Delhi High Court Backs CCPD Concerns on SBI Promotion Policy, Orders Fresh Consideration of Barriers Faced by Blind Officers and examine alternative promotion pathways stressing that disability cannot be a ground to deny career advancement.

Published by: Disability Rights India (DRI)

Category: Employment Rights | Banking Sector | Reasonable Accommodation

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia
Case No.: W.P.(C) 6027/2025
Case Title: Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association v. State Bank of India & Others
Date of Judgment: 29 May 2026 

Background

More than three years after the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) found SBI's promotion policy discriminatory towards blind employees, the Delhi High Court has directed the State Bank of India to formally revisit the issue and examine solutions to prevent career stagnation of officers with visual disabilities.

The litigation was initiated by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA), challenging SBI's promotion policy that requires officers aspiring for promotion to Senior Management Grades (Scale IV and V) to first serve as Branch Managers or in Credit, Trade Finance or Forex assignments.

The Association argued that these assignments involve functions that are presently inaccessible to visually impaired officers because of the absence of assistive technology, inaccessible documentation systems, physical inspection requirements and unresolved questions of legal liability.

A Battle That Started Before the CCPD

This litigation did not emerge overnight.

The controversy traces its origins to proceedings initiated before the Court of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (CCPD) in 2022 by the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA). The complaint challenged SBI's promotion policy on the ground that mandatory Branch Manager and Credit-related assignments effectively excluded blind officers from promotional opportunities because the duties associated with those roles were not accessible under existing systems and technologies.

After examining the issue, the CCPD accepted the core concerns raised by VIBEWA and held that the promotion criteria had the effect of disadvantaging visually impaired employees. The CCPD recommended that SBI modify its promotion policy, provide reasonable accommodation, recognise alternative assignments performed by blind officers and review exclusionary provisions that impeded career progression.

SBI, however, declined to implement the recommendations, resulting in the dispute eventually reaching the Delhi High Court.

Significantly, while the High Court stopped short of striking down the promotion policy, it accepted the legitimacy of the concerns underlying the CCPD proceedings. The Court noted that seemingly neutral promotion criteria can operate in a discriminatory manner against persons with disabilities and directed SBI's Board of Directors to reconsider the issue after examining detailed proposals to be submitted by VIBEWA.

Thus, nearly three-and-a-half years after the CCPD's intervention, the concerns first raised before the disability rights watchdog have now received judicial recognition from the Delhi High Court.

The Real Issue: Equal Criteria or Equal Opportunity?

The case raises a recurring question in disability rights jurisprudence: Does treating everyone identically always amount to equality?

SBI argued that the same promotion criteria apply to all officers and that several visually impaired officers are already performing the mandatory assignments.

VIBEWA, however, contended that equality cannot mean forcing blind officers to satisfy requirements that are designed around visual functions.

The Association pointed out that Branch Managers and Credit Officers are required to:

• Verify original title deeds and signatures;
• Conduct physical inspections of business premises and collateral properties;
• Monitor CCTV footage and strong rooms;
• Verify stocks and securities;
• Certify regulatory compliance carrying personal liability.

In the absence of accessible systems and clear accountability mechanisms, blind officers face barriers that their sighted counterparts do not. The result is not merely inconvenience—it is exclusion from promotion itself.

High Court Recognises the Principle of Indirect Discrimination

While the Court did not strike down SBI's policy, it accepted an important legal principle.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Leesamma Joseph and In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court recognised that a seemingly neutral rule can still operate in a discriminatory manner if it disproportionately disadvantages persons with disabilities.

The Court observed:

"Any provision that creates an impediment to the promotion of visually impaired officers would run contrary to the provisions of the RPwD Act."

This observation is significant because it shifts the focus from formal equality to substantive equality—the cornerstone of modern disability rights law.

Why the Court Did Not Strike Down the Policy

The Court ultimately refrained from invalidating the promotion criteria because it found that the Association had not placed before it sufficient details regarding specific officers adversely affected by the policy or concrete proposals capable of addressing SBI's operational concerns.

However, instead of rejecting the claim, the Court adopted a solution-oriented approach.

