed what began as an individual grievance into an opportunity to address the systemic barriers faced by persons with disabilities across Karnataka.

The resulting 465-page judgment stands out as one of the most comprehensive judicial interventions on accessibility ever delivered by an Indian court. Our sector colleague Dr. Jayna Kothari, Senior Advocate represented the Respondents in the case.

The Background

Mrs. Barnali Rout, a teacher employed by PSBB Learning Leadership Academy, Bengaluru, suffered a serious spinal injury in August 2013 while attempting to prevent a student from jumping from a school building. The incident left her with approximately 90% permanent locomotor disability.

The State Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities directed the school to pay compensation and provide relief. The school challenged the Commissioner's order before the Karnataka High Court, raising multiple legal questions, including:

• Whether the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 applies to private educational institutions.
• Whether private employers are obligated to provide reasonable accommodation.
• Whether the State Commissioner possesses authority to issue corrective directions.
• What obligations educational institutions owe to employees who acquire disabilities during service.

The Court answered each of these questions in favour of a robust and purposive interpretation of disability rights.

Accessibility Is a Fundamental Right

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the judgment is its unequivocal recognition that accessibility is not a welfare measure.

The Court held that accessibility flows directly from the guarantees of equality, dignity, freedom, and life under the Constitution. Drawing from Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 38, 41, and 46, the Court declared that accessibility is a fundamental right and not an act of charity.

The judgment adopts the principles of:

• Universal Design;
• Inclusion by Design;
• Reasonable Accommodation;
• Barrier-Free Environment; and
• Substantive Equality.

Importantly, the Court also recognised the concept of intersectionality, acknowledging that disability often overlaps with gender, age, caste, poverty, geography, and other forms of disadvantage.

A Landmark SOP on Universal Accessibility

The most enduring feature of the judgment is the Court's issuance of a detailed Standard Operating Procedure on Universal Accessibility.

The SOP has been directed to operate throughout Karnataka as binding directions until the State Government frames comprehensive accessibility rules under Sections 40 and 45 of the RPwD Act, 2016.

Who Is Covered?

The SOP extends to an extraordinary range of establishments, including:

Government Institutions

• Secretariat buildings
• Government departments
• Courts and tribunals
• Police stations
• Panchayat offices
• Municipal offices
• Prisons and correctional facilities

Public Commercial Establishments

• Shopping malls
• Commercial complexes
• Multiplexes and cinemas
• Hotels and restaurants
• Banks and ATMs
• Fuel stations

Educational Institutions

• Schools
• Colleges
• Universities
• Coaching centres
• Libraries
• Examination centres

Healthcare Facilities

• Hospitals
• Clinics
• Rehabilitation centres
• Mental health institutions

Transport Infrastructure

• Railway stations
• Metro stations
• Bus terminals
• Airports
• Taxi stands
• Parking facilities
• Footpaths and pedestrian crossings

Religious and Cultural Institutions

• Temples
• Mosques
• Churches
• Gurudwaras
• Museums
• Heritage sites
• Sports complexes

Residential Developments

• Apartment complexes
• Housing societies
• Student hostels
• Senior living facilities

Digital Platforms

The SOP is particularly notable for its detailed treatment of digital accessibility. It applies to:

• Government websites;
• Mobile applications;
• E-governance portals;
• Court filing systems;
• Online grievance portals;
• Smart-city platforms; and
• Public-facing private digital services.

The Court has mandated compliance with recognised digital accessibility standards and emphasised WCAG 2.1 Level AA compliance, keyboard accessibility, screen-reader compatibility, captioning, and support for Indian Sign Language.

Accessibility Obligations for New and Existing Buildings

The Court has adopted a phased compliance model.

New Constructions

• Every new public or private building must be designed as accessible from inception.
• No building approval or completion certificate should be granted unless accessibility requirements are incorporated into the design.

Existing Buildings

The SOP requires accessibility retrofitting through defined timelines. High-footfall facilities have been prioritised for early compliance, such as:

• Airports,
• Railway stations,
• Metro stations,
• Bus terminals,
• Shopping malls, and
• Commercial complexes

The Court has also mandated accessibility audits, annual reviews, renewal audits, and surprise inspections. Significantly, the Court directed that occupancy certificates and trade licence renewals should be linked to accessibility compliance. This is potentially one of the strongest enforcement mechanisms seen in Indian accessibility jurisprudence.

Detailed Accessibility Standards

Unlike many previous judicial directions that merely refer to accessibility in general terms, the Karnataka High Court has prescribed specific measurable standards.

The SOP includes requirements relating to:

• Ramp gradients;
• Accessible toilets;
• Lift dimensions;
• Corridor widths;
• Service counters;
• Signage;
• Wayfinding systems;
• Emergency evacuation measures;
• Areas of Rescue Assistance;
• Accessible parking;
• Public seating; and
• Communication accessibility.

The judgment therefore moves beyond principles and enters the domain of practical implementation.

Special Directions for Educational Institutions

The Court devoted particular attention to schools and educational institutions. Every educational institution is required to:

• Establish Disability Anti-Discrimination Committees;
• Adopt Inclusive Education Policies;
• Ensure that admissions are not denied solely on the ground of disability;
• Install safety features in buildings;
• Maintain accessible facilities; and
• Develop emergency response protocols.

These directions have significance far beyond the facts of the present case and may serve as a model for educational institutions nationwide.

Private Sector Obligations Clarified

One of the most important legal findings concerns the applicability of the RPwD Act to private establishments.

The Court carefully distinguished the position under the 1995 disability law and held that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 expressly covers private establishments.

