Spouse Appointed Guardian of Comatose Husband: Delhi High Court Invokes Parens Patriae Jurisdiction Amid Legal Vacuum

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justice Sachin Datta
Case No.: W.P.(C) 16793/2025
Case Title: Professor Alka Acharya v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 31.12.2025

In a significant ruling addressing the continuing legal vacuum surrounding guardianship of persons in a comatose or vegetative state, the Delhi High Court appointed a wife as the legal guardian of her husband, who was rendered incapacitated following a severe intracranial haemorrhage.

Background

The petitioner, Professor Alka Acharya, approached the Court seeking appointment as the legal guardian of her husband, Mr. Salam Khan, who has been in a persistent vegetative state since February 2025. Following emergency neurosurgery and prolonged hospitalization, Mr. Khan remained unconscious, requiring continuous medical support including tracheostomy and assisted feeding.

With no statutory mechanism available for appointing a guardian in such situations, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under the doctrine of parens patriae to manage her husband’s medical care and financial affairs.

Medical and Administrative Findings

Pursuant to the Court’s directions:

• A Medical Board from Govind Ballabh Pant Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education and Research (GIPMER) examined Mr. Khan and confirmed:

  • Persistent vegetative state
  • 100% disability
  • Inability to take any decisions or perform daily activities

• The Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) conducted a detailed inquiry and verified:

  • The marital relationship and legal heirship
  • Absence of any dispute or conflict of interest
  • Financial stability and proper caregiving by the petitioner
  • Authenticity of disclosed movable and immovable assets

Importantly, the couple’s children also gave their no-objection to the appointment.

Key Legal Issue

The case once again highlighted a critical gap in Indian law: there is no clear statutory framework governing appointment of guardians for individuals in a comatose or vegetative state.

The Court relied on its earlier precedent in N.A. v. GNCTD and other High Court rulings, which recognize that:

• Neither the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 nor the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 adequately address such situations
• Constitutional Courts retain inherent powers under Article 226 to step in and protect such individuals
• The doctrine of parens patriae empowers courts to act in the best interests and welfare of incapacitated persons

Court’s Observations

The Court reiterated that:

• Persons in vegetative states fall outside conventional statutory categories such as “persons with disabilities” or “persons with mental illness” for the purpose of guardianship frameworks
• This creates a “clear statutory vacuum”, necessitating judicial intervention
• Courts must adopt a case-by-case approach, guided by medical evidence, family structure, and absence of conflict

Directions Issued

Allowing the petition, the Court:

1. Appointed Professor Alka Acharya as the legal guardian of her husband
2. Permitted her to manage and deal with both movable and immovable assets of Mr. Khan to meet his medical and living expenses
3. Granted her authority over: Medical decisions and caregiving; Financial management and daily expenditures; Operation of bank accounts, investments, and insurance

Significance

This judgment reinforces an evolving but crucial line of jurisprudence where High Courts step in to fill legislative gaps affecting some of the most vulnerable individuals. Key takeaways include:

• Recognition of legal vacuum: Existing disability and mental health laws do not cover guardianship for comatose persons
• Expanded role of constitutional courts: Courts continue to invoke parens patriae jurisdiction to ensure protection and dignity
• Preference for close relatives: Spouses and immediate family members are ordinarily preferred as guardians
• Need for legislative reform: The case underscores the urgent need for a structured statutory framework governing such situations

Comment

While the judgment provides immediate relief and practical clarity in individual cases, it also highlights a systemic issue. Despite progressive legislation like the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, certain categories of persons—especially those in prolonged unconscious states—remain outside formal legal protection mechanisms.

Until Parliament addresses this gap, courts will continue to play a vital, albeit ad hoc, role in safeguarding the rights, dignity, and welfare of such individuals.

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Acquired Disability Not a Ground to Push Employees Out of Service: P&H High Court

Court: Punjab & Haryana High Court
Bench: Justice Sandeep Moudgil
Case No.: CWP-31286-2024
Case Title: Brij Bhushan v. State of Haryana & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 19 December 2025
Cases Referred: Kunal Singh v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 524; Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (2025)

In a significant reaffirmation of the rights of employees acquiring disability during service, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that denying service protection on account of disability strikes at the very foundation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The Court emphasised that such an approach not only violates statutory protections but also erodes human dignity.

Background

The petitioner, a long-serving employee of Haryana Roadways, was initially appointed in 1986 and later promoted as a Painter. During his service, he suffered a brain haemorrhage and was assessed with 70% disability by a competent medical authority, rendering him unable to perform his original duties.

Invoking Section 20 of the RPwD Act, he sought retention in service on a supernumerary or suitable alternative post with full service benefits until superannuation. Despite a legal notice and earlier directions, the authorities rejected his claim on the ground that his disability was not “permanent” and further initiated disciplinary proceedings alleging unauthorised absence.

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court challenging both the rejection order and the charge-sheet.

Key Issues

• Whether an employee acquiring disability during service can be denied protection due to absence of a “permanent” disability certificate

• Scope and application of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016

• Legality of disciplinary action in the context of disability-related absence

Court’s Analysis

The Court rejected the State’s narrow interpretation of disability certification. It held that the petitioner clearly fell within the statutory definition of a “person with disability,” given the extent of functional limitations affecting his ability to work and perform daily activities.

Importantly, the Court noted that the disability certificate—valid up to 2029—covered the remaining period of the petitioner’s service, making the distinction between “temporary” and “permanent” disability irrelevant in the facts of the case.