It directed VIBEWA to submit a comprehensive representation identifying affected officers, detailing the barriers they face, and proposing alternative pathways, accommodations and best practices adopted by other public sector banks. SBI's Board of Directors has been directed to examine these proposals and consider implementing feasible measures consistent with the RPwD Act.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment is important for reasons extending far beyond SBI.

First, it represents judicial recognition that career stagnation can itself amount to disability discrimination.

Second, it reinforces the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence that indirect discrimination is as harmful as explicit exclusion.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, it breathes fresh life into the CCPD's 2022 findings, which SBI had effectively ignored for over three years.

The Court has not given SBI a clean chit. Instead, it has required the country's largest public sector bank to engage with the concerns raised by blind employees, revisit the CCPD's recommendations, and seriously examine whether alternative pathways and reasonable accommodations can be devised.

For thousands of employees with disabilities working in the banking sector, the judgment sends a clear message: promotion policies cannot be insulated from scrutiny merely because they are framed in neutral language. If a rule creates barriers that prevent persons with disabilities from progressing in their careers, institutions must justify those barriers and actively seek solutions.

The next chapter of this battle will now unfold before SBI's Board of Directors.

Editor's Disclosure: The author of this blog post, Advocate Subhash Chandra Vashishth, represented the Visually Impaired Bank Employees Welfare Association (VIBEWA) in the proceedings before the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities that culminated in the CCPD's recommendations discussed in this article. The CCPD recommendations were covered in our blog post titled "Court of CCPD holds the SBI's Promotion Policy to grades of SMGS IV and SMGS V (2022-23) as discriminatory to employees with visual disabilities, recommends review" dated 01 Dec 2022.

Read the High Court Judgement  in VIBEWA Vs. SBI & Others

Disability Developed After 14 Years of Army Service Cannot Be Denied Attributability Without Adequate Reasoning: J&K and Ladakh High Court Upholds Disability Pension

Court: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh

Bench: Justice Sindhu Sharma and Justice Shahzad Azeem

Case Title: Union of India & Others v. Ex Naik Roshan Lal
Case No.: WP(C) No. 1885/2023 (before the J&K and Ladakh High Court challenging the AFT order)
Neutral Citation: 2026:JKLHC-JMU:1651
Decided on: 29 May 2026

Background

The present case arose from a challenge by the Union of India to an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) granting disability pension to Ex Naik Roshan Lal, a former Army personnel who had developed a disability during the course of his military service.

Roshan Lal had served in the Indian Army for approximately fourteen years before being invalided out of service on account of a medical condition. Upon his discharge, the competent authorities denied disability pension on the ground that the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service.

Aggrieved by the denial, the respondent approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, which held that the disability pension claim had been wrongly rejected and directed the authorities to grant disability benefits. The Union of India challenged the Tribunal's order before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.

Issues Before the Court

The High Court was called upon to determine:

1. Whether the disability suffered by the respondent could be denied attribution to military service despite having manifested after fourteen years of active service.
2. Whether the Release Medical Board had provided sufficient reasons to conclude that the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service.
3. Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal was justified in directing the grant of disability pension to the respondent.
4. Whether the rejection of disability pension complied with the principles governing entitlement under military pension regulations and judicial precedents.

Key Observations of the Court

The Court emphasized that when a disability develops after a long period of military service, the authorities cannot mechanically deny attributability without furnishing cogent and convincing reasons.

The Bench noted that the respondent had rendered approximately fourteen years of service before the onset of the medical condition. The record did not disclose any adequate reasoning demonstrating why the disability was completely unrelated to military service.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that members of the Armed Forces are presumed to be in sound physical and mental condition at the time of their enrolment unless a contrary medical condition is recorded. Therefore, where a disability manifests during service, the burden lies on the authorities to establish, through clear medical evidence and reasoning, that the condition was neither attributable to nor aggravated by service.

The High Court found that the Medical Board's conclusions were unsupported by sufficient analysis and failed to explain how the disability was entirely disconnected from the respondent's prolonged military service.

The Bench observed that a mere assertion that a disease is not attributable to service cannot substitute a reasoned determination, particularly when such a finding deprives a serviceman of valuable pensionary benefits.