The judgment notes that the statutory definitions of "establishment" and "private establishment" leave little room for doubt.

Consequently, schools, companies, trusts, societies, hospitals, commercial entities, and other private organisations are bound by many obligations under the RPwD Act, including non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation.

This clarification is likely to have significant implications across India.

State Accessibility Authority

Recognising that rights without implementation mechanisms often remain ineffective, the Court directed the State Government to establish:

State Accessibility Authority

The Authority is expected to:

• Monitor compliance;
• Empanel accessibility auditors;
• Issue certifications;
• Maintain monitoring systems;
• Update standards; and
• Publish annual accessibility reports.

District Accessibility Committees

The Court also directed constitution of District Accessibility Committees across Karnataka to ensure local-level implementation and monitoring.

Relief to the Teacher

The Court upheld the compensation awarded to the teacher and directed the school to offer meaningful reinstatement through reasonable accommodation measures, including:

• Ground-floor wheelchair-accessible classrooms;
• Accessible washroom facilities;
• Transport allowance;
• Additional rest breaks;
• Online teaching options when required; and
• Necessary support arrangements.

The Court firmly rejected the argument that the teacher's conduct in attempting to save a student could diminish the school's obligations under disability rights law.

Why This Judgment Matters

This decision is remarkable for at least five reasons.

1. First, it treats accessibility as a constitutional right rather than a welfare measure.
2. Second, it recognises that disability rights obligations extend beyond government establishments to the private sector.
3. Third, it bridges the longstanding implementation gap by prescribing concrete standards and timelines.
4. Fourth, it places digital accessibility on an equal footing with physical accessibility.
5. Fifth, it creates an institutional framework for monitoring compliance rather than leaving implementation to goodwill alone.

DRI's Perspective

For years, disability rights advocates have highlighted that India's challenge is no longer the absence of law but the absence of implementation.

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 contains an extensive framework on accessibility. Yet progress across many sectors has remained uneven because accessibility standards have often lacked enforceable implementation mechanisms.

The Karnataka High Court's judgment seeks to address precisely this gap.

While many aspects of the SOP may require further scrutiny and some directions may ultimately be tested before appellate courts, the judgment unquestionably represents one of the boldest judicial attempts to operationalise accessibility rights in India.

Its influence is likely to extend far beyond Karnataka.

If implemented effectively, the judgment may become a model for other States and contribute significantly to transforming accessibility from a legal promise into a lived reality.

Accessibility is not charity. Accessibility is not welfare. Accessibility is a right. The Karnataka High Court has now said so in unmistakable terms.

Read the Judgement dated 01 June 2026 in PSBB Learning Leadership Academy v. Mrs. Barnali Rout & Others 

Delhi High Court Backs CCPD Concerns on SBI Promotion Policy, Orders Fresh Consideration of Barriers Faced by Blind Officers and examine alternative promotion pathways stressing that disability cannot be a ground to deny career advancement.

Published by: Disability Rights India (DRI)

Category: Employment Rights | Banking Sector | Reasonable Accommodation

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia
Case No.: W.P.(C) 6027/2025
Case Title: Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association v. State Bank of India & Others
Date of Judgment: 29 May 2026 

Background

More than three years after the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) found SBI's promotion policy discriminatory towards blind employees, the Delhi High Court has directed the State Bank of India to formally revisit the issue and examine solutions to prevent career stagnation of officers with visual disabilities.

The litigation was initiated by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA), challenging SBI's promotion policy that requires officers aspiring for promotion to Senior Management Grades (Scale IV and V) to first serve as Branch Managers or in Credit, Trade Finance or Forex assignments.

The Association argued that these assignments involve functions that are presently inaccessible to visually impaired officers because of the absence of assistive technology, inaccessible documentation systems, physical inspection requirements and unresolved questions of legal liability.

A Battle That Started Before the CCPD

This litigation did not emerge overnight.

The controversy traces its origins to proceedings initiated before the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) in 2022 by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA). The complaint challenged SBI's promotion policy on the ground that mandatory Branch Manager and Credit-related assignments effectively excluded blind officers from promotional opportunities because the duties associated with those roles were not accessible under existing systems and technologies.

After examining the issue, the CCPD accepted the core concerns raised by VIBEWA and held that the promotion criteria had the effect of disadvantaging visually impaired employees. The CCPD recommended that SBI modify its promotion policy, provide reasonable accommodation, recognise alternative assignments performed by blind officers and review exclusionary provisions that impeded career progression.

SBI, however, declined to implement the recommendations, resulting in the dispute eventually reaching the Delhi High Court.

Significantly, while the High Court stopped short of striking down the promotion policy, it accepted the legitimacy of the concerns underlying the CCPD proceedings. The Court noted that seemingly neutral promotion criteria can operate in a discriminatory manner against persons with disabilities and directed SBI's Board of Directors to reconsider the issue after examining detailed proposals to be submitted by VIBEWA.

Thus, nearly three-and-a-half years after the CCPD's intervention, the concerns first raised before the disability rights watchdog have now received judicial recognition from the Delhi High Court.

The Real Issue: Equal Criteria or Equal Opportunity?

The case raises a recurring question in disability rights jurisprudence: Does treating everyone identically always amount to equality?

SBI argued that the same promotion criteria apply to all officers and that several visually impaired officers are already performing the mandatory assignments.

VIBEWA, however, contended that equality cannot mean forcing blind officers to satisfy requirements that are designed around visual functions.

The Association pointed out that Branch Managers and Credit Officers are required to:

• Verify original title deeds and signatures;
• Conduct physical inspections of business premises and collateral properties;
• Monitor CCTV footage and strong rooms;
• Verify stocks and securities;
• Certify regulatory compliance carrying personal liability.

