Showing posts with label Delhi High Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Delhi High Court. Show all posts

Friday, April 4, 2014

Supreme Court to hear Curative Petition on Decriminalisation of Homosexuality

Dear Colleagues,

Chapter XVI, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code dating back to 1861, introduced during the British rule of India, criminalises sexual activities "against the order of nature", arguably including homosexual acts.

The section was declared unconstitutional with respect to sex between consenting adults by the High Court of Delhi on 2 July 2009. That judgement was overturned by the Supreme Court of India on 11 December 2013, with the Court holding that amending or repealing Section 377 should be a matter left to Parliament, not the judiciary.

The Supreme Court on 03rd April 14,  agreed to consider the plea for an open court hearing on curative petitions filed by gay rights activists against its verdict criminalizing homosexuality. 

A bench headed by Chief Justice P Sathasivam, before whom the matter was mentioned by senior lawyers appearing for different parties, said that it will go through the documents and consider their plea. 

Curative petition is the last judicial resort available for redressal of grievances in court and it is normally considered by judges in-chamber without granting opportunity to parties to argue the case. 

The petitioners, including NGO Naz Foundation which has been spearheading the legal battle on behalf of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community, contended that there was an error in the judgment delivered on December 11 last year as it was based on old law. 

Senior Advocate Ashok Desai said that the judgment in the instant case was reserved on March 27, 2012 but the verdict was delivered after around 21 months by the SC and during this period lots of changes took place including amendment in laws which were not considered by the bench which delivered the judgment.  Senior advocates like Harish Salve, Mukul Rohatgi, Anand Grover and other lawyers supported Ashok Desai and pleaded for an open court hearing.   They submitted that the case should have been heard by the Constitution bench instead of two-judge bench which heard and delivered the verdict on the controversial issue. 

The apex court had earlier dismissed a batch of review petitions filed by the Centre and gay rights activists including noted filmmaker Shyam Benegal against its December 2013 verdict declaring gay sex an offence punishable upto life imprisonment. 


Wednesday, April 2, 2014

Overweight airhostesses to get back their jobs with backwages

Is fat fit? In certain circumstances, yes, the Delhi high court has said. The court said that the question, is not raised in the sense of physical well being. Accumulated medical wisdom would have us believe that weight brings with it several health related problems; such as, hyper tension, cardio vascular disease, etcetera. What has to be thus, kept in mind is that, the question posed is, contextual and not generic.

Writing a common judgement for three cases one each by Sangita Garg, Punita Bakshi & Sona Chawla against the NACIL (National Aviation Company of India Ltd.), Justice Rajiv Shakdher, in this important ruling  directed Indian Airlines (now NACIL) to reinstate three air hostesses who had been dismissed for gaining weight with full backwages and consequential benefits.

To access the common judgement click here:  Sangeeta Garg Versus Indian Airlines WP(C) 30/ 2010 

Justice Shakdher further observed while ruling in favour of the three women, " It is quite clear that Indian Airlines Ltd has not applied its mind to germane factors before taking a decision to terminate the petitioners' services. The reasons given had no link with the conclusion reached which was to dispense with the services of the petitioners," Justice Shakdher observed while ruling in favour of the three women.

HC directed IA to take back in service the women with full back wages and all consequential benefits, rejecting the argument of the airlines that contract for appointment itself made it clear that excess weight will lead to dismissal.

The women who had joined IA as air-hostesses, were till their termination from service, deployed as ground staff. The airline dismissed them on the ground they failed to maintain weight within the prescribed limits.

On their part, the women didn't seek redeployment as cabin crew but continuance of their present job as ground staff. They argued they were removed summarily without being given a chance to answer the allegations. They further pointed out that facts and circumstances in each of the three cases were different which is why they gained weight. For example one of the petitioners had a medical condition while another was being put to extreme stress by her estranged husband and in-laws.

Defending its decision IA maintained even if the women were medically fit, to continue with their services it could be terminated under the terms of the contract upon their failure to maintain weight as per prescribed limits. It added that indulgence over several years was granted to the women despite which, they were unable to bring their weight within the prescribed limit, leading to their dismissal. IA further argued that it is in travel industry where pleasing appearance, manners and physical fitness was required of members of both sexes. But HC was not convinced, holding in essence that termination from service for employees who were not in active flight duties was too severe an act.

Related Story in Times of India : Air Hostesses sacked for weitht to get back jobs 



Thursday, March 27, 2014

Delhi HC issues notices to Civic Agencies on Barrier Free Pedestrian Infrastructure

A Division Bench headed by the Acting Chief Justice B. D. Ahmed and Justice Sidharth Mridul of Delhi High Court on 26 March 2014, issued notices to Govt. of Delhi, civic bodies, Traffic Police, Police Commissioner & DDA  on a public interest litigation that sought a direction to ensure barrier free pedestrian infrastructure in the city of Delhi. The responses are to be filed by May 26, 2014.

The petitioner Mr. Vinod Kumar Bansal, a social worker stressed that parking spaces should be provided to the physically challenged in line with the Master Plan Delhi 2021. The petition sought the court's direction to the Delhi government and civic agencies to install auditory signals at red lights on public roads for physically handicapped which have not been provided despite clear cut provision in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act 1995.

The petition further sought directions to make pavements wheelchair-friendly. "Footpaths, pavements and public roads are laid only for the purpose for passing through by the pedestrians / vehicles and are also meant for passage only and for no other purpose or business but the shopkeepers are misusing the footpaths, pavements and to some extent roads in Delhi," the PIL said.

The petition titled  Vinod Kumar Bansal Versus Govt. of NCT Delhi and Others registered as W.P.(C) 1977/2014, also points out that footpaths and pavements are constructed for free and safe passage for and by the pedestrians. However, authorities have ignored their duty to regulate, maintain and control the free flow of traffic and of the general public at large. The petition seeks to make all pavements wheelchair friendly.

More updates soon!

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

DHC | Nishant. S. Diwan vs High Court Of Delhi | W.P.(C) 983/2014 | Dated 25 March, 2014 [Judgement]

Court: Delhi High Court at New Delhi

Bench:     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT 
                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR

Case No. & Title: W.P.(C) 983/2014, Nishant S. Diwan Vs. High Court of Delhi

Date of Judgement: 25 March 2014
 
Author: S.Ravindra Bhat

------

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 21.03.2014
Pronounced on: 25.03.2014

W.P.(C) 983/2014, C.M. NOS.1973/2014 & 1974/2014
       
NISHANT. S. DIWAN                          .....Petitioner

Through: Sh. Jinendra Jain, Sh. Ajay Jain, Sh. B.N. Gaur, Sh. R.P. Kaushal and Sh. Arun Jain,                Advocates.      
             