Directions Issued by the Court

The High Court upheld the order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the Union of India was dismissed. The Court affirmed the respondent's entitlement to disability pension and declined to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal. As a consequence, the directions issued by the Armed Forces Tribunal for grant of disability benefits remained operative.

Significance of the Judgment

This judgment carries considerable significance for disability rights within the armed forces and for the jurisprudence governing disability pensions.

• First, it reinforces the principle that military personnel who develop disabilities during service cannot be deprived of pensionary benefits through unreasoned or mechanical findings of Medical Boards.
• Second, the judgment strengthens the presumption in favour of servicemen whose disabilities arise after years of active duty. It recognizes the unique physical and psychological demands of military service and places an obligation upon authorities to justify any denial of attributability with substantial evidence.
• Third, the decision underscores the importance of reasoned administrative decision-making. Medical Boards and pension authorities must provide clear and rational explanations rather than relying upon conclusory observations.
• Finally, the ruling aligns with the broader constitutional values of fairness, dignity, and social security for individuals who have served the nation in uniform.

Commentary

The judgment is a welcome reaffirmation of the protective framework developed by constitutional courts and the Armed Forces Tribunal in matters concerning disability pensions.

Over the years, courts have consistently recognized that disability pension is not merely a financial benefit but a measure of social justice for personnel who suffer health impairments during military service. The denial of such benefits often has severe consequences for veterans and their families.

The High Court's insistence on reasoned medical findings serves as an important safeguard against arbitrary administrative action. The ruling sends a clear message that disability pension claims cannot be rejected on the basis of vague or unsupported conclusions, particularly where the disability emerges after prolonged service.

The decision also reflects a humane and purposive interpretation of pension regulations. Rather than adopting a narrow technical approach, the Court focused on the realities of military service and the obligation of the State to protect the welfare of former servicemen.

From a disability rights perspective, the judgment advances the principle that individuals who acquire disabilities during service must receive fair treatment and meaningful access to statutory benefits. It contributes to a growing body of jurisprudence emphasizing accountability, transparency, and reasoned decision-making in disability-related adjudication.

Read the Judgement

Schizophrenia Presumed Attributable to Military Service Unless Proven Otherwise: Kerala High Court Upholds Disability Pension for Army Veteran

Court: High Court of Kerala
Bench: Justice K. Natarajan and Justice Johnson John
Case Title: Union of India v. Valsala S.
Case No.: W.P.(C) No. 48547 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:36398
Decided on: 26 May 2026

Background

In an important judgment reaffirming the rights of armed forces personnel suffering from mental illness, the Kerala High Court has held that disability pension cannot be denied merely because the Release Medical Board labels schizophrenia as "constitutional in origin" without furnishing any reasons. The Court dismissed the Union of India's challenge to an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal granting disability pension to an Army personnel who had been invalided out of service on account of schizophrenia.

The case was pursued by Valsala S., widow of late Sepoy Sreekandan Nair, who was recruited into the Indian Army on 7 August 1973. He was invalided out of service on 15 July 1979 after being diagnosed with Schizophrenia, with the Release Medical Board assessing his disability at 60% for two years. His claim for disability pension was rejected on the ground that the disease was "constitutional in origin" and neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. His statutory appeal also failed, and he passed away in 1994.

Years later, his widow approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. The Tribunal found that the Medical Board had offered no reasons whatsoever for concluding that the disease was constitutional in origin and consequently granted disability pension. Challenging that decision, the Union of India approached the Kerala High Court.

Issues Before the Court

The High Court considered the following questions:

• Whether disability pension can be denied solely on the basis of an unreasoned opinion of the Release Medical Board.
• Whether statutory presumptions under the Entitlement Rules and Armed Forces Medical Regulations operate in favour of personnel invalided out with schizophrenia.
• Whether courts can interfere where the Medical Board's opinion lacks reasons.
• Whether delay in approaching the Tribunal should defeat the claim of a person suffering from schizophrenia.

Key Findings

1. Presumption Favours the Soldier

The Court reiterated that under the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 and Regulation 423(c) of the Regulations for Medical Services for Armed Forces, 1983, where no note regarding any disease is recorded at the time of enrolment, a disease leading to invalidment is ordinarily presumed to have arisen during military service.