In the absence of accessible systems and clear accountability mechanisms, blind officers face barriers that their sighted counterparts do not. The result is not merely inconvenience—it is exclusion from promotion itself.

High Court Recognises the Principle of Indirect Discrimination

While the Court did not strike down SBI's policy, it accepted an important legal principle.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Leesamma Joseph and In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court recognised that a seemingly neutral rule can still operate in a discriminatory manner if it disproportionately disadvantages persons with disabilities.

The Court observed:

"Any provision that creates an impediment to the promotion of visually impaired officers would run contrary to the provisions of the RPwD Act."

This observation is significant because it shifts the focus from formal equality to substantive equality—the cornerstone of modern disability rights law.

Why the Court Did Not Strike Down the Policy

The Court ultimately refrained from invalidating the promotion criteria because it found that the Association had not placed before it sufficient details regarding specific officers adversely affected by the policy or concrete proposals capable of addressing SBI's operational concerns.

However, instead of rejecting the claim, the Court adopted a solution-oriented approach.

It directed VIBEWA to submit a comprehensive representation identifying affected officers, detailing the barriers they face, and proposing alternative pathways, accommodations and best practices adopted by other public sector banks. SBI's Board of Directors has been directed to examine these proposals and consider implementing feasible measures consistent with the RPwD Act.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment is important for reasons extending far beyond SBI.

First, it represents judicial recognition that career stagnation can itself amount to disability discrimination.

Second, it reinforces the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence that indirect discrimination is as harmful as explicit exclusion.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, it breathes fresh life into the CCPD's 2022 findings, which SBI had effectively ignored for over three years.

The Court has not given SBI a clean chit. Instead, it has required the country's largest public sector bank to engage with the concerns raised by blind employees, revisit the CCPD's recommendations, and seriously examine whether alternative pathways and reasonable accommodations can be devised.

For thousands of employees with disabilities working in the banking sector, the judgment sends a clear message: promotion policies cannot be insulated from scrutiny merely because they are framed in neutral language. If a rule creates barriers that prevent persons with disabilities from progressing in their careers, institutions must justify those barriers and actively seek solutions.

The next chapter of this battle will now unfold before SBI's Board of Directors.

Editor's Disclosure: The author of this blog post, Advocate Subhash Chandra Vashishth, represented the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA) in the proceedings before the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities that culminated in the CCPD's recommendations discussed in this article. The CCPD recommendations were covered in our blog post titled "Court of CCPD holds the SBI's Promotion Policy to grades of SMGS IV and SMGS V (2022-23) as discriminatory to employees with visual disabilities, recommends review" dated 01 Dec 2022.

Read the High Court Judgement  in VIBEWA Vs. SBI & Others

Inclusive Medical Education Requires Accommodation: Delhi High Court on Rights of Disabled Students

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Prathiba M. Singh
Case No.: W.P.(C) 1712/2025
Case Title: Sahil Arsh v. National Medical Commission & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 4 February 2026

 

Background

 

The petition before the Delhi High Court was filed by a medical student with a disability who challenged certain regulatory restrictions imposed by the National Medical Commission (NMC) that limited the ability of persons with disabilities to pursue medical education. The petitioner contended that the eligibility criteria and institutional practices adopted by medical authorities did not adequately account for the needs of students with disabilities.

 

According to the petitioner, despite the statutory protections provided under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, several medical institutions continued to apply rigid eligibility requirements that effectively excluded candidates with disabilities from pursuing medical education or completing their training on equal terms. The petitioner argued that such practices were inconsistent with the principle of reasonable accommodation mandated by the RPwD Act.

 

The matter therefore raised an important question regarding the obligations of regulatory bodies governing professional education. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether professional standards could be interpreted in a manner that excluded persons with disabilities or whether institutions must adapt their systems to ensure inclusive participation.

 

Key Observations

 

The Delhi High Court emphasised that professional education, including medical education, must be governed by the principles of equality, accessibility and reasonable accommodation recognised under the RPwD Act. The Court observed that regulatory bodies cannot frame or enforce rules that have the effect of systematically excluding persons with disabilities from professional courses.

 

Justice Prathiba M. Singh noted that the purpose of disability legislation is to ensure that educational institutions adopt inclusive practices that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively. This includes not only physical accessibility but also modifications in academic procedures, evaluation systems and institutional support mechanisms.

 

The Court further observed that professional competence should not be assessed through rigid assumptions about disability. Instead, institutions must examine whether reasonable accommodations and assistive technologies can enable students with disabilities to perform the essential functions required in the profession.

 

Importantly, the Court emphasised that regulatory frameworks governing medical education must be interpreted in a manner that advances the objective of inclusion rather than reinforcing outdated perceptions about the capabilities of persons with disabilities.

 

Directions Issued

 

• The Court directed the National Medical Commission to reconsider the petitioner’s case in light of the principles of reasonable accommodation under the RPwD Act.

• Authorities were instructed to ensure that regulatory guidelines governing medical education are consistent with the statutory rights of persons with disabilities.

• The Court emphasised that institutions must adopt inclusive policies that enable students with disabilities to participate effectively in professional education.

 

Commentary

 

The judgment represents an important development in the evolving discourse on disability rights in professional education. Historically, certain professions—including medicine—have been governed by rigid eligibility criteria that often excluded persons with disabilities based on assumptions about their abilities.

 

However, contemporary disability rights law recognises that such exclusion frequently reflects institutional barriers rather than inherent limitations. Advances in assistive technologies, adaptive learning systems and inclusive teaching methods have significantly expanded the possibilities for persons with disabilities to participate in professional fields.