Versus

HIGH COURT OF DELHI THROUGH REGISTRAR  GENERAL AND ANR.  ...Respondents

Through: Sh. Rajiv Bansal and Sh. Anchit Sharma, Advocates, for Resp. No.1.
       Ms. Sonal. K. Singh and Sh. Anurag Gohil, Advocates, for Resp. No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT 
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR 

MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT *

1. In these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, a direction is sought to the Delhi High Court Establishment, through its Registrar General (hereafter called "the High Court Establishment") to reserve 3% of the vacancies for the disabled persons, in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service (DHJS) Examination-2013 and consequently reserve 3% of the posts of the total cadre strength of that Service (hereafter referred to as "DHJS") and consider his case as well in the category of "disabled persons". Consequently, direction to the High Court Establishment to grant extra 30 minutes to the petitioner for attempting the DHJS Examination, in respect of the direct- recruitment quota is also sought.

2. The petitioner has been practicing as an advocate since 1998; he claims to be disabled in terms of The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereafter referred to as the "Disabilities Act"). He suffers from what is termed as "FOLLOW UP CASE OF HYDROCEPHALUS WITH STUNT SURGERY WITH MYOSITIS OSSIFICANS HIP WITH ANKYLOSED HIP". This condition, the petitioner says, is described as "locomotor disability" under the Disabilities Act which entitles him to benefits under that law, especially Section 33. The petitioner contends that in terms of an old 1977 Central Government notification, reservations to the extent of 3% for persons with disabilities was provided for in Group-C and Group-D posts and in Central Public Service Undertakings. There was a continuous demand to extend that benefit to Group-A and Group-B posts eventually leading to litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution which culminated in the decision reported as National Federation of Blind v. Union Public Service Commission and Others AIR 1993 SC 1916. The Supreme Court, in its judgement, directed the Central Government to consider the feasibility of extending the reservations to Group-A and Group-B posts. The petitioner relies upon Section 33 of the Disabilities Act to urge that with its enactment, every appropriate government is obliged to appoint in every establishment not less than 3% of the W.P.(C) 983/2014 Page 2 vacancies, of the posts from amongst persons or class of persons with disabilities such as blindness or blurred vision, hearing impairment or locomotor disabilities or cerebral palsy.
3. The petitioner then refers to various developments, including the judgment of a Single Judge in Ravi Kumar Arora v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr. reported as (111) 2004 DLT 126 which was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court. The petitioner also refers to another Division Bench ruling in All India Confederation of the Blind v. Union of India (Ministry of Railways) (W.P.(C) 23132/2005) where a direction to the Central Government to fill-up backlog of reserved posts of disabled category of candidates, on the basis of total cadre strength and not on the basis of vacancies, was given. It is submitted that with the recent judgment of the Supreme Court, reported as Union of India (UOI) and Anr. v. National Federation of the Blind and Ors. 2013 (10) SCC 772, a wide nature of the rights, ensuring to all citizens with disabilities and the corresponding obligation to fill-up at least 3% of the vacancies in respect of each service and post has been mandated.

4. The petitioner complains that the advertisement dated 30.12.2013 issued by the High Court Establishment, calling for applications and advertising 14 vacancies (4 set apart for SC/ST candidates and 10 for general candidates) is contrary to the express provisions of the Disabilities Act and the guidelines issued in that  regard. Emphasising Section 33, the petitioner argues that since he suffers from locomotor disability, the High Court Establishment was under a duty to set-apart the appropriate number of posts having regard to the total cadre strength of 224 posts in DHJS. It is argued that the omission to make appropriate reservation in the proposed or on-going recruitment process in fact amounts to discrimination because persons with disabilities can compete for almost similar, if not entirely identical posts, of Civil Judges and Magistrates, through a Central Government circular of 18-01-2007.

5. It is also urged that the Central Government itself has determined that the ITAT members would be subjected to the 3% reservation under the Disabilities Act in the same 18.01.2007 circular. These two categories, i.e. Civil Judges/Magistrates as well as the members of ITAT perform similar functions which are of judicial nature. In the circumstances, to exclude DHJS from the benefit of reservation is both arbitrary and discriminatory. Besides, the circular of 18.01.2007 relied upon by the High Court Establishment, there is no rationale to support this differential treatment nor does the tenor of the decision of the Court taken at that time, show that any differentiation or unequal treatment was intended.

6. The relevant provisions of the Disabilities Act are as follows:
"2(a) Appropriate Government" means,-  (i)in relation to the Central Government or any establishment/wholly or substantially financed by that Government, or a Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonment Act, 1924, the Central Government ;(ii)in relation to a State Government or any establishment wholly or substantially financed by that Government, or any local authority, other than a Cantonment Board, the State Government;(iii)in respect of the Central Co-ordination Committee and the Central Executive Committee, the Central Government;(iv)in respect of the State Co-ordination Committee and the State Executive Committee, the State Government;
          xxxxx                   xxxxx                   xxxxxx

          2(i)"Disability" means-
             i.blindness;
             ii.low vision;
             iii.leprosy-cured;
             iv.hearing impairment;
             v.loco motor disability;
             vi.mental retardation;
             vii.mental illness;
       xxxxx                     xxxxx                   xxxxxx

          2(j)"employer" means,-
i. In relation to a Government, the authority notified by the Head of the Department in this behalf or where no such authority is notified, the Head of the Department; and ii. in relation to an establishment, the Chief Executive Officer of that establishment;        xxxxx                     xxxxx                    xxxxxx
          2(k)      "establishment"   means    a    corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a local authority or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes Departments of a Government;
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx
32. Identification of posts which can be reserved for persons with disabilities. - Appropriate Governments shall -a. identify posts, in the establishments, which can be reserved for the persons with disability; b. at periodical intervals not exceeding three years, review the list of posts identified and up-date the list taking into consideration the developments in technology.xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx 
33. Reservation of Posts - Every appropriate Government shall appoint in every establishment such percentage of vacancies not less than three per cent. for persons or class of persons with disability of which one per cent. each shall be reserved for persons suffering from-         i.    blindness or low vision;        ii.    hearing impairment;       iii.    locomotor disability or cerebral palsy, in the posts           identified for each disability:
Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any department or establishment, by notification subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx 
36. Vacancies not filled up to be carried forward - Where in any recruitment year any vacancy under section 33, cannot be filled up due to non-availability of a suitable person with disability or, for any other sufficient reason, such vacancy shall be carried forward in the succeeding recruitment year and if in the succeeding recruitment year also suitable person with disability is not available, it may first be filled by interchange among the three categories and only when there is no parson with disability available for the post in that year, the employer shall fill up the vacancy by appointment of a person, other than a person with disability:Provided that if the nature of vacancies in an establishment is such that a given category of person cannot be employed, the vacancies may be interchanged among the three categories with the prior approval of the appropriate Government."
7. The High Court Establishment, in its reply and the arguments advanced on its behalf in Court does not deny the essential facts, such as publication of the advertisement calling for applications from amongst the eligible candidates to fill-up the 14 vacancies or that 10 of them have been set apart for general candidates and 4 for SC/ST candidates. Learned counsel for the High Court Establishment however, argues that in terms of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment notification dated 18.01.2007, only Civil Judges and Magistrates of the Delhi Judicial Service (DJS), covered by the Delhi Judicial Service Rules and comprising of the cadre of Civil Judges/Magistrates have been identified as posts who are subject to the coverage of the Disabilities Act. Pointed reference is made to Sr. No. 466 of the Central Government, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment description in this regard which is as follows:

SI No
Designation
Physical Requirements for the jobs
Categories of   Disabled suitable
Nature of work  preferred  
Working conditions/ remarks
466
Judges/Magistrates Subordinate in  Lower Judiciaries
S.SCT.C.R.W                    
OA.OL.BL.B.B V  
Deal with Civil and Criminal cases by adopting established procedure both under Civil and Criminal      Codes.   Records  and pass necessary orders/judgments
The work is mostly performed inside.   The work place is well lighted. The     worker usually works alone.