The burden, therefore, lies squarely upon the authorities to rebut that presumption with cogent medical evidence.

2. A Mere Medical Opinion Without Reasons Cannot Defeat Pension Rights

The central reason for dismissing the writ petition was that the Release Medical Board merely recorded that schizophrenia was "constitutional in origin" without explaining how it reached that conclusion.

The High Court held that an unreasoned medical opinion cannot form the basis for denying a valuable statutory benefit such as disability pension.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, the Court observed that where the Medical Board's opinion is devoid of reasons, the consequential administrative decision denying disability pension becomes legally unsustainable.

3. Schizophrenia Requires a Sensitive Judicial Approach

The Court extensively referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Veer Pal Singh v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence, which recognises schizophrenia as a chronic, severe and disabling mental illness affecting cognition, behaviour, perception and the ability to function independently.

The judgment also relied upon the Supreme Court's observations in Rajumon T.M., noting that courts must remain conscious of the debilitating effects of schizophrenia, which often impair an individual's ability to pursue legal remedies or effectively represent his own case. Consequently, delay in approaching judicial forums cannot be viewed in the same manner as ordinary civil litigation.

4. Disability Pension Is Beneficial Legislation

The Bench reaffirmed that provisions relating to disability pension constitute beneficial social welfare legislation and therefore deserve liberal interpretation.

Where two interpretations are possible, courts must adopt the one that advances the object of protecting disabled servicemen rather than defeating their claims on technical grounds.

5. High Courts Can Correct Jurisdictional Errors

Rejecting the Union's contention that the High Court should not interfere with findings of the Armed Forces Tribunal, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass to reiterate that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 remains available where there is a jurisdictional error, denial of fundamental rights or an error apparent on the face of the record.

Decision

The Kerala High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Union of India and upheld the Armed Forces Tribunal's order granting disability pension.

The Court found no error in the Tribunal's conclusion that the Medical Board's unexplained opinion could not displace the statutory presumption that the disease arose during military service.

Why This Judgment Matters

(a) Reinforces the Presumption in Favour of Disabled Servicemen

The decision strengthens the long-established principle that where no disability is recorded at the time of recruitment, diseases leading to invalidment are presumed to have arisen during service unless the Government proves otherwise through reasoned medical evidence.

(b) Advances Mental Health Jurisprudence

The judgment is significant because it recognises the unique nature of schizophrenia and acknowledges that persons suffering from severe mental illness may face substantial barriers in pursuing legal remedies. This represents a welcome move towards a disability-sensitive approach in pension adjudication.

(c) Insists on Reasoned Medical Decision-Making

The ruling makes it clear that Medical Boards cannot deny statutory benefits through conclusory observations. A mere statement that a disease is "constitutional in origin" is insufficient unless supported by scientific reasoning and evidence.

(d) Strengthens Social Security Rights

Disability pension is not an act of governmental generosity but a statutory entitlement forming part of the social security framework available to armed forces personnel invalided out of service.

DRI Commentary

This judgment is another important step in the Supreme Court-led evolution of disability pension jurisprudence relating to mental illness. The Kerala High Court has correctly recognised that statutory presumptions cannot be displaced by unexplained medical conclusions.

Equally significant is the Court's appreciation of schizophrenia as a serious psychosocial disability. Persons living with schizophrenia frequently experience cognitive impairment, difficulty in decision-making, diminished insight and prolonged dependence on caregivers. These realities make it inappropriate to judge delays in asserting legal rights through the conventional lens of limitation.

The judgment also reinforces an essential administrative law principle: reasons are the heartbeat of every decision affecting rights. Where the State seeks to deny disability pension, particularly to personnel invalided out on account of mental illness, it must provide clear, evidence-based reasons. A bare assertion that a disease is constitutional in origin cannot satisfy the standards of fairness required under law.

For disability rights advocates, the decision is significant beyond military pension law. It affirms that mental disabilities deserve the same evidentiary fairness, statutory protection and rights-based interpretation as physical disabilities. It also reiterates that beneficial legislation intended to secure social protection must be interpreted liberally in favour of persons with disabilities rather than narrowly to defeat legitimate claims.