 

By emphasising the obligation of regulatory bodies to incorporate reasonable accommodation into professional education frameworks, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed the transformative vision underlying the RPwD Act. The statute seeks not merely to remove formal barriers but to reshape institutional practices so that diversity becomes a normal and expected feature of educational environments.

 

The decision also signals a broader shift in judicial thinking. Rather than treating disability as a ground for exclusion from demanding professions, courts increasingly recognise that institutions must adapt their structures to accommodate diverse forms of participation. In doing so, the judgment contributes to the development of a more inclusive model of professional education in India.

Read the judgement [PDF 560KB]

Substantive Equality over Technicalities- SC Grants Relief to Woman with Benchmark Disability saying Reasonable Accommodation is a Fundamental Right [Judgement Included]

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026

Case Title: Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors.  [PDF 289 KB]

Date of Judgment: 13 January 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 53

Cases Referred: Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India (2024 INSC 775); Anmol v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 387); Om Rathod v. DGHS (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130); Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592); Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC; Avni Prakash v. NTA; Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625; Jane Kaushik v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257)

Brief 

In a significant judgment reinforcing the centrality of reasonable accommodation and substantive equality in public employment, the Supreme Court in Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited held that technicalities such as expiry of a recruitment panel cannot defeat the fundamental and statutory rights of persons with disabilities (PwDs). The Court directed Coal India Limited (CIL) to appoint the appellant, a woman with benchmark disability, by creating a supernumerary post and ensuring a suitable, accessible desk job with assistive infrastructure. 

Background

Coal India Limited had issued a recruitment notification in 2019 for Management Trainees. Sujata Bora applied under the visually disabled category, qualified for interview, and was later called for document verification and an Initial Medical Examination (IME) in 2021. She was declared medically unfit on the ground of visual disability coupled with residual partial hemiparesis.

Challenging this, she approached the Calcutta High Court. The Single Judge quashed the IME result and held that CIL could not deny appointment in the multiple disabilities category, but limited relief by directing consideration in the subsequent recruitment cycle since the earlier process had concluded. The Division Bench, however, set aside even this relief, primarily on the ground that the panel had expired.

Before the Supreme Court, detailed medical assessment was ordered through an AIIMS medical board. The final report assessed her disability at 57%, above the 40% benchmark threshold, making her eligible under the RPwD Act. The Court also interacted with the appellant and noted her determination and capability. 

Key Directions

The Supreme Court:

• Set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court.
• Held that the appellant had been wrongly denied employment through no fault of her own.
• Directed creation of a supernumerary post for her appointment.
• Requested that she be given a suitable desk job, with a separate computer and keyboard consistent with universal design under the RPwD Act.
• Requested posting at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam.
• Exercised powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. 

Reasonable Accommodation as a “Gateway Right”

One of the most important contributions of this judgment is its strong articulation of reasonable accommodation. The Court reaffirmed that:

• Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right.
• It is a gateway right enabling PwDs to enjoy all other rights.
• Denial of reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination and undermines substantive equality.

The Court rejected a narrow view of accommodation limited to devices or physical aids, instead endorsing a broad, purposive interpretation aligned with dignity, autonomy, and participation.

Intersectionality: Gender and Disability

The Court expressly recognised intersectional discrimination, noting that the appellant was a single woman with disability striving to overcome compounded barriers. It held that equality analysis cannot be unidimensional where multiple axes of disadvantage operate together. This acknowledgment strengthens the evolving Indian jurisprudence on intersectionality in disability rights.

Directive Principles and the Right to Work

Linking disability rights with constitutional philosophy, the Court invoked Articles 14, 21, 39(a), and 41, reiterating that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are “two wheels of a chariot.” The right to livelihood and work was treated as integral to a meaningful life.

Corporate Responsibility and Disability

Notably, the judgment situates disability inclusion within Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and ESG frameworks, referencing UN Guiding Principles and ILO materials. It emphasises that disability rights are human rights and must be addressed from a non-discrimination perspective, not merely as diversity optics. 

Significance

This ruling is a landmark for several reasons:

• Panel expiry cannot defeat disability rights where injustice is evident.
• Reasonable accommodation is firmly embedded as a fundamental right.
• Supernumerary posts are validated as a remedy in appropriate cases.
• Intersectionality receives explicit judicial recognition.
• Public sector employers are reminded that exclusion at the threshold, without exploring accommodations, is unlawful.

The Court’s opening line—“Lack of physical sight does not equate to a lack of vision”—aptly captures the spirit of the decision. The judgment sends a clear message: disability rights are not charity, nor mere policy preferences; they are enforceable legal and constitutional guarantees.

Read the Judgement

SC- Colour Blindness Cannot Be a Ground to End Public Employment or Deny Alternate Employment: Supreme Court Orders Redeployment of TSRTC Driver

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J. K. Maheshwari and Justice Aravind Kumar
Case Title: Ch. Joseph v. The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Ors.
Case No.: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 36278 of 2017
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 920
Decided on: 1 August 2025

Background

In a landmark judgment strengthening employment rights of persons acquiring disabilities during service, the Supreme Court has held that public employers cannot prematurely retire an employee on medical grounds without first making a genuine effort to identify suitable alternative employment.

The appellant, Ch. Joseph, was appointed as a driver in the then Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) in 2014 after satisfying all eligibility requirements. During a routine medical examination conducted while in service, he was found to be suffering from colour blindness and was declared medically unfit to continue as a driver.