8. Counsel for the respondent also refers to a previous Division Bench decision of this Court dated 23.08.2006 in W.P.(C) 9840/2006 where the following order was made:
"the Government of India, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has issued a corrigendum vide Notification dated 25th July, 2006 notifying that in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) Part I, Section 1, serial number 178 dated the 30th June, 2001 containing the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment notification number 16-25/99-I dated W.P.(C) 983/2014 Page 8 the 31st May, 2001, in the List of Jobs Identified for being held by persons with Orthopedic Disabilities or C.P. in Group A, relating to categories of Disabled suitable for jobs, for the letters and words "B.LV (mobility not to be restricted)", the letters "OA, OL, BL" shall be substituted. In view of this corrigendum, the persons with orthopaedic disability or C.P. having one arm (OA), one leg (OL), both legs (BL) affected as well as blind persons and persons with low vision (mobility not to be restricted) have been recommended for appointment as Judges/Magistrates in subordinate Judiciary. It is pertinent to state that this is a recommendation of the Expert Committee constituted to identify/review the posts persons with disabilities - in the Ministries/Departments, Public Sector Undertakings. The Government of NCT of Delhi shall forward the recommendations of the Expert Committee as they stand amended by the corrigendum dated 25th July, 2006 to the Delhi High Court.As and when such a communication is sent by the Government of NCT of Delhi to the Delhi High Court, the same would be processed by the Delhi High Court in accordance with law."
9. The respondent further states that consequential action pursuant to the above directions was taken pursuant to the recommendation of a five-Judge Committee made on 09.03.2007 in respect of the DJS, comprising of Civil Judges and Magistrates. The minutes of meeting recommended that:
"........3% of the vacancies shall be reserved for persons with disabilities as required under Section 33 of "The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995". The Committee was of the view that since the obligation to reserve 3% vacancies arises from the provisions of Section 33 of the Act aforementioned, there is no provision in the Rules themselves. The reservation and appointment shall be regulated by the statutory notification, if any, issued by the Government of India. The Committee has in this regard taken note of Notification No.16-25/99-NI-I dated 31.05.2001 as amended vide Corrigendum No.39- 14/2006/DD-III dated 25.07.2006 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Government of India, New Delhi, identifying the posts of "Judges/Magistrates Subordinate in Lower Judiciaries" as the jobs identified for being held by persons with specified disabilities viz. Blind- Low Vision (mobility not to be restricted) OA - one Arm Affected (right or left) OL - one leg affected (right or left), BL (both legs affected but not arms).The advertisement notice to be issued for future DJS Examinations shall accordingly make a suitable provision and invite applications from all such person as are eligible for appointment against such vacancies."
10. It is argued that in the absence of a specific determination under Section 32, the petitioner cannot claim a right to be considered as a disabled candidate nor seek that reservation should be given in the cadre of DHJS. Counsel for the respondent also urges that since the advertisement was issued, any interdiction by this Court at this stage, given the fact that the examination is scheduled for 06.04.2014, would upset the entire timeline and delay the recruitment process. It is argued that whilst there can be no quarrel to the applicability of the Disabilities Act, yet as to what category of posts requires to be covered by the enactment is a matter of discretion best left to the High Court by virtue of Section 32. In the present case, the exercise having been concluded on 09.03.2007 and since in that decision, the reservations in the cadre of DHJS were not recommended, it would be unfeasible to reserve any post for persons with disabilities as that would involve a great deal of administrative inconvenience.

11. The latest decision of the Supreme Court in National Federation of the Blind (supra) considered the obligations of employers, particularly those in the Central Government, State and the public sector to comply with the provisions of the Disabilities Act. The Court traced the history of the enactment as well as the instructions issued from time to time by the Central Government to consolidate and update the instructions. These were the Office Memorandum dated 29.12.2005, 10.12.2008 etc. which were analysed. The Court rejected the submission on behalf of the Union of India (UOI) that the obligation to reserve the posts would arise only after their identification. It was held that, "to accept such a submission would amount to accepting the situation where the provisions of Section 33 of the aforesaid Act would be kept deferred indefinitely by bureaucratic inaction. Such a stand taken by the petitioners before the High Court was rightly rejected." The Court then held that logically in terms of Section 32, posts had to be identified for reservation for purposes of Section 33 but the exercise had to be undertaken simultaneously with the coming into force of the Act, to give meaning and effect to Section 33. The Court pertinently noticed its previous decision in Govt. of India through Secretary and Anr. v. Ravi Prakash Gupta and Anr. 2010 (7) SCC 626 that, "16. It is only logical that, as provided in Section 32 of the aforesaid Act, posts have to be identified for reservation for the purposes of Section 33, but such identification was meant to be simultaneously undertaken with the coming into operation of the Act, to give effect to the provisions of Section 33. The legislature never intended the provisions of Section 32 of the Act to be used as a tool to deny the benefits of Section 33 to these categories of disabled persons indicated therein. Such a submission strikes at the foundation of the provisions relating to the duty cast upon the appropriate Government to make appointments in every establishment (emphasis added)."