The ruling is likely to strengthen future challenges where disability pension has been denied solely on the basis of unreasoned opinions of Medical Boards, particularly in cases involving mental illnesses such as schizophrenia.

Read the Judgement 

Supreme Court Clarifies RPwD Act: Persons Forcibly Made to Ingest Acid Also Entitled to Recognition as Acid Attack Victims [Judgement included]

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Case No.: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1112 of 2025

Case Title: Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

Date of Order: 04 May 2026

In an important and expansive interpretation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”), the Supreme Court has ruled that persons who are forcibly made to ingest acid must also be treated as “acid attack victims” under the law, even if they do not suffer visible external disfigurement.

The order significantly broadens the protection available to survivors of acid violence by recognizing that acid attacks are not confined to incidents involving acid being thrown on a victim’s body. The Court also clarified that persons suffering internal injuries caused by acid ingestion are equally entitled to the protections and statutory benefits available under the RPwD Act.

Background

The matter arose in ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the rights, rehabilitation, and protection of acid attack survivors. During the hearing, senior advocate and Amicus Curiae Mukul Rohatgi pointed out a significant gap in the statutory framework.

Under the Schedule to the RPwD Act, “acid attack victims” are recognized as persons with specified disabilities. However, the definition referred to persons disfigured due to violent assaults involving the “throwing of acid or similar corrosive substances.” This wording unintentionally excluded victims who were forced to ingest acid or suffered internal injuries without visible external disfigurement.

The Court noted that both Section 326B of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code and Section 124(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 expressly recognize not only the throwing of acid but also the administration of acid by other means as a criminal offence.

Supreme Court’s Observations

The Bench observed that the present wording of the RPwD Act created an artificial distinction between categories of acid attack survivors. The Court specifically noted:

“A plain reading of the above indicates that victims to whom acid has been administered are not encompassed within the expression ‘acid attack victims’.”

The Court further acknowledged that the law’s current emphasis on “disfigurement” improperly restricted the scope of protection:

“Further, the use of the term ‘disfigured’ appears to confine the scope to external disfigurement of the body, thereby excluding cases involving internal injuries or scarring caused by the administration of acid.”

Recognizing the serious implications of such exclusion, the Court adopted a purposive and rights-oriented interpretation of the RPwD Act.

Key Directions Issued by the Court

Pending a formal amendment to the Schedule of the RPwD Act, the Supreme Court directed that:

“for all intents and purposes, and in order to give full effect to the legislative scheme underlying the 2016 Act, the expression ‘acid attack victims’ shall be construed to include victims to whom acid has been administered.”

The Court went further and clarified that the protection would also extend to survivors suffering internal injuries:

“It shall further include those who have suffered internal injuries, irrespective of whether there is any external disfigurement of the body.”

Importantly, the Bench declared that this interpretation would operate retrospectively from the inception of the RPwD Act:

“This clarificatory interpretation shall be deemed to have been incorporated at Serial No. 1A(e) of the Schedule from the inception of the 2016 Act.”

The Court also recorded the submission of the Solicitor General that the concerned Ministry had already initiated steps to formally amend the Schedule to the Act.

Significance of the Judgment

This order is a major step toward a more inclusive and realistic understanding of acid violence under Indian disability law. By recognizing survivors of forced acid ingestion and those with internal injuries, the Supreme Court has ensured that the RPwD Act is interpreted in line with its social welfare and human rights objectives.

The judgment also reinforces an important principle in disability jurisprudence: disability rights protections cannot be denied merely because an injury is not externally visible. Internal injuries, chronic pain, organ damage, and long-term medical consequences can be equally disabling and deserving of legal recognition and support.

The ruling is likely to have a substantial impact on access to disability certificates, reservations, rehabilitation schemes, healthcare benefits, compensation, and social protection measures available to acid attack survivors under the RPwD Act and allied welfare schemes.

At a broader level, the decision reflects the Supreme Court’s continuing move toward purposive interpretation of disability legislation so that statutory benefits are not defeated by narrow or technical readings of definitions. However, we still see that the definition "Acid Attack Victim" It doesn't yet cover the Thermal Burn victims due to throwing of kerosene or petrol or a similar material.

Read the Order/Judgement in Shaheen Malik v. Union of India & Anr.