Although Joseph sought reassignment to a non-driving post, the Corporation rejected his request on the ground that its internal circulars did not permit alternate employment for colour-blind drivers. Instead, he was compulsorily retired and offered additional monetary benefits.

The Single Judge of the High Court directed the Corporation to provide alternate employment. However, the Division Bench reversed that decision by relying upon an earlier Supreme Court judgment that interpreted the definition of disability under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995.

The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to determine whether the Corporation could retire the appellant without exploring alternative employment and whether binding industrial settlements guaranteeing redeployment continued to protect colour-blind drivers.

Issues Before the Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

• Whether retirement of a driver solely on account of colour blindness, without considering alternate employment, was legally sustainable.
• Whether a binding settlement executed under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act guaranteeing alternate employment continued to remain enforceable.
• Whether internal administrative circulars could override rights created under a statutory industrial settlement.
• Whether the Corporation had discharged its obligation to meaningfully assess alternative employment before terminating the appellant's services.

Key Findings

a) Medical Unfitness for One Post Does Not Mean Unfitness for All Employment

The Court held that the Corporation fundamentally erred in assuming that inability to perform driving duties automatically rendered the appellant unsuitable for every other post.

Colour blindness may disqualify a person from driving public transport vehicles, but it does not establish incapacity to discharge numerous other functions within the organisation.

The Court observed that Joseph had specifically sought appointment as a Shramik, a post that did not require normal colour vision. Yet the Corporation made no attempt to examine his suitability or identify available vacancies.

b) Alternate Employment Must Be Explored Before Medical Retirement

The Supreme Court held that retirement on medical grounds can only be a measure of last resort.

Before terminating an employee, the employer must make a genuine and documented effort to identify suitable alternative employment. Failure to undertake such an exercise amounts to a substantive violation of law rather than a mere procedural lapse.

The Court described this obligation as flowing from the constitutional principle of reasonable accommodation, which forms part of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

c) Binding Industrial Settlements Cannot Be Overridden by Administrative Circulars

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment concerns the legal status of settlements arrived at under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court examined a 1979 Memorandum of Settlement entered into between the Corporation and recognised trade unions. Clause 14 expressly provided that drivers who developed colour blindness during service would be given alternate employment while protecting their pay and seniority.

Rejecting the Corporation's contention that a later settlement had superseded the earlier one, the Court held that:

• the 1986 settlement did not expressly repeal Clause 14;
• the earlier clause specifically dealt with colour-blind drivers;
• the later settlement merely dealt generally with medically unfit drivers; and
• applying the principle generalia specialibus non derogant, the specific provision continued to prevail.

The Court further held that internal circulars issued in 2014 and 2015 could not override a statutory settlement possessing binding legal force under the Industrial Disputes Act.

d) Reasonable Accommodation Extends Beyond Statutory Definitions

The judgment is particularly significant because it moves beyond the technical question whether colour blindness falls within the statutory definition of disability.

Relying upon its recent decisions in Mohamed Ibrahim v. Chairman and Managing Director, Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India and Kunal Singh v. Union of India, the Court held that the obligation of reasonable accommodation cannot be defeated merely because a particular medical condition falls outside the enumerated categories of disability.

The Bench observed that constitutional principles of equality, dignity and non-discrimination require employers to preserve employment wherever an employee retains the functional ability to perform other duties.

e) Inaction Is Institutional Exclusion

The Court made an important observation regarding the burden resting upon employers. It held that the employer—not the employee—must demonstrate that no suitable alternative post exists.

Merely asserting that no vacancy was available is insufficient. The employer must place material on record showing that it examined available posts, assessed the employee's suitability and genuinely attempted redeployment. Failure to undertake such an exercise amounts to institutional exclusion of persons with disabilities.

Directions Issued

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court:

• set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court;
• directed the Corporation to appoint the appellant to a suitable alternative post consistent with his medical condition;
• directed that he be placed in the same pay scale he held before retirement;
• awarded 25% of salary arrears and consequential benefits; and
• directed that the intervening period be treated as continuous service for all purposes.

Why This Judgment Matters

1) Expands Protection Beyond Technical Definitions

The judgment recognises that equality in employment cannot depend solely upon whether a medical condition falls within statutory definitions. Constitutional guarantees of dignity and reasonable accommodation may independently require employers to retain employees through suitable redeployment.

2) Reinforces Reasonable Accommodation in Public Employment

The Court firmly establishes that employers must actively explore adjustments and alternative assignments before terminating employees who acquire disabilities or medical conditions affecting their original duties.

3) Strengthens the Sanctity of Industrial Settlements

The decision also reinforces that settlements entered under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act possess statutory force and cannot be diluted through unilateral administrative instructions.

4) Protects Livelihood and Human Dignity

The judgment recognises that loss of a particular functional ability should not automatically result in loss of livelihood where the employee remains capable of contributing in another capacity.

DRI Commentary

This judgment marks another important milestone in the Supreme Court's gradual transition from a narrow statutory understanding of disability towards a constitutional model founded on reasonable accommodation, substantive equality and preservation of dignity.

Although colour blindness has traditionally presented difficulties under disability legislation because it may not satisfy the statutory definitions of benchmark disability, the Court refused to allow those technical classifications to determine the outcome. Instead, it focused on the more fundamental question: Can the employee continue to contribute through another suitable role?

Equally significant is the Court's insistence that employers must demonstrate meaningful efforts at redeployment. For far too long, public authorities have treated medical retirement as an administrative convenience rather than a measure of last resort. This judgment reverses that approach by placing the burden squarely on the employer to prove that no suitable alternative employment exists.