12. The Court in National Federation of the Blind (supra) then went on to endorse the view that the extent of dependence - of reservation, upon the identification exercise would be for "making appointments and not for the purpose of making reservations". The judgment went on to hold as follows:
"30. Apart from the reasoning of this Court in Ravi Prakash Gupta (supra), even a reading of Section 33, at the outset, establishes vividly the intention of the legislature viz., reservation of 3% for differently abled persons should have to be computed on the basis of total vacancies in the strength of a cadre and not just on the basis of the vacancies available in the identified posts. There is no ambiguity in the language of Section 33 and from the W.P.(C) 983/2014 Page 12 construction of the said statutory provision only one meaning is possible. 
31. A perusal of Section 33 of the Act reveals that this section has been divided into three parts. The first part is "every appropriate Government shall appoint in every establishment such percentage of vacancies not less than 3% for persons or class of persons with disability." It is evident from this part that it mandates every appropriate Government shall appoint a minimum of 3% vacancies in its establishments for persons with disabilities. In this light, the contention of the Union of India that reservation in terms of Section 33 has to be computed against identified posts only is not tenable by any method of interpretation of this part of the Section. 
32. The second part of this section starts as follows:"...of which one percent each shall be reserved for persons suffering from blindness or low vision, hearing impairment & locomotor disability or cerebral palsy in the posts identified for each disability." From the above, it is clear that it deals with distribution of 3% posts in every establishment among 3 categories of disabilities. It starts from the word "of which". The word "of which" has to relate to appointing not less than 3% vacancies in an establishment and, in any way, it does not refer to the identified posts. In fact, the contention of the Union of India is sought to be justified by bringing the last portion of the second part of the section viz. "....identified posts" in this very first part which deals with the statutory obligation imposed upon the appropriate Government to "appoint not less than 3% vacancies for the persons or class of persons with disabilities." In our considered view, it is not plausible in the light of established rules of interpretation. The minimum level of representation of persons with disabilities has been provided in this very first part and the second part deals with the distribution of this 3% among the three categories of disabilities. Further, in the last portion of the second part the words used are "in the identified posts for each disability" and not "of identified posts". This can only mean that out of minimum 3% of vacancies of posts in the establishments 1% each has to be given to each of the 3 categories of disability viz., blind and low vision, hearing impaired and locomotor disabled or cerebral palsy separately and the number of appointments equivalent to the 1% for each disability out of total 3% has to be made against the vacancies in the identified posts. The attempt to read identified posts in the first part itself and also to read the same to have any relation with the computation of reservation is completely misconceived.XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXX 
36. Admittedly, the Act is a social legislation enacted for the benefit of persons with disabilities and its provisions must be interpreted in order to fulfill its objective. Besides, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if the language of a statutory provision is unambiguous, it has to be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the said statutory provision. In the present case, the plain and unambiguous meaning of Section 33 is that every appropriate Government has to appoint a minimum of 3% vacancies in an establishment out of which 1% each shall be reserved for persons suffering from blindness and low vision, persons suffering from hearing impairment and persons suffering from locomotor or cerebral palsy. 
37. To illustrate, if there are 100 vacancies of 100 posts in an establishment, the concerned establishment will have to reserve a minimum of 3% for persons with disabilities out of which at least 1% has to be reserved separately for each of the following disabilities: persons suffering from blindness or low vision, persons suffering from hearing impairment and the persons suffering from locomotor disability or cerebral palsy. Appointment of 1 blind person against 1 vacancy reserved for him/her will be made against a vacancy in an identified post for instance, the post of peon, which is identified for him in group D. Similarly, one hearing impaired will be appointed against one reserved vacancy for that category in the post of store attendant in group D post. Likewise, one person suffering from locomotor disability or cerebral palsy will be appointed against the post of "Farash" group D post identified for that category of disability. It was argued on behalf of Union of India with reference to the post of driver that since the said post is not suitable to be manned by a person suffering from blindness, the above interpretation of the Section would be against the administrative exigencies. Such an argument is wholly misconceived. A given post may not be identified as suitable for one category of disability, the same could be identified as suitable for another category or categories of disability entitled to the benefit of reservation. In fact, the second part of the Section has clarified this situation by providing that the number of vacancies equivalent to 1% for each of the aforementioned three categories will be filled up by the respective category by using vacancies in identified posts for each of them for the purposes of appointment.XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 
49. Employment is a key factor in the empowerment and inclusion of people with disabilities. It is an alarming reality that the disabled people are out of job not because their disability comes in the way of their functioning rather it is social and practical barriers that prevent them from joining the workforce. As a result, many disabled people live in poverty and in deplorable conditions. They are denied the right to make a useful contribution to their own lives and to the lives of their families and community."
13. With the enactment of the Disabilities Act, every establishment was placed under an obligation to effectuate its provisions, including its mandate to reserve and fill at least 3% of the vacancies which arose. This obligation is, given the nature of the mandate under Section 33, non-derogable by its character. The decision in Ravi Prakash Gupta, (supra) held this to be so, in as many terms:
"15.......... neither Section 32 nor Section 33 of the aforesaid Act makes any distinction with regard to Groups A, B, C and D posts. They only speak of identification and reservation of posts for people with disabilities, though the proviso to Section 33 does empower the appropriate Government to exempt any establishment from the provisions of the said section, having regard to the type of work carried on in any department or establishment. No such exemption has been pleaded or brought to our notice on behalf of the petitioners.16. It is only logical that, as provided in Section 32 of the aforesaid Act, posts have to be identified for reservation for the purposes of Section 33, but such identification was meant to be simultaneously undertaken with the coming into operation of the Act, to give effect to the provisions of Section 33. The legislature never intended the provisions of Section 32 of the Act to be used as a tool to deny the benefits of Section 33 to these categories of disabled persons indicated therein. Such a submission strikes at the foundation of the provisions relating to the duty cast upon the appropriate Government to make appointments in every establishment.......17. While it cannot be denied that unless posts are identified for the purposes of Section 33 of the aforesaid Act, no appointments from the reserved categories contained therein can be made, and that to such extent the provisions of Section 33 are dependent on Section 32 of the W.P.(C) 983/2014 Page 16 Act, as submitted by the learned ASG, but the extent of such dependence would be for the purpose of making appointments and not for the purpose of making reservation. In other words, reservation under Section 33 of the Act is not dependent on identification, as urged on behalf of the Union of India, though a duty has been cast upon the appropriate Government to make appointments in the number of posts reserved for the three categories mentioned in Section 33 of the Act in respect of persons suffering from the disabilities spelt out therein. In fact, a situation has also been noticed where on account of non- availability of candidates some of the reserved posts could remain vacant in a given year. For meeting such eventualities, provision was made to carry forward such vacancies for two years after which they would lapse. Since in the instant case such a situation did not arise and posts were not reserved under Section 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, the question of carrying forward of vacancies or lapse thereof, does not arise."
14. The enunciation of law by the Supreme Court is categorical about the imperative nature of the Disabilities Act's provisions vis-à- vis reservation of posts in various establishments. This Court therefore, is bound to decide the issue before it within the framework of the declaration of law in Ravi Prakash Gupta, (supra) and National Federation of the Blind (supra) both pronouncements of three judge Benches of the Supreme Court.

15. Precedential compulsion apart, there is another circumstance which the Court has to consider. The respondents main argument- supplementary to the lack of identification of the post of District Judge, is that the matter was put to the Committee of Judges which took note of the 18-01-2007 circular of the Central Government and  decided that reservations in the DJS (as opposed to the DHJS) cadre and posts were to be ensured. A careful look at that document, i.e the minutes of meeting of 09-03-2007 shows that the Committee considered the proposal in the background of whether to provide for reservations in DJS. This is evident from the following observations in its minutes:
"The reservation and appointment shall be regulated by the statutory notification, if any, issued by the Government of India. The Committee has in this regard taken note of Notification No.16-25/99-NI-I dated 31.05.2001 as amended vide Corrigendum No.39-14/2006/DD-III dated 25.07.2006 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Government of India, New Delhi, identifying the posts of "Judges/Magistrates Subordinate in Lower Judiciaries" as the jobs identified for being held by persons with specified disabilities..."
However, the Committee did not positively rule-out reservations in DHJS. The operative direction was premised on the need to take a decision on the recruitment for DJS vacancies.