Reiterating the mandate of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, the Court underscored that:

• An employee acquiring disability cannot be removed, reduced in rank, or denied promotion

• If unable to perform existing duties, the employee must be shifted to a suitable post

• Where no such post exists, the employee must be retained on a supernumerary post with full benefits

The Court also drew upon Supreme Court jurisprudence to reinforce that reasonable accommodation is not discretionary but a legal obligation flowing from constitutional principles of equality and dignity.

Observations on State as a Model Employer

In a strongly worded observation, the Court held that public authorities must act with sensitivity and responsibility when dealing with employees who acquire disabilities during service. It cautioned against bureaucratic rigidity and emphasised that institutional responses must prioritise inclusion over exclusion.

The judgment highlights that beneficial legislation like the RPwD Act must be interpreted purposively, ensuring that employees are not pushed out of service due to circumstances beyond their control.

Decision

Allowing the petition, the Court:

• Quashed the rejection order and the charge-sheet

• Directed the State to retain the petitioner on a supernumerary or suitable post

• Ensured continuity of service, full salary, and all consequential benefits

• Ordered payment of arrears with interest

• Directed that the period of absence due to disability be treated as duty

Commentary

This judgment is a crucial addition to the growing body of jurisprudence reinforcing employment security for persons who acquire disabilities during service. It decisively rejects technical objections—such as the nature of disability certification—that are often used to deny statutory protections.

The ruling aligns with earlier Supreme Court precedents and strengthens the principle that reasonable accommodation and service continuity are enforceable rights, not administrative concessions.

For disability rights practitioners, the judgment is particularly important in addressing a recurring issue: the misuse of procedural or certification-based grounds to dilute the protections under Section 20 of the RPwD Act.

At a broader level, the decision reiterates that the State’s role as a model employer must be measured not by formal compliance, but by its commitment to dignity, inclusion, and substantive equality.

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HIV-Positive Persons Fall Within the Definition of Persons with Disabilities: A Landmark Ruling by Delhi HC

Court: Delhi High Court
Bench / Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla
Case No.: W.P.(C) 3616/2021
Case Title: [Name withheld] v. Union of India & Ors. (BSF)
Date of Judgment: 16 December 2025
Relevant Statutes:

• Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016
• HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017

Brief

In a significant and precedent-setting judgment, the Delhi High Court has categorically held that an HIV-positive person can fall within the definition of a “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). This ruling marks what is arguably the first direct judicial equation of HIV-positive status with disability under the RPwD framework.

The case arose from the discharge of a Border Security Force (BSF) constable, who was removed from service in April 2019 after being diagnosed as HIV-positive. The constable had contracted HIV in 2017 and was undergoing antiretroviral therapy (ART). Despite treatment and recovery from associated ailments, including abdominal tuberculosis, he was issued a show-cause notice in November 2018 and subsequently discharged on the ground of being “physically unfit”. His departmental appeal was rejected in October 2020, compelling him to approach the Delhi High Court.

Key Findings of the Court

The Division Bench held that the petitioner’s discharge was unlawful under both the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017 and the RPwD Act, 2016.

1. HIV as a Disability under the RPwD Act
   The Court held that an HIV-positive employee suffering from a long-term physical impairment that hinders full and effective participation in society would fall within the ambit of “person with disability” under Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act. Consequently, the statutory protections under Section 20 of the RPwD Act—particularly the prohibition on dispensing with the services of an employee who acquires a disability during service—were squarely attracted.

2. Non-Discrimination in Employment
   Drawing a clear parallel between the RPwD Act and the HIV Act, the Court reiterated that both statutes prohibit discrimination in matters of employment. Section 20(2) of the RPwD Act mandates reasonable accommodation, while Section 20(4) specifically bars termination of service on the ground of disability acquired during employment.

3. Violation of the HIV Act, 2017
   The Court relied heavily on Section 3 of the HIV Act, which imposes an absolute bar on terminating employment solely on the ground of HIV-positive status. The only exception—contained in Section 3(a)—requires a written assessment by an independent and qualified healthcare provider certifying that the employee is unfit to perform duties and poses a significant risk of transmission.

   The BSF, the Court noted, made no attempt whatsoever to comply with this mandatory requirement. In the absence of such an assessment, the presumption must be that the employee posed no significant risk and was fit for duty.

4. Reinstatement with Continuity of Service
   Setting aside both the discharge order (2019) and the appellate order (2020), the Court directed reinstatement of the petitioner with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, including pay fixation. However, back wages were expressly denied.

5. Reasonable Accommodation and Alternate Employment
   Importantly, the Court clarified that if the petitioner could not perform duties attached to the post of constable due to medical reasons, the BSF was duty-bound to provide reasonable accommodation. This includes offering alternate employment in an equivalent post, or if such a post is unavailable, placement in a supernumerary or equivalent position.

Broader Significance

This judgment is a watershed moment in Indian disability rights jurisprudence. For the first time, a constitutional court has explicitly recognised that HIV-positive persons may qualify as persons with disabilities under the RPwD Act, thereby extending to them the full spectrum of statutory protections relating to non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and security of tenure.

The ruling also reinforces the legislative intent of the HIV Act, 2017, which seeks to dismantle stigma-driven employment practices rooted in fear rather than medical evidence. Together, the two statutes are interpreted as complementary rights-based frameworks, not siloed protections.

For uniformed services and other government establishments, the decision sends a clear message: HIV status, by itself, cannot be a ground for termination. Any departure from this principle must strictly comply with statutory safeguards, medical evidence, and the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation.

From a disability rights perspective, the judgment deepens the understanding of “disability” as a lived, functional, and rights-oriented concept—rather than a narrow medical label—bringing Indian jurisprudence closer to the spirit of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

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