The Court's reaffirmation of the doctrine of reasonable accommodation also reflects the evolution of Indian disability jurisprudence under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. Drawing upon Vikash Kumar, Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal and Mohamed Ibrahim, the Bench makes it clear that equality often requires individualised assessment rather than rigid adherence to medical classifications.

Perhaps the most enduring contribution of this decision is its recognition that public employment is not merely about filling posts—it is about preserving human dignity. A medical certificate declaring an employee unfit for one job cannot become a licence to extinguish a career without first exhausting every reasonable possibility of continued employment.

For persons with disabilities and employees acquiring medical impairments during service, this judgment substantially strengthens the obligation of public employers to adopt accommodation and redeployment as the norm, and medical retirement as the exception.

Read the Judgement

Hyper-Technical Recruitment Rules Cannot Override Disability Rights: Delhi High Court Upholds Relief to Disabled Candidate

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Ajay Digpaul

Case No.: W.P.(C) 2238/2025
Case Title: Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) v. Sumit
Date of Judgment: 20 February 2025

The Delhi High Court has reaffirmed that procedural technicalities cannot be used to deny reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities in public employment. Dismissing a challenge filed by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, the Court upheld relief granted to a candidate with 63% orthopaedic disability who had been denied exemption from a qualifying typing test despite being otherwise eligible for such exemption. The Court ruled that rigid insistence on procedural formalities must give way where it defeats the substantive guarantees of equality, inclusion and reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Background

The dispute arose from recruitment to the post of DASS Grade IV conducted by DSSSB. Candidates were required to clear a typing skill test, which was only qualifying in nature. Merit for final selection depended entirely on marks obtained in the written examination.

The respondent, who has 63% permanent orthopaedic disability affecting his left elbow joint, appeared for the typing test but failed to qualify. He later asserted that he had requested exemption during the examination because pain and restricted movement in his left arm prevented him from completing the test effectively. However, he did not physically produce his disability certificate before the examiner at that time.

Subsequently, DSSSB granted exemption from the typing test to several other candidates with orthopaedic disabilities who had submitted the required disability documents. Many of those candidates had scored lower marks than the respondent in the written examination but were nevertheless selected.

Aggrieved by the denial of similar accommodation, the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking exemption from the typing test and consideration for appointment on the basis of his written examination performance. The Tribunal accepted his claim and directed DSSSB to extend the benefit of exemption. DSSSB then challenged the Tribunal’s order before the High Court.

Findings of the High Court

The High Court refused to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision. It noted that DSSSB itself did not dispute the genuineness of the respondent’s disability or his eligibility for exemption under the applicable Office Memorandum.

The Court emphasised that the typing test was merely qualifying in nature and had no bearing on comparative merit. Since the respondent had scored higher than several candidates who ultimately received appointments after being granted exemption, denying him the same accommodation solely on procedural grounds would produce an arbitrary and exclusionary result.

Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC and Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that disability rights jurisprudence requires a liberal, purposive and rights-based interpretation of legal and administrative provisions.

The Bench strongly cautioned against hyper-technical application of procedural requirements in disability matters. It observed that insisting upon strict procedural compliance in every situation may defeat the very purpose of reasonable accommodation and undermine the protective framework established under the RPwD Act.

Importantly, the Court accepted that the respondent had in fact sought exemption during the typing test. In these circumstances, refusing accommodation merely because the disability certificate was not physically shown at that precise moment would amount to elevating form over substance.

At the same time, the Court clarified that its ruling turned on the specific facts of the case and should not be read as dispensing with procedural requirements altogether in all disability-related matters.

Directions

• The writ petition filed by DSSSB was dismissed.
• The Tribunal’s order granting exemption from the typing test was upheld.
• The respondent became entitled to consideration for appointment according to his written examination merit, subject to the limitations imposed by the Tribunal regarding consequential benefits.

Commentary

This judgment significantly strengthens the principle that reasonable accommodation cannot be reduced to a mechanical administrative formality. The Court recognised that once the existence of disability and entitlement to accommodation were undisputed, procedural lapses could not be used as a tool to exclude a disabled candidate from public employment.

The ruling also advances the shift in Indian disability jurisprudence from formal equality to substantive equality. The Court acknowledged that recruitment systems designed around able-bodied assumptions often create barriers for persons with disabilities unless authorities adopt a flexible and disability-sensitive approach.

Equally important is the Court’s reaffirmation that reasonable accommodation is not a concession or discretionary benefit. It is a statutory and constitutional obligation flowing from dignity, equality, inclusion and equal participation under the RPwD Act and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

By rejecting a hyper-technical interpretation of procedural rules, the judgment sends a clear message that administrative processes must serve the objectives of disability rights law rather than frustrate them. At the same time, the Court carefully balanced inclusion with administrative discipline by limiting the ruling to the peculiar facts before it.

The decision therefore stands as an important precedent for inclusive recruitment practices and reinforces that procedural frameworks must operate in harmony with the substantive rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities.

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Child Care Leave (CCL) for Mothers of Children with Disabilities is a Constitutional Right: Supreme Court Directs Himachal Pradesh to Reform Leave Policy

Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon'ble Chief Justice and Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala

Case No. : SLP (Civil) No. 16864 of 2021  (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 23-04-2021 in CWP No.3861/2020 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla)

Case Title: Shalini Dharmani v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.,
Date of Order: 22 April 2024

Background

In a significant order strengthening the rights of parents of children with disabilities, the Supreme Court has held that Child Care Leave (CCL) is not merely an employment benefit but an essential constitutional measure to ensure equal participation of women in the workforce.