16. The second reason why this Court feels compelled to reject the respondent's argument is that as between DJS officers (who are Judges) and DHJS officers (who are also Judges certainly not less so) there is and can be no difference for the purposes of reservation under the Disabilities Act. The mere use of the word ("Magistrates") in Sl. No 466 in the circular of the Central Government was not meant to limit the benefit of reservation under the Act to only the Civil Judges/ Magistrates cadre or posts. Both categories of holders of posts' workload is fairly described as "Deal with Civil and Criminal cases by adopting established procedure both under Civil and Criminal Codes. Records evidence and pass necessary orders/judgments." Likewise, the notification (of the Central Government) goes on to mention in the last column, i.e "working conditions/remarks" that work is performed inside and the working conditions are well lighted. These descriptions apply equally to those in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service, who also exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of DJS officers. Furthermore, the circular of the Central Government also describes Income Tax Appellate Tribunal members' posts as those which are subject to reservations under the Disabilities Act. The decision of the Committee (of this Court) dated 09-03-2007 surely was not intended to result in such discrimination.

17. The Supreme Court had perspicuously held that the doctrine of classification, which can be legitimately used to examine complaints of discrimination and violation of Article 14, itself cannot produce inequality, through under-classification or undue emphasis as the basis of drawing distinction when none exist. This aspect was emphasized in Roop Chand Adlakha and Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority and Ors., AIR 1989 SC 307:
"7....................................The process of classification is in itself productive of inequality and in that sense antithetical of equality. The process would be constitutionally valid if it recognises a pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration of the effects of such pre-existent inequality................................. The process cannot merely blow-up or magnify in-substantial or microscopic differences on merely meretricious or plausible. The over-emphasis on the doctrine of classification or any anxious and sustained attempts to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the article of its precious content and end in re-placing doctrine of equality by the doctrine of the classification........................."
In The State of Gujarat & Anr v Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad & Anr. [(1974) 4 SCC 656], again, the Supreme Court dwelt on the same aspect, in the following words:
"54. A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not. The question then is: what does the phrase "similarly situated" mean? The answer to the question is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. The purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public mischief or the achievement of some positive public good.55. A classification is under-inclusive when all who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief but there are others also tainted whom the classification does not include. In other words, a classification is bad as under- inclusive when a State benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit or place the same burden on others who are similarly situated. A classification is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well. In other words, this type of  classification imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those attended with mischief at which the law aims. Herod ordering the death of all male children born on a particular day because one of them would some day bring about his downfall employed such a classification."
In one of the earlier cases, the Court had emphasized that when some distinction is sought to be the basis of differentiation for the purpose of classification, under Article 14, "the classification, however, must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained and cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis.." (Ref. Dhirendra Kumar Mandal v The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to the Govt. of West Bengal and Anr. AIR 1954 SC 424).

18. In the present case, there is no material to suggest that DHJS officers perform duties and functions which are radically different from those in DJS. Indeed, their positions answer to the description of "Judges" of "Subordinate courts" (the latter being the expression used by the Constitution itself). Other posts whose holders discharge judicial functions such as members of ITAT too have been accorded the benefit of disability reservations under the Act.

19. In these circumstances, this Court holds that the non-inclusion of DHJS cadre posts for the purposes of reservation under the Disabilities Act, cannot be upheld; it amounts to discrimination.

20. Now, as to the question of relief. During the hearing, the Petitioner had contended that in terms of the existing guidelines he should be given relaxation in the time to be taken for writing the examination by way of extension of half an hour. As far as age relaxation is concerned, the advertisement does not specify any maximum age limit. That question does not accordingly arise.

21. The decision in National Federation of the Blind (supra) states that reservation under the Disabilities Act is to be vacancy-based - on a textual reading of Section 33. If one were to literally apply that authority to the facts of this case, it would not be possible to earmark any post under the 3% quota since the total number of advertised posts is only 14. Keeping in mind the circumstance that for the period 2007 onwards when the disabilities reservation was introduced in Judicial Services in Delhi for the first time, and also taking notice of the fact that this Court is called upon to decide the issue in the context of the direct recruitment quota for the DHJS which is 25% of the entire cadre strength of 224 posts or such other number as is determined, having regard to the increased number of posts, the most feasible approach under the circumstances would be to determine the total number of posts that are to be filled in this quota before actually taking steps to fill them. This Court is also mindful of the circumstance that the advertisement in this case was issued on 30.12.2013. The petitioner approached this Court on 03.02.2014. One of the alternatives that this Court could adopt would be to direct the consideration of the petitioner's case, based upon his claim as a disabled candidate and, therefore, entitled to be considered as against the 3% quota. Although this course is attractive, at the same time, the Court cannot be oblivious of the circumstance that other eligible and possibly equal, if not more meritorious candidates, are unaware of their right to be considered against this quota. Directing the petitioner's case alone to be processed on the basis of the documents and materials presented by him to back-up the claim of disability would in such a case result in keeping out those candidates. In these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the most appropriate method of proceeding with this exercise is to direct the respondents to earmark one of the advertised posts for disabled candidates in terms of the 3% quota under the Disabilities Act and not fill it up in the present recruitment process. Once the recruitment process is completed and the appointments are made, depending upon the further number of vacancies which may exist at the stage of declaration of results, the respondents should carry-out a review of the balance number of vacancies that can be appropriately earmarked for those with disabilities, club them with the post directed to be kept apart and proceed with the next recruitment process, clearly indicating the total number of vacancies earmarked under the 3% quota. In the event the respondents are not in a position to advertise all the vacancies, it shall endeavour to at least carry-out a special recruitment procedure in respect of only the earmarked vacancies falling to the share of those entitled to be considered under the 3% quota under the Disabilities Act, within one year of the date of declaration of results in the current recruitment process. A direction is accordingly issued to the respondents to carry-out the exercise and complete the special recruitment drive after following the steps indicated above.

22. The Writ Petition is entitled to succeed to the above extent indicated above. It is accordingly allowed along with pending applications with no order as to costs.

Order dasti.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT (JUDGE) 
R.V. EASWAR (JUDGE) 

MARCH 25, 2014

Friday, March 21, 2014

Right to medical aid is State's responsibility - HC directs Govt. to cut down bureaucratic chain & fund the treatment of children with genetic disorder

Court comes to the aid of two dying patients

Akanksha Jain, New Delhi, March 21, 2014

“We need to cut down the bureaucratic chain so that the money reaches needy patients,” the High Court told the Delhi Government on Thursday.

A Bench of Justice Manmohan made this remark while dealing with pleas of two poor patients who suffer from genetic disorders and have sought medical aid from the State.