The case arose from the plight of Ms. Shalini Dharmani, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at Government College, Nalagarh, Himachal Pradesh. She is the mother and primary caregiver of her fourteen-year-old son who suffers from Osteogenesis Imperfecta (Brittle Bone Disease), a rare genetic disorder requiring repeated surgeries, continuous medical treatment and constant care.

Because of her son's medical condition, she exhausted every category of leave available under the Himachal Pradesh service rules. However, unlike Central Government employees, State Government employees in Himachal Pradesh were not entitled to Child Care Leave because the State had deleted the corresponding provision from its leave rules.

Her request for Child Care Leave was rejected, and the Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed her writ petition on the ground that no such provision existed under the applicable State Rules. She therefore approached the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The petitioner relied upon Rule 43-C of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, which permits a woman Government servant to avail 730 days of Child Care Leave during her entire service.

By an Office Memorandum dated 3 March 2010, the Central Government further extended this benefit for women employees having children with disabilities by allowing Child Care Leave until the child attains 22 years of age, instead of the general age limit of 18 years.

The petitioner also relied upon the objectives and mandate of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which seeks to ensure equal opportunity and inclusion for persons with disabilities.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following important questions:

• Whether denial of Child Care Leave to a mother caring for a child with disability merely because the State has not adopted the Central Rules violates constitutional guarantees?
• Whether State employment policies must be aligned with the objectives of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016?
• Whether Child Care Leave is simply a service benefit or an essential component of substantive equality and equal opportunity for women?

Supreme Court's Observations

The Court made several significant observations that go beyond service law and enter the realm of constitutional rights.

1. Women's Participation in Employment is a Constitutional Right

Rejecting the argument that Child Care Leave is merely a policy concession, the Court observed:

"The participation of women in the work force is not a matter of privilege, but a constitutional entitlement protected by Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution; besides Article 19(1)(g)."

    The Court recognised that without adequate caregiving support, many women         may be forced to leave employment altogether.

2. Mothers of Children with Disabilities Need Greater Protection

The Court observed that the constitutional concern becomes even more compelling where a mother is caring for a child with special needs requiring continuous medical intervention.

Such situations require the State to adopt policies that acknowledge the additional caregiving responsibilities arising from disability.

3. State Policies Must Conform to Constitutional Values

The Supreme Court held that although framing service rules is a matter of policy, those policies cannot operate independently of constitutional guarantees.

The Court observed that State policies must remain consistent with constitutional protections and the objectives of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Directions Issued by the Supreme Court

Recognising the wider policy implications, the Supreme Court directed the Government of Himachal Pradesh to comprehensively reconsider its Child Care Leave policy.

The Court ordered the constitution of a Committee chaired by the Chief Secretary comprising:

• State Commissioner under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act;
• Secretary, Women and Child Development Department;
• Secretary, Social Welfare Department.

The Committee was also directed to engage with the concerned Ministries of the Union Government before submitting its recommendations.

Pending the final policy decision, the Supreme Court directed that the petitioner's application for special leave should be considered favourably.

What Happened After the Judgment?

Following the intervention of the Supreme Court, the Himachal Pradesh Cabinet approved amendments to its leave rules by adopting the Himachal Pradesh Amendment Rules, 2024.

The amended Rules now provide:

• Child Care Leave up to 730 days during the entire service;
• applicable to female Government employees caring for children having benchmark disabilities (40% or more);
• bringing the State's policy substantially in line with the Central Government framework.

The case thus demonstrates how constitutional litigation can directly influence public policy for the benefit of persons with disabilities and their families.

Why This Judgment Matters

Although the case concerns Child Care Leave, its significance extends much further. The decision recognises that disability rights are not confined to ramps, accessible websites or reservation in employment. They also require Governments to acknowledge the additional responsibilities borne by families of persons with disabilities.

The judgment reinforces several important principles:

• caregiving responsibilities arising from disability deserve legal recognition;
• women should not be forced to choose between employment and caring for a child with disability;
• equality requires reasonable accommodation in employment policies;
• service rules must evolve consistently with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016;
• constitutional guarantees cannot be defeated merely because an enabling service rule has not been framed.

Disability Rights India View

This decision represents an important step in recognising caregiving as a disability rights issue.

Parents—particularly mothers—often shoulder lifelong caregiving responsibilities that extend far beyond ordinary parenting. Hospital admissions, rehabilitation, therapy sessions, assistive devices, educational interventions and emergency medical care require substantial time and flexibility.

The RPwD Act recognises the need for equal opportunity and reasonable accommodation. That objective cannot be achieved unless employment policies also accommodate the realities of disability-related caregiving.

While the Supreme Court's order arose in the context of a woman Government employee, the broader principle has implications for all Governments across India. States that continue to deny Child Care Leave or other flexible work arrangements for parents of children with disabilities should revisit their policies in light of the constitutional principles articulated by the Supreme Court.

The judgment also serves as a reminder that reasonable accommodation extends beyond physical accessibility. Inclusive employment requires policies that enable caregivers to remain in the workforce without sacrificing the care and support required by children with disabilities.

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court recognised that women's participation in employment is a constitutional right, not a privilege.
• Child Care Leave is an important measure for achieving substantive equality in employment.
• State leave policies must be consistent with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.
• Governments must recognise the enhanced caregiving responsibilities associated with disability.
• Following the Supreme Court's intervention, Himachal Pradesh amended its leave rules to provide 730 days of Child Care Leave for female Government employees caring for children with benchmark disabilities.

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Citation: Shalini Dharmani v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., SLP (Civil) No. 16864 of 2021, Supreme Court of India, Order dated 22 April 2024. 