One of them is 36-year-old Amit Ahuja, a bed-ridden haemophiliac, who lost his left leg and continues to bleed in a ward at the Lok Nayak Jaya Prakash Narayan Hospital (LNJP) with multiple bedsores and a pseudo tumour in the right leg.

Criticizing the government and its hospitals for not creating dedicated bank accounts where the public can donate money for the treatment of poor patients, the Bench asked: “Has anyone heard of any account of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences [AIIMS] or LNJP for anyone to deposit money by way of charity? Why is it not in place? Why is LNJP shy of accepting public money for poor patients?”

When told by the Health Secretary that the Government has one such account, the Bench said: “We need to cut down the bureaucratic chain so that money reaches the needy. The account should be subject to audit. The head of any government hospital should not need to request the State for treating the poor.”

Hearing the plea of Mr. Ahuja, the court said: “No person can bleed to death.”

Meanwhile, the Bench transferred Rs.7.75 lakh collected by High Court lawyers into a bank account of AIIMS for immediate treatment of Mohammad Ahmed, the son of rickshawpuller Mohammad Sirajuddin who broke down outside court while talking to The Hindu .

“Even the Prime Minister’s Office did not come to aid when I lost three children to the same disorder,” he said.

“I am faced with grave crisis today. One person is bleeding, his wounds are not healing. The other patient needs enzyme therapy. His three siblings have died of the same disorder. I have to look for a legal answer to this. Every person has a right to medical aid,” Justice Manmohan said.

During the hearing, counsel for Mr. Ahuja advocate Gurmit Singh Hans told the Bench that he is being treated for the disorder since he was nine-months-old, but now when all his family assets stand exhausted the hospital has denied him treatment, which is worsening his condition.

The LNJP Hospital Department Head told the Bench that the only drug available for haemophilia costs more than Rs.50 lakh and is to be given daily to the patient.

“When medical science has made some advances, we have to give it to the common man. Otherwise what is the idea of having such lofty ideas in the Constitution? It cannot be only for the high and mighty,” the Bench said.


“We need to cut down bureaucratic chain so the money reaches needy patients”

Source: The Hindu

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

Disability angle in Nursery admission norms - HC issues notice to centre

Nursery norms: Centre to clarify on disability quota
TNN | Feb 26, 2014, 02.19 AM IST


NEW DELHI: The High Court on Tuesday asked the Centre to clarify if Delhi's schools still have the discretion to provide admissions in nursery classes to disabled kids, despite the Lieutenant Governor's guidelines clubbing them with children of economically weaker groups (EWS).

A bench of justices S Ravindra Bhat and R V Easwar gave a day's time to the Centre to explain after the latter told the court it is up to the Delhi government to make guidelines for providing any benefit to disabled kids since the city government has enough "elbow room" despite the LG's order.

But HC was not satisfied and questioned the Centre's stand saying "no elbow room is visible" under the guidelines or the Persons with Disabilities Act. It added that if no proper guidelines are framed for providing relief to disabled students, the "discretionary approach" of schools will get an "escape route".

"If you (Centre and Delhi governments) don't come out with guidelines, it could lead to an escape route to the discretionary approach of schools," the bench said and kept the matter for Wednesday after the counsel, appearing for the Centre, said its officials would be present in the court to explain the government's stand.

The bench was hearing a PIL, by Pramod Arora, father of a child with special needs, challenging the LG's nursery admission guidelines to the extent it clubs disabled children with kids from EWS group. His petition also seeks 3% reservation for disabled kids in the nursery class.

During the day's proceedings, the Centre said it is for Delhi government to evolve guidelines on the issue but the court pointed out only when the Centre asks the state government to do so will it acts.

It also asked the Centre to "see what is possible under the Act", whether 3% reservation is possible and if yes, how to implement the same.

Meanwhile a group of parents on Tuesday also challenged the points for interstate transfer in the new nursery admission guidelines. A bench of acting Chief Justice and Justice Siddharth Mridul sought a reply from the state government and posted the case for Thursday.

Source: Times of India

Monday, August 5, 2013

Delhi HC questions MSJE why disabled can't function as surgeon

Court questions 3% reservation for differently-abled MBBS degree holders

Sunday, Jul 28, 2013, 12:59 IST | Place: Delhi | Agency: DNA

Ayesha Arvind

The Delhi High Court has questioned the 3% reservation for differently-abled persons holding MBBS degree only in non-surgical posts. While hearing a plea pertaining to such an appointment, the Court asked, "Does the Centre feel that differently-abled persons with valid MBBS degrees are unfit to perform their duties as doctors in surgical procedures?" The Court has sought a clarification from the ministry of social justice and empowerment in this regard.

A bench of Justices Pradip Nandrajog and V Kameswar Rao has also directed the chief commissioner for persons with disabilities to appear in the Court on Monday. The Court order follows a plea in which an ENT surgeon has challenged the appointment of an orthopedically-handicapped (OPH) candidate for the same post in AIIMS for which he too had applied.

The surgeon, Dilip Samal, had applied for the post of senior resident/demonstrator at AIIMS in July last year under the OBC category. He challenged the appointment of an OPH candidate after his RTI query revealed that the selected candidate had scored less than the qualifying marks in written test. Samal was later informed by the AIIMS authorities that as per procedure those who qualify under the OPH category are adjusted in the respective category, irrespective of the marks and merits in the entrance exam.

Samal then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) for relief. In January this year, the CAT had set aside the selection of the OPH candidate Mohammad Mubashshirul Haq. It had ruled that the AIIMS had not notified any relaxed standards of suitability for the OPH candidates while inviting applications or any time thereafter. AIIMS, in turn, challenged CAT’s ruling before the High Court.

The Court took note of the fact that Section 32 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and the DoPT guidelines mandate that authorities first identify posts to be reserved in medical facilities for persons with disabilities and specifically earmark them.

And that these seats cannot be adjusted with vacancies under other categories.

“Two issues arise out of the plea. The first being whether it is mandatory in law to identify seats reserved for differently-abled persons in medical specialities when applicants are invited from eligible candidates. The other issue which arises is a directive issued by the ministry of social justice and empowerment, government of India, requiring reservation in the medical field only in non-surgical posts,” the Court said.

“It is the second issue which troubles us more than the first. Prima facie, we find it strange that the ministry of social justice and empowerment would be of the opinion that differently-abled persons per se would be unfit to perform duties as a doctor in a discipline which requires surgical procedures to be performed,” it said.

Colourblindness no ground for denying promotion - Delhi High Court

Expressing displeasure over the central government's inaction, the Delhi High Court has directed the authorities to treat CRPF personnel with colour blindness on par with others for promotion.

A bench of Justice Gita Mittal and Justice Deepa Sharma said in a recent order that the authorities "have proceeded arbitrarily" in the cases of the colour blind personnel compelling them to repeatedly approach the court.

Earlier, the court decided the issue relating to colour blindness in serving Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) whose colour blindness was discovered at the time of medical examination for promotion.

The court said that such personnel "would be entitled to full benefits of promotions as is extended to those who do not suffer from colour blindness".