Supreme Court: Citing Reasonable Accommodation provisions, bench directs a person with defective colour vision to be appointed as Assistant Engineer Electrical

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aravind Kumar

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12671 of 2022]

Case Title: Mohamed Ibrahim Vs. The Chairman & Managing Director & Ors.

Date of Judgement: 16 October 2023

Brief:

The Supreme Court granted relief to the appellant - a person with colour blindness - who was denied appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer applying the principle of "reasonable accommodation" as defined in the RPwD Act. Incidently, colour blindness is not an identified or defined disability in the schedule to the Act.

The Court highlighted that the provisions of the RPwD Act are specifically designed to foster the participation and empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (PwDs). However, it expressed its concern that the benefits arising from affirmative action are confined to a specific category of PwDs, including those with orthopedic, visual, hearing, and mental disabilities, among others covered in the schedule to the Act. These benefits are intricately linked to the concept of "benchmark" disabilities, which grants affirmative action and similar benefits to PwDs who meet a defined threshold of disability, typically 40 percent or more. This distinction based on specified categories and threshold conditions, as per the topc court, creates substantial barriers.

It bench observed, “The actual benefits in the form of affirmative action are defined by a specific category of PwDs (orthopaedical, visual, hearing, mental, etc.) and tied to the context of “benchmark” disabilities, which entitles those PwDs who qualify with a certain threshold of disability (40 percent or more) to the affirmative action and other similar benefits. The nature of inclusion of specified categories only to the exclusion of other categories of disabilities, on the one hand, and the eligibility of a threshold, in the opinion of this court, constitute barriers.”

"The twin conditions of falling within defined categories, and also a threshold condition of a minimum percentage, of such disabilities, in fact are a barrier," opined the court. The Court emphasized the necessity of a more rational and inclusive approach to accommodate individuals who may not it into the established categories of PwDs in the schedule to the Act.

“The facts of this case demonstrate that the appellant is fit, in all senses of the term, to discharge the duties attached to the post he applied and was selected for. Yet, he is denied the position, for being “disabled” as he is color blind. At the same time, he does not fit the category of PwD under the lexicon of the universe contained within the Act. These challenge traditional understandings of what constitutes “disabilities”. The court has to, therefore, travel beyond the provisions of the Act and discern a principle that can be rationally applied.”

The bench was hearing an appeal against the Madras HC judgment which had ruled in favour of the respondent(TANGEDCO) asserting its right to reject the appellant's candidature on the grounds of colour blindness. The case revolved around a job application for the position of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) by the appellant. The appellant, who was initially considered qualified for the role, was subsequently found to be color blind during a medical examination. This raised concerns about his ability to fulfill the responsibilities of an engineer, which frequently involve working with color-coded power cables and wires.

As a result of these concerns, TANGEDCO rejected the appellant's candidature. The appellant challenged this decision under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the Madras High Court initially ruled in his favor, directing TANGEDCO to offer him the position. However, in appeal before the division bench, the decision highlighted the evolving doctrine of proportionality, indicating that TANGEDCO's decision had a reasonable basis, even by this modern standard. Consequently, the division bench's judgment reversed the previous order, leading the appellant to seek redress from the Supreme Court. 

The SC bench noted that respondent TANGEDCO had not explicitly indicated that colour vision deficiency, in any form or degree, serves as a disqualifying factor for the role of an Assistant Engineer. It emphasized that the appellant, being a graduate in electrical engineering, possessed knowledge and experience related to the role's functions. Additionally, practical experience during the course exposed the candidate to equipment defects and solutions for breakdowns. Thus, the SC bench established the need for some form of accommodation.

The Court relied on Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 4 SCR 638 to highlight that when public facilities and services are designed with standards inaccessible to persons with disabilities, it results in their exclusion and a denial of rights. The concept of equality goes beyond merely preventing discrimination; it involves addressing systematic discrimination through positive rights, affirmative action, and reasonable accommodation.

The Court also cited the case of Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India  2021 (13) SCR 823, which distinguishes between formal equality and substantive equality. Substantive equality aims to achieve equal outcomes, and the principle of reasonable accommodation plays a critical role in this.

The Court observed that reasonable accommodation entails accommodating disabled individuals based on their capacities. It also relied on Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission  2021 (12) SCR 311, which held “The principle of reasonable accommodation acknowledges that if disability” should be remedied and opportunities are “to be affirmatively created for facilitating the development of the disabled. Reasonable accommodation is founded in the norm of inclusion. Exclusion results in the negation of individual dignity and worth or they can choose the route of reasonable accommodation, where each individual's dignity and worth is respected.”

The court also cited Ashutosh Kumar v. Film and Television Institute of India (2022),  where the Supreme Court directed the FTII to accommodate students with colour blindness saying, "The respondent institute is a premier institute and one would expect it to encourage liberate thought process and not put courses connected with films in any conformist box".

While  acknowledging the resondent's concerns about colour vision impairment, the Court reminded the TANGEDCO of its obligation to operate within the framework of "reasonable accommodation" as defined by Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act. Resultantly, the court set aside the impugned judgement of the Division bench of Madras High Court saying, “The impugned judgment cannot stand; it is set aside. TANGEDCO, the respondent corporation, is directed to appoint and continue the appellant in its service, as AE (Electrical) at the appropriate stage of the grade of pay,”.

During the hearing, the Court learnt that a member of the bar, Mr. Mehmoud Yumar Faruqi had life experiences of colour blindness -as someone living with a condition of colour blindness and had collected considerable case law and literature. The court had, therefore, requested his assistance for the proceedings. The court expressed its gratitude for his assistance.  

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