However, despite "clear directions of the court, the authorities were not only refusing promotion but were proceeding to board out such personnel who were discovered to be suffering from colour blindness".

The court said the authorities had "miserably" failed to abide by the specific directives of the court.

The observations of the court came on the petition of Suresh Ram, a trooper whose promotion was stalled following the discovery that he was colour blind.

The court directed the authorities to promoted Ram from the rank of constable to head constable with all benefits, including seniority.




Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Disabled Students must get same admission benefits as SC/ST, rules Delhi HC

Court:          Delhi high Court

Bench:         Acting Chief Justice A K Sikri and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw

Case No.:     Writ Petition (C) No. 4853 of 2012 

Case Title:    Anamol Bhandari Versus Delhi Technological University

Date of Judgement:  12 September 2012

Brief:

In a path breaking judgement, a Bench of Delhi High Court has held that  the people with
disabilities are equally socially backward, if not more, as those belonging to SC/ST categories and therefore, as per the Constitutional mandates, they are entitled to at least the same benefit of relaxation as given to SC/ST candidates.

This puts to rest the debate of whether Constitutions favours only the SC/ST and not disabled since Disability is not specifically included in the Constitution.

Holding that people suffering from disabilities are also equally socially backward, if not more, as SC/ST candidates, the Delhi High Court has directed the Delhi Technological University (DTU) to provide the same concession in marks for admitting disabled persons as applicable for SC/ST candidates.

“We hold that the provision of giving only 5 per cent concession in marks to persons with disabilities (PWD) candidates as opposed to 10 per cent relaxation provided to SC/ST candidates is discriminatory and PWD candidates are entitled to same treatment,” a bench of Acting Chief Justice A K Sikri and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw said.

The court’s order came on a petition by Anamol Bhandari, a physically disabled student, who challenged the disparity in treatment between the two categories.

In his petition, Bhandari said he had passed his CBSE exam with 52.66 per cent. He said DTU had fixed its cut-off for general candidates at 60 per cent but had provided a relaxation of 10 per cent for SC/ST candidates and 5 per cent for PWD candidates.

The petitioner said though he had cleared his All India Engineering Entrance exam with a rank sufficient to gain admission to DTU, he could not get admission on the basis that his Class XII marks did not meet the cut-off.

He said if the relaxation given to PWD candidates was on  par with SC/ST candidates, then he have been eligible for admission.

The university contended that they were free to frame their own admission guidelines, being an autonomous body. It argued that the petitioner was aware when applying that he would be eligible for a 5 per cent relaxation.

However, when the bench asked the counsel for DTU whether there was any rational basis for fixing the limit of relaxation at 5 per cent for PWD candidates, no clear answer was given and the counsel merely said it was a “policy decision”.

For detailed judgement passed on 12 September 2012 in this case titled Writ Petition (C) No.4853 of 2012 ANAMOL BHANDARI Versus Delhi Technological University, please click here or read the Order embedded below:


 




Tuesday, April 24, 2012

Disclose psychiatric info under RTI ? Yes, says CIC; No, says HC


Dear Colleagues,

While we all agree that each medical history and document is confidential and carries sensitive information about the patient undergoing treatment and can not be revealed to a third person. However, by simple logic that its my treatment process, I have full right to know about it! How can I be denied of my right to access my own treatment document?

We have had several examples where persons were forcefully admitted in to mental institutions since their spouses or  family members observed certain "symptoms" and the patient never came out since there exist no process that can be initiated by the patient himself even if he is all right. Such methods have often been put to (mis)use by husbands against the wives to settle matrimonial cases and in many other cases, by other family members to grab the control on the property of the victim.

In the instant case before the Delhi High Court, the High Court has overruled the decision of the Central Information Commission that had directed the hospital IHBAS to provide the info to the patient. The judiciary need to be more sensitive and aware of the rights of persons with disabilities given India's commitment to UNCRPD and the regime of  right to information besides the Indian Constitution that assures to all citizens equality before law. The document related to medical (psychiatric) treatment must be provided to the patient.  Could they have done same with a heart patient or a kidney patient?

While the hospital may refuse husband or other family members citing confidentiality, the patient has the first right to access her treatment documents and she has a right to second medical opinion on the basis of the treatment record. Its not the property of the hospital!

Here is the news from Indian Express.

Disclose psychiatric info under RTI ? Yes, says CIC; No, says HC
Pritha Chatterjee : New Delhi, Tue Apr 24 2012, 


Do psychiatry patients have the right to access records of their treatment? While the Central Information Commission (CIC) directed a mental health hospital to provide this information to a patient, the hospital has moved court citing confidentiality.

The Delhi High Court has given the Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied Sciences (IHBAS) a stay order against disclosing the information till the next hearing in September.

The case pertains to a 32-year-old married woman. She was admitted to IHABS in April 2011 by the hospital’s mobile health unit from her Gurgaon home, after her husband approached hospital with her “symptoms”.

According to Dr Nimesh Desai, director of IHBAS, “Confidentiality of psychiatric information — which includes all information disclosed by different parties related to the patient for treatment purposes — is a very fundamental concept. It is something every psychiatrist promises his interviewees verbally. Unfortunately, till date, India does not have a legal provision regarding this. The unique nature of this information — which includes historical information of the patient, his or her recollections, fantasies, feelings, fears and preoccupations from the past as well as in the present — distinguishes it from other medical records.”

The patient was discharged after four days and has since been staying with her mother in Bhopal. After her discharge, she filed an RTI seeking “the basis for my admission, doctor’s observation, and clinical examination reports, and doctor’s observation...”

Meanwhile, the patient’s husband, too, filed an RTI application, seeking the reasons of his wife’s discharge, “without my information.”

In both cases, IHBAS authorities stated that “the information sought was provided by the patient and her husband, which is sensitive/confidential in nature.”

“The need for discretion in disclosing psychiatric information is compounded in cases like this, where there is a possible marital discord and each seeks such history to use against the other,” Dr Desai said.

The December 2011 CIC order by Information Commissioner Shailesh Gandhi stated that while the hospital was exempted from disclosing treatment records to anyone other than the patient, “these precedents are not relevant when the information is being sought by the patient herself”.

Arguing against this, in their writ before the High Court, IHBAS said, “that every party disclosed information in confidentiality to the psychiatrist and the hospital should not give it away to anyone, including the patient.”

The disclosure of information contained in psychiatry case records would discourage the patients and their relatives to furnish personal and sensitive information and they would prefer to withhold such information, which would largely affect the treatment,” the writ stated.

Meanwhile, the patient’s family said they were “exploring legal options, on this violation of the CIC order.”

Source: Indian Express

Sunday, April 22, 2012

Delhi High Court- Extra Premium or Reduced Insurance Cover, both discriminatory against Disabled [Judgement Included]

Dear Colleagues,

Refer to my earlier posts on 02 Sep 2009, 09 October 2009 and 21 January 2010 on the issue since the matter has been pending before the Delhi High Court. There were several occasions that the Court was about to pronounce judgement however, Union of India bought time on each hearing with a promise that they are amending the rules to remove the discriminatory practices against the persons with disabilities (read employees) in insurance sector and dragged the case to 2012. However, at the end, the court got infuriated the way the Government turned turtle on their own statement before the court and tried to justify the discrimination of extra premium.

The brief background of the case

In the instant case, the petitioner Mr. Vikas Gupta, through a public interest litigation, filed by Mr. Pankaj Sinha, a lawyer with visual impairment from Human Rights Law Network, brought to the notice of the court that the Postal Life Insurance Policy issued for the benefit of government employees was inherently discriminatory against employees with disabilities. It allowed the maximum sum insured for employees with disabilities to only Rs. 1 lac while their non-disabled counterparts enjoyed a maximum insurance cover of 5 lacs. Not only this, the employees with disabilities were paying a higher premium than those without disabilities.

Thus through this litigation, the petitioner sought parity in the maximum sum assured and premium charged from the employees with disabilities in comparison to the employees without disabilities. When the matter came up for hearing and notice was issued, Postal Life insurance realizing their follies, issued a notification during pendency of the petition raising the maximum insurance coverage for employees with disabilities to that of non-disabled employees i.e. up to Rs. 5 lakhs. However, they continued to charge extra premium from the employees with disabilities.

The petitioner argued that the extra premium charged was without any scientific justification. When the court sought explanation from PLIC, the Additional Solicitor General stated before the court that they do not discriminate on the basis of disability and there is no extra premium charged.

However, later Union of India turned turtle on their statement and justified the extra premium from the employees on the blanket ground of disabilities and argued that the Insurance Policy was a contract between the insurer and the insured. That in the insurance business a pool was created through contributions made by persons seeking to protect themselves from common risk. Premium was collected by insurance companies which also act as trustee to the pool. Any loss to the insured in case of happening of an uncertain event was paid out of this pool. It worked on the principle of risk sharing. Therefore, prejudice would be caused to the normal insured persons in case of any casualty of the disabled persons. As disabled persons are more prone to accidental risks as compared to normal persons and the amount which is to be paid to the family of the deceased would be paid out of the same pool.  Hence, it is justified to charge extra premium from the employees with disabilities. They also argued that extra premium payable by the disabled person is marginally different from the premium payable by normal persons. Further they justified the extra premium on the ground that the extent of handicap differs from one person to another and that they would continue to charge differential premium decided upon the health profile of the individual proponent.

The petitioner argued that the extra premium clause has no scientific base nor can be justified by any legal enactment or any empirical study. On the contrary, such a standalone stipulation for Persons with Disabilities in form of a special scheme in the Postal Life Insurance for Government employees was discriminatory, non-inclusive, unjust and violates principles of natural justice of equity and fairness and above all it ran against the mandate of the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 and the UN Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities that India is a proud signatory to. Further, it specifically violated Articles 3 and 25(e) of the UN Convention.

The petitioner accepted the rationale of PLI to the extent that any loss to the insured in case of happening of an uncertain event is paid out of this pool and that it worked on the Principle of risk sharing. However the petitioner strongly refuted that disabled persons are more prone to accidental risks as compared to normal persons. On the contrary, the petitioner argued, there was no empirical study or data to support or substantiate such a baseless, false and biased view which only reinforced the stereotypes about persons with disability and their proneness to accident.

Petitioner argued that the right to equality and non-discrimination were inalienable rights which couldn't be taken away by any contract and charging extra premium from employees with disabilities was a direct discrimination with them on the basis of disability which was in direct conflict with Article 2 of UNCRPD.

The petitioner also argued that the justification of health profile put forward by the respondents was faulty for they seem to treat disability as a negative health profile. It was stressed that living with disability was distinct from suffering from a life threatening disease, while the respondent seemed to consider both as synonymous. An employee with visual impairment or with hearing impairment or with neurological impairment also enjoyed good health like anybody else. Therefore, an employee living with a disability would not mean that he / she was suffering from a disease and prone to life risks or susceptible to die prematurely. Such a conclusion on the part of respondent was illogical, arbitrary, had no empirical base and without any understanding of disability, hence, such a conclusion was required to be struck down.

The judgement 

Hon’ble High court in the instant case agreed that charging extra premium from employees with disabilities was indeed a discrimination on the basis of disability and therefore through this remarkable judgement directed the postal life insurance to provide equal insurance coverage and not charge extra premium from the employees with disabilities.
  • Download the Vikas Gupta Vs. UOI judgement [PDF 381 KB]  
  • For copy of the interim notification raising the maximum insurance amount to Rs. 5 lakh, [word file


The Road Ahead


I see this judgment  as a milestone in the disability rights movement with far-reaching implications not only in India but also beyond India and especially in European countries where the Actuaries continue to discriminate against persons with disabilities by under-valuing their lives. However, India, its Courts and the persons with disabilities are very progressive on this front and the western countries can follow suit at least on this count.

This is just a beginning. We need a well devised future strategy  to dismantle the entire regime of discrimination that is prevailing in the insurance sector and the immediate challenges are:

(a) The insurance sector still discriminates on the basis of etiology of the disability i.e. causes of disability, whether it is from birth and after birth; neurological or physical and  then rates their lives accordingly,  which in my considered view has again no scientific base.

(b) The persons with neurological disabilities are still not allowed any insurance policy and needs to be challenged.

(c) PLI is an insurance scheme for the benefit of government employees hence, it will cover a very small section of persons with disabilities. Those who are outside the government jobs especially those in rural areas are far away from reaping the benefits of insurance. Though the judgement challenges the principles that have so far formed the basis for denying the  insurance to the disabled.

(d) The Actuaries who are in the business of assessing the life risks are not aware of the real challenges and the lives of the persons with disabilities and they continue to live in their own world and decide on their own whims, the risk calculation of the life of a person with disabilities. They need to be sensitized and made aware not only about the lives of persons with disabilities but also the rights regime that UNCRPD brings.

(e) The entire literature on insurance that I had to read while pursuing this case from outside, I found it reinforced the stereotypes about persons with disabilities and their proneness to accident! Hence, we need new literature for future actuaries to understand that Disability can not be treated always as a negative health profile and that living with disability was distinct from suffering from a life threatening disease.

(f) There is a need to raise awareness that a person with visual impairment or with hearing impairment or with neurological impairment also enjoys good health like anybody else.

(g) The rules of Insurance sector needs to be changed in light of this judgement and applied across the sector. All insurance  issuing companies - be it private or government have to factor in the principles of this judgement and make amends.

(h) The discrimination continues unabated in not just in `life insurance, sector but in health insurance and other insurance products on the offer. This needs to be addressed on priority.

(j) We need to take this awareness to the most marginalized persons with disabilities in rural areas through several means.  

I am sure we all are up for it and would take this to its logical end.

regards

Subhash Chandra Vashishth
Advocate-Disability